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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis investigates three empirical issues in the field of bank credit rating in an 
international setting. First, it models the financial and non-financial determinants of 
bank credit ratings. Second, it examines the impact of news announcements concerning 
bank credit rating changes, that is, upgrades and downgrades, on the performance of 
bank stock. Lastly, the thesis examines the trends in bank credit rating over time by 
focusing on rating migration within the historical pattern of both ratings and rating 
changes. 
The thesis reveals that the assignment of credit ratings to international banks is driven 
heavily by the Capital Adequacy, Assets Quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity and 
Sensitivity to the Market (CAMELS). The inclusion of non-financial variables, such as 
the too-big-to-fail and bank’s corporate governance measures, adds to the explanatory 
power of the rating determinant models. In addition, the thesis reveals that there is 
asymmetry in the reaction of the market to rating actions. It finds significant positive 
market reactions to subsamples of bank upgrades. Downgrades generally elicit 
significant negative market reactions. Finally, the results provide evidence of downward 
momentum in the rating migration of banks over time and the importance of duration in 
a rating notch on the likelihood of a bank migrating to another state. Generally, the 
longer a rated bank stays in a particular rating notch, the lower its probability of 
transiting to another rating notch. 
1 
 
 INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 1.
 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis investigates three empirical issues in the field of bank credit ratings in an 
international setting. First, it models the financial and non-financial determinants of 
bank credit ratings. The thesis presents a number of different specifications of the 
ordered probit model in the estimation of the bank rating determinant equation. The 
models aim to accurately predict the assignment of credit ratings to banks. It employs an 
out-of-sample approach in the test of prediction accuracy of credit rating agencies. This 
thesis is motivated by the intense spotlight on the credit rating agencies, particularly 
following the global financial crisis of 2007/08. The need to critically examine the 
credit rating industry and the accuracy of the ratings they assign warrant further 
investigation. In addition, the various regulatory changes concerning the global banking 
industry, particularly as it concerns structural reforms of banks, banking regulation and 
risk culture serve as important motives for this study.  
Second, the thesis examines the impact of news announcements concerning bank credit 
rating changes, that is, upgrades and downgrades, on the performance of bank stocks. 
The aim of this event study analysis is to gauge the market reaction to bank rating 
changes. The premise for this is the claim by credit rating agencies that they possess 
private information not available to market. If this is the case, then the event study 
models should reveal significant abnormal returns around the time of news 
announcements. Finally, the thesis examines trends in bank credit ratings over time. 
This enables an investigation of bank credit rating dynamics, focusing on rating 
migration within the historical pattern of both ratings and ratings changes. The thesis 
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tests for the effects of rating duration and drift (momentum) on bank credit rating 
migration. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 presents a brief 
overview of the background of, and motivation for, the study. Section 1.3 states the 
research questions and objectives that the thesis aims to address. Section 1.4 discusses 
the expected important contributions of the thesis. Section 1.5 presents the findings of 
the thesis. Finally, the summary of the chapter is presented in Section 1.6. 
1.2 Overview and motivation 
According to the US Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC (2003) in its report on 
the role and function of credit rating agencies in the operation of the securities market, 
‘a credit rating reflects a rating agency’s opinion, as of a particular date, of the credit 
worthiness of a particular company, security or obligations’ (p. 5). Parker and Tarashev 
(2011) argue that rating reflects both quantitative assessments of credit risk (using 
models) and the expert opinion of a ratings committee. The external credit rating 
agencies such as Fitch, Moody’s, and Standard and Poor’s perform a major role in 
financial markets by bridging the information gap and providing valuable input to the 
assessment of credit risks of entities and their issues (Taylor 2013). Credit ratings are 
thus, an invaluable tool for investors when it comes to making decisions about 
transactions in bonds and other fixed income investments (Langohr and Langohr, 2008). 
However, credit rating agencies maintain that their ratings are only opinions on relative 
credit risk and therefore do not constitute investment advice in the same manner as buy, 
hold, or sell recommendations (Dodd-Frank Act, 2010). Thus, while forward-looking 
opinion is important to investors in their decision making processes, an investment 
grade rating does not guarantee that an investment will not default, nor is it a guarantee 
the future credit quality or credit risk if such rated entity or issue. 
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This thesis examines bank credit ratings within an international setting due to the unique 
features of the banking industry. Banks are generally considered as being opaque and 
difficult to assess due to the complexity of their structure, business models and the 
nature of their assets. The major credit rating agencies argue that the assessments of 
bank creditworthiness go beyond analysing and forecasting banks’ performance. They 
maintain that there is need to account for the degree of external support, as well as an 
assessment of the degree of systemic risk and the inherent volatility of banks’ 
performance (Fitch 2007). Banks are important in financial stability and their role as 
financial intermediaries and interconnectedness exerts considerable influence on the 
degree of external assistance they receive.  
The findings from this thesis highlight the importance of the concept too “too-big-to-
fail” (TBTF), or what the Financial Stability Board (FSB) in their 2013 report refers to 
as Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs), in the bank credit rating 
process. The TBTF problem arises when the threatened failure of an SIFI leaves 
national governments with no option but to bail it out using public funds to avoid 
financial instability and economic damage. The knowledge that this can happen 
encourages SIFIs to take excessive risks. According to the FSB (2013), SIFIs are 
institutions of such size, market importance and interconnectedness that their distress or 
failure would cause significant dislocation in the financial system and adverse economic 
consequence. Thus, in rating banks, a rating agency has to evaluate not only the ability 
of the parent or sovereign to honour this commitment but also their willingness to do so. 
This confers special treatment to banks in the assignment of their ratings. In addition, 
evidence exists to support the notion that the too-big-to-fail notion confers funding 
advantage to large financial institutions, particularly in the period before the enactment 
of the Dodd-Frank Act 2010 (Labonte, 2015). Part of the motive for this thesis is 
therefore linked to the argument that the decision by the major credit rating agencies to 
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rate the largest financial firms more highly because of the additional government 
support they receive. This too-big-to-fail ‘subsidy’ may take the form of explicit direct 
payment, financial support, or guarantee (Cull, 2014).  
The global financial crisis which resulted in global panic and economic slowdowns or 
severe recessions in many countries across the world reinforced the importance of 
external supports in times of crisis. The period witnessed the collapse of the subprime 
mortgage market in the US, and revealed the huge exposure of international banks to the 
securitization market. The failure or risk of failure of major global financial institutions 
such as Lehman Brothers and Washington Mutual, the takeover of the investment giant 
Bear Sterns, the nationalization of Northern Rock (now owned by Virgin Money), 
Lloyds TSB and the Royal Bank of Scotland, coupled with rescue packages of national 
governments across the world underscore the importance of a sound credit risk 
management system and the need for a holistic approach to bank risk assessments. 
Bank’s rating is thus important because the creditworthiness of a bank depends on 
vulnerabilities that may build up in different parts of the financial system, as well as on 
interlinkages in this system. A bank’s rating thus reflects the industrial, financial and 
economic context of the bank’s business and not derived in isolation.  
The role of credit rating agencies in the 2007/08 financial crisis has come under severe 
scrutiny, due to their claim ab initio of assigning true creditworthiness in the form of 
rating notches to financial institutions and their instruments. The over reliance of the 
market, and in particular of traders, investors and regulators, on external credit ratings 
contributed to the laxity and the herd behaviour of many of these market participants. 
This further aggravated the ineffective credit risk management system which 
characterised the industry. There has been significant criticism of the credit rating 
agencies, particularly with regards to their methodologies. The level of opacity in the 
rating methodology, particularly in the period leading up to the global financial crisis, 
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has motivated international regulators such as the International Organisation of 
Securities, IOSCO (in Europe) and the SEC (in the US) to scrutinize, and recommend 
the changes in the credit rating methodologies and the level of disclosure within the 
industry. As a consequence, there is now increased demand for transparency in the 
rating process. The opacity of the rating methodology, as well as its perception as a 
‘black-box’ approach, by market participants (Pender, 1992; Steeman, 2002), has 
attracted academics and researchers to explore the models, inputs and motivations 
underlying the rating methodology.  
Overall, the motivation for this thesis relates to the implications of the 2007/08 financial 
crisis on the banking and credit ratings industries as well as the regulators and market 
participants. Some of the salient lessons from global financial crisis, the systemic nature 
of bank risk, weakened finances of some sovereign providers of support, and policy 
initiatives to reduce the over-reliance of banks on government support motivates this 
study. An empirical examination of the dynamics of the credit rating process has great 
policy implications because ratings that reflect changes to regulatory and support 
frameworks and accurately capture banks’ vulnerabilities would help strengthen market 
discipline and align risk with funding costs. Further, the more transparent a rating is, the 
better it is at conveying explicit assessments of the external support available to banks 
(Packer and Tarashev, 2011). 
In view of these motivations, and the growing interest in credit ratings, particularly from 
an academic stand point, including rating determinants and the influence of rating 
agencies on financial markets, this study aims to address three research questions. These 
are presented briefly in the next section. 
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1.3 Research questions and the objectives of the thesis 
This thesis attempts to investigate three key areas of bank credit ratings: (i) the 
determinants of bank credit ratings; (ii) bank stock return reactions to bank credit rating 
news announcements; and (iii) bank credit rating dynamics through time. The thesis 
employs international bank data relating to stock prices and returns, credit ratings, 
market index data, as well as non-financial information relating to each bank. The thesis 
seeks to address the following questions: 
1. What are the determinants of credit ratings for banks across the globe? 
The 2007/08 global financial crisis raises questions around the reliability of the 
credit ratings process. The assignment of credit ratings to banks is designed to 
capture their creditworthiness. This follows detailed evaluation of a wide range of 
factors, both financial and non-financial. This research question is motivated by 
the seeming failure of the credit rating agencies to accurately capture the credit 
risk of banks within their rating assignment process. The global financial crisis 
has further brought to the fore investors’ limited understanding of the 
complexities of ratings and the underlying risks that the ratings of these 
instruments and entities entail. Thus, leading to an undue reliance placed on 
ratings by investors for their investment decisions. It is therefore imperative to 
examine the significant factors driving this bank credit rating process by 
modelling a number of different specifications of the ordered probit equation.  
The series of regulatory reforms and directives on CRAs after the global financial 
crisis, particularly in the EU and the US are expected to change the behaviour of 
the agencies. The key reform actions globally have centred around the overtly 
reliance on CRAs by financial institutions for their investment, the need for more 
transparency, more diversity and stricter independence of CRAs to address 
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conflicts of interest, and to make CRAs accountable for the ratings they assign 
(ESMA, 2015).  
This first research question is further motivated by the need to carry out detailed 
examination of banks’ business models and their risk culture as these could 
potentially influence the determinants of their ratings. The IFC (2013) argues that 
CRAs struggle to correctly capture the risk exposure of banks due to their 
complexities and business models. Hence, for CRAs, the issue of transparency, 
disclosure and risk culture effectiveness in banks becomes important in their 
crating assignment process. In 2014, Christine Lagarde
1
, Managing Director of 
the International Monetary Fund, asserts that “while some changes in behaviour 
are taking place [in banking], these are not deep or broad enough. The industry 
still prizes short-term profit over long-term prudence, today’s bonus over 
tomorrow’s relationship.” Further, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) 2014 
report argues that the weaknesses in risk culture are often considered a root cause 
of the global financial crisis. This thesis, provides significant contributions to the 
body of knowledge by investigating issues around corporate governance and how 
the notion of the “too-big-to-fail” have influence the way CRAs perceives risk in 
banks. 
2. Do bank credit rating announcements result in abnormal returns behaviour around 
the announcement date? 
Rating agencies are important in the mitigation of information asymmetry problems 
in the capital market. They maintain that they possess private information which is 
not available to the market and thus, on average, there should be a significant 
abnormal equity returns reaction to rating news announcements. Evidence suggests 
                                                 
1
 Emily Cadman, “IMF’s Lagarde attacks financial sector for blocking reform,” Financial Times, May 27, 
2014 
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that there are significant numbers of rating adjustments in the period following the 
financial crisis (FSB, 2009). The banks within the sample employed in this thesis 
show rating changes across the investment- and noninvestment-grades. There was 
considerable number of downgrades in the periods following the 2007/08 global 
financial crisis, partly due to the calibration of the CRAs’ rating models (Jones and 
Mulet-Marquis, 2014). With the level of regulatory reforms in the US and EU, one 
would expect a change in behaviour by the CRAs after the crisis. In addition, part 
of the regulatory reforms involves reducing the influence of credit rating agencies 
in the market. It follows that the market reactions to news announcements 
concerning bank credit ratings will be different in the period following the 2007/08 
financial crisis. Therefore, a thorough investigation of the behaviour of bank equity 
returns around the time of bank credit rating news announcements should provide 
further insight into the relevance of rating information to the market.  
3. What are the dynamics of bank credit ratings changes through time? Do bank credit 
ratings demonstrate non-Markovian behaviour?  
This thesis seeks to investigate trends in bank credit quality over time by examining 
the movement of banks in each rating grade for each year across countries. The 
distribution of ratings changes plays a crucial role in many credit risk models 
(Nickell et al., 2001). These distributions may be argue to vary over time and 
across issuers and their issues. Guttler and Raupach (2007) maintain that rating 
downgrades are known to make subsequent downgrades more likely. This rating 
momentum implies that the probabilities of future transitions and defaults do not 
depend on the current rating only but also on previous transitions. This has become 
very important, particularly with the changes brought by the Basel III Accord to 
calculate the appropriate capital charge for banks. Further, a credit rating’s 
importance to the predicted probability of default for long-term securities from 
short-term credit risk dynamics forms an important aspect of rating transition. 
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Evidence suggests that there are prevalence of rating momentum in cases of 
downgrades within a certain rating category, where ratings with previous 
downgrades are more prone to further downgrades and defaults than others (Jarrow 
et al., 1997; Lando and Skodeberg, 2002; Christensen et al., 2004). Other studies 
shows that the time (duration) an issuer spends on a particular rating class have 
impact on their transiting to the next rating class (Kavvathas, 2000; Altman and 
Kao (1992). An examination of the possible rating momentum and duration effects 
within a sample of international banks will enhance the understanding of bank 
rating behaviour. This inadvertently helps improve on how to manage portfolio 
credit risk.  
Further, evidence suggests that rating agencies have become more conservative in 
assigning credit ratings (Baghai et al., 2013). In the wake of the 2007/08 global 
financial crisis, credit rating agencies have come under increasing scrutiny, with 
reforms coming from regulators across the world. There are now increased 
requirements for transparency in rating methodology, adequate disclosure and 
accountability within the rating industry (ESMA, 2013). Thus, there is an increased 
likelihood that rating agencies will err on the part of caution in their (re)assignment 
of ratings, particularly to banks, as a wrong rating or reversal could further 
aggravate the mistrust of the markets in their rating actions.   
Rating agencies maintain that their ratings are fairly stable as they rate ‘through-
the-cycle’. However, there is a trade-off between stability and timeliness of ratings 
(Blume et al., 1998). For the market to be efficient and for ratings to be relevant in 
investment decision making, rating actions must be timely. However, rating 
agencies claim to have a long-term view of the creditworthiness of their rated 
issuers and issues. Failure to establish a balance between stability and timeliness of 
rating actions may have significant impact on their reputation. To assess the 
stability of the distribution of rating changes, this thesis examines whether 
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probabilities of moving between rating categories over one-year horizons vary 
either across different banks. If these ratings transition probabilities ware stable, 
then default probabilities at all possible future horizons would be stable. The 
cyclicality or otherwise of the rating process has been investigated by authors such 
as Cantor and Packer (1997), Blume et al. (1998), Amato and Furfine (2004), 
Altman and Rijken (2004) and their findings are mixed.  
1.4 Contributions of this study 
This thesis contributes to the existing literature in several ways: First, it is one of few 
studies that focus on the determinants of the long-term credit ratings of international 
banks. The use of an issuer long term rating confers the advantage of being able to 
examine the holistic effects of rating agency actions on an entity, rather than on its 
issues. Further, the thesis extends the current literature on bank credit rating 
determinants by incorporating the set of explanatory variables used in the extant 
literature, as well as qualitative non-financial variables in the empirical models. Much 
of the existing literature employs the more easily measurable variables drawn from the 
CAMELS framework alone. However, by incorporating data on the factors that capture 
too-big-to-fail, corporate governance, country-specific risk, as well as market 
information, this study makes a significant contribution.  
The acronym “CAMEL” refers to the five components of a bank’s condition that are 
typically assessed: Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, and 
Liquidity. A sixth component, a bank’s Sensitivity to market risk was added in 1997 by 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC); hence the new acronym CAMELS 
(FDIC, 1997). This latter component makes explicit reference to the quality of risk 
management processes in the management component. The capital adequacy refers to a 
financial institution’s expected minimum capital requirement that serves as a buffer in 
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times of shock. The effect of credit, market, and other risks on the institution's financial 
condition should be considered when evaluating the adequacy of capital. The asset 
quality rating reflects the quantity of existing and potential credit risk associated with 
the loan and investment portfolios, other real estate owned, and other assets, as well as 
off-balance sheet transactions. The management refers to the capability of the board of 
directors and management, in their respective roles, to identify, measure, monitors, and 
controls the risks of an institution's activities and to ensure a financial institution's safe, 
sound, and efficient operation in compliance with applicable laws and regulations is 
reflected in this rating. The earnings reflect not only the quantity and trend of earnings, 
but also factors that may affect the sustainability or quality of earnings. The quantity as 
well as the quality of earnings can be affected by excessive or inadequately managed 
credit risk that may result in loan losses. The liquidity refers to the current level and 
prospective sources of liquidity compared to funding needs, as well as to the adequacy 
of funds management practices relative to the institution's size, complexity, and risk 
profile. Finally, the sensitivity to the market risk component reflects the degree to which 
changes in interest rates, foreign exchange rates, commodity prices, or equity prices can 
adversely affect a financial institution's earnings or economic capital. 
The origin of the CAMELS can be traced to the Uniform Financial Institutions Rating 
System (UFIRS) adopted by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council 
(FFIEC) in 1979. The UFIRS has proven to be an effective internal supervisory tool for 
evaluating the soundness of financial institutions on a uniform basis and for identifying 
those institutions requiring special attention or concern (FRBSF, 1999). Under the 
UFIRS, each financial institution is assigned a composite rating based on an evaluation 
and rating of six the essential components of an institution's financial condition and 
operations. Further, the evaluations of these components take into consideration the 
financial institution's size, the nature and complexity of its activities, and its risk profile. 
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The FDIC in their 1997 report on the UFIRS states that composite and component 
ratings are assigned based on a 1 to 5 numerical scale. A 1 indicates the highest rating, 
strongest performance and risk management practices, and least degree of supervisory 
concern, while a 5 indicates the lowest rating, weakest performance, inadequate risk 
management practices and, therefore, the highest degree of supervisory concern.  
The thesis provides a detailed insight into the behaviour of bank stock returns around 
the period of bank credit rating news announcements. The thesis contributes in several 
respects to the existing literature. The general position in the extant literature is that 
rating upgrades are not associated with stock market reactions, while rating downgrades 
elicit significant negative reactions. This thesis employs several specifications in 
modelling bank stock behaviour by examining subsamples of bank upgrades and 
downgrades. More specifically, it examines bank credit rating changes within 
subsamples of bank stocks rated in the investment-grade, speculative-grade, across 
investment thresholds, as well as unanticipated rating actions. This study is among the 
first, to the author’s knowledge, to test for bank stock reactions to credit rating change 
announcements. The reported results are insightful and indicate that market reactions 
vary significantly by rating category. 
The thesis extends the bank credit rating literature by employing a robust news event 
testing technique using both parametric and non-parametric approaches. It adopts an 
extension of the traditional two-stage event-study parametric approach, by employing a 
one-stage dummy variable approach within the testing framework. In addition, the 
thesis accounts for changing variances of abnormal returns across the banks by 
employing two other variants of the traditional event study approach, that is, the 
Boehmer et al. (1991) specification and the GARCH (1,1) specification. To the author’s 
best knowledge, this is the only study that does so for a sample of international banks. 
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By investigating the behaviour of international bank credit ratings over time, this thesis 
addresses two major issues: testing for the presence of non Markovian behaviour in 
bank credit rating transitions and issues around the evident downward trend in bank 
ratings, particularly following the 2007/08 financial crisis. These are important 
considerations because the major credit rating agencies adopt transition frameworks that 
make the strong assumption of the existence of Markovian behaviour in bank stock 
credit rating transition. In addition, the major credit rating agencies have reviewed their 
rating methodologies following the credit crisis due to pressure from regulators, 
particularly in the US and Euro zone. Thus, the thesis allows for a test of the level of 
impact this tightening has had on rating assignments for international banks.  
1.5 Key findings 
The discussion of the main findings of this thesis focuses on the three areas 
investigated. The study finds that across all the specifications employed, the CAMELS 
framework components, that is, capital adequacy, asset quality, earnings, liquidity and 
sensitivity to the market are all statistically significant determinants of international 
bank credit ratings. These findings reinforce the importance of a bank-specific, 
quantitative measure of balance sheet strength in the assigning of a credit rating to a 
bank. Langohr and Langohr (2008) argue that in the determination of a bank’s 
probability of default, the financial strength rating evaluation comes first. The 
importance of financial strength ratings on banks further highlights the importance of 
the CAMELS system in the rating process.  
This thesis makes a significant contribution to the body of knowledge in the area of 
bank credit rating determination, by employing variables that capture the too-big-to-fail 
notion as well as corporate governance factors related to this. It indicates that the 
variable too-big-to-fail is consistently significant across all model specifications. Credit 
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rating agencies perceive the propensity to receive external support by banks as 
beneficial, and reward banks based on their size and connectedness within the financial 
system and economy at large. In addition to the too-big-to-fail impact on the rating 
framework, the results from the thesis confirm the importance of a range of corporate 
governance measures (directors’ shareholdings, institutional ownership and the 
proportion of independent directors on the board of directors) as important factors in 
determining bank ratings, thereby supporting the hypotheses stated. 
The results of the news events tests provide evidence of asymmetric reactions in bank 
stock returns to credit rating news announcements across announcement types. For the 
full sample of bank upgrades, the parametric approaches show significant (positive) 
news leakage and partial correction in the market following the date of a bank rating 
upgrade announcement. Overall, the results for the bank stock reactions for upgrades 
are consistent with the existing literature. This thesis adds to the body of knowledge by 
investigating subsets of rating announcements within both upgrade and downgrade 
settings. For upgrades within the investment grades, the results show significant positive 
event-day reactions for both the parametric and non-parametric approaches. This is an 
interesting finding considering that most of the existing studies on the effects of 
‘positive news’ provide evidence of no significant market reactions. 
In terms of the trends in credit rating transition for the sample of international banks, the 
bank credit rating migration matrices are more diagonally dominant in the cohort 
approach than in the duration approach. Generally, the probability of experiencing 
downgrades is higher for investment-grade banks than for speculative-grade banks. The 
results of the two non-Markovian behaviour tests, the rating drift and the waiting-time 
effect tests, show very strong evidence of downward momentum or drift in the top 
investment-grades (AAA to A-). In contrast, the hypothesis of no rating drift is accepted 
for banks in the lower investment-grade and speculative-grade ratings. This has 
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considerable implication for portfolio manager in terms of assessing their asset portfolio 
constituents.  
The results from this thesis reinforces the current policy debates around the reliability 
and over-reliance of credit ratings, the need for regulatory reforms and oversights of the 
credit rating industry and the need to hold credit ratings accountable for their rating 
actions. With regulatory reforms already initiated in the US (the Dodd-Frank Act, 2010) 
and the EU (with the emergence of the European Securities and Market Authority - 
ESMA in 2011) to tackle the issues of disclosure, transparency and conflicts of interest, 
this thesis presents empirical evidence of the continued importance of ratings in the 
financial market.  
1.6 Summary 
This chapter discusses the  main research questions of the thesis which are (i) What are 
the determinants of credit ratings for banks across the globe?, (ii) Do bank credit rating 
announcements result in abnormal returns behaviour around the announcement date? 
and, (iii) What are the dynamics of bank credit ratings changes through time? Do bank 
credit ratings demonstrate non-Markovian behaviour? It further explains the 
contributions of the study to the existing body of knowledge in the bank credit ratings 
field. It presents the structure of the thesis and provides an overview and brief 
explanation of the approach of each chapter. Chapter 2 examines the credit rating 
industry and presents a review of the structure of the industry. The chapter examines the 
rating process and the criticism of the main credit rating agencies, before and after the 
financial crisis. It provides an insight into the regulatory role of credit ratings and the 
regulatory oversight within the industry 
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 CREDIT RATING FOUNDATION,   ANALYSIS CHAPTER 2.
AND THE RATING PROCESS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This thesis aims to investigate bank credit ratings by examining their determinants and 
the impact on the financial market. This chapter attempts to critically assess the credit 
rating industry and provides a better understanding of the dynamics of that industry, 
including the relevance, criticism and regulatory oversight of the credit rating agencies 
(CRAs) within financial markets. Further, the chapter examines developments in the 
industry following the 2007/08 global financial crisis. CRAs are an important part of the 
financial market and the relevance of a rating is typically measured by studying security 
prices. If such prices reflect ratings and rating changes, rather than the opposite 
causality, then the market pays close attention to ratings (Langohr and Langohr, 2008). 
However, the market may pay attention without any significant price movement if such 
rating announcements are fully anticipated.  
A credit rating is a measure of the creditworthiness of an entity or its financial asset 
issue (e.g. a bond rating), and represents the opinion of a credit rating agency (Gonzalez 
et al., 2004; Langohr and Langohr, 2008; Wappenschmidt, 2009). Rating agencies do 
not operate in isolation, but are subject to regulatory oversight, e.g. in the US, CRAs 
operate under Nationally Recognised Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSRO) 
governed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Asmussen (2005) and 
Matthies (2013) maintain that the rating industry is an oligopoly in structure with the 
three leading rating agencies, Fitch, Standards and Poor’s (S&P) and Moody’s, 
controlling around 95% of the market.  
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Credit ratings from the major rating agencies play a variety of roles in the financial 
market, and the meaning of agency ratings also varies depending on the analyst’s 
perception of risk. Agencies insist that a rating is forward-looking as it assesses default 
risk over the life of an instrument or with regard to the issuer being rated. Further, they 
maintain that a rating is not a recommendation to buy, sell or hold, that is, it does not 
constitute an instrument pricing process. However, credit rating has become a standard 
benchmark for asset pricing and valuation in the financial markets, and market 
participants employ ratings as a benchmark for comparison with their own analysis and 
the internal ratings process (Erlenmaier, 2006).  
The CRAs have been criticised for their role in the 2007/08 global financial crisis. In 
the aftermath of this crisis, the credit rating business and the rating process itself have 
come under intense scrutiny from regulatory authorities, market participants and the 
general public. The crisis highlights some salient issues around the role of CRAs in the 
market such as the timeliness of CRA ratings actions, the accuracy and the transparency 
of the rating process, the procyclicality of the assigned ratings and the ability of the 
CRAs to reduce information asymmetry. More importantly, the pertinent question of 
how rating agencies maintain objectivity when they are paid large fees (issuer-pay 
model) by the same companies they rate is a cause for concern. In particular, the failure 
of CRAs to provide accurate ratings for securitized products, e.g. the collateralized debt 
obligations (CDOs) and other asset-backed securities and sophisticated financial 
products in the run up to the global financial crisis of 2007/08, has cast doubt upon their 
value-adding role.  
Moreover, some commentators (Levich et al., 2002; Darcy, 2009) argue that the CRAs 
knew very little about the fundamental creditworthiness of these products, hence 
making accurate ratings unlikely. Ciro (2013) argues that the inability of CRAs to 
account for the looming collapse in the housing market in the US also led to 
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considerable mispricing of the inherent risk of these financial products. New regulations 
focusing on the credit rating industry and amendments to existing ones are bound to 
shape the dynamics of the industry and the way in which market participants view 
CRAs. There have been calls for greater disclosure from regulatory authorities, 
especially in the areas of fees received from issuers, the factors influencing rating 
actions, and the underlying assumptions of the CRA methodology. An understanding of 
these issues may better understanding of bank credit ratings process and provide some 
insight into this opaque industry. This thesis is thus very important as it is motivated by 
some of these criticisms, particularly the flawed business model, opaqueness of the 
rating methodologies, the conflict between timeliness and accuracy of ratings and the 
impact of new regulations of the credit rating industry. All these provide an opportunity 
to examine the determinants and relevance of bank credit rating in the financial market.  
The remainder of this chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 examines the nature of credit 
ratings. Section 2.3 discusses credit rating classifications. Section 2.4 presents the credit 
rating system. Section 2.5 discusses the importance and criticism of CRAs, particularly 
following the 2007/08 global financial crisis. Section 2.6 examines the credit rating 
process and the dynamics of obtaining and maintaining a credit rating. Section 2.7 gives 
an insight into the regulatory role of credit ratings and the regulatory oversight existing 
in the industry. Section 2.8 summarises the chapter. 
2.2 The nature of credit ratings  
Credit rating plays an important role in the financial market as it to bridges the 
information gap between lenders and borrowers in the financial market. By providing 
information about the creditworthiness of an issuer or its issue, investors have better 
knowledge about their investment choices. Frost (2007) argues that almost all agencies 
base their rating on the relative, not absolute, probability of default. The relative aspect 
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here relates to the use of ranked alphabet letters (with +/- signs) as shown in Table 2.1. 
These indicate the relative standing of the ratings within the major rating categories.  
Table 2.1: Ratings classification system 
AAA: Highest credit quality 
 
'AAA' ratings denote the lowest expectation of default risk. They are assigned only in 
cases of exceptionally strong capacity for payment of financial commitments. This 
capacity is highly unlikely to be adversely affected by foreseeable events. 
AA: Very high credit quality. 
 
'AA' ratings denote expectations of very low default risk. They indicate very strong 
capacity for payment of financial commitments. This capacity is not significantly 
vulnerable to foreseeable events. 
A: High credit quality. 
 
'A' ratings denote expectations of low default risk. The capacity for payment of 
financial commitments is considered strong. This capacity may, nevertheless, be more 
vulnerable to adverse business or economic conditions than is the case for higher 
ratings. 
BBB: Good credit quality. 
 
'BBB' ratings indicate that expectations of default risk are currently low. The capacity 
for payment of financial commitments is considered adequate but adverse business or 
economic conditions are more likely to impair this capacity. 
BB: Speculative. 
 
'BB' ratings indicate an elevated vulnerability to default risk, particularly in the event 
of adverse changes in business or economic conditions over time; however, business 
or financial flexibility exists which supports the servicing of financial commitments. 
B: Highly speculative. 
 
'B' ratings indicate that material default risk is present, but a limited margin of safety 
remains. Financial commitments are currently being met; however, capacity for 
continued payment is vulnerable to deterioration in the business and economic 
environment. 
CCC: Substantial credit risk Default is a real possibility. 
CC: Very high levels of credit 
risk 
Default of some kind appears probable. 
C: Exceptionally high levels of 
credit risk 
Default is imminent or inevitable, or the issuer is in standstill. Conditions that are 
indicative of a 'C' category rating for an issuer include: 
RD: Restricted default 'RD' ratings indicate an issuer that in Fitch Ratings' opinion has experienced an 
uncured payment default on a bond, loan or other material financial obligation but 
which has not entered into bankruptcy filings, administration, receivership, 
liquidation or other formal winding-up procedure, and which has not otherwise ceased 
operating. 
D: Default 'D' ratings indicate an issuer that in Fitch Ratings' opinion has entered into bankruptcy 
filings, administration, receivership, liquidation or other formal winding-up 
procedure, or which has otherwise ceased business. 
Sources: Fitch Ratings – Definitions of Ratings and Other Forms of Opinion (2014) *Used with 
permission of the publisher 
 
In the 1970s, the US introduced the Nationally Recognised Statistical Rating 
Organizations (NRSRO) requirement which sought to recognise rating agencies and 
allow the use of ratings by financial institutions for regulatory purposes. The creation of 
the NRSRO allows for a lowering of the barrier to entry into the rating industry as new 
CRAs only need to meet the requirements for registration to qualify as members.  
2.3 Credit rating classifications 
The rating classification may be based on: the rated entity (this can be the rating of an 
specific issue/instrument or the issuer/counterparty itself); the issuer of the rating (those 
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that carry out the rating process, and this can be external or internal); the originator of 
the rating (focusing on who initiated that rating, i.e. solicited at the request of the issuer, 
or unsolicited); and finally, the rating horizon (that is, whether it is a long-term or short-
term rating).  
Generally, in an issue-specific rating, agencies primarily assess the likely amount that 
debt holders would be able to recover in the event of default (Trueck and Rachev, 
2009). It deals with the performance of a specific instrument, e.g. a bond. Further, the 
issue-specific rating combines the risk of default and the expected loss-given-default. 
The risk of default is the possibility that the issuer of an instrument or issue (for 
example, a bond) will default, by failing to repay the outstanding commitments 
(Standard and Poor’s, 2007). 
Figure 2.1: Categorization of ratings 
 
 
Default may not always lead to losses as recovery may be possible even in the event of 
default. The expected loss-given-default (LGD) is the magnitude of likely loss on 
exposure (exposure being the amount that may be lost on an investment) (HBIK, 2012). 
A debt instrument can experience a loss only if there is default, at or before maturity 
(Schuermann, 2004).  A Standard & Poor’s issue-specific credit rating for example, is 
‘an opinion of the creditworthiness of an obligor with respect to a specific financial 
Rated entity 
Issue vs. Issuer 
  
Rating issuer 
External vs. Internal 
  
Rating Originator 
Solicited vs. Unsolicited 
  
  
Rating Horizon 
Long term vs. Short term 
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obligation, a specific class of financial obligations, or a specific financial programme; 
this may be a bank loan or a debt issue’ (Standard and Poor’s 2005: 8).  
The issuer credit rating, also called the counterparty risk rating, rates the issuer as a 
whole, regardless of a particular debt instrument. Counterparty risk is the risk that the 
counterparty to a financial contract will not meet the terms of the contract. According to 
the Corporate Ratings Criteria for Standard and Poor’s (2005: 9) an issuer credit rating 
is ‘not specific to any particular financial obligation, because it does not take into 
account any particular obligation’; rather it ‘provides an overall assessment of a 
company’s credit worthiness’.  
Ratings may also be classified on the basis of the provider. When a rating is provided by 
a rating agency, the type of rating is referred to as an external credit rating as opposed to 
the case where ratings are produced by the internal rating systems of banks and other 
corporate entities and involve the establishment of an internal rating model to classify 
the credit risk exposure of a bank’s activities and its counterparties. The new Basel III 
Accord proposes a shift from the over-reliance on external credit rating agencies 
measuring credit risk, to a more risk sensitive internal rating based approach. The 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) in 2010 issued a set of principles for reducing reliance 
on external credit assessments in standards, laws and regulations. The FSB maintains 
that this aims to reduce the cliff effects and herding behaviour that threaten financial 
stability and were seen to arise from external credit assessment thresholds being hard-
wired into laws, regulations and market practices.  
Credit ratings ascribed by CRAs can also be divided into either solicited or unsolicited 
credit ratings. For solicited ratings, borrowers request a rating, provide private 
information, pay for, and obtain the rating. One can argue that solicited ratings provide 
CRAs access to private information which normally will not be available to investors, 
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as the entity being rated has the incentive to provide qualitative, detailed information 
that will aid in its rating. Solicited ratings provide more detailed information to the 
market since they communicate previously unknown information which has been held 
by the top management of companies soliciting such ratings. However, the issuer-pay 
model practiced by the credit rating industry presents a conflict of interest between the 
rater and the company being rated. A bank seeking a better rating may ‘go shopping’ to 
find the rating agency that is willing to assign the best rating for their instruments.  
The length of rating horizon presents another way of categorising credit ratings. Here, 
ratings can be classified as either long-term or short-term. Long-term ratings provide an 
opinion of the creditworthiness of an issue or an instrument over a time horizon that 
extends three to five years in the future (Langohr and Langohr, 2008). It is argued that 
long-term ratings give an indication of the rating quality of a company without any 
procyclicality, and this thesis employs this long-term view in its approach. The need for 
stability in a rating is another motive for developing a long term credit rating devoid of 
any short term business cycle effects. Rosch (2005) argues that long-term ratings are 
free of any short term bias that might cause temporary change in a firm’s credit quality. 
A short-term rating deals primarily with the coming year and provides an opinion on the 
ability of an issuer to make timely payments on short-term financial commitments.  
Apart from the above categorization of ratings in the corporate sector, ratings can also 
be given to governments (or States). This type of rating is called a sovereign rating. 
Sovereign ratings give an opinion of the ability and willingness of a government to 
service its debt in full and on time. The current sovereign debt crises that affects 
countries such as the US, the UK, Greece and Italy which have all seen their sovereign 
ratings downgraded (and some by more than one notch), have a direct impact on the 
ratings of companies operating within those countries.  
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2.4 The credit rating system 
A rating expresses the opinion of the CRA on the relative credit strength of an issuer in 
general or of an instrument over its lifetime. Credit rating agencies summarize their 
opinions about obligors (contractual partners) in ratings with graded symbols, such as 
AA-, BBB+, and Caa3. The distinctive characteristic of this credit rating scale is its 
ordinality. The ordinality implies that all ratings along this scale or rank are comparable. 
Each symbol represents a group within which the credit risk characteristics are broadly 
the same across entities. One of the main challenges for major CRAs is maintaining 
consistency across all classes of issuers, industries, instruments, and regions.  
This thesis examines the market impact of bank credit rating announcements by 
employing different specifications of rating actions, one of which is rating anticipation. 
Rating anticipation may come in the form of rating outlooks or placements of a 
Watchlist. Rating outlooks indicate the potential direction of a rating over the 
intermediate term (usually six months to two years) (Langohr and Langohr, 2008). An 
outlook signal does not necessarily result in a rating change; however it provides an 
element of stability to long-term ratings. The rating outlook can be positive, negative, 
stable or developing, i.e. the rating could be raised, lowered, not likely to change, or 
may be either raised or lowered respectively. The motive for the direction assigned to an 
outlook depends on the perception of the analyst about issues such as the firm’s risks, 
the political situation and the firm’s earnings growth forecast.  
Watchlists give a high probability that the issuer rating will change, even though the 
direction of change may be uncertain. Johnson (2003) maintains that by placing a rating 
on their Watchlists, CRAs effectively send a signal to the market that they are reviewing 
the underlying creditworthiness of the company. However, Cantwell (2000) argues that 
the concept of the Watchlist is out-of-date, as financial markets have become more 
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efficient and the sheer quantity and quality of information available in an online real-
time environment makes them of limited added value.  
Investors and the users of ratings information often have unrealistic expectations 
regarding what ratings actually mean (SEC, 2003). Hence, a careful interpretation of 
ratings is important. The credit rating agencies (especially the major ones) often 
maintain that ratings address benchmark probabilities of default and that their ratings 
are not absolute default probabilities. This implies that rating opinions are not meant to 
be guarantees of credit quality or exact measures of the probability that a particular 
issuer or debt issue will default. However, a rating expresses an opinion about the credit 
quality of an issuer or a debt issue within a scale, from the strongest to the weakest, 
relative to others on that scale. It may be argued that since future events cannot be 
foreseen, the assignment of credit ratings is not an exact science. 
Ratings also tend not to be procyclical, but rather aim to be ‘cycle neutral’, so that they 
are not systematically adjusted in times of boom or bust (Carey and Stulz, 2006). 
Ratings thus do not typically change through the business cycle. If ratings were cyclical 
then a security could be rated low because of poor performance in the short-term, 
pending its expected recovery and good performance in the near future. Any cyclicality 
in ratings on the part of CRAs would lead to volatile ratings. 
Langohr and Langohr (2008) argue that ratings are also descriptive, and not prescriptive 
of the debt situation. The optimal credit rating for a company’s debt at any given point 
in time may range from speculative (worst) to investment grade (safest). Shareholders 
attempt to increase the amount that their firm should borrow so that shareholders’ 
wealth can be maximized. Shareholders often trade-off the cost of lower credit ratings 
against the benefit of additional debt. However, there is an optimal debt-to-asset ratio 
that maximizes shareholders’ wealth, and minimises the over cost of capital (Kisgen, 
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2006). A rating does not prescribe such an optimal ratio as reporting it could lead to an 
error of judgement on the part of investors.  
Ratings do not put a value on an instrument, rather they only measure and grade credit 
risks. Credit risk is just one of the factors that drive an instrument’s risk: market risk, 
operational risk, liquidity risk are some of the other drivers. However, CRAs do not 
report directly on these other risks. The change in credit ratings occurs discretely 
whereas bond yields may be observed to move continuously. Credit ratings hence do 
not price instruments; rather they give an opinion on whether an issuer will be able to 
make payments in a timely manner.  
This study recognises the issue of reverse causality in the modelling of the determinants 
of international bank credit ratings. Reverse causality is particularly plausible from the 
level of ratings to some bank characteristics such as profitability or funding structure. 
For example, banks with low ratings may face higher financing costs, seek shorter 
maturities on the liability side of their balance sheet or experience lower profitability. 
Ratha et al. (2007) suggest the use of lagged variables rather than contemporaneous 
ones to account for any reverse causality. This thesis employs three time specifications 
to account for possible reverse causality within the modelling process for the bank 
credit rating determinants. 
2.5 The importance and criticism of credit ratings 
This section discusses the role and criticism of credit ratings in the financial market and 
how ratings have evolved over the last couple of decades. CRAs maintain that they add 
value to the financial market by helping to reduce information asymmetry, providing 
more access to the market and reducing the overall cost of funds. However, the global 
financial crisis exposed some of the shortcomings of the rating process including 
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potential conflicts of interest, a lack of understanding of the nature of rated instruments, 
and alleged unfair practices. 
 Credit ratings and the financial market 2.5.1
Credit ratings from the major rating agencies play a variety of roles in financial markets. 
This section focuses on the various ways in which credit rating brings value to market 
participants. By providing independent opinions on the creditworthiness of both 
obligors (issuing companies) and of individual securities, CRAs help investors to 
allocate risk and to make decisions about the value and pricing of securities (Keenan 
and Sobehart, 2000). The financial market provides an avenue that aims to bring 
together the buyers and sellers of financial instruments. Investors need information on 
the nature of the investments and wish to invest their funds, and issuers need access to 
those funds. Hence, credit ratings help to shorten the distance between lenders and 
borrowers. As a result, there is a reduction in the cost of information and a reduction in 
the cost of market access. Credit ratings present an important source of information for 
potential investors and other market participants to assess the riskiness of investments. 
In sum, ratings aim to achieve the somewhat conflicting objectives of accuracy, 
comparability of rating information, timeliness, and stability of the rating action. 
However, there exists credit rating inconsistency, especially among the big three rating 
agencies. Laere et al. (2012) argue that the major CRAs set different standards for 
particular rating grades. They maintain that both S&P and Moody’s bank ratings reflect 
different indicators and dimensions of a bank’s financial health and this contributes to 
disparity in some instances. Ratings may be said to function as a measure of credit risk, 
a means of comparison between issues, and a common standard against which to refer 
to credit risk. These functions are often difficult to disentangle and are complementary 
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in the sense that the demand for one of the functions of ratings is enhanced by the fact 
that ratings fulfil all three functions.  
Over time, CRAs have also assumed a so-called ‘certification’ role, whereby ratings act 
as a credit-quality threshold in financial contracts (Deb et al., 2011). For instance, when 
referenced in an investment mandate or performance benchmark, ratings help investors 
to discipline fund managers by restricting investments to assets with certain 
characteristics. Johnson and Kriz (2002) argue that the availability of credit ratings 
prevents the buyers of financial securities from grouping all financial products in the 
market into one category without distinguishing the superior credit quality of some over 
others. The absence of credit ratings, they add, drives rational buyers into believing that 
the sellers of financial securities have an incentive to market poor-quality financial 
products as high-quality products.  
The availability of CRA ratings as convenient composite measures of credit quality has 
led to a broadening and deepening of their role over time. Table 2.2 highlights a number 
of areas in which CRA ratings are now ‘hardwired’ into contracts and market practices 
(Deb et al., 2011). In their certification role, ratings can help to resolve moral hazard 
problems between individual investors (principals) and the institutions (agents) they 
appoint to manage their portfolios. 
Further, Thompson and Vaz (1990) argue that credit rating agencies, via their 
certification function, convey the true credit quality of companies, which is in turn 
determined on the basis of constant monitoring and evaluation of a company’s financial 
and non-financial performance. Information barriers are lifted with the publication of 
credit ratings, hence market participants benefit and the whole market improves in its 
efficiency. 
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Table 2.2: Examples of the certification role of the CRA ratings 
Purpose Comment 
Investment mandates/Policies/Criteria for 
index inclusion  
  
 
 
 
 
Access to capital markets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Secured funding and repo markets
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Collateral agreements 
Ratings are often hardwired into the investment mandates of life 
insurers, pension funds, mutual funds, etc. They also determine 
eligibility criteria for inclusion in bond indices that track a 
certain segment of the credit market (e.g. investment-grade 
bonds; sub-investment grade bonds) and act as performance 
benchmarks for fund managers. 
 
The cost and availability of funding in capital markets is often 
linked directly to a borrower’s credit rating. Indeed, access to 
some financial markets is restricted to issuers with ratings above 
a particular threshold For example, access to wholesale funding 
markets is typically restricted to entities with a sufficiently high 
short-term credit rating. 
 
Similarly, secured funding and repo markets rely heavily on 
CRA ratings. Metrick and Gorton (2010) observe that, pre-
crisis, banks’ increasing demand for secured funding from the 
parallel banking system (e.g. money market mutual funds, 
structured investment vehicles, CDOs) led to a commensurate 
increase in the demand for high-quality collateral, typically 
identified by its credit rating. 
 
Many financial contracts include references to credit loan 
contracts ratings. For instance, the Credit Support Annex (CSA) 
of a standard International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
(ISDA) Master Agreement in the OTC derivatives market 
specifies the terms on which collateral calls will be made. CSAs 
often state that additional collateral will be called in the event of 
a credit rating downgrade. 
Source: Deb et al. (2011), Bank of England Financial Stability Paper (March 2011) *A non-inclusive 
permission to reproduce the material for the purpose outlined, subject to the acknowledgement of the 
source (Bank of England) 
However, adverse selection arises because borrowers possess more accurate information 
about the true state of their company than lenders. Particularly as a company will 
generally have an option to finance projects internally through retained earnings, any 
attempt to source external financing from capital markets may face a standard ‘lemons 
problem’ (Akerlof, 1970). The lemon problem describes the information asymmetry 
which occurs when the seller knows more about a product than the buyer 
 Credit ratings and information asymmetry in financial markets 2.5.2
Investors are much less informed about what is going on within a firm than the 
managers which run them. Seyhun (1998) argues that general shareholders know less 
than insiders. Hence, one of the most critical impediments to investor rights is their 
ignorance of what goes on in a company, that is, the information asymmetry between 
outside investors and the insiders who control company operations. Steeman (2002) 
posits that this information gap can lead investors to investing in the wrong firm 
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because of limited or costly information. The niche that credit rating agencies occupy 
within the financial market is thus that of dealing with information asymmetry as they 
try to bridge the information gap, whilst assisting companies in attracting investor funds 
and helping them signal their credit quality to the public. Mauboussin (2006) argues that 
information asymmetry will persist in the market because one can never fully move 
from the outside to the inside. Insiders will always be ‘ahead of the crowd’, and will 
always know more than outsiders. It may however be argued that market participants 
will only pay attention to the information contained in ratings if they offer something 
unique (Levich et al., 2002). 
CRAs argue that the information they provide is very relevant to the market and this 
argument is supported by the literature which focuses on CRA access to non-public 
information, the associated economies of scale, and the nature of CRA certification. 
With respect to information asymmetry, Frost (2006) argues that CRAs play a 
validation role by disseminating information to market participants. In this role they 
further argue that CRAs gather and analyse information widely available to investors, 
portfolio managers, buy-side firms, sell-side firms and others. Similarly, Boot et al. 
(2006) argue that credit ratings act as information equalisers as most of the investors in 
the financial markets are faced with a shortage of information on the company’s credit 
profile, while other major actors in these markets (including banks and CRAs) have 
access to more detailed information, which is embodied in a credit rating. Hence, 
investors can then use this information to make reasonable investment decisions. Other 
authors (Galil, 2003; Gonzalez et al., 2004; Partnoy, 2009) argue that credit ratings 
reduce information asymmetries between investors and companies, prospective and 
existing issuers of debt, and thus become the driving force behind the development of 
financial markets. The issue of access to private and confidential information is further 
highlighted by Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) who contends that CRA decisions 
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convey valuable information to the capital market based on their access to this private 
information about the company’s health and prospects alike. Furthermore, Griffin and 
Sanvicente (1982) maintain that this information advantage of credit ratings emanates 
from the agencies giving an incentive to company managers to reveal non-public 
information to them ‘about production, investment and financial plans’ (p. 104) in an 
attempt to obtain a favourable rating. They further argue that to the extent that such new 
data provide rating agencies with valuable information, the whole rating process 
becomes a ‘vehicle for communication of private knowledge to investors and creditors’ 
(p. 104).  
In economic terms, the rationale for using ratings may stem from their ability to provide 
informational economies of scale and from their contribution to solving the principal-
agent problem. Gonzalez et al. (2004) argue that creditors and investors have found it 
efficient to use rating opinions in initiating and monitoring their transactions because of 
the economies of scale achieved in gathering and analysing information. This, they 
argue has in turn facilitated the access of borrowers to debt markets, by widening the 
investor pool and reducing the adverse selection problems resulting from information 
asymmetries between investors and issuers of debt, and has provided a good basis for 
the development of financial markets. In addition, ratings are used to solve the 
principal-agent problem, that is, equity holders can use the information to determine 
what is going on within a company. Consistent with Gonzalez et al., Baker and Mansi 
(2002) argue that rating agencies are competent in gathering and analysing information 
and that they can bear the cost of collecting this kind of information better than 
individual investors due to the sheer volume of companies they rate. More importantly, 
Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) highlights the need for special skills and training 
associated with information gathering and processing which gives rating agencies a 
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distinct advantage over other information providers, hence increasing the importance of 
credit ratings as an investment aid. 
Despite the role of the CRAs in bridging the information gap in the financial market, 
there has been some heavy criticism of their informational value. Weinstein (1977) 
notes that unless bonds are continuously rated, ‘a rating change will always lag the 
information that led to the change’ (p. 331). He further maintains that bond ratings are 
not informationally efficient since they only reflect a reaction by rating agencies to 
information that the market already possesses. Goh and Ederington (1999) also show 
that credit rating changes and their information content do not have any effect on 
market prices nor do they produce any significant abnormal returns. However, the 
whole certification process is based on standardised quality categories with a view to 
overcoming information asymmetries between both sides of the market. Therefore, 
rating agencies act as information intermediaries and cannot be expected to provide 
reliable warning signals in the event of deterioration in a company’s credit (Li et al., 
2006).  
  Credit ratings, market access and the cost of funds 2.5.3
Credit ratings impact on the market access of firms as well the cost of funds. Kaplan 
and Urwitz (1979) argue that the credit rating that has been allocated to a given 
company can determine the risk premium that markets and investors require, as well as 
determining the marketability of a debt issue. Kisgen (2006) shows that credit ratings 
exert a considerable impact on a company’s cost of capital, and that as long as the 
capital market regards ratings as being informative, ‘firms will be pooled together by 
ratings and thus a ratings change would result in discrete changes in a firm’s cost of 
capital’ (p. 1036). Credit ratings determine the interest rate that businesses have to pay 
investors in order to persuade them to part with their funds (Liu and Thakor, 1984; 
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Creighton et al., 2007). Firms with strong credit ratings tend to offer a lower promised 
yield than those of lower credit quality. This is because companies with high credit 
ratings especially those in the investment-grade category are not considered to be very 
likely to default, and the likelihood of default tends to decrease as one goes up the rating 
scale.  
Steeman (2002) argues that credit ratings are important because they not only give an 
indication of a company’s funding costs, they also provide access to the capital market 
since they are a publicly available measure of inherent credit risk linked to a specific 
corporate entity. However, not every market participant agrees that credit ratings are the 
major factor that differentiates which companies are creditworthy and which are not; 
credit ratings are there to resolve the issue of information asymmetry and offer each 
market participant an equal amount of information in order to make an investment 
decision (Duff and Einig, 2009). 
 Credit ratings and procyclicality 2.5.4
One of the major goals of CRAs is to assign ratings that are uncorrelated with the 
cyclical nature of business and other macroeconomic trends. This goal could potentially 
benefit investors with buy-to-hold strategies as opposed to trading in instruments. The 
rating process may thus be said to be through-the-cycle as the assigned ratings are 
immune to short term volatility and variation in the market. Amato and Furfine (2004) 
posit that a rating through-the-cycle is a rating process that is ‘independent of the state 
of the business cycle, conditional on its underlying financial and business 
characteristics’ (p. 2642). However, Loffler (2003) argues that it is plausible to expect 
the long-term creditworthiness of firms and hence their credit ratings to covary 
positively with the business cycle. The author maintains that in many instances a long-
lived fundamental shock in the market drives both the financial and business 
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performance of firms and hence may induce business cycle fluctuations. However, 
credit rating agencies claim to rate through-the-cycle, and not take changes in business 
cycle into account.  
Prior studies present evidence about the cyclical nature of credit ratings and the 
financial system as a whole (Blume et al., 1998; Nickell et al., 2000; Bangia et al., 
2002; Altman et al., 2002; Cantor and Mann, 2003). The financial system tends to be 
procyclical, with the volume of bank lending at its peak during an economic boom and 
at its lowest point trough during a recession or financial crisis. However, within the 
financial system, the perception of risk by market participants is countercyclical, i.e. it 
is at its highest during a financial crisis or bust. Both the regulatory authorities and 
lenders tend to be more lax and less vigilant during times of economic boom and this 
contributes to the countercyclical behaviour of the market (Lown et al., 2000). Credit 
rating is not designed to vary in a procyclical manner. However, Nickell et al. (2000) 
find that transition matrices tend to exhibit a higher frequency of downgrades during a 
recession and a higher occurrence of upgrades during boom times. Similarly, Altman 
and Kao (1992) find that credit ratings tend to exhibit serial correlation, i.e. an upgrade 
is more likely to be followed by a subsequent upgrade than a downgrade. Generally, 
empirical evidence shows that even though credit ratings move with the business cycle, 
the cyclicality is driven more by the changes to business and financial risks, rather than 
to rating standards. 
 Credit ratings and moral hazard 2.5.5
Mukhopadhyay (2004) argues that CRAs suffer from a possible moral hazard problem. 
The 2007/08 global financial crisis exposes the flaws in the structure of the market of 
CRAs leading to serious moral hazard problems that are not easy to resolve. The 
business model of the credit rating agencies, that is the issuer-pay model, implies 
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majority of the users of the rating information, investors and regulators do not pay for 
such information. This current practice where issuers pay for ratings raises serious 
concerns about conflict of interest. CRAs may be tempted to inflate the rating they 
assign in order to maximize their profit, however, they argue that there is a reputational 
issue at stake that in assigning ratings despite being paid for the process by the issuer. 
However, Cantor and Packer (1994) argue that the fear of losing reputation, that is, that 
desire to prevent long-term loses, seems to be more important than a desire to make 
short-term gains by inflating ratings. There are also concerns whether or not issuers 
shop for better ratings. An issuer may decides on which company it wants to be rated by 
based on the expected rating level they are going to get. With the structure of the market 
and the increase competition, issues might be tempted to shop around for the best rating, 
thus leading to a compromise in rating standards and an inflation in ratings. 
There have been calls to introduce a government-backed agency in the rating industry 
following the series of downgrades of Greece, Portugal and Spain by the major CRAs in 
2010. The call for an ‘independent’ European rating agency (Tait, 2010) was suggested 
to be a way forward in mitigating the moral hazard problems faced by the major CRA. 
Further, an EU-based rating agency may act as a balance from negative influences that 
CRAs currently have on financial markets in Europe.  
 Credit ratings and objectivity 2.5.6
The quality of the rating process is very important in entrenching confidence in the 
market place on the accuracy of ratings. A CRA has in principle no incentive to present 
biased and inaccurate data as if it was unbiased and inaccurate (Langohr and Langohr, 
2008). Objectivity or independence of opinion is thus a cornerstone of the value that 
CRAs have in making predictive assessments about an issuer’s creditworthiness. CRAs 
maintain that their independence of opinion is very key in their business. In addition, 
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Deb et al. (2011) argue that rating agencies emerge to assist dispersed investors in the 
monitoring of issuers in debt capital markets. By assigning an objective measure of 
credit quality to debt issues, based on independent analysis of issuer-supplied financial 
information, CRAs can help to reduce information asymmetry between investors and 
borrowers. This allows for wider market participation and provides deeper and more 
liquid markets.  
With the fiasco of the 2007/08 global financial crisis and the culpability of the CRAs, 
there are concerns about the independence and objectivity of the opinion of CRAs on 
the ratings they issue. These in turn have significant impact on the reputation of the 
CRAs. Again, this objectivity ties in with timeliness of the rating action, as a delay in 
say, a downgrade may have serious consequences for investors. A related issue is that of 
due-diligence in the rating process, and CRAs have been accused of paying inadequate 
attention to details (US SEC, 2003). CRAs however, maintains their position against the 
charges of inaccuracy, rating delays, and inadequate due diligence. Following the 
2007/08 global financial crisis, there are evidence to suggest that the three main CRAs 
have taking steps towards improving their objectivity, timeliness and due-diligence 
(Corbet, 2013). These actions includes appointment of forensic accounting expertise by 
S&P to very issuer information, appointment of analysts by Moody’s to deal with off-
balance-sheet exposures and analyst training (SEC, 2013). There are also discussion 
around the transparency of the rating assignment process which deals with adequacy, 
fairness and confidentiality of rating-related information (ESMA, 2012).  
 Credit ratings, business model and accuracy of ratings 2.5.7
The demand for ratings comes from both investors and issuers, and both are willing to 
pay for them (Langohr and Langohr, 2008). The CRAs aim to provide investors with 
valuable information about firms in need of financing. Due to asymmetric information 
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between the firms and the investors, credit ratings often have a significant impact on the 
firms' financing outcomes. The current business model in the credit rating industry, the 
issuer-pay model, has raised several questions on rating inflation, flawed ratings and 
conflict of interest between the parties involved. Despite being held culpable in the 
2007/08 global financial crisis the CRAs claim that this conflict is unlikely to bias their 
ratings out of concern for their reputation is not true. Deb and Murphy (2009) argue that 
there are two justifications for charging issuers: firstly, issuers receive substantial value 
through the publication of independent ratings that gives them access to public funds; 
and secondly, the CRAs need these revenues to be able to sustain the costs of their 
activities. They further provide an analysis of the annual reports of the big-three rating 
agencies and suggest that the issuer-pay rating revenues account for roughly 84% of 
Moody's total revenues (average of last 5 years), while the corresponding amount for 
S&P and Fitch is 72% and 85% respectively.  
Rochet et al. (2008) argue that reputational concerns are not enough to solve the conflict 
of interest problem and that in equilibrium, rating agencies are likely to behave laxly, 
that is, rate bad banks as good and are prone to reputation cycles. Further, Camanho et 
al. (2011) suggest that moving from a monopolistic to a duopolistic setting within the 
credit rating industry will increase ratings inflation and aggravate the lax behaviour of 
rating agencies. The new regulatory regime in the EU (by the European Securities and 
Market Authority) and the US (the Securities and Exchange Commission) are shifting 
the paradigm of credit ratings being considered as `opinions' and to a situation where 
CRAs are going to be made liable for the quality of their ratings. This has the potential 
of resolving the conflict of interest and reduces the flawed, inaccurate or inflated 
ratings.  
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2.6 The credit rating process – obtaining and maintaining a credit rating 
The processes and methods used to establish credit ratings vary widely across CRAs, 
though the largest international CRAs tend to follow similar procedures for similar 
types of instrument. An overview of the credit rating process is provided below in 
Figure 2.2. The first stage in the process of obtaining a credit rating involves a meeting 
between the CRA and the management of the client company. The meeting provides an 
avenue for the client to provide detailed background information about their company 
(usually the information spans at least five years). This information is required to assist 
the rating team in making a more informed decision regarding the creditworthiness of 
the firm. In-depth interviews with company management are an integral part of the 
rating process.  
Figure 2.2: A conceptual framework of the rating process 
 
Source: Conceptual framework developed by the author 
The lead analyst tends to direct extensive research which is aimed at finding a 
conditional, unbiased and efficient estimate of the client’s default probability.  
Following this, a rating recommendation is made in a draft report submitted to the rating 
committee, where the lead analyst defends his/her proposal. The primary objective of 
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the rating committee is to ensure the validity and accuracy of the rating, whilst also 
ensuring that consistent standards are being applied in its determination.  
The issuer and adviser are immediately informed of the rating action. However, the 
issuer has the opportunity to review the draft press release before it is made public. This 
allows the issuer to raise any concerns and if necessary submit an appeal to express their 
disagreement with the accuracy of the assigned rating. Rating agencies argue that they 
are willing to correct any mistakes in their ratings, but categorically do not allow firms 
to dictate their rating assessment and opinion (Fitch, 2007b). The final part of the credit 
rating process is the communication of the rating to the market after the issuer agrees 
with the recommendation. There may also be an after-sales service to the client issuer 
which may come in the form of an advisory role or continuing professional relationship, 
which enables the client and the credit rating agency to work together in order to get 
periodic feedback about the company’s relative standing and how it is evolving. Hence 
rating analysts need to be up-to-date regarding developments in the company. 
2.7 Credit ratings and regulatory oversight 
The general position of the market is that flawed credit rating contributed to the global 
financial crisis of 2007/08. The use of rating processes that were deemed unsuitable for 
highly sophisticated financial products, and the failure of credit rating agencies to 
properly assess the risks of complex financial securities, have brought such ratings 
under intense scrutiny. A key question which resulted from this crisis was whether CRA 
operating practices and/or the lack of adequate regulatory oversight contributed to 
investor losses during the crises. This has led to the proposal and implementation of 
several radical reforms within the CRA industry. These reforms have resulted in new 
developments in the general governance of the industry, with resulting effects for both 
the major CRAs and the global financial institutions. For example, in 2014, the US SEC 
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adopted new requirements for credit rating agencies to resolve issues around the areas 
of governance, conflicts of interest, transparency and disclosure in order to improve the 
quality of credit ratings and increase credit rating agency accountability. The new rules 
fall under the requirements of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (2010) and apply to credit rating agencies registered with the 
Commission as nationally recognized statistical rating organizations (NRSROs). In the 
EU, the European Securities and Market Authority, ESMA, has been created to 
contribute to safeguarding the stability of the European Union's financial system by 
enhancing the protection of investors and promoting stable and orderly financial 
markets. The ESMA carries out policy work in the area of CRAs in its role as the single 
supervisor of CRAs within the European Union. The latest of their reform on the credit 
rating industry is the Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 on Credit Rating Agencies. This 
focuses in reducing the reliance on CRAs and their ratings. 
Thus, this section discusses new developments in the credit rating industry, mostly 
triggered by the regulatory reforms following the failings of the rating agencies in the 
period leading up to the 2007/08 global financial crisis. These developments form part 
of the core motivation for this thesis in light of the efforts by the US SEC and European 
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to improve the quality and consistency of 
CRA supervision. The regulatory reforms within the credit rating industry have 
implications for the structure and the way the CRAs do their business. For example, 
banks are now being encourage to adopt a more internal rating based model, and reduce 
the over-reliance on external credit rating agencies in measuring the risk of their credit 
portfolios. CRAs are required to increase their disclosure, particularly in terms of their 
methodology and models. By modelling the determinants of these bank ratings, it would 
be possible to better understand the dynamics of the rating process and better align these 
with those of the industry.  
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 The regulatory use of credit ratings 2.7.1
Credit ratings play a crucial regulatory role in the financial market. The sheer success of 
credit rating products and services may have contributed to regulators deciding to use 
ratings for their own prudential regulatory purposes, amongst others. Credit rating is 
featured prominently in the current Basel II standardized approach to calculating credit 
risk. The new Basel III Accord takes a fresh approach to the use of credit ratings within 
a bank’s risk management process by proposing a significant reduction in the use and 
reliance of ratings issued by CRAs (BCBS, 2014). According to Gonzalez et al. (2004) 
the importance of rating-based regulations can be traced as far back as the 1930s where 
it was particularly visible in the United States. In the European Union (EU), as in the 
case of the US, the regulatory use of credit ratings is a part of the capital adequacy 
requirements of financial institutions, especially the Committee of European Securities 
Regulators (CESR/10-945, 2010) guidance. The directive holds that the European 
legislation makes use of ratings as a regulatory instrument.  
Table 2.3 shows a summary categorization of the uses of credit ratings – prudence, 
market access, and investor protection. The prudential regulatory role of credit ratings 
relates to their use in maintaining market confidence. The most significant part of this 
prudential regulatory role relates to the minimum regulatory capital requirements 
imposed upon financial institutions. 
Table 2.3: The regulatory use of ratings 
Key purpose Summary 
Prudence   The regulatory use focuses on ensuring the stability of a financial 
institution in order to maintain market confidence; deciding the 
credit risk class of assets. 
Market access  It is used here as a criteria for issuers that want to gain access to 
the capital market. Ratings are used to differentiate the 
information requirements that the issuer must fulfil to be granted 
access to the market. 
Investor protection This is the ultimate goal of financial regulation and across the 
globe credit ratings have been used to achieve it. 
Source: Author’s conceptualization of the regulatory use of ratings 
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In 2012, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) reports an accelerated route towards the 
implementation of the FSB Principles to reduce reliance on CRA’s ratings. In the EU, 
this reform is driven by the ESMA which was designated as the single supervisor of 
credit rating agencies within the region in accordance with the provisions of Regulation 
1060/2009 on credit rating agencies. Further, there are efforts within the EU to increase 
the harmonisation of the supervision of CRAs at international level through its work 
with the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO).  
In response to the regulatory developments in the US and Europe, many Asia-Pacific 
economies have already taken action to strengthen the regulatory framework governing 
the use of credit rating (Van Laere, 2010).  In November 2009, the Australian Federal 
Government passed new regulations regarding CRAs in an effort to limit investors’ over 
reliance on ratings. Part of the new regulation proposed by the Australian Securities and 
Investment Commission (ASIC) removes the exemption that protected CRAs from 
liabilities that may arise from having their ratings published in prospectuses, disclosure 
statements and take-over documents. Further, for CRAs to keep their licences, they will 
have to manage conflicts of interest, have resources that match the ‘scale and 
complexity’ of their business, and have in place risk management systems.  
CRAs in India are regulated by the Security and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), and 
their duties cover the disclosure, transparency and integrity of rating agencies. On May 
3, 2010, the SEBI released further CRA guidelines on matters including transparency 
and disclosure, conflict management and documentation, which reinforce the existing 
CRA regulatory framework in India. In addition, attempts are now being made to tackle 
‘rating shopping’ which has arisen from the issuer-pay business model. Bolton et al. 
(2009) show that with multiple ratings, issuers have more opportunity to rate-shop. 
Skreta and Veldkamp (2008) explore the interaction between rate-shopping, complexity 
of the security and competition and show that the intensity for rate-shopping increases 
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with the complexity of the security and competition between rating agencies amplifies 
this problem. 
Similarly, in Japan, CRAs are required to secure personnel who have sufficient expert 
knowledge and skills, to ensure the quality of information used in credit rating 
activities. Further to this, on June 1, 2011 there was an agreement for collaboration in 
terms of supervision and information exchange sharing between the Financial Services 
Agency of Japan (FSA) and the European regulatory body ESMA. This was to facilitate 
cross border cooperation on CRAs. 
The major External Credit Assessment Institutions (ECAIs) play a significant role in the 
standardised approach and securitisation framework of prudential regulation through the 
mapping of each of their credit assessments to the corresponding risk weights. 
However, the global financial crisis of 2007/08 highlighted the risks of over-reliance on 
ECAIs which are dominated by a small pool of credit rating agencies. With the 
implementation of Basel III, several changes to asset risk measurement approach place 
more responsibility on financial institutions to strengthen their own credit risk 
assessment and not to rely solely and mechanistically on external credit ratings (Credit 
Rating Agencies Regulation, CRA III, 2013). These reforms also have implications for 
regulators (and regulatory regimes) and central banks who were overly dependent on 
CRA’s credit ratings. The wider consequence of this is that regulators and central banks 
will need to start using their own judgement when determining what financial 
instruments they will accept for regulatory purposes. With the directives to banks to 
strengthen their internal credit risk assessment processes (based on the Capital 
Requirements Directives, CRD IV) in the EU, banks are positioning themselves to 
further strengthen their own risk analysis of the assets that they hold. CRD IV requires 
banks with material credit risk exposures to shift from the use of ratings by external 
rating agencies to an internal risk based (IRB) models. According to a report by PWC 
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(2014), the European Banking Authority (EBA) monitors banks’ progress against 
parameters, such as the probability of default (PD, loss given default (LGD) generated 
by the IRB models, and discloses, on an annual basis, information on the steps taken by 
institutions to reduce their over-reliance on external credit ratings and on the degree of 
supervisory convergence in Europe. 
Further, the new Basel III Accord in its design makes provisions for the counter-cyclical 
buffer (CCB), which requires banks to raise capital requirements in the build-up to a 
credit boom as buffer against the outcome of the credit boom. Alongside this CCB, the 
proposed buffer for systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), could 
potentially have significant implications for the credit rating process and the way CRAs 
(re)assign bank credit ratings.  
These reforms help to motivate this research. The thesis examines the level of market 
reliance on the information content of credit rating actions as well as investigating the 
trends in the rating dynamics. In so doing, it provides a better understanding of the 
workings of the credit rating agencies. For example, ESMA (2014) argue that 
downgrades usually lag behind market sentiment, in part because the CRAs need more 
time to carry out their detailed analysis. This motivates part of this thesis on the impact 
of credit rating news announcements. Another illustration of the apparent lag in credit 
rating agency’s reaction is the case of the yields on Greece and Irish government debts, 
which rose long before credit rating agencies downgraded their debt (Mnyanda and 
Meakin 2012). Further, the CRA III directives stipulate the adoption of specific and 
rigorous methodologies (capturing all relevant variables) for rating sovereign debt. The 
accurate capture of the sovereign rating is important for banks. In most cases, sovereign 
ratings serve as a ceiling for bank ratings within a particular country and the results of 
this thesis show that it impacts on the final rating assigned to banks.  
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 Regulatory oversight of the credit rating industry 2.7.2
In order to avoid conflicts of interest between the CRAs and the firms they rate, the 
various national and global regulators provide oversight that ensures good practice in 
the industry. The scandals that resulted from the financial crises of early 2000 and 2007-
08 (relating specifically to the structured finance market) highlight the fact that CRAs 
have to be competent, diligent, transparent, independent and trustworthy to ensure a 
stable and functioning capital market. However, Ustig (2010) argues that any approach 
to regulating the CRAs must address the question of what should be regulated and with 
what tools - in other words, how should CRAs be regulated? There is quite extension 
regulation of the credit rating industry. At one end, the CRAs may regulate themselves 
while at the other end of the spectrum there is the government as the regulatory 
authority. For self-regulation to work, that is, allowing CRAs to set their own codes of 
conduct, there is a need for an effective supervision that would reveal if there are 
breaches in these codes and more importantly there must be identifiable sanctions for 
any breach. 
The regulatory oversight of the credit rating industry may be viewed from three major 
perspectives: global, the US and the EU. Table 2.4 illustrates the regulation of the credit 
rating industry before and after the global financial crisis. Prior to the crisis of 2007/08, 
IOSCO maintained that credit rating agencies could voluntarily comply with its code of 
conduct. More importantly, CRAs were expected to incorporate the IOSCO code into 
their own codes of conduct or explain in clear terms why certain aspects had not been 
adopted, that is, ‘comply or explain’. This voluntary compliance focuses on the areas of: 
the quality and integrity of the entire rating process; the issue of conflicts of interest; 
CRA responsibilities to the investing public and issuers; and the public disclosure of the 
CRA’s own code of conduct. There were no mechanisms in place to force the CRAs to 
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comply, nor was there any reference to government regulation of the credit rating 
industry. 
However, most CRAs, and especially the major agencies, already had their own codes 
of conduct incorporated into their objectives. Hence, there was an internationally 
accepted framework of self-regulation. After the financial crises, however, IOSCO 
revised its code of conduct and strengthened its position. Some of its demands were for 
the CRAs to increase their public disclosure, improve the quality of their rating 
processes, and ensure that there is constant monitoring and timeliness of ratings. All of 
these measures aimed to ensure that credit rating agencies function in the way that they 
were intended to. 
Table 2.4: Summary of the regulatory oversight of credit rating agencies 
 Before the Crisis After the Crisis 
IOSCO  
 
 
 
 
 
 
US(SEC)  
Voluntary compliance by the CRAs 
(‘comply or explain basis’). No 
enforcement mechanism / government 
regulations. Agencies develop own 
code of conduct 
 
Informal recognition of CRAs by US 
SEC (NRSROs). No regulation of 
credit rating process including 
procedures and methodologies. Credit 
Rating Reform Act 2006.  
Revised its code of conduct 
framework. Increased public 
disclosure. Differentiated 
structured finance products from 
other non-structured assets  
 
Enhanced disclosure of 
performance statistics and rating 
methodologies. 
 
EU(ESMA) 
 
Relied heavily on voluntary adherence 
to the IOSCO codes. External credit 
rating assessment only to be provided 
by credit rating agencies recognised by 
national authorities. 
 
Application to ESMA for 
registration if CRAs want their 
ratings to be used in the EU. 
Constant supervision by the EU 
(ESMA) of registered CRAs. 
 
Source: Author’s interpretation of the various regulatory oversights of the CRAs 
 
Further, the IOSCO (2008) report suggests that CRAs are too slow to review existing 
ratings and make downgrades as appropriate, and highlights the possible conflict of 
interest arising from CRAs advising issuers on how to design structured financial 
products. In addition, the IOSCO (2012) survey report provides a comprehensive 
description of the key risk controls implemented by the CRAs to promote the integrity 
of the credit rating process and the procedures put in place to manage conflicts of 
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interest. This provides a better understanding of the workings of the CRAs and allows 
CRAs to compare their internal controls and procedures with those of their peers. 
Further, the IOSCO (2015) presents changes to the definition of credit rating
2
, to 
provide more clarity by replacing “opinion” with “assessment”. The modification 
reflects the fact that under the provisions of the IOSCO CRA Code (2015), CRAs 
should strive to determine credit ratings: (1) using methodologies that are rigorous, (2) 
that reflect all information known and are believed to be relevant at the time when the 
credit rating is determined; (3) using analysts that have appropriate knowledge and 
expertise; and (4) that are free of bias and not influenced by conflicts. 
Regulation of the credit rating industry in the US prior to the financial crisis could be 
traced back to 1975 when there was an informal recognition of the CRAs through the 
designation of Nationally Recognised Statistical Rating Organisations (NRSROs). This 
allowed the use of ratings by financial institutions to satisfy part of their regulatory 
requirements. The regulation at this stage was minimal, with very little oversight, as the 
role of ratings was dependent on market acceptance rather than on regulatory rules. 
However in 2006, the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act was passed in the US which 
gave the SEC legal authority over CRAs. Some of the legal oversight is in line with 
IOSCO and includes greater disclosure of information on internal standards and 
policies, as well as the rating methodologies used by the CRAs. In addition, the 
regulatory authorities could also conduct on-site inspections of CRAs and impose 
disciplinary action if there is a violation of the law. After the global financial crisis of 
2007/08, there was an amendment of the Act (Amendments to Rules for NRSRO, 
Exchange Act Release 34-59342, 2009) and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (2010), which now stipulates that there should be even greater 
                                                 
2
 The term “credit rating” is defined in the 2008 Code as “an opinion regarding the creditworthiness of an 
entity, a credit commitment, a debt or debt-like security or an issuer of such obligations, expressed using 
an established and defined ranking system” (IOSCO 2008: 5). 
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and enhanced disclosure of performance statistics and rating methodologies. Other 
requirements include enhanced record keeping and practice that minimizes conflicts of 
interest, especially between CRAs and clients. In August 2014, the US SEC adopted 
rules regarding NRSRO reports of internal controls over the ratings process and the 
transparency of NRSRO ratings performance. This includes steps to be followed when 
adopting or revising credit ratings procedures and methodologies and adopt standards 
for NRSRO analysts including rules regarding ratings symbols. 
The EU relies heavily on voluntary adherence to the IOSCO code. For credit rating 
agencies to act as external credit assessment institutions under the standardized 
approach of the Basel III framework, they need to be recognised by the authorities and 
satisfy criteria set by supervisors concerning objectivity, independence, continuous 
monitoring, and transparency. The global financial crisis of 2007/8 led to more stringent 
requirements. One resulting effect of the crisis is that all rating agencies that wanted 
their credit ratings to be used in the EU need to apply for registration with CESR, and to 
be subjected to regular supervision. Some of the other stringent rules imposed by the 
EU also include: ‘prohibition from advisory services – which could limit conflicts of 
interest; enhanced disclosure and transparency requirements; differentiation of complex 
products and stronger internal governance mechanisms’ (Katz et al., 2009: 5). The 
reforms within the EU are driven by the ESMA. In 2014, the ESMA publish a report on 
the Use of Credit Ratings by Financial Intermediaries Article 5(a) of the CRA 
Regulation. This report states that “the European Banking Authority (EBA), the 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and ESMA shall not 
refer to credit ratings in their guidelines, recommendations and draft technical standards 
where such references have the potential to trigger sole or mechanistic reliance on credit 
ratings by the competent authorities, the sectoral competent authorities” (p. 7). They 
argue that the goal of this principle is to reduce the cliff effects from CRA ratings that 
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can amplify procyclicality and cause systemic disruption (i.e. mitigate risks over credit 
cycles and not allow say a downgrade to spread to other part of the financial system). 
However, the use of external ratings is also driven by investors who often refer to 
external credit ratings before buying shares of a fund, or when guiding investment 
managers on the basis of a tailored investment mandate.  
The IOSCO Consultation Report (2015) stresses the importance for asset managers to 
have the appropriate expertise and processes in place to be able to assess the credit 
quality of a financial instrument or counterparty. The report further emphasises that in 
performing such an assessment, asset managers may choose to use external credit 
ratings, however these should only be used as one element among others of the internal 
credit assessment process. 
2.8 Summary 
This chapter reviews the credit rating industry with a view to understanding its 
dynamics and trends over the sample period. The credit rating industry has grown 
significantly since the 1970s when the US established the NRSRO. Evidence shows that 
credit rating agencies are an important component of the financial market. Even though 
the ratings they produce do not price instruments, their information content has become 
highly valuable in the decision making process of market participants. The chapter 
examines the credit rating industry from four main perspectives: the nature of the credit 
ratings and the rating system; the role and criticism of credit ratings; the rating process; 
the regulatory use of ratings; and the regulatory oversight of credit ratings. 
Credit rating is a reflection of the creditworthiness of an issue or issuer and is usually 
measured on an ordinal scale. The major credit rating agencies employ letters to 
indicate the relative standing of the ratings within the major rating categories. The 
industry has experienced a shift in the business model, from an initial subscriber-pay 
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model to an issue-pay model. Despite concerns about conflicts of interest that this 
generates, the model has been maintained over the last few decades. It has also led to 
the generation of huge revenue for the CRAs. In order to break into new markets and 
maintain competition, the CRAs introduced unsolicited ratings. This involves assigning 
ratings to firms and issues based on publicly available information. Credit rating 
agencies have become an integral part of the financial market, performing salient roles 
ranging from reducing the cost of information and market access to regulatory roles in 
the calculation of risk-weighted assets. The use of credit rating as a measure of credit 
risk within a bank’s portfolio is changing under the new Basel III Accord.  
There are unrealistic expectations by users and market participants regarding what 
ratings actually mean. The over-reliance on the information contents of ratings may 
have contributed to the global financial crisis where grossly inaccurate ratings of exotic 
instruments resulted in huge financial losses for investors. Similarly Goh and 
Ederington (1999) maintain that credit rating changes and their information content do 
not add value to the market. Basel III presents new challenges for the users of credit 
rating in measuring credit risk, with the new regulation being driven towards reduced 
reliance on ECAIs via the standardized approached. Banks are now being encouraged to 
develop their own internal rating based models for credit risk assessments. The Basel III 
requirements are consistent with the several changes to US asset risk weightings driven 
by the Dodd-Frank Act requirement to remove from US regulations reliance on external 
credit ratings (e.g., in the context of investments in securitized assets or sovereign debt). 
Within the EU, institutions with a material number of exposures in a given portfolio will 
be required to develop internal ratings for that portfolio and to use external ratings to 
benchmark the resulting capital requirements to their internal credit opinions. 
The pro-cyclical nature of ratings has also come under scrutiny, with evidence showing 
that the claim of through-the-cycle rating may not be realistic as rating agencies are 
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confronted with the trade-off between rating stability and timely response. CRAs are 
sometimes accused of being too lax in rating securities that they are familiar with. 
Similarly a conflict of interest arguably exists between the CRAs and the companies 
they rate. The issuer-pay model creates an avenue for credit rating shopping, where an 
issuer can shop around for a better rating. The global financial crisis also highlights 
laxity in the regulation and oversight of the credit rating industry. There is an over 
reliance on ratings by the regulatory authority, especially within the context of Basel II 
Accord, which Basel III Accord hope to reduce.  
The regulatory reforms within the credit rating industry are driven by regulatory 
institutions such as (IOSCO), US (SEC) and EU (ESMA). Their reforms introduced 
since the global financial crisis focus on the need for a revised code of conduct within 
the credit rating industry including, but not limited to enhanced disclosure, reduction in 
the over-reliance of ratings by market participants, and addressing conflicts of interest. 
These reforms should result in increased competition, enhanced internal control, 
disclosure of greater statistical information, as well as a more consistent application of 
rating symbols and definitions.   
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 REVIEW OF BANK CREDIT RISK EXPOSURE  CHAPTER 3.
 
3.1 Introduction 
Credit risk is the possibility of incurring a loss as the result of a borrower or 
counterparty failing to meet its financial obligations or as a result of the deterioration in 
the credit quality of the borrower or counterparty (Bessis, 2010). In the event of a 
customer default, the loss incurred by a bank is expressed as the outstanding amount 
owed by the debtor, less any recoveries, e.g. from liquidation of collateral. A change in 
the credit quality of the counterparty has an impact on the valuation of assets eligible for 
fair value measurement.  Switzer and Wang (2013) maintain that the credit risk of banks 
is recognised as one of the key features of the liquidity panic in the US financial system 
and the global financial crisis of 2007/08. The crisis underscores the importance of 
adequate risk management, efficient regulation and supervisory oversight for banking 
institutions around the world. Thus these two issues (risk culture in banks and banking 
regulatory reforms) present a couple of the key motivations for thesis, because they both 
have significant impact on the way international banks are perceived not just the CRAs, 
but also the global financial market. 
The 2007/08 global financial crisis renewed interests in the risk culture of banks and 
their effects on the way banks are run and managed. There is no doubt that the failures 
of risk culture, which permitted excessive and uncontrolled risk-taking were at the heart 
of the financial crisis (Jackson, 2014). This view is supported by Ernst and Young 
(2014) who maintain that risk culture in banks is driven by continuing high-profile 
conduct failings and growing pressure from regulators to tighten controls on risk 
behaviour in banks. This is further reinforced by McKinsey and Company (2013), who 
argues that the risk culture in failed banks can be traced to the failings of corporate 
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governance in these banks. Boards and senior management are facing growing scrutiny 
and pressure from stakeholders to tighten internal controls and reduce high-risk 
behaviour. The impact of rising litigation costs, steep fines and reputational damage has 
been a catalyst for banks to re-evaluate and strengthen their risk governance 
frameworks (FCA, 2015). Stulz (2014) notes that across international banks, boards are 
adding new committees to more closely monitor business ethics and conducts. All these 
create interesting issues for the CRAs in their assessments of an international bank’s 
credit rating. This thesis provides an opportunity to contribute to literature by 
incorporating measures of corporate governance within its bank credit rating 
determinant equation. 
In addition, this thesis introduces another important issue in its examination of bank 
ratings. This relates to the subsidy a bank gets by being too-big-to-fail. This notion has 
not only aggravated the risk culture, complacency and moral hazard issues in banks, it 
forms an important consideration for the largest CRAs in their assessment of bank 
ratings. For example, Fitch publishes a support rating floor (SRF) that reflects its view 
about the likelihood of government support for a bank or its holding company. Further, 
one may argue that when market participants expect financial institutions to receive 
support, they under-price their risk, and this results in excessive risk-taking (moral 
hazard) and pressures competing firms to do likewise. However, the sweeping reforms 
in the financial industry particularly in the US and in the EU (e.g. Walker, 2009; Dodd-
Frank Act, 2010; Vickers Report, 2012; Liikanen report, 2012) all aim to reduce the 
influence of this notion on risk assessments of banks. The investigation of the 
determinants of international bank credit rating presents an opportunity to examine the 
impact of banks’ changing risk culture, business model and corporate governance in the 
wake of the global financial crisis. 
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The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the importance of 
bank credit ratings. Section 3.3 discusses the influence of other bank related risks on 
credit rating assignment. Section 3.4 discusses how rating has been influenced by global 
regulations, particularly the new Basel III Accord and the regulatory reforms at all 
levels across the world. Section 3.5 explores the relationship between credit risk and the 
corporate governance structure of banks. This section reviews the extensive literature 
that has emerged, focusing on the effects of corporate governance on bank risk-taking 
attitude. Section 3.6 examines how financial innovations impacts on the perception of 
CRAs in the assessments of bank credit rating. The impact of the financial crisis on 
banks is reviewed in Section 3.7. The chapter summary is presented in Section 3.8. 
3.2 Importance of understanding the determinants of bank credit ratings 
External credit ratings can be regarded as comprehensive measures of risk, because they 
incorporate all of the risk factors that are perceived to be relevant by rating agencies. 
However, following the 2007/08 global financial crisis, the role of the major credit 
rating agencies and the ratings they assign to banks have come under increased search 
light, with CRAs recalibrating their rating scales and providing greater disclosure about 
their methodologies (Fitch, 2015). The difficulty of the CRAs to assign the appropriate 
ratings to banks in a timely manner is evidenced by the series of downgrades in the 
global banking industry following the 2007/08 global financial crisis. Parker and 
Tarashev (2011) argue that prior to the 2007/08 global financial crisis, credit ratings 
were not particularly successful in recognising the build-up of pervasive risk exposures 
in the financial system or in identifying which banks were most exposed to them. The 
crisis highlights important lessons about systemic risk and the volatility of banks’ 
performance, weakened finances of some sovereign providers of support, and policy 
initiatives to discourage banks from seeking external support (Kenny and Morgan, 
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2011). The financial crisis has given rise to policy initiatives that aim to weaken the 
reliance of regulators and investors on rating agencies. 
 The risk assessments of banks for the purpose of evaluating their credit risk exposure 
(and the assigned credit ratings) are quite unique and different from those of other firms. 
The nature of banks’ business as financial intermediaries, and their interconnectedness 
to other sectors of the economy shape the risk factors they are exposed to. The 
assessment of a bank’s creditworthiness involves not just an examination of the strength 
of its balance sheet; it includes an evaluation of the degree of liquidity risk, systemic 
risk, access to government support, the level of internal credit risk control, as well as 
issues concerning corporate governance. Banks differ from other firms not just in size, 
but also in their asset and liability structure, capital and liquidity requirements, and 
funding structure. The investigation of the determinants of international bank credit 
rating present an opportunity to examine the impact of banks’ changing risk culture, 
business model and corporate governance in the wake of the global financial crisis. 
It is thus important to investigate the determinants of a bank credit rating due the failure 
of the CRAs to adequately capture the true ratings of international banks in the build-up 
to the 2007/08 global financial crisis. In addition, following this crisis, and in light of 
the current regulatory reforms within the banking and credit rating industries, this thesis 
investigates how the CRAs methodologies have changed in response to the crisis. Bank 
credit rating methodologies are changing in response to regulatory pressure and the 
volatile nature of the banking industry following the 2007/08 global financial crisis. 
This is evident in many of the credit rating documentations and reports. Packer and 
Tarashev (2011) argue that major credit ratings agencies are implementing significant 
changes to their bank rating methodologies, seeking public comments. Further, there are 
recalibrations in the relative importance attached to rating factors.  
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The issue of bank capital and bank liquidity position are fundamental to the 
understanding of the role of banks, their risk appetite, and how these risks are managed. 
In the traditional banking business model, banks transform many small deposits of a 
short-term maturity into fewer longer-term loans. This ‘maturity transformation’ is an 
inherent part of a bank’s traditional business model. Banks’ business models have 
changed significantly, in particular, during the period leading up to the global financial 
crisis. This has been motivated by the development of financial instruments for 
transferring credit risk from on- to off-balance sheet. This further complicates an 
accurate assessment of overall bank risk exposure.   
In addition, Nijsken and Wagner (2011) suggest that the business model of some banks 
relies on excessive leverage and short-term financing over time. An Institute of 
International Finance (2008) report argues that the inability of banks to withstand 
market shock is due to series of factors including risk governance weaknesses, 
misaligned incentives, incomplete risk capture in management reports, and ineffective 
market discipline. It is notable that market stress following the 2007/08 global financial 
crisis affected many major financial institutions. According to the Credit Risk 
Management Policy Group III (2008) report, a number of banks had weak controls over 
balance sheet growth and off-balance sheet risks, as well as inadequate communication 
and aggregation across business lines and functions. 
A bank’s capital may be viewed as a potential mitigating factor in the transmission of 
shocks through bank lending (Kapan and Minoui, 2013). However, the proposals for 
new regulations (in particular, Basel III Accord) have been spurred by the fact that 
banks which required government support during the crisis actually met thresholds of 
capital adequacy before the crisis (Frag et al., 2013). Not only did capital ratios fail to 
raise concerns ahead of the crisis, they also failed to accurately predict the institutions 
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that incurred the highest losses or ultimately failed (IMF, 2009; Mayes and Wood, 
2009; Haldane and Madouros, 2012). 
The run up to the 2007/08 global financial crisis highlights weaknesses in the credit risk 
management and internal controls of banks. A report by the Senior Supervisors Group 
(SSG, 2009) argues that the global financial crisis highlighted significant vulnerabilities 
of banks whose business models rely heavily on uninterrupted access to secured 
financing markets. Excessive reliance on short-term wholesale funding of long-term 
illiquid assets by banks, in particular, cross-border financing further impeded the ability 
of banks to withstand market shocks. Studies (e.g. Poghosyan and Chiak, 2011; 
Rosengren, 2013) suggest that banks that are less affected by changes in the market had 
conservative and well-structured internal control processes in place prior to the global 
financial crisis. International banks that had significant size and diversification were 
able to draw on other funding sources including a reliance on central bank lending 
facilities. All these mitigated against market stress and shock in the period of the global 
financial crisis. 
Ciro (2013) maintains that during the run up to the 2007/08 global financial crisis there 
were failures on the part of some boards of directors and senior managers of large 
financial institutions to establish, measure, and adhere to a level of risk acceptable to the 
firm. The SSG (2009) report further links the internal control weaknesses of banks to 
compensation programs that conflict with the control objectives of those banks, as well 
as inadequate technological infrastructure that hindered effective risk identification and 
measurement. The Financial Stability Forum (2008) report argues that the standard risk 
management tools used by financial firms in the run up to the 2007/08 global financial 
crisis are not suited for estimating the scale of potential losses in the adverse tail of risk 
distributions for structured credit products.  
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Hence, the issues raised thus far around the changing bank business model, flawed 
ratings, bank risk culture and the push towards an improved methodological approach in 
the rating process motivates this study. It is thus important to investigate the 
determinants of a bank credit rating due the failure of the CRAs to adequately capture 
the true ratings of international banks in the build-up to the 2007/08 global financial 
crisis. 
3.3 Other bank related risks and bank credit rating  
There is a strong link between liquidity risk and credit risk, which has implications for 
bank stability and creditworthiness. The global financial crisis of 2007/08 resulted in 
huge credit risk within the portfolio of bank assets, and this potentially caused a freeze 
in the interbank liquidity market. Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014) argue that each risk 
category has a significant impact on bank default probability and suggest a joint 
management of liquidity risk in conjunction with asset quality and credit risk in a bank. 
Liquidity risk is particularly synonymous with banks, and banks are inherently 
vulnerable especially in their fundamental role in the maturity transformation. A bank 
can thus experience liquidity problems on both sides of the balance sheet, that is, if 
there are significant unexpected loan defaults and, say, large unexpected withdrawals 
from depositors (e.g. bank-run). Cai and Thakor (2008) argue that a bank may be 
motivated to take on excessive credit risk in order to manage its liquidity risk in loan 
markets that have limited competition. 
Studies on financial crises, such as that in 2007/08 (e.g. Diamond and Rajan, 2005; 
Acharya and Viswanathan, 2011; Gorton and Metrick, 2011; He and Xiong, 2012a), 
suggest a positive relationship between liquidity risk and credit risk. The credit rating 
process involves an evaluation of the bank asset quality and the risk associated with the 
deterioration of these assets. Bank failure is linked with either insolvency or an 
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aggregate shortage of liquidity in the system. Diamond and Rajan (2005) argue that 
liquidity problems and insolvency problems interact, and can each cause the other; bank 
failures can themselves cause liquidity shortages.  
In a similar study, Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014) investigate the relationship between 
these two major sources of bank default: liquidity and credit risk employing a sample of 
US commercial banks during the period 1998-2000. They argue that the financial crisis 
of 2007/08 was driven by large credit risk in banks’ portfolios, and this caused a freeze 
of the market for liquidity. The ultimate risk a bank is exposed to is the risk of going out 
of business. There is therefore the need to examine the effects of the interaction of 
liquidity risk and credit risk on a bank’s probability of default (PD). Acharya and Mora 
(2013) analyse the liquidity provision roles of banks at the individual bank level during 
the global financial crisis of 2007/08. They find that the aggregate liquidity shock at the 
start of the crisis impacted greatly on banks with exposure to drawdowns of 
commitments and credit lines. They argue that these banks, especially those that failed, 
suffered from liquidity shortages just before the actual default. They provide evidence 
to support the argument that the joint occurrence of liquidity risk and credit risk pushed 
banks into default during the global financial crisis. Distressed banks faced liquidity 
issues which resulted in an aggressive drive for deposits that saw them offering high 
commercial deposit (CD) rates. In another related study, He and Xiong (2012b) provide 
explanations on how liquidity and credit risk jointly cause default.  
Risk concentrations is another area of weakness in banks and it played a key role in the 
financial instability of the banking sector, particularly in the crisis of 2007/8 (Reynolds, 
2009). Bandyopadhyay (2010) argues that concentration risk has direct impact on a 
bank’s portfolio loss and hence its core capital and solvency position. Bonti et al. 
(2006) argue that the term ‘concentration risk’ within the context of banking generally 
refers to risk occurring in credit portfolios, and arises from an uneven distribution of 
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bank loans to individual borrowers (single-name concentration) or in industry and 
service sectors or geographical regions (sectoral concentration). Existing studies in the 
area of bank credit risk exposure focus on credit risk concentration and this is motivated 
by the global banking regulation that stipulates the increasing use of external and 
internal credit ratings (BCBS, 2006). The Basel Committee has identified the treatment 
of credit concentration risk as one of the main factors which need to be covered by the 
supervisory review process in the implementation of the Basel III Accord.  
The events leading to the 2007/08 collapse of the subprime market in US, where bank 
risk exposure to the housing market created joint concentration in a particular sector, 
exemplifies systematic concentration risk. The economic disruption which affected the 
group of joint borrowers jeopardised the solvency of the entire group of banks involved 
and put the financial stability of the global banking system at risk. The focus of most 
banks’ internal risk management, as well as supervisory and regulatory view, is on 
concentration credit risk at the level of individual institutions. However, this risk is not 
limited to the credit portfolio, and may involve other forms of risks such as market risk 
(trading activities) and liquidity risk (e.g. concentration in liabilities such as the 
concentration of depositors). The most significant concentration risk with implications 
for the solvency of banks is the concentration in credit portfolio at the micro level 
(BCBS, 2005).  
The impact of credit concentration risk depends on the extent of correlation among 
borrowers under various economic conditions. The amount of portfolio credit risk may 
change with macroeconomic conditions. During economic booms, losses may be seen 
as being ‘stored’ and tend not to create any noticeable adverse effects on performance or 
credit quality. However, correlations amongst borrowers in a bank loan portfolio usually 
become very apparent when there is an economic downturn. Banks may hold enough 
risk capital to mitigate against higher level of unexpected losses due to high 
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concentration risk in their portfolios. Nickell et al. (2000) show that the probability of 
default depends on the stage in the business cycle, and that transition matrices tend to 
exhibit a higher frequency of downgrades during recessions and a higher occurrence of 
upgrades during booms.  
The concern about issues related to concentration in bank portfolios is particularly 
important now because of the downgrades to several countries, such as US, Greece, UK, 
Italy, in the period following the financial crisis of 2007/08. Avila et al. (2013) argue 
that concentration of credit exposure constitutes one of the most important causes of 
large losses in banks portfolios, hence the need for proper monitoring and evaluation by 
supervisory authorities. The CRAs’ assessment of the credit quality of banks’ asset 
portfolios pay particular attention to the diversification and the level of correlation 
existing amongst them.   
It is important to understand the determinants of bank credit ratings in light of these 
failings and the crisis that resulted from them. In providing clarity on the issue of bank 
credit rating assignments, this thesis models bank credit rating determinants by 
employing variables that capture the main drivers of bank credit risk. In doing so, the 
thesis investigates the impact of the 2007/08 global financial crisis on bank ratings, 
whilst also testing for any indication of increased stringency in the rating methodologies 
over the sample period. An important consideration in modelling bank credit rating 
determinants is the inclusion of variable(s) that capture external support by banks to be 
able to support their operations. The 2007/08 crisis shows that access to external 
government support (capital injections, asset purchases or liquidity provisions) is 
significant and impacts on a bank’s assigned rating. This thesis employs relevant 
proxies for this variable in the various model specifications (e.g. the too-big-to-fail 
variable). Further, the introduction of other proxies for credit risk and liquidity risk 
measures, couple with an appreciation of the effects of risk concentration build up 
61 
 
within a bank’s asset portfolio provides an opportunity for an holistic approach to 
modelling an international bank’s rating determinants.  
3.4 Global banking regulation 
The financial industry is perhaps the most heavily regulated industry within the 
economy and the banking sector represents the most regulated sector within that 
industry. Events in the last couple of decades indicate that the financial industry is prone 
to crisis and instability. Banking is a very sensitive industry due to the level of 
interconnectivity between institutions, as well as the nature of the core business of the 
industry, i.e. maturity transformation. The significant tendency for contagion, coupled 
with the problem of systemic risk, that is, the risk that problems in one banking 
institution may spread to others, increases bank exposure and makes the industry as a 
whole very vulnerable. Lindquist (2004) argues that as other industries are deregulated, 
capital adequacy regulation becomes more important for banks, and this has resulted in 
an increased focus on banks’ capital to assets ratios. The focus on capital requirements 
as a key instrument of banking regulation is on providing both a cushion during adverse 
economic conditions and a mechanism for preventing risk-taking ex ante (Jokipii and 
Milne, 2010). The Basel Committee on Bank Supervision (BCBS) performs the role of 
an international advisory authority on bank regulation and has been at the forefront of 
promulgating guidance in ensuring healthy banking across global banking systems  
The 2007/08 global financial crisis provided an opportunity for the BCBS to implement 
fundamental restructuring of the ways risk management and regulations are carried out 
in the financial industry. These reforms (contained in Basel III Accord) aim to 
strengthen global capital and liquidity rules, as well as promoting a more resilient 
banking industry. The framework of the proposed Basel III now includes bank stress 
testing and market liquidity risks, in addition to the regulation of bank capital adequacy. 
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This section examines the effects of the evolving regulatory framework on bank credit 
risk assessments under the Basel Accord. It focuses on the Basel III Accord, while 
discussing the issues and implications of the changes leading up to its implementation. 
 Basel III Accord and its implications for credit risk assessment 3.4.1
Credit ratings measure the creditworthiness of an entity and as such, measure an aspect 
of credit risk relating to the amount of regulatory capital that should be set aside to 
cover the risky assets in a bank’s books. The global financial crisis has shown several 
weaknesses in the global regulatory framework and in banks’ risk management 
practices. In response to the crisis, the BCBS began consultation to address the 
deficiencies in financial regulation and strengthen bank capital requirements by 
increasing liquidity and decreasing bank leverage. This gave rise to the Basel III Accord 
in 2010 whose full implementation is currently proposed for March 2019.   
Table 3.1 presents some of the reforms to the Basel II framework by the BCBS in 2009. 
These include enhanced risk coverage and counterparty credit risk disclosure. There is 
now an increased capital requirement for the trading book and complex securitization 
positions. The new regulation, Basel III, now adds the following reforms: the 
calculation of capital requirements for counterparty credit risk (CCR) based on stressed 
outputs; the introduction of a capital charge for potential mark-to-market losses, that is, 
credit valuation risk; and strengthening standards for collateral management and raising 
CCR management standards (Accenture, 2013). These are underpinned by a leverage 
ratio that serves to constrain excess leverage in the banking system and provide an extra 
layer of protection against model risk and measurement error. Finally, the Committee 
introduces a number of macroprudential elements into the capital framework to help 
contain systemic risks arising from procyclicality and from the interconnectedness of 
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financial institutions. Paul Tucker
3
 maintains that one of the implications of the new 
macroprudential guidelines as contained in the UK’s proposed banking reform to 
address the too-big-to-fail notion (which at the moment, effectively subsidised longer-
term bond finance for banks). This notion presents an important element for this thesis 
as the Basel III deferred implementation on how to deal with SIFIs (systemically 
important financial institutions, i.e. TBTF, “Too-Big-To-Fail” institutions). By 
including a proxy for the measure of the TBTF, this thesis makes a significant 
contribution and adds policy implication findings to the existing studies.  
Table 3.1: Summary of the key amendments to Basel II Accord (the new Basel III) 
Source: Bank for International Settlement (2014) *Used with permission of the publisher 
                                                 
3 ‘Banking reform and macroprudential regulation: implications for banks’ capital structure and credit conditions’, 
speech given by Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor Financial Stability, at the SUERF/Bank of Finland Conference 2013, 
‘Banking after regulatory reform – business as usual’, Helsinki Regulation Authority Board  
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For a bank to be assigned a particular rating, CRAs take into consideration the impact of 
changing capital regulation on banks’ credit risk exposure. However, Berger et al. 
(2008) maintain that most banks prior to the 2007/08 global financial crisis held capital 
in excess of the regulatory minimum requirement. They suggest that this could have 
been motivated by the advantages linked with high economic capital and external 
pressure from regulators and/or financial markets. Despite the high levels of capital 
adequacy in banks in the pre-crisis period, the onset of the crisis raised serious concerns 
about the practical role capital plays in strengthening banks and the impact it has on 
banks’ credit ratings. 
The proposed Basel III reforms raise both the quality and size of the regulatory capital 
base and enhance the risk coverage of the capital framework. The aim of Basel III is to 
put in place structures that enable banks to improve their loss-absorption capacity in 
both going concern and liquidation scenarios (PWC, 2011). In terms of the quality of 
capital, common equity and retained earnings are required to be the predominant 
components of Tier 1. The direct implication of this for banks is the raising of 
significant capital along with the retention of profits and reduced dividends. This may 
impact positively on the assessments of banks by credit rating agencies due to the 
availability of a more reliable capital buffer to cushion banks in times of shock. The 
level of capital capacity results in an increase in the minimum common equity Tier 1 
from 2.0 percent to 4.5 percent. Further, the capital conservation buffer of 2.5 percent 
will now be required under the Basel III, bringing the total common equity requirement 
to 7.0 percent. This implies that banks will face additional capital requirements 
(common equity).  
Basel III develops a counter-cyclical buffer which will be implemented by increases to 
the capital conservation buffer during periods of excessive credit growth. The internal 
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rating based (IRB) approach in Basel II has the tendency to encourage procyclical 
behaviour on the part of banks, i.e. maintaining lower amounts of capital in good times, 
and banks adopting the IRB methodology may have had lower estimates of risk for their 
assets. In a recession or time of economic downturns, banks are forced to have capital 
reflecting higher risk levels. This may have resulted in banks, lending less to the 
economy, which might inhibit growth and economic recovery (Cummins and Phillips, 
2009). This can impact on the credit rating of a bank due to it taking more risky actions 
either to shore up its deposits or to increase its capital. Hence the main objectives of the 
countercyclical buffer are to: reduce any excess cyclicality of the minimum capital 
requirement; promote more forward-looking provisions; conserve capital to build 
buffers at individual banks and in the banking sector that can be used in periods of 
stress-testing. The exact amount of the countercyclical buffer is determined by national 
regulators (BIS, 2010) and will generally be determined by the state and amount of 
credit in a given economy. The more the credit lending, the higher is the buffer.  
An underlying cause of the global financial crisis was the build-up of excessive on- and 
off-balance sheet leverage in the banking system. The Basel III framework introduced a 
simple, transparent, non-risk based leverage ratio to act as a credible supplementary 
measure to the risk-based capital requirements (BCBS, 2014). The leverage ratio acts as 
a non-risk-sensitive backstop measure to reduce the risk of built-up of excessive 
leverage in the financial institution and in the financial system as a whole (PwC 2011). 
The potential implication of the introduction of the leverage ratio in Basel III Accord is 
that it could reduce lending and presents a clear incentive to banks to strengthen their 
capital position. Banks may thus be required by the market and the rating agencies to 
maintain a higher leverage ratio than requested by the regulators.                                                                                                                             
Another regulatory response to the global financial crisis is the application of 
comprehensive stress testing techniques by central banks and supervisory authorities to 
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assess the vulnerabilities of the financial systems to credit risk. The stress test focuses 
on linking macroeconomic drivers of stress with bank-specific measures of credit risk 
(Foglia, 2009). Schuermann (2013) argues that the reason for the increasing use of 
stress testing is because existing techniques such as regulatory capital ratios are no 
longer informative and are heavily discounted by the market. The regulatory focus on 
stress testing is driven by need for regulators to be pre-emptive about the possible loss 
by banks and to help mitigate moral hazard. 
Prior to the 2007/08 global financial crisis, the bank stress testing approach in some 
banks was executed as an isolated exercise within the risk function with little interaction 
with other business areas. The first use of the regulatory stress testing approach was in 
the US in 2009, and it allowed for the disclosure of information on the financial sector’s 
potential losses under exceptional but plausible shocks. Other countries and regions, 
particularly in those countries where the crisis impacts were severe, such as the UK and 
the EU zone, have followed the US by introducing regular, comprehensive stress testing 
regimes. A survey by the PwC (2014) shows that most banks expect to develop their 
existing stress testing frameworks over the next three years (up to 2017). This is in 
recognition of the fact that this regulatory development will place increasing demands 
on bank stress testing capabilities. 
This potentially helps regulators to assess the significance of the financial systems’ 
vulnerabilities. Apart from applying a forward-looking macroeconomic perspective, it 
allows for the assessment of risk exposure across institutions (World Economic and 
Financial Surveys, 2014).  The European Banking Authority, EBA (2014) maintains 
that banks within the EU zone should undergo formal stress testing of their banking 
books, and this focuses on credit risk. Further, Eurozone banks, which are impacted by 
the upcoming ECB/EBA stress test in the first quarter of 2016, are beginning to prepare, 
as most have focused their efforts to date on preparing for the asset quality reviews 
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(EBA, 2015). The implementation of the bank-wide stress test approach as part of the 
Basel III Accord could potentially improve the credit ratings of banks and positively 
impact on the overall health of the global financial system.  
3.5 Bank credit risk and corporate governance structure 
The central theme in an issuer’s credit rating process is the analysis of its risk exposure 
and propensity to take on more risk. The importance of corporate governance, in 
particular the composition of the board of directors as well as ownership structure, is 
that it contributes to the risk-taking attitude of a bank (Buch and Delong, 2008). The 
major rating agencies also support this position by maintaining that they incorporate 
information about corporate governance structure in their rating process. Standard and 
Poor’s for example, maintains that in the credit analysis process of a corporate issuer 
such as a bank, they typically consider non-financial factors including management and 
corporate governance attitude. These they argue enable an assessment of the risk 
tolerance and financial policy of such an issuer. The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (2010) also reiterate the importance of promoting sound corporate 
governance practices for banking organisations. One of the highlights of its guidance is 
that ‘risks generated by operations that lack transparency should be adequately 
managed’ (p. 5). More importantly, the Basel guidance suggests ways of improving 
bank corporate governance including the role of the credit rating agencies in reviewing 
and assessing the impact of corporate governance practices on a bank’s risk profile. 
Switzer and Wang (2013) argue that the mismanagement of the credit risk of banks in 
the period leading up to the 2007/08 global financial crisis was as a result of poor 
governance practice. This supports the widely held belief that the failure of bank 
corporate governance played a central role in the global financial crisis. There is 
significant evidence to suggest that the corporate governance mechanism contributes 
significantly to risk-taking of banks and can thus impact on the creditworthiness 
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assessment by rating agencies. Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) point out that the PD of a 
firm depends on the availability of credible information to evaluate default risk and 
agency costs. These are determined by the corporate governance mechanism of the firm. 
Laeven and Levine (2009) further suggest that bank risk-taking varies with the 
comparative power of shareholders within the governance structure. Most of the studies 
on bank corporate governance examine the relationship between bank risk and 
performance, particularly after the global financial crisis (Erkens et al., 2010; Minton et 
al., 2010; Mongiardino and Plath, 2010; Cornett et al., 2011; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 
2011). Others investigate how executive compensation and ownership structures 
influence corporate governance (Wilson and Williams, 2000; Goddard et al., 2004; 
Chen et al., 2006; Mehran and Rosenberg, 2008). These studies are relevant to 
understanding the ways in which credit rating agencies assign a rating to a bank. The 
findings enable judgement to be made on the probability that a particular bank will 
behave in such a way that will increase the overall PD or its ability to honour its 
contractual obligations.  
Cornett et al. (2010) and Minton et al. (2010) investigate the relationship between 
various corporate governance mechanisms and bank performance during the 2007/08 
global financial crisis. Using a sample of about 300 publicly traded US banks, Cornett 
et al. find that their corporate governance proxies (number of independent directors and 
institutional ownership) have positive relationship with bank performance during the 
crisis period. For example, an increase in institutional ownership and independence of 
the board leads to better bank crisis performance. Similarly, Minton et al. show that the 
financial expertise of the board is positively related to risk-taking and bank performance 
before the crisis, but negatively related to risk-taking in the crisis period. 
Erkens et al. (2010) investigate the relationship between corporate governance and the 
performance during the global financial crisis of 2007/08 employing an international 
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sample of 296 financial firms from 30 countries. They find that firms with higher 
institutional ownership experienced worse stock returns during the crisis. They argue 
that banks with higher institutional ownership engage in riskier dealing prior to the 
crisis, which results in larger shareholder losses during the crisis period. 
Mongiardino and Plath (2010) argue that risk governance in large banks has only 
improved slightly despite the increasing pressure from regulators, and even though 
largest banks have a dedicated risk committee, they meet very infrequently. Following 
their survey of 20 large banks in the US they suggest three remedies for best banking 
risk governance: 1) a dedicated board-level risk committee of which 2) a majority 
should be independent, and 3) that the Chief Risk Officer is part of the bank’s executive 
board. Hau and Thum (2009) however, argue that most bank risk committees are not 
comprised of enough independent and financially knowledgeable members. In a related 
study, Beltratti and Stulz (2012) investigate the link between corporate governance and 
bank performance during the credit crisis using an international sample of 503 banks 
from July 2007 to December 2008. They base their study on the argument that there is a 
correlation between governance and unobserved characteristics of banks. Beltratti and 
Stulz argue that banks that are under pressure to exceed set performance levels took 
risks aimed at maximizing shareholders’ wealth before the crisis, but were costly post-
crisis because of outcomes that were not expected when the risks were taken ab initio. 
They find that banks with more shareholder-friendly boards as measured by the 
Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ) performed worse during the crisis, implying 
that good governance does not necessarily have to be in the best interests of the 
shareholders. The CGQ is metric developed by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) 
that rates publicly traded companies in terms of the quality of their corporate.  
Most crises originating from within the banking sector may be attributed to ‘bad’ 
banking or ‘bad’ policy, whereby the management of banks take excessive risks at the 
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expense of their investors. Akhigbe and Martin (2008) and Pathan (2009) examine the 
relationship between corporate governance and bank risk-taking. Akhigbe and Martin 
study the impact of the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley rule on the changes in the capital 
market measure of risk for US financial services firms. The study employs a sample of 
768 US financial services firms for the year 2002 to capture disclosure and governance. 
They find that the risk measures of financial firms vary inversely with the strength of 
corporate governance. Pathan (2009) also examines the relevance of bank board 
structure on bank risk-taking using a sample of 212 large US bank holding companies 
over the period 1997-2004 (with 1,534 observations). In particular, the author 
investigates whether strong bank boards and CEO power affect bank risk-taking. The 
study finds that banks with stronger corporate governance mechanisms have a higher 
profitability in 2008, suggesting that good governance may negate the influence of any 
adverse effects of the financial crisis on bank financial performance.  
Studies examining the impact of bank corporate governance on credit/default risk and 
risk-taking employ several proxies for governance quality: board size, board 
independence, the separation between CEO and Chairman, institutional ownership, 
insider holdings by top management and directors, and directors with CEO positions in 
private and public organisations (Ryan and Wiggins, 2004; Laeven and Levine, 2009; 
Aebi et al., 2012). From a theoretical point, the resource dependence theory provides a 
useful framework for examining the significance of board size. The theory proposes that 
large board benefits firms because diversified board members could provide greater 
expertise, access to resources, and high quality advice (Hillman et al., 2007). On the 
contrary, agency theory suggests that large board are not efficient due to coordination 
and communication problems, director free rider problems and internal conflicts among 
directors (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Johnson et al., 1996; Dalton et al., 2007). 
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There is evidence to show that board independence is negatively related to risk-taking in 
banks. Pathan (2009) reports that the coefficient of his proxy for board independence, 
that is, the percentage of the total number of directors who are independent, is negative 
and statistically significant in relation to all bank risk measures employed. Similarly, 
Faleye and Krishnan (2010) find that board independence reduces riskiness measured as 
the borrower’s long-term S&P credit rating; this is not however related to the bank’s 
decision to diversify its lending risk through loan syndication. Ellul and Yerramilli 
(2013) investigate whether strong and independent risk management is significantly 
related to bank risk-taking and performance using a sample of 74 large US BHCs over 
the period 1995 to 2010. They construct a Risk Management Index (RMI), using five 
variables that measure the strength of a bank’s risk management. Their findings indicate 
that banks with a high RMI value in the period prior to the global financial crisis were 
less risky and performed better (lower tail risk, lower non-performing loans) than before 
the global financial crisis. Similarly, Aebi et al. (2012) find that banks in which the 
Chief Risk Officer reports directly to the board of directors performed significantly 
better in the credit crisis. Several studies on financial firms address the issue of the 
impact of CEO duality on risk-taking. CEO duality refers to a situation whereby the 
CEO or an executive director of a bank also doubles as the Chairman of the Board of 
Directors. Evidence suggests that this situation has several implications for the riskiness 
of a bank. Grove et al. (2011) find that CEO duality is negatively associated with bank 
performance and loan quality. Similarly, Faleye and Krishnan (2010) argue that the 
probability of lending to high-risk borrowers increases with CEO-chair duality. On the 
contrary, the study by Pathan (2009) suggests that CEO duality may reduce bank risk. 
The study finds that the coefficient of CEO power (measuring a CEO’s ability to control 
board decisions including CEO duality) is negative across all bank risk measures used 
and is statistically significant in most of his regressions.  
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Using a sample of 287 banks over the period 1989-1993, Simpson and Gleason (1999) 
find a lower probability of financial distress when the chairman of the board is also the 
CEO. Wang et al. (2012) report a negative impact of CEO duality on efficiency. In 
contrast, Aebi et al. (2012) do not find that CEO duality affects buy-and-hold returns in 
their sample of US banks. Berger et al. (2012) examine the role of management 
structures in bank defaults during the global financial crisis of 2007/08. Distinguishing 
between 249 bank failures and 4021 non-default US commercial banks, they do not find 
that CEO duality influences bank default probabilities.   
This thesis contributes significantly to the existing literature because the effect of 
corporate governance on bank credit ratings is modelled. This is in light of the 
important relationship between governance and the risk taking attitude of banks. Sound 
governance and control practices are important in ensuring that banks are operating in 
the best interests of depositors and not taking risky projects that potentially undermine 
the stability of the banking institution or lead to contagion.  
3.6 Financial innovation and banks’ risk assessment 
Several reasons have been adduced for the cause of the 2007/08 global financial crisis. 
In particular, the laxities in regulatory oversight, intense competition, and indiscriminate 
use of financially innovative products have all contributed in one way or the other to the 
crisis (Ciro, 2013; Savona and Kirton, 2013). A growing strand of literature now 
focuses on the various ways through which banks transfer credit risk in the financial 
system, particularly via the process of securitization. Securitization has the potential to 
significantly impact a upon a bank’s insolvency risk, leverage and profitability, all of 
which have varying effects on the credit ratings of a bank. The process allows a bank to 
optimally choose its exposure to different aspects of the credit risk of an underlying 
pool of assets. Using US bank holding company data from 2001-2007, Jiangli and 
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Pritsker (2008) provide evidence that banks increase their risk in response to 
securitization by increasing their leverage.  
According to the Bank of England Financial Stability Report (2009) in the credit bubble 
period, major UK banks securitized 70 per cent of their commercial loans within 120 
days of origination. By temporarily transferring the credit risk of their loans to others, 
banks potentially reduce the likelihood that loan defaults trigger financial distress. 
Similarly, due to the rapid development in financial innovation, banks significantly 
increased the securitization of their assets. However, this could potentially trigger a 
change in behaviour of the affected bank. Wagner (2007) argues that by engaging in 
credit risk transfer, banks may simply take on new risky loans due to their ability to 
easily liquidate these assets in times of crisis. Similarly, Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) 
find that banks that actively engaged in loan sale markets hold a larger share of their 
portfolio in risky assets than banks that are not active in loan sales. Nijskens and 
Wagner (2011) argue that CRT may increase bank risk in a systemic way, even if 
individual bank risk does not increase. Evidence shows that most banks engage in the 
simultaneous buying and selling of credit risk CDS, resulting in banks being too 
correlated with each other (Elsinger et al., 2006; Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007; 
Wagner, 2007). The implication of this is an amplified systemic risk crisis within the 
financial system, since it increases the likelihood of banks incurring joint losses.  
One may argue therefore that the development of the derivative market aided the 
reduction in the total risk of banks. Rule (2001, p.26) argues, for instance, that the 
‘[d]evelopment of [the credit derivatives] markets has clear potential benefits for 
financial stability because they allow the origination and funding of credit to be 
separated from the efficient allocation of the resulting credit risk’. Credit derivatives 
allow credit risk transfer within the banking system and also between banks and non-
bank financial institutions (Hirtle, 2009). This risk transfer is frequently cited as a 
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stabilizing factor in the financial system, reducing concentrations of exposures in 
individual banks and spreading credit risk more widely to those parties best able to bear 
it (Geithner 2006, Greenspan 2005). The development in financial innovative products 
could have particular implications for the opinions of ratings agencies or the internal 
assessments of banks.  
3.7 The global financial crisis of 2007/8 and its implications for banks 
The global financial crisis of 2007/8 impacted significantly upon the liquidity and 
solvency of banks across the world. The decline in profitability affected the banks’ 
ability to generate internal funds, and hence their reliance on external financing 
(Salvador et al., 2014). The consequence of this is an increase in the cost of financing 
and a loss of credit quality. Major international banks in developed economies such as 
the US, the UK, and European Zone collapsed, while others had to be bailed out by 
national governments. The crisis not only impacts upon the commercial sector, but also 
cut across all the major sectors within the financial industry such as insurance and 
investment houses. The period was marked by the collapse of large investment bank 
giants such as Lehman Brothers and Bear Stern and well as the world’s largest insurer 
AIG. In the UK, the onset of the crisis saw a run on Northern Rock, with the Royal 
Bank of Scotland (and by implication NatWest) and Lloyds Banking Group coming 
under state control. The period just prior to the crisis was marked by banks engaging 
heavily in the use of financial and structured products such as the Assets-Backed 
Securities (ABS). The downgrades of these products following the collapse of the 
subprime market in the US had a significant impact on the performance of the 
originating bank’s parent (Higgins et al., 2010). This saw a significant decline in the 
rating notches of banks (downgrades).  
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The aftermath of the crisis witnessed a series of unprecedented policy and regulatory 
changes particularly in the US, the EU, as well as most national governments across the 
world. In the UK for example, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) published the 
Turner Review which highlighted the role of the CRAs in the 2007/08 financial crisis. 
The FSA (2009) report suggests that there was insufficient consideration of market and 
macroeconomic developments as drivers of bank credit ratings. Other policy changes 
focus on the recapitalization of banks and the injection of funds into the banking 
industry with the aim of providing both fiscal and monetary stimulus to renew market 
confidence in the banks (Valdez and Molyneux, 2013).  
The Bank for International Settlement (BIS, 2009) identifies certain key 
macroeconomic and microeconomic factors that led to the 2007/08 global financial 
crisis. These factors range from the imbalance in capital flows to banks which leveraged 
up to enhance returns. The role of the rating agencies in assigning ratings to new 
securitized financial instruments coupled with the growth of securitized markets were 
highlighted as major causes. The incentives for rating agencies to assign ratings to these 
instruments were high because of the high level of income they were generating from 
their issuer-pay model. Conversely, investor and portfolio managers were able to invest 
in what they perceived were low-risk investments, generating high returns. The various 
reforms in the financial industry since the onset the crisis aims to cleanse bank balance 
sheets, increase capital and liquidity requirements, and increase oversight and regulation 
of securitization business.  
3.8 Summary 
The assessment of the credit quality of a bank is an important step in assigning an 
appropriate credit rating to it. The credit quality of the bank portfolio is driven by the 
credit risk exposure of the bank. Rating agencies such as Fitch and S&P consider other 
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factors such as market position, the level of capital, and the overall risk management 
policies and practices in their rating process. This chapter examines the issues around 
bank credit risk exposure, and the impact of the 2007/08 global financial crisis on the 
banking industry. Of particular interest for a bank is the changing business model and 
risk appetite in the banking industry. These are driven by issues around bank capital and 
liquidity position, funding alternatives, the influence of the SIFIs concept, and in 
particular the propensity to receive external government support. 
Capital adequacy regulation has become an important feature in estimating the 
appropriate buffer for banks particularly during an economic downturn. An important 
aspect of credit risk exposure is the amount of regulatory capital which should be set 
aside to cover the risky assets in a bank’s books. The transition from Basel II to III 
Accord saw an improvement in the estimation of capital charges for risky assets. With 
the introduction of other types of capital buffers (CCB, leverage ratios, liquidity ratios), 
alongside the core capital provisions, the Basel III Accord aims to The use of both 
external rating agencies and the internal models of banks (IRB) ensures that banks of all 
sizes can adequately make enough provision to cover losses resulting from their asset 
portfolio. 
The newly issued Basel III regulations made key amendments to Basel II Accord in 
terms of enhancing capital requirements, the maintenance of a minimum leverage ratio, 
and the introduction of new liquidity requirements for banks. Further, the risk-taking 
attitude of a bank is influenced by the structure of its corporate governance mechanism. 
The rating agencies maintain that they incorporate information about a bank’s corporate 
governance in their rating process. Studies show that governance issues such as 
ownership structure, board independence, and the number of non-executive directors on 
the board impact on the risk-taking attitude of banks 
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 BANK CREDIT RATING DETERMINANTS CHAPTER 4.
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to investigate the significant factors driving the assignment of credit 
ratings to international banks. An investigation of the determinants of bank credit 
ratings is important. A rating measures the risk of credit loss resulting from failure by 
the counterparty to uphold a scheduled payment agreement. Rating classifications are an 
important variable to the portfolio credit risk model as they are mapped onto 
probabilities of default (Carey and Hrycay, 2001). The ‘quantification’ of ratings thus 
involves estimating the probability of default for counterparties assigned to each rating 
notch.  
Prior to the financial crisis of 2007/08, the global banking regulator, under the Basel II 
guidelines, explicitly recognises the role of the CRAs in financial markets. Due to this 
regulatory recognition, there was an increased incentive for banks to seek and obtain a 
favourable credit rating. With greater acceptance of ratings in the marketplace, 
regulators have increasingly used ratings to simplify the task of prudential oversight. 
However, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) 2010 published the Principles for 
Reducing Reliance on CRA Ratings report which aims to end mechanistic reliance on 
CRA ratings by banks, institutional investors and other market participants. The goal is 
to reduce the “hard wiring” of CRA ratings in standards, laws and regulations and to 
provide incentives for banks to develop their own capacity for credit risk assessment 
and due diligence. The FSB (2010) report further reiterates the implications of such 
reliance during the global financial crisis such as the  herding behaviour and of abrupt 
sell-offs of securities when they are downgraded (“cliff effects”), which in turn amplify 
procyclicality and cause systemic disruption.  
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Despite these efforts by the FSB, reliance on ratings persists in the market, particularly 
in private contracts, investment mandates, internal limits, and collateral agreements 
(BCBS, 2010). Reliance on ratings also remains to some extent in existing risk-based 
prudential frameworks for banks and insurers, where such frameworks are largely based 
on international standards (e.g. the standardized approach to measuring credit ratings 
under Basel II Accord). All these thus make it imperative to model the determinants of 
these bank ratings to test their accuracy and predictive power. 
Credit ratings are still very relevant in the market place, particularly in the pricing of the 
cost of borrowings. Poon and Firth (2005) argue that in the case of inter-bank lending 
there is a need for credit ratings because the lender needs to calculate the counterparty’s 
capital adequacy ratio (as contained in the Basel II Accord) on the basis of such ratings. 
In a related way, credit ratings are also of great importance as they influence a firm’s 
cost of debt and its capital structure, an argument supported by Graham and Harvey 
(2001) who find that CFOs of Fortune 500 companies consider credit ratings the second 
most important consideration after the maintenance of financial flexibility, when 
deciding whether to issue more debt.  
The rest of this chapter is divided into the following sections: Section 4.2 examines the 
main factors considered by CRAs when assigning credit ratings to banks and reviews 
evidence from previous studies. Section 4.3 discussed the impact of the CAMELS 
framework on bank credit ratings. Section 4.4 examines other factors that could 
potentially impact on the assignment of a credit rating to a bank. Section 4.5 
summarises the bank rating determinant hypotheses, while Section 4.6 presents the 
summary to the chapter. 
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4.2 The main determinants of bank credit rating  
The first part of this section examines the criteria set by the major CRAs in assigning 
credit ratings to banks. This forms the basis for the empirical investigation of the 
determinants of bank credit ratings and aims to identify the broad categorization of 
these determinants. It further draws on previous studies that investigate the determinants 
of bank credit rating. A rating ranks the credit quality of say, a bank, in an ordinal 
fashion using coded letters assigned by the respective agencies. These rankings are mere 
ordinal numbers and not absolute values representing the level of risk. The rating of an 
entity aims to reduce information asymmetry between the issuer and other market 
participants, and as such, makes the market more efficient. CRAs stress that their 
ratings constitute opinions on the creditworthiness of an issuer or an issue, and not a 
recommendation whether to invest or not. The processes and methods employed by the 
major rating agencies vary widely. However, in general terms, CRAs rely on a variety 
of criteria ranging from qualitative factors such as competitive position and market 
share to quantitative assessment including financial variables (e.g. measuring balance 
sheet strength) in assessing the inherent risk of the issuer (the bank in this case). Rating 
a corporate entity will always involve some element of qualitative judgements, due to 
the large number of factors influencing the situation and riskiness of the entity. 
The current business models employed by global banks are constantly changing, 
particularly in relation to raising capital and enhancing liquidity. Following the global 
financial crisis of 2007/8, banks have been modifying their business models to keep up 
with the dynamics of the environment and remain competitive. The need to raise more 
capital, enhance liquidity and perhaps exit from certain businesses (e.g. securitization) 
may provide greater stability in the banking industry and more stable bank ratings. The 
financial crisis has resulted in global and regional regulators shifting towards a more 
protective approach to ring-fencing capital and liquidity (Bank of England, 2015). Some 
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of the changes in the  global banking regulatory reforms since the financial crisis (e.g. 
CRR/CRD IV capital requirements, Basel III Accord leverage ratio (LR), liquidity 
coverage ratio (LCR), net stable funding ratio (NSFR), reforms in banking structures 
and the resolution regimes) have significant implications for the banking industry.  
It is important that banks’ risk exposures are backed by a high quality capital base. 
Evidence from the global financial crisis shows that bank credit losses and write-downs 
reduce the equity capital accounts, which is part of banks’ tangible common equity base 
(BCBS, 2011). Further, in response to the regulatory shortcomings in the period leading 
up to the financial crisis, the Committee in 2009 completed a number of critical reforms 
to the Basel II framework (leading to the Basel III Accord). Banks are now, under the 
Basel III Accord, encouraged to estimate their capital requirement for counterparty 
credit risk using stressed inputs. This aims to address concerns about capital charges 
becoming too low during periods of compressed market volatility and helps address 
procyclicality. The issue of capital (particularly Tier 1 capital) constitutes an important 
factor in measuring a bank’s credit rating. According to McKinsey (2012) banks are 
beginning to adapt their business models to fit in with the Basel III requirements, with 
greater collateralization of banking business and more capital-efficient product mix. 
With the Basel III Accord, banks are expected to raise the quality of capital, whilst other 
forms of regulatory capital become ineligible for regulatory purposes. Further, the 
European Banking Authority (2012) maintains that banks that qualify as systemically 
important financial institutions (SIFIs) will be subject to a capital surcharge. This thesis 
presents models employing measure of bank capital (the core Tier 1 capital) as potential 
determinant of bank credit rating.    
It should be noted that in light of the global financial crisis, strong capital requirements 
by themselves are not enough to ensure the banking sector stability. A strong liquidity 
base reinforced through robust supervisory standards is of equal importance. It is 
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interesting to note that during the 2007/08 global financial crisis, many banks despite 
their seemingly high capital-base still experienced challenges due to their inability to 
manage their liquidity in a prudent way.  The global financial crisis further reiterated the 
importance of liquidity to the workings of the financial markets and in particular, the 
banking sector. The period just before the start of the crisis witnessed a boom in the 
global financial markets, with availability of funding at low cost (Salvador et al., 2014). 
With the crisis, the banking industry came under severe stress necessitating central 
banks’ action to support both the functioning of money markets and, in some cases, 
individual institutions. With the enforcement of the new liquidity rule, there is bound to 
be a shift more towards deposits and a reduction in short-term wholesale funding 
reliance (EBA, 2015).  
However, these are likely to increase the cost of funding and put pressure on banks’ 
earnings in the short-term. With the changing bank business model with regards to 
liquidity requirements, this thesis captures the implications of the liquidity and earnings 
potential of banks on their creditworthiness and hence their overall credit ratings. This 
thesis employs a variety of variables that could potentially capture the importance of 
these changes in banks’ business model on their creditworthiness. One of the important 
variables that the thesis employs is the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) variable. The size of a 
bank and its interconnectedness to other part of the economy both within and outside of 
the country of operations, makes it imperative to examine the TBTF effects on credit 
rating assignment. There is a growing recognition of the importance of SIFIs and this is 
contained in the Basel III reform where banks identified in this category are levied with 
a capital surcharge. With the Volcker committee’s recommendation on ring-fencing 
banks and the separation of banking activities, there are bound to be a significant 
changes in the structure and models of banks globally.  
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Currently, in the UK, the Vickers commission’s recommendations on the structural 
reform of the UK banking industry are already an integral part of the Banking Reform 
Act, 2013. The provisions of the Act are due to be in full effect by 1st January 2019. 
This will require the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) to carry out a review of 
proprietary trading activity within one year of the implementation of the retail ring 
fence (Bank of England, 2015). This model is being replicated in the EU with the 
Liikanen report (2012) following on from the recommendations of the Vickers 
commission (particularly on ring-fencing).  
Overall, this thesis tests some of the issues raised and in particular, the bank-specific 
issues, by employing the CAMELS structure. The need for bank to look beyond the 
capital adequacy requirements, and focus on ways of meeting the other requirements 
within Basel III Accord (leverage ratio, liquidity ratios) are becoming increasingly 
important. In addition, this thesis tests the importance of the TBTF notion within its 
alternative bank credit rating determinant models.     
Figure 4.1 presents the bank ratings framework drawn from the rating methodologies of 
the three main CRAs, i.e. Fitch, Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s. The framework 
summarises the key factors that drive the way ratings are assigned to banks by the major 
CRAs. The level of assessment of a bank’s creditworthiness may be analysed at two 
levels, the macro-level analysis of the creditworthiness of a bank (economic risk and 
industry risk assessments), as well as the micro-level analysis, which captures a bank’s 
business position, capital and earnings, risk position, and funding and liquidity 
positions. The major CRAs, in response to the 2007/08 financial crisis, reviewed and 
updated their bank rating methodologies and assumptions to make their processes more 
transparent. For example, S&P develop the Stand-Alone Credit Profile (SACP) and 
Issuer Credit Rating (ICR) for banks. The former considers the potential for additional 
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direct support from the bank’s parent group or the sovereign government. This is 
closely in line with Fitch’s Support Ratings. 
Figure 4.1: Framework for bank credit ratings 
 
Source: Author’s conceptualization of the drivers of bank credit rating 
 
Due to the sensitive nature of the banking industry, Fitch (2007) maintains that apart 
from issuing the conventional long term rating to banks, support ratings are also issued. 
The support rating aims to provide an opinion on whether a bank would receive support 
(particularly from government) should this become necessary. The support rating 
assigned by Fitch can provide more useful information, particularly following the 
financial crisis as the market may be better informed on the worst case scenario, i.e. 
when nobody steps in to rescue a bank. Hence, the nature of external support adds to the 
other two sets of factors in the analysis by providing additional information on the level 
of support a bank will receive if it becomes necessary. The Eurozone crisis and market 
speculation on the level of support for sovereign countries within the EU, and in 
particular Greece, further intensifies the pressure on banks within that zone.  
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Fitch (2007) maintains that the need to constantly review the market and individual 
fundamental factors influencing bank ratings is driven by the changing operating 
environment for banks globally. They further argue that following the onset of the 
financial crisis some large and highly rated banks face downside pressure. The global 
financial crisis, and especially its ripple effects throughout the Euro zone, directly 
impacts on sovereign and bank ratings not just within the EU zone, but globally.  
Despite the global financial crisis, Fitch maintains that there is a need to employ a 
consistent ratings framework to reflect a changing world. They argue that there will be 
no material changes in its rating methodology over the medium term (Fitch, 2007), 
though the need for an assessment of extraordinary support as captured by Fitch’s 
support rating is reinforced. One may argue that support is more meaningful for banks 
as banks tend to fail rather than default (with the difference being the provision of 
support).  
Bank-specific analysis (micro-analysis) is largely quantitative in nature. It involves the 
popular CAMELS approach, i.e. the analysis of bank’s capital adequacy, assets quality, 
management, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to the market. The analysis involves 
measuring a bank’s business position, capital and earnings, risk position, funding and 
liquidity. Business position here measures the strength of a bank’s business operations, 
combining a bank’s business stability, concentration, management and corporate 
strategy. The business stability factor is an assessment of the ability of a bank to enjoy 
continuous operation at the same business level in the face of economic and market 
fluctuations. A bank’s business stability is important for instilling confidence in market 
participants, especially during financial crises or turbulence in the market. The financial 
crisis has shown that banks that were exposed to large trading operations, and in 
particular derivative and structured product markets, are more sensitive to an erosion of 
confidence. Concentration and diversity of business activities are measured by the 
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contribution of different business lines and geographical locations to a bank’s revenues, 
compared with banks of a similar industry risk (Fitch, 2007). Banks with a broader mix 
of business activities tend to have lower risk, and those with a narrower mix have higher 
risk. The management and strategy factor considers the management’s ability to execute 
operational plans in a consistent manner.  
Rating agencies maintain that they rate through-the-cycle, that is, firm rating is 
independent of the state of the business cycle and any short term variation in economic 
conditions. This position ensures the stability of ratings (Altman and Rijken, 2004). One 
may argue however that changes in the micro (firm-specific) drivers of bank 
performance are greatly influenced by the stability or otherwise of the operating macro-
environment and fluctuations in the business cycle. Hence there is a certain level of 
comovement between the likelihood of a change in rating and the overall trend in the 
level of economic activity of a country. CRAs score the economic risk of the countries 
in which a bank operates in order to capture the economic risk of that bank. Some of the 
factors that are taken into consideration here include economic and policy flexibility of 
a country, as well as the credit risk of the contributors to the economy, i.e. households 
and enterprises (Fitch, 2007). CRAs employ the proportion of a bank’s business in each 
country to weight the economic risk score.  
Over the last couple of decades there have been periods of boom and economic 
downturn, and evidence shows that market participants are countercyclical in their risk 
perception (Lown et al., 2000). For example, there is more stringency in the 
requirements and monitoring of, say, a loan portfolio during an economic downturn, 
with regulatory authorities tending to be more lax in times of boom than in slowdowns. 
There have been quite a number reforms and regulatory oversights on the credit rating 
industry, particularly in the US. In 2006, the US congress passed the Credit Rating 
Agency Reform Act which required the US Securities and Exchange Commission 
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(SEC) to set out strict guidelines for determining the CRAs that qualify as Nationally 
Recognised Statistical Rating Organisations (NRSROs). Being a member of the 
NRSRO confers a lot of advantages upon a rating agency, particular in their use by 
global regulators such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Even though 
the law prohibited the SEC from regulating an NRSRO’s rating methodologies, the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act added new requirements 
for NRSROs. The Act focuses on internal control, conflict of interest with respect to 
sales and marketing practices, application and disclosure of credit rating methodology, 
as well as specific and additional disclosure for ratings related to Assets Backed 
Security (ABS) products.  
Following the financial crisis, the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority in 2011 proposed 
the Credit Rating Agencies Regulations III which has now passed to the European 
Parliament and the Council for negotiation. The major hallmarks in this proposal are the 
need for more diversity and stricter independence of CRAs to address conflicts of 
interest. In addition, it seeks to make CRAs more accountable for the ratings they 
provide, by allowing investors to bring civil liability claims against a CRA before 
national court where the CRA had infringed either intentionally or with gross neglect. 
All of these have implications for the way CRAs rate firms, particularly banks. In order 
to correctly assign ratings to an entity (say, a bank) there is a need for CRAs to 
determine and analyse bank-specific drivers of strength and performance.  
4.3 CAMELS and bank credit rating assignments 
This section examines the impact of the measure of bank fundamental performance 
indicator (i.e. CAMELS) on bank credit rating. Determining the credit rating of a bank 
requires detailed analysis. However, it is difficult to use the same set of criteria as CRAs 
in modelling bank credit ratings due to the limited guidance provided by such agencies 
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on the weighting assigned to each of the factors. Further, the choice of the variables 
employed in any empirical study reflects data availability for each bank in a given 
sample.  
This thesis follows the popular classification of CAMELS and guidance from the 
categorization as presented in BANKSCOPE database when identifying the micro (or 
bank-level) determinants of bank credit ratings. There are a significant number of 
financial ratios grouped under the CAMELS classification. Thus, the hypotheses that are 
proposed will only capture a broad classification of financial variables, e.g. capital 
adequacy, asset quality. Further, due to the potentially high level of multicollinearity 
that exists within the variables of each group, hypotheses will not be stated for specific 
financial ratios. The treatment of multicollinearity is discussed in Section 5.4.1. The 
following sections will discuss the broad implications of each of the financial ratio 
categories.  
 Capital adequacy 4.3.1
Credit risk in banks cannot be discussed without the consideration of capital adequacy 
standards. Banks and other financial institutions are subject to a range of controls, 
especially from regulatory bodies both within and outside their domicile countries, and 
one such regulation is the level of capital that they must hold to provide a cushion to 
meet any operating losses incurred. National regulators require banks and other 
financial institutions to hold a level of capital adequate to protect against credit, market, 
interest rate, operational and other risks. Capital adequacy is the central focus of the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, which is the body charged with the 
responsibility of providing global regulatory guidance for banks. A capital requirement 
proposed by the Bank for International Settlements, i.e. the BIS regulatory requirement 
or the Basel capital ratios, has been universally adopted since 1988 (Basel I Accord). 
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The Basel rules on regulatory capital were motivated by the increasing number of banks 
engaged in cross-border operations.  
The pre-financial crisis capital regimes failed to provide the needed protection to the 
financial system when the crisis started. Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2013) argue that many 
of the banks that were bailed out in the wake of the financial crisis complied with 
minimum capital requirements. With the introduction of new capital standards in Basel 
III Accord, there is the expectation that bank capital will help reduce risk-taking 
incentives by banks and further provide a buffer to absorb unexpected negative shocks 
in the market. Basel III Accord aims to strengthen the link between risk taking and 
capital requirements. The provisions of Basel III Accord include, amongst others, 
stricter requirements on banks concerning risk management and information disclosure.  
There are a number of empirical studies on the impact of bank business models on bank 
risk and performance during the 2007/08 global financial crisis. Beltratti and Stulz 
(2011) find that banks with more Tier 1 capital and a higher ratio of loan to total assets 
performed better in the initial stages of the crisis. Similarly, Berger and Bouwman 
(2011) show that during banking crises higher capital levels improve bank performance, 
while a larger deposit base and more liquid assets are associated with higher returns. 
Cole and White (2012) show that higher levels of capital and stronger CAMELS ratings 
lower the likelihood of bank failure. Similarly, Altunbas et al. (2011) find that banks 
with higher risk are larger and have less capital, greater reliance on short-term market 
funding, and aggressive credit growth.  
Despite the increased attention on capital requirements by banks, coupled with the 
ability of the capital adequacy ratios to indicate the level of cushion for losses and the 
exposure of banks to risks, some studies indicate that capital requirements may actually 
increase risk-taking behaviour (Koehn and Santomero, 1980; Besanko and Kanatas, 
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1996; Blum, 1999), while others (Kendall, 1991; Beatty and Gron, 2001) provide mixed 
results regarding the contribution of capital requirements to a bank’s risk-taking. 
Koehn and Santomero (1980) maintain that in order to establish an explicit relationship 
between the risk of a bank portfolio, the amount of bank capital held and the chance of 
bankruptcy, there is a need to establish the characteristics of the distribution of the 
returns from bank operations. In other words, one would expect that a less risk-averse 
bank would hold risky securities and therefore would be closely watched by regulators. 
However, the imposition of a higher required capital-asset ratio on such banks may well 
have a perverse effect. They argue that for such banks, it would appear that the 
regulators should find some other instruments to control for the probability of failure, 
such as asset restrictions, or abandon attempts that essentially prove counterproductive. 
Regulating bank capital through ratio constraints, therefore, appears to be an inadequate 
tool to control the riskiness of banks and the probability of failure. Other authors argue 
that capital requirements reduce monitoring incentives, which could lead to a possible 
reduction in the quality of banks’ portfolios (Besanko and Kanatas, 1996; Boot and 
Greenbaum, 1993).  
This thesis models a variable that proxies for the core (Tier 1) capital adequacy for 
banks within the bank credit rating determinant framework. The motivation for this is 
the potential policy implications of the findings for the current regulatory reforms. The 
current discussion and general intuition is that a stronger capital position should enable 
banks to cope better with market shocks, particularly during a systemic crisis. With the 
approval in Europe of the CRD IV, the directive which implements the guidelines that 
define the new agreement on the minimum capital requirements imposed on banks by 
the Basel Committee, an investigation of the impact of capital adequacy becomes 
extremely important. The strengthening of capital requirements under Basel III Accord 
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could be perceived by rating agencies as being positive and as such, banks with higher 
quality capital in the form of Tier 1 capital could be assigned higher ratings. 
 Asset quality 4.3.2
Asset quality is perhaps the most important part of bank analysis as it is the main driver 
of future earnings. Loan portfolios generally represent the largest proportion of a bank’s 
assets, and so analysis will focus on loan quality and the conservatism of loan loss 
provisioning. Poghosyan and Čihak (2011) show that the asset quality and earnings 
profiles of banks are important determinants of bank distress next to leverage, 
suggesting that these should be central to EU-wide financial regulation and supervision. 
For many commercial banking institutions, lending is at the heart of their business and 
thus loan portfolios are generally the biggest component of a bank’s asset holdings and 
account for a large share of revenues and costs. Analysis of the quality of this asset class 
is very important and indicative of the banks’ balance-sheet strength. 
The sovereign crisis in the EU and, in general terms, the macroeconomic conditions 
following the global financial crisis, impact negatively on banks’ risk and solvency 
profiles. Farag et al. (2013) argue that the main negative outcome relates to the 
deterioration in the credit risk with an increase in bad debts and non-performing loans 
exposure. All these have significant consequences for risk in the banking industry. 
Risks to the solvency of banking institutions very often originate from an impairment of 
assets, which in turn leads to deterioration in the financial health and profitability of the 
institution’s borrowers. Thus, the quality of a bank’s loan portfolio affects the financial 
health and viability of that bank. Information asymmetry and moral hazard can also 
result in a reduction in the quality of a loan portfolio. In general, the less transparent the 
credit information about a particular borrower is, the greater is the bank’s risk of default 
if credit is extended to such a borrower. However, if banks can utilize their uniqueness 
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in gathering vast amounts of information about borrowers, and recycling this 
information, they can potentially enhance their profitability. In the case of moral hazard, 
when the borrower takes a loan from a bank, an agency problem may arise in the 
relationship between the borrower and the bank. The borrower for his part may take on 
additional risk to the detriment of the bank, hence increasing the likelihood of 
defaulting on the loan and consequently reducing the quality of the bank’s assets. 
Borio and Drehman (2009) argue that the r2007/08 global financial crisis and strain on 
bank funding are closely connected due to the weaknesses on the asset side of banks’ 
balance sheets which tends to trigger funding problems. For banks to achieve financial 
stability, they must maintain a high quality of assets in their portfolio. The failure to 
ensure banking stability can cause financial fragility and may lead to a crisis in the 
event of market illiquidity and/or bank contagion (Swamy, 2015). The EBA (2013) 
recommendation on asset quality review further illustrates the importance of banks’ 
credit portfolios, including risk classification and provisioning, particularly in 
maintaining strong financial stability and to support the efforts to provide adequate 
capital levels to cover the risks associated with these exposures. The report requires 
banks within the EU to undertake asset quality reviews (AQRs) of their asset classes 
considered to be high risk. This is consistent with the establishment of the the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) which is a new system of banking supervision for 
Europe, whose aims are to ensure the safety and soundness of the European banking 
system, increase financial integration and stability and ensure consistent supervision 
(ECB, 2015).  
There is no doubt that exposure to credit risk continues to be the leading source of 
challenge to banks and supervisors across the world. With the new Basel III reforms, 
banking supervisors globally are being encouraged to promote sound practices for 
managing credit risk. Hence, banks are reinforcing their internal credit risk control 
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process and making provisions to hold adequate capital against these risks (Iannotta and 
Pennacchi, 2012). This thesis recognises the importance of bank asset quality in the 
modelling of bank credit ratings. With the renewed call by regulators such as the 
European Central Bank (ECB) to carry out comprehensive audit stress-tests of bank 
balance sheets, the assessment of asset quality, asset valuations, and classifications of 
non-performing loan exposures, collateral valuation and provisions become very 
relevant to modelling bank credit rating.  
 Management 4.3.3
The issue of corporate governance is important in the rating of banks because poor 
corporate governance can easily lead to a bank’s financial distress. BIS (2010) 
maintains that there is a broader implication for banks of not being adequately governed 
in that it presents a significant cost burden on the public and central bank as lender of 
last resort, particularly in times of financial crisis. Good corporate governance should 
provide an incentive for bank management staff and members of the board to pursue the 
overall interests of the bank and its shareholders. The global financial crisis brought to 
light a number of corporate governance failures, particularly around board practices, 
inadequate risk management and internal control, compensation, disclosure and 
transparency (Laeven and Levine, 2009). Grandmont et al. (2009) argue that this failure 
in corporate governance could have been easily avoided if an adequate governance 
mechanism had been in place. All of these governance factors have implications for the 
way rating agencies assign ratings to banks. 
The House of Commons Treasury Committee (2009) report highlights the corporate 
governance failings in the run up to the 2007/08 financial crisis. It maintains that the 
system of compensation operating in banks contributes in an important way to the crisis 
by encouraging not just risk-taking, but encouraging excessive risk-taking. One may 
93 
 
suggest therefore that the bonus culture in the banking sector creates incentives for 
taking undue short-term risks rather than taking a longer-term view. In addition, 
governance failings on the part of non-executive directors to act as an effective check 
on, and challenge to, executive managers further aggravates the crisis. All these have 
significant effects on risk management in banks which failed to predict the crisis. 
Hence, banks were led to falsely believe that their risk had been well managed and 
diversified by securitisation.  
The importance of corporate governance in the overall performance and monitoring 
efficiency of the banking industry is further underlined by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS). It maintains that corporate governance is important to 
facilitating a sound financial system. Banks are structurally very complex and opaque in 
terms of their internal operations and disclosure, thus increasing the level of information 
asymmetry between shareholders and management. Levine (2004) argues that 
complexity in banks can take a variety of forms from the quality of loans not properly 
assessed to financial engineering not being clear. Overall, bank complexity exacerbates 
the governance problem and presents significant implications for the type of internal 
risk management processes that are in place.  
Zhuang (1999) argue that ownership structure is one of the most important factors in 
shaping the corporate governance system of banks and that it determines the nature of 
the agency problem. A lack of transparency has often been cited as contributing heavily 
to the 2007/08 global financial crisis (Acharya et al., 2010; Dudley 2009), hence one 
may argue that the financial sector cannot function properly without a sufficient amount 
of disclosure. The corporate governance issue is further aggravated by the possible 
effects of insiders or controlling shareholders exercising an inappropriate influence on a 
bank’s activities. In order to maintain a high level of corporate governance, there is a 
need for banks to have an adequate number and appropriate composition of board 
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members. This thesis makes a significant contribution to the literature by addressing the 
issue of corporate governance within its various bank credit rating model specifications. 
It proxies for the influence of three corporate governance measures – the number of 
independent board directors (non-executive directors –NED), the percentage of 
directors’ ownership, and the influence of institutional ownership. The FCA (2015) 
maintains that the primary role of all NEDs is independent oversight and challenge of 
the Executive. 
Rating agencies claim to examine the independence of board members and top 
management staff from major shareholders, and maintain that weak corporate 
governance can greatly impair a bank’s credit quality (Fitch, 2007). Shareholders see 
the board as the first line of defence on issues pertaining to governance. This has 
motivated major credit agencies to issue corporate governance ratings which in 
conjunction with the traditional ratings can help reduce information asymmetry between 
shareholders and banks (Balling et al., 2005). Further, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) 
argue that the most important cause of high profile cases of corporate fraud and 
increases in debt financing cost is weak corporate governance. They maintain that a 
weak governance structure leads to a downward shift in a firm’s future cash flow 
distribution resulting in a higher likelihood of default and a lower credit rating. Some 
aspects of corporate governance may also motivate shareholders to compel management 
to take on riskier projects by using their voting powers. This has the potential to 
increase the likelihood of default, causing lower ratings.  
A number of prior studies in the area of corporate governance concentrate on board 
independence, institutional ownership structure, and financial transparency and 
disclosure considerations. The existing literature maintains that there is a positive 
relationship between board independence and firm performance, implying that better 
firm performance should result in higher credit ratings. Issues concerning board 
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independence focus on board size and composition, i.e. the proportion of outside and 
inside directors, board leadership and committee structure, and the engagement and 
competence of board members (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006). However, Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996) and Bhagat and Black (2000) find no positive relation between board 
independence and firm performance. Agrawal and Knoeber argue that the significant 
negative relation between outside membership on the board and firm performance could 
be due to having too many outsiders on the board. In a related study, Klein (1998) finds 
no relation between overall board composition and firm performance. However, she 
finds a positive relation between inside directors with expertise in finance and 
investment and firm performance. 
Bank directors in particular need to bring to the board a unique set of skills and 
expertise, in particular in their ability to understand and analyse risk positions. Evidence 
shows that financial expertise is very important, particularly for independent board 
members. Knowledge of the banking industry, the financial regulatory system, and the 
law and regulation governing the operation of a banking institution are very important. 
Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) however, contend that firms with a greater proportion of 
outside (independent) directors on the board have a stronger governance culture, and 
enjoy reduced agency risk and hence higher credit ratings. Generally, one may argue 
that independent directors (non-executives) have limited conflicts of interest, thus 
resulting in a positive relationship with bank value. De Andres and Vallelado (2008) 
argue that an excessive proportion of non-executive directors could damage the 
advisory role of boards since it might prevent bank executives from joining the board. 
Ownership structure relates to the blockholders and institutional shareholders in a 
company, and plays an important role in determining credit ratings. Jensen (1993) finds 
that blockholders that hold large equity positions add value to a well-functioning 
governance system because they help minimize any agency problems by applying their 
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power to put pressure on management. Similarly, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that, 
due to their block voting rights, active institutional investors or blockholders can exert 
corrective actions and monitor a management’s opportunistic behaviour. Along the 
same lines, Opler and Sokobin (1997) argue that firms with a large proportion of active 
institutional shareholders are characterised by above-market performance. The extant 
literature also provides evidence to support the argument that high levels of institutional 
ownership and/or blockholders are not necessarily associated with better credit quality 
(Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Cremers et al., 2004). Similarly, Bhojraj and Sengupta 
maintain that a high percentage of institutional ownership and/or blockholders are not 
necessarily associated with better ratings. The top management of banks may exert 
greater influence for their own benefit which may be detrimental to other capital 
providers.  
Studies also show that financial transparency is critical in reducing asymmetry between 
the firm and its funding providers. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) argue that greater 
financial transparency encourages the monitoring of management behaviour and makes 
it less likely for management to take advantage of their position. Similarly, Sengupta 
(1998) argues that firms that are transparent and have good disclosure policies are 
perceived to be less likely to withhold unfavourable information, and as such may be 
viewed as less risky, and assigned a higher credit rating. Other studies (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Minow and Bingham, 1995) maintain that directors’ shareholdings are a 
determinant of credit ratings. They argue that increasing the shareholding of directors 
provides them with the motivation to improve corporate performance due to sharing 
some of the financial risk of the firm with other shareholders. However, this may also 
lead to an accumulation of voting rights, giving them the power to keep themselves in 
office.  
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For the purposes of modelling, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) measure institutional 
ownership as the percentage of outstanding shares held by institution investors, while 
the number of outside blockholders that owns 5% or more of a firm’s outstanding 
voting stock is employed to represent ‘significant shareholders’. Moreover, board 
independence is defined as the percentage of the board made up of independent outside 
directors. These measures are common to related studies (e.g. Agrawal and Knoeber, 
1996; Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003). In general, results from existing studies support the 
hypothesis that there is a significant positive relation between institutional ownership, 
board independence, director ownership, and firm credit ratings. 
The special role played by banks in the economy means that the industry is heavily 
regulated. Thus regulation may play an important part in monitoring and serves as an 
added governance mechanism for banks. However, regulatory rules and policies may 
also aggravate the governance problem, e.g. the regulator might limit the power of 
markets to discipline banks (Ciancanelli and Reyes-Gonzalez, 2000) or discourage 
competition by restricting ownership structure (Macey and O’Hara, 2003). 
The issue of governance may also be extended to bank efficiency. There is a close 
relationship between bank efficiency and bank risk in general. Earlier studies by Berger 
and DeYoung (1997), Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) and Pastor and Serrano (2005) 
establish a relationship between bank efficiency and the determinants of bank risk. 
Berger and DeYoung (1997) find that falls in cost efficiency precede increases in 
problem loans (the latter further leading to a reduction in cost efficiency. Treacy and 
Carey (2000) suggest that when analysing a bank credit rating, CRAs should consider 
numerous factors, including cost and efficiency of information gathering. A review of 
literature shows that there are several approaches to measuring the efficiency of 
financial institutions. One of the efficiency ratios popularly employed in literature is the 
cost-to-income (CI) ratio. This ratio is defined as non-interest expense divided by the 
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sum of net income and non-interest income (Hess and Francis, 2004). It is an important 
benchmark, particularly among publicly traded banks (Cocheo, 2000). A number of 
studies find negative relationships between cost efficiency and problem loans (Kwam 
and Eisenbeis, 1994; Resti, 1995). The evidence suggests that cost-inefficient banks 
tend to have loan performance problems and this may potentially increase the overall 
credit risk of bank.  
In light of the continued importance of corporate governance, and the implications for 
regulatory reforms (such as those in Basel III Accord), this thesis seeks to make a 
significant contribution to the body of knowledge by modelling proxies of corporate 
governance in bank credit rating model specifications. The BCBS (2013) report 
emphasizes the critical importance of effective corporate governance for the safe and 
sound functioning of banks, and this position is part of the motivation for this study. By 
stressing the importance of corporate governance as part of a bank's overall strategic 
framework and promoting the value of strong boards and board committees, the BCBS 
underlines the importance of a sound risk culture in driving risk management within a 
bank. 
 Earnings 4.3.4
The earnings of a bank influence the level of rating assigned because the higher the 
earnings capacity of a bank, the less risky it becomes in terms of debt repayment. A 
bank’s credit risk strategy recognises the goals of credit quality, earnings and growth 
(Shen and Lu 2005). The effective management of this category of risk is thus critical to 
the earnings and balance sheet of banks. Thus, a bank manages this risk to maximize its 
long-term results by ensuring the integrity of assets and the quality of earnings. The 
price for taking credit risk must be sufficient to compensate for the risk to earnings and 
capital. Incorrect pricing can lead to risk/return imbalances, lost business, and adverse 
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selection (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Rajan (2005) argues that risk in banking is 
synonymous with earnings volatility. This earnings volatility has the potential to create 
losses which imposes a need for a bank to hold capital buffer. Every bank, regardless of 
size, is in business to be profitable and, consequently, must determine the acceptable 
risk/reward trade-off for its activities, factoring in the cost of capital.  
Pettit et al. (2004) and Poon et al. (2009) maintain that profitability is important in 
credit rating assignment because the level of profitability is necessary for banks to 
support growth and for other long-term strategic plans. Previous studies in the area of 
bank credit ratings employ diverse measures of earnings/profitability in their rating 
models. However, most tend to employ the return on assets (ROA), the return on equity 
(ROE), the net interest margin, non-interest expenses to gross income, and interest 
margin to gross income (Poon et al., 2009; Distinguin et al., 2012; Hau et al., 2012). In 
general, empirical studies find a strong positive relationship between profitability and 
credit ratings, that is, the more profitable a firm, the higher its credit ratings.  
 Liquidity  4.3.5
The primary business of a bank is to act as an intermediary for both the surplus and 
deficit parts of the economy. Liquidity ratios are very important to banks because they 
give an indication of whether or not banks can meet expected and unexpected demand 
for cash. The level of liquidity thus influences the ability of a bank or the entire banking 
system to withstand shocks. Assessing the extent to which an asset is liquid or not 
requires considerable judgement, especially for traded securities, due to the dependence 
on the liquidity of the secondary markets on which the securities are traded. Banks with 
sufficiently high liquidity are able to better withstand large shocks in the market or 
economy and this can strengthen the confidence of market participants and depositors in 
the banks as well as in the broader banking sector. Thus, liquidity or liability 
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management is a measure of the ability of the bank to finance itself under stress.  
Access to funding is used to gauge the creditworthiness of the bank, and is especially 
important for banks without a large deposit base.  
Fight (2000) argues that liquidity is an indicator of financial flexibility for a company 
since it portrays the ability of the company to carry out its activities, even in difficult 
times, without undermining its credit quality. However, for corporate organisations, 
having a large amount of ‘idle’ cash in hand may be a signal that the company is not 
able to identify valuable investment opportunities; hence liquidity may be negatively 
related to credit ratings. Similarly, Demirovic and Thomas (2007) argue that a negative 
relationship between liquidity and credit ratings is possible because the ratios employed 
in empirical studies may not necessarily proxy for the day-to-day liquidity requirement 
of banks. For banks, the measure of liquidity is slightly different from that of other non-
banking institutions. Poon and Firth (2005) employ six variables to represent liquidity. 
These are the interbank ratio, loans to total assets, loans to short-term funding, loans to 
total deposits and borrowings, liquid assets to short-term funding, and liquid assets to 
total deposits and borrowings. After eliminating those liquidity ratios with high 
correlations, they employ the ratio of loans to total assets. Loans to total assets represent 
the percentage of assets of the bank that are tied up in loans. Poon and Firth argue that 
the higher this ratio is, the less liquid the bank is, and hence the lower the bank’s credit 
rating. Their results confirm that loans to total assets negatively affect credit ratings. 
Similarly, Poon et al. (2009), using that same liquidity variables, find that liquidity is 
significantly positively related to the credit ratings of banks.  
The liquidity risk and credit risks, individually and jointly, have a great influence on the 
probability of default of a bank. According the Bank for International Settlements, 
liquidity is the ability of a bank to fund increases in assets and meet obligations as they 
come due, without incurring unacceptable losses (BIS, 2010). Liquidity risk is the risk 
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that a bank may face difficulty in meeting or financing its short-term commitments. Put 
differently, liquidity risk is the risk to an institution’s financial condition or safety and 
soundness arising from its inability (whether real or perceived) to meet its contractual 
obligations (Nikolaou, 2009). In that sense, the probability of not being liquid would 
suggest that there is liquidity risk. Fundamentally, banks are constantly engaged in the 
role of maturity transformation of short-term deposits into long-term assets. This makes 
them vulnerable to liquidity risk. This funding requirement, that is, the funding liquidity 
risk, can potentially result in a system-wide implication if there is liquidity shortfall. 
Morris and Shin (2009) argue that a run on a bank could potentially undermine its long-
term creditors and suggests that the measure of bank credit risk incorporates the 
probability of default due to a run (on its short-term commitments). Gopalan et al. 
(2009) argue that there is a greater tendency to observe downgrades if rating agencies 
underestimate liquidity risk in the process of assigning ratings.  
Credit rating has been argued to be a good measure of credit risk (Hilscher and Wilson, 
2013). The majority of bank failures in the past have been linked to the poor 
management of credit risk. Credit risk is the potential that a bank borrower or 
counterparty will fail to meet its obligations in accordance with agreed terms (BIS, 
2010). Failure to do this will lead to a deterioration of the asset portfolio and 
subsequently a decline in the overall creditworthiness of a bank (downgrade). For 
banks, the major sources of credit risk include loan portfolio, interbank transactions, and 
banking activities, including the derivative markets.  
There is a strong relationship between liquidity and credit risks, and evidence indicates 
that liquidity risk impacts directly on a bank’s probability of default (Brunnemeier and 
Pedersen, 2007; Imbierowicz and Rauch, 2014). Several other studies (Wagner, 2007; 
Cai and Thakor, 2008; Gatev et al., 2009; Acharya et al., 2010; He and Xiong, 2012a) 
show the influence that liquidity and credit risk have on each other and also how this 
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interaction influences bank stability. Acharya and Mora (2013) examine the role of 
banks as liquidity providers during financial crises and provide evidence that banks that 
failed during the crisis suffered from liquidity shortages just before the actual default. 
This suggests that distressed banks faced severe liquidity issues, especially in 
comparison to healthy banks. Credit rating agencies may perceive this as being negative 
and assign a lower rating to a bank or downgrade it a result. 
In the existing empirical studies, liquidity tends to be positively related to credit ratings 
and most of the time is statistically significant. Furthermore, Poon (2003) and Doumpos 
and Pasiouras (2005) find that liquidity ratios are significantly positively related to 
credit ratings. Interestingly, Poon and Firth (2005) find that banks with unsolicited 
ratings are less liquid than banks with solicited ratings. Finally, Adams et al. (2003) 
argue that liquidity is not only a determinant of whether a UK insurance company will 
get rated or not by a CRA; it also plays an important role in the actual credit rating that 
the CRA assigns. 
 Sensitivity to the market 4.3.6
Business risk provides another set of factors employed by CRAs in determining a 
bank’s rating. CRAs assess the business risk of the banking industry by examining the 
institutional framework in a given country, including the quality and effectiveness of the 
regulatory authorities, and how the regulators manage financial crises or shocks within 
financial markets. Further, rating agencies claim to examine the competitive landscape 
and performance of banks, including the variety of its financial products and services. 
The level and dynamics of competition within the industry determine the degree of use 
of complex financial products. The greater the propensity to use complex financial and 
structured products, the higher the industry risk. Over the past couple of decades, there 
has been a significant level of deregulation in the financial industry, and many banks 
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now operate internationally (Brei et al., 2013). This implies that the strength and 
effectiveness of a bank’s home and foreign regulatory framework are very important. 
Empirical evidence (e.g. Blume et al., 1998; Amato and Furfine, 2004) suggests the use 
of an industry beta to capture business risk. 
Further, Fitch (2007b) maintains that in analysing the market or business risk they cover 
‘all structural and trading risks across a bank’s entire business, including on- and off-
balance sheet business’ (p. 6). They contend that the analysis of market risk is in line 
with the requirement stipulated in the Basel II Accord. Amato and Furfine (2004) 
consider three measures of business risk: firm size, market beta, and the residual 
standard error from the market model estimation. A number of studies have tested the 
effect of market beta (a proxy for systematic risk) on credit ratings, and the results show 
a significant negative relationship. Amato and Furfine, following Blume et al., separate 
equity risk into its systematic (beta) and idiosyncratic (non-beta) components in order to 
capture the relative sensitivity of firms to aggregate business conditions (measured by 
beta). The idiosyncratic variation in equity return captures unique firm specific factors 
such as the ability of management (Laeven and Levine, 2009). The market model 
consists of equity data for up to 200 days to the reference date for each rating 
observation. To adjust for non-synchronous trading effects, i.e. the effects of infrequent 
trading on time series properties of assets, both studies employ the Dimson (1979) 
procedure and standardize the estimates of beta and standard error by averaging across 
all firm estimates for the year in which they are calculated. The studies find that the 
coefficients of both the market model beta and the market-model standard errors are 
negative and significant at the 10% level. This is an indication that on average a firm is 
sensitive to business conditions, and its rating may be conditional on them. 
Despite the development of market-based credit ratings (e.g. Moody’s KMV), rating 
agencies generally claim not to allow for market factors (e.g. share prices) to feature in 
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their rating processes. Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) argue for the inclusion of an indicator 
of market risk, i.e. the market beta of firms. They maintain that market beta integrates a 
firm’s operating and risk characteristics, thus any changes in a fundamental financial 
ratio indicator is reflected in the market beta and hence may affect a firm’s 
creditworthiness and its overall credit rating. This finding is consistent with Blume et al. 
(1998) who argue that market-based risk measures provide information about a 
company’s creditworthiness. They thus hypothesise a negative relationship between 
credit ratings and beta. Other studies (e.g. Allen and Saunders, 2003; Gan, 2004; Gray 
et al., 2006) also argue in support of a negative relationship between credit rating and 
beta. Gray et al. maintain that firms with higher expected equity betas tend to have 
lower ratings, and find evidence of a negative and marginally significant industry beta 
coefficient. Similarly, Gan argues for the inclusion of beta as a determinant of credit 
ratings. 
In addition to the two measures of business risk (market beta and idiosyncratic stock 
returns variations), this thesis employs the Z-score to measure overall bank risk. 
Following the literature (Roy, 1952; Laeven and Levine, 2009), the Z-Score is 
calculated as the ratio of the sum of the return on assets (RoA) and the capital ratio, 
divided by the standard deviation of the return on assets. The Z-score measures the 
number of standard deviations a bank’s return on assets has to decrease from its 
expected value before the bank is insolvent because equity is depleted (Roy, 1952). 
Accordingly, a high Z-score indicates low bank risk. As the regular score is highly 
skewed, a natural logarithm is applied to the Z-score following Laeven and Levine 
(2009) and Houston et al. (2010).  
105 
 
4.4 Other factors that impact upon bank credit ratings 
This section discusses other potential factors that impacts on the assignment of credit 
rating to international banks.  
 Bank size 4.4.1
Size has been employed in a number of studies (Poon et al., 2003; Amato and Furfine, 
2004; Caporale et al., 2009; Distinguin et al., 2012) to capture some of the qualitative 
characteristics of banks such as geographical presence, competitive position, market 
share, and product and brand recognition. The major CRAs argue that size may proxy 
for diversification of activities undertaken by a bank, especially in domestic and 
international operating environments, and takes into account a bank’s franchise and its 
ability to protect existing business and gain new business. The size of a bank may also 
be linked to the concept of too-big-to-fail (TBTF) which highlights the role of 
governments in keeping banks afloat due to their magnitude and interconnectivity with 
other parts of the economy. Allowing banks to fail can cause significant damage to the 
financial system and the economy, as observed in the global financial crisis. Galil 
(2003) maintains that TBTF distorts free markets, motivates risky behaviour on the part 
of the banks and creates unwholesome and unfair competitive advantage for the largest 
banks. All of these factors can have significant influence on the creditworthiness of a 
bank. Fitch (2007), in its rating methodology criteria, creates a rating type for banks to 
capture the level of support banks would receive if they ran into difficulties, i.e. Fitch 
Support Rating. It also maintains that it analyses the stability of the shareholder 
structure, as well as the bank’s ability to attract support willingly from its owners and 
home government if needed. Indeed, large banks may arguably become too big to be 
downgraded by rating agencies (Melaschenko and Reynolds, 2013). International banks 
have become extremely large and complex, and interconnected with the rest of the 
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financial system. A downgrade of a ‘TBTF’ bank can trigger a loss in market 
confidence as well as contagion in the entire financial sector.  
Demirovic and Thomas (2007) argue for the need to adopt the market value of assets as 
a measure of size over historic book value, maintaining that the former is more 
correlated with long-term credit ratings. They find firm size to be significantly 
positively related to corporate creditworthiness. Similarly, Amato and Furfine (2004) 
and Gonzalez et al. (2004) argue for the use of market-based values to measure size as 
this incorporates an element of business risk, though this may also be susceptible to 
noise and other non-credit events in the market.  
Table 4.1 presents Fitch support ratings which maintain the assumption that necessary 
support is provided on a timely basis. For banking institutions, one measure of bank size 
is the value of the assets (usually total assets) as stated on the balance sheet. The bigger 
a bank, the more diversified its asset base and therefore the lower the default risk. Size 
is usually expressed as the natural logarithms of total assets, to enable ‘diminishing 
returns to scale in respect of diversification’ (Galil, 2003: 19). 
Table 4.1: Fitch support rating criteria 
Fitch support 
ratings 
Definition 
1 A bank for which there is an extremely high probability of external support. The potential 
provider of support is very highly rated in its own right and has a very high propensity to 
support the bank in question. 
2 A bank for which there is a high probability of external support. The potential provider of 
support is highly rated in its own right and has a high propensity to provide support to the 
bank in question. 
3 A bank for which there is a moderate probability of support because of uncertainties about 
the ability or propensity of the potential provider of support to do so. 
4 A bank for which there is a limited probability of support because of significant 
uncertainties about the ability or propensity of any possible provider of support to do so. 
5 A bank for which there is a possibility of external support, but it cannot be relied upon. 
This may be due to a lack of propensity to provide support or to very weak financial ability 
to do so. 
Source: Fitch Ratings – Definitions of ratings and other forms of options (2014) *Used with permission 
of the publisher 
For banking institutions, one measure of bank size is the value of the assets (usually 
total assets) as stated on the balance sheet. The bigger a bank, the more diversified its 
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asset base and therefore the lower the default risk. Size is usually expressed as the 
natural logarithms of total assets, to enable ‘diminishing returns to scale in respect of 
diversification’ (Galil, 2003: 19). Another argument for the transformation by the 
natural logarithm is that it helps normalise the distribution of assets (Altman, 1968). In a 
related study, Hau et al. (2012) reveal a systematic relationship between the direction 
(bias) of rating errors and bank size. They maintain that rating agencies assign more 
favourable ratings to larger banks relative to their expected default risk measured two 
years later. Further, they argue that there is an incentive for rating agencies to be biased 
towards large banks, and find that the accuracy of ratings decreases with bank size, i.e. 
larger banks are characterized by upwardly biased ratings. Hau et al., argue that larger 
banks are usually more complex and thus more difficult to rate, and this may increase 
both positive and negative rating errors associated with size as a rating criterion. 
However, one can argue that size increases with diversification, larger market share and 
stability, implying a counteracting effect upon the accuracy of bank ratings. In 2010, 
following the financial crisis of 2007/08, there has been a call to separate banks with 
trading income from those engaged in loan business only (Dodd-Frank Act, 2010). This 
may in some way reduce the complexity, opacity and size of banks and make for a more 
transparent risk analysis process. 
Empirically, there is strong evidence of a positive relationship between bank size and 
the credit rating assigned by rating agencies (see Poon et al., 2009; Bissoondoyal-
Bheenick and Treepongkuruna, 2011; Pasiouras et al., 2007; Distinguin et al., 2012). 
All of these studies find a positive and significant relationship between the size of a 
bank as measured by the natural logarithm of assets and bank credit ratings. 
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 Business cycle and bank credit rating 4.4.2
Several studies, though not directly related to banks, address the issue of timing 
dynamics, the business cycle and rating stability (Blume et al., 1998; Altman et al., 
2002; Amato and Furfine, 2004; Laere and Baesens, 2011). This strand of literature 
tests rating stringency over time as well as examining whether a firm’s rating is 
independent of the state of the business cycle, conditional on the firm’s financial and 
business characteristics. The studies employ various macroeconomic factor proxies to 
capture the level of economic activity and risk in the operating environment that may 
potentially influence the rating assigned. 
Amato and Furfine, replicating the work of Blume et al., employ an ordered probit 
model which includes a trend term. The trend term is introduced to capture time effects 
which may be due to either changes in stringency of the rating agencies or an overall 
deterioration in a firm’s creditworthiness. Whilst Blume et al. employ US data on 
Moody’s and S&P rated corporate debt between 1973 and 1992, Amata and Furfine 
adopt US data on S&P issuer ratings for the period 1981 to 2001. The two studies model 
time dummies as intercepts while allowing the slope to remain constant. This allows 
them to test if rating agencies have become tougher over time, ceteris paribus. For 
Blume et al. the dependent variable is a numerical representation of each company’s 
bond rating. Their ordered probit model consists of independent variables which include 
accounting data, beta coefficients and standard errors of the residuals from the market 
model. They argue that a decline in the value of the intercept over time indicates more 
stringency in rating criteria. Their results also find that ratings have on average become 
worse which may imply that there is an increase in rating stringency over time. Their 
results indicate that the declining trend is of economic significance following the 
modelling of rating standards in early periods to forecast firms’ ratings in later years.  
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To achieve this test of stringency, the sample is split into two, with the coefficients 
estimated for one period and tested on the other half of the period. The authors argue 
that their results are conditional on firm characteristics. A backward forecast also yields 
a consistent result of higher ratings for earlier years within their sample size. The results 
of Blume et al. support the argument that part of the decline in the level of credit quality 
of US corporate bonds over time can be attributed to a higher level of stringency in the 
credit rating process. Further the findings show that accounting and market-based risk 
measures are more informative for larger companies than for smaller ones.  
The authors maintain that if stringency increases over time, the trend should have a 
positive coefficient. However the trend variable that captures the movement in the 
underlying risk factor in their model is negative and statistically significant at 5% level 
in what they refer to as strong test of procyclicality. This implies that there are more 
upgrades than downgrades over time. However, their results from the recession period 
indicate that rating changes show more downgrades than upgrades. 
In a related study, Doherty and Phillips (2002) hypothesise that increased stringency of 
the rating process is linked partly with the need for CRAs to remain competitive. Their 
methodology is based on the ordered probit model of Blume et al. and examines the 
decline in property-liability insurer ratings. They model this in two ways. By assuming 
time-invariant slope coefficients on the independent variable and allowing intercept to 
be time-invariant, they are able to examine the shift in the intercept of their model, thus 
capturing changes in stringency. Using the same methodology to model the rating 
process yearly allows them to predict both prior and future ratings. Doherty and 
Phillips, following Blume et al. find that at least part of the average decline in insurer 
ratings produced by AM Best is attributed to increased stringency. In addition, they find 
that size is quite significant in motiving a rating, and larger insurers that operate across 
geographical boundaries are more likely to request a second rating. This is consistent 
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with the notion that more complex firms, particularly those whose customers place a 
higher value on information, have a greater demand to communicate their financial 
strength to the market.  
Following on from the works of Blume et al. and Doherty and Phillips, Pottier and 
Sommer (1999) examine AM Best and S&P assigned ratings of life insurance 
companies. Employing the same methodology as these previous studies, they 
investigate whether both rating agencies increased the stringency of their rating 
standards and they find results consistent with those of the previous two studies. The 
authors find that a significant increase in stringency occurs over time, implying that if 
everything else is held constant, rating agencies consistently assign declining ratings to 
life insurance firms. Pottier and Sommer attribute this result partly to an increase in 
stringency and partly to a real decline in overall insurer industry financial performance 
not captured in the financial variables employed in the model.  
This thesis employs cross-country data when modelling the determinants of bank credit 
ratings, and as such it is important to account for potential cross-country effects. Despite 
the overarching regulatory role of Basel II Accord, each national government maintains 
their own regulatory and supervisory oversight which differs greatly across countries 
and can exert a significant influence on how rating agencies assign ratings to banks. 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2010) and Barth et al. (2008) find that regulation and 
the quality of bureaucracy greatly influences the stability of banking systems. Laere and 
Baesens (2011) argue that country dimensions go beyond regulatory practice, and 
propose the inclusion of sovereign ratings as a country level variable in modelling the 
determinants of bank ratings. Fitch maintains that national or sovereign ratings give an 
opinion on the assessment of credit quality of the national government and indicate the 
likelihood that a government will default on its obligations. Cantor and Parker (1997) 
argue that a sovereign rating allows government to access funds from international 
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capital markets. Hence, country risk is similar to sovereign risk because it takes into 
account factors that influence the macroeconomic conditions of a country. Hence the 
sovereign rating of a country may proxy for the economic risk within that country. 
Sovereign ratings are usually ascribed to a country by rating agencies.  
4.5 Bank rating determinant hypotheses 
The previous sections provide the theoretical justification for a list of potential drivers 
of bank credit ratings. This analysis presents the background to the next chapter on the 
methodological approach and econometric models of this thesis. This section 
summarises the hypotheses that have been developed based on the empirical evidence 
reviewed in earlier sections. It incorporates both financial and non-financial factors that 
could potentially influence bank rating assignments. The banking system is very prone 
to contagion in which the deterioration or failure of a single key bank can spread rapidly 
through a variety of mechanisms across the whole banking system. Even though the 
original shock to a bank may be external or exogenous to the banking institution, paying 
particular attention to, and taking action on, these identified factors could allow a bank 
to cushion the effects of the shock and emerge unscathed. The sources of vulnerability 
for banks can vary from poor asset quality, undue exposure to market and credit risk, 
and a lack of capital. Table 4.2 presents the bank credit rating determinant hypotheses. 
Table 4.2: Bank credit rating determinant hypotheses 
Dimension   Hypothesis 
Capital adequacy H1: There is a positive relationship between bank capital adequacy ratios 
and credit ratings of banks. 
Asset quality 
 
Earnings ratio 
 
Liquidity ratio 
 
Market risk 
 
 
 
 
H2: There is a negative relationship between bank asset quality ratios and 
credit ratings of banks. 
H3: There is a positive relationship between bank profitability and credit 
ratings of banks. 
H4: There is a positive relationship between bank liquidity and credit 
ratings of banks. 
H5: There is a negative relationship between bank stock betas and credit 
ratings of banks. 
H6: There is a negative relationship between bank idiosyncratic stock 
return variation and credit ratings of banks. 
H7: There is a positive relationship between bank Z-Scores and credit 
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Liquidity risk 
 
Credit risk 
 
Efficiency 
 
Bank size 
 
 
 
Ownership structure 
 
 
 
Corporate governance 
 
Business cycle 
ratings of banks. 
H8: There is a negative relationship between bank liquidity risks and 
credit ratings of banks. 
H9: There is a negative relationship between bank unexpected losses in 
the current period and credit ratings of banks. 
H10: There is a negative relationship between bank cost to income ratios 
and credit ratings of banks. 
H11: There is a positive relationship between bank size and credit ratings 
of banks.  
H12: There is a positive relationship between Fitch support ratings and 
credit ratings of banks. 
H13: There is a positive relationship between directors’ ownership in 
banks and credit ratings of banks. 
H14: There is a positive relationship between institutional ownership in 
banks and credit ratings of banks.  
H15: There is a positive relationship between director independence in 
banks boards and credit ratings of banks.  
H16: There is a positive relationship between the sovereign rating of a 
country and the credit ratings of its constituent banks.  
H17: There is an asymmetry in rating agency actions between recession 
and expansion periods, i.e. downward rating are more prominent in 
recessions than in boom periods.  
 
4.6 Summary 
This chapter examines the significant factors driving the assignment of bank credit 
ratings. It reviews both the positions of the major CRAs and empirical evidence of the 
determinants of bank credit ratings. Credit rating agencies and the ratings they assign 
have become very important within the context of a financial market and as an 
invaluable reference tool for investments and regulators. The major credit rating 
agencies maintain that they consider variety of factors when during the credit rating 
process of a bank. These range from qualitative to quantitative assessments of the 
creditworthiness of an entity. The 2007/08 global financial crisis has put further 
pressure on the CRAs to be more transparent in not just their credit rating criteria, but in 
addition, their rating methodology. Broadly speaking, the CRAs assess macro- and 
bank-specific determinants, as well as the level of potential external support available to 
a bank in assigning a credit rating.  
Evidence from empirical research shows that variables employed in credit rating 
determinants models are consistent with those of the CRAs. However, due to limited 
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access to some of the more qualitative data, most studies are heavily dependent of 
quantitative measures such as the CAMELS factors. There are strong suggestions in 
existing studies that quantitative measures such as capital adequacy, assets quality, 
earnings, liquidity and sensitivity to the market, drive the rating process (Poon and Firth 
2005; Distinguin et al., 2012). In addition, this thesis makes significant contributions to 
the literature by incorporating within credit rating models variables that capture 
corporate governance. The complexity of banks and their opaqueness further aggravates 
the governance problem. 
Another important variable, size, is examined within two context. One is the size of the 
bank as measured by the asset size, and a second more important measure of size is the 
influence of a bank size within the economy, and in particular the interconnectedness of 
banks. The latter is linked to the concept of too-big-to-fail. This thesis employs the 
Fitch support rating to measure the potential influence of bank size in getting external 
support when needed, particularly in times of economic slowdown or recession. Based 
on the review of existing literature and theoretical justifications, the chapter further 
provides a list of hypotheses to be tested in the subsequent chapter.   
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 A REVIEW OF THE METHODOLOGICAL CHAPTER 5.
APPROACHES, DATA AND ECONOMETRIC MODELS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter establishes the methodological approach to be adopted in the first 
empirical element of this thesis based on the review of the various approaches in the 
existing literature. As a reminder, the main objective of this first part of the thesis is to 
test empirically, the factors that drive the determinants of bank credit ratings. There 
have been few earlier attempts at modelling the determinants of firm credit ratings in 
the financial services sector (i.e. the banking and insurance industry), though a 
significant number of studies exist for non-financial company (corporate) and country 
(sovereign) ratings. This thesis focuses on the banking sector as it plays a crucial role in 
financial intermediation and the overall health of the economy. A rating measures the 
risk of credit loss resulting from failure by the counterparty to uphold a scheduled 
payment agreement. Rating classifications are an important variable to the portfolio 
credit risk model as they are mapped onto probabilities of default (Carey and Hrycay, 
2001). The ‘quantification’ of ratings thus involves estimating the probability of default 
for counterparties assigned to each rating notch.  
To model the determinants of bank credit rating in an international setting, it is 
imperative for this study to employ a methodological approach that would capture the 
ordinal nature of bank credit ratings. Hence, the principles underpinning the choice of 
models and estimation approaches to be adopted in this first empirical component of the 
thesis are discussed and established within this chapter. Further, the nature and selection 
of variables, treatment of dummies (including the TBTF and year dummies), the 
standardisation of beta and the selection of the econometric models are presented. In 
addition, this thesis recognises and discusses important econometric issues concerning 
multicollinearity, endogeneity (with specific reference to omitted variables and reverse 
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causality) and persistence in variables. The chapter presents the data of the study, 
sampling techniques and descriptive statistics.    
The structure of the rest of the chapter is as follows: Section 5.2 reviews the 
methodological approaches employed in the existing literature for modelling the 
determinants of credit ratings. The section presents the rationale behind the approach 
adopted in this thesis. Section 5.3 discusses the choice of econometric model for 
estimating bank rating determinants. Section 5.4 presents econometric and variable 
issues. Section 5.5 discusses the issues around the nature of the data employed. Section 
5.6 presents data on bank fundamental characteristics. Section 5.7 summarises the 
chapter. 
5.2 Review of empirical approaches in the existing literature 
This section examines the approaches to modelling credit ratings determinants adopted 
in the existing empirical literature as the basis for the approach employed in this thesis. 
The approach to analysing the determinants of credit ratings and rating predictions has 
evolved over time from the use of the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
techniques and multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) approaches in earlier studies 
(Pinches and Mingo, 1973; Cantor and Packer, 1996) to the more established ordered 
choice regression models of Poon and Firth (2005), Poon et al.(2009), Bissoondoyal-
Bheenick and Trepongkaruna (2009), Caporale et al. (2009) and Distinguin et al. 
(2012). A parallel branch of methodological approach employs artificial intelligence 
(AI) techniques (Dutta and Shekhar, 1988; Kim, 1993; Bennell et al., 2006; Kumar and 
Bhattacharya, 2006).  
The models and approaches that earlier studies adopt in estimating the determinants of 
credit ratings are driven by the nature of the ratings as well as the development of more 
sophisticated econometric techniques. A rating expresses an opinion of a rating agency 
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on the likelihood of default or the relative creditworthiness of an issuer or issue over a 
specific time horizon. Langohr and Langohr (2008) argue that the unique feature of the 
credit rating scale or index is its ordinality, which refers to the comparability of all 
ratings along the scale. Ratings exist in a natural order, usually ranked from those 
corresponding to higher creditworthiness (say AAA, AA, A, and so on) to those of 
lower rankings. Credit rating as a dependent variable is qualitative in nature, unlike the 
more common dependent variable type that is quantitative. The qualitative, ordinal-
scaled and discrete-valued nature of credit ratings needs to be taken into account when 
choosing and estimating an appropriate econometric modelling approach. 
Most of the earlier studies on rating assignment focus on the determinants of, and 
predictive models for, bond ratings (Pogue and Soldofsky, 1969; West, 1970; Kaplan 
and Urwitz, 1979; Horrigan, 1996). An early methodology employed in the literature to 
assess the determinants of ratings (for industrial bonds) is the use of multiple 
discriminant analysis (MDA). Pinches and Mingo (1973) adopt a two-stage approach to 
assign ratings to particular bond issues. The first stage involves the screening of a set of 
potential variables that are appropriate as independent variables via factor analysis to 
account for as much variation in the data as possible. This screening results in a set of 
six potential independent variables: subordination, years of consecutive dividends, issue 
size, and three financial ratios. The second stage of their analysis involves the use of 
MDA to develop the final predictive model and hence classify bonds into rating 
categories on the basis of the explanatory power of the independent variables. The 
authors achieve this by producing linear discriminant functions that distinguish between 
categories. The basic assumptions of MDA are that: i) the groups are discrete and 
known; ii) each observation in each group is described by a set of measurements on n 
variables; and iii) the n variables arise from a multivariate normal distribution. Pinches 
and Mingo argue that using an MDA approach is essential to developing and 
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understanding the model for predicting industrial bond ratings. Their model correctly 
assigns ratings to approximately 69% of their sample, though the accuracy of their 
approach drops slightly to 65% when used on the control sample. While their model 
achieves satisfactory predictive accuracy rates, Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) and Gray et 
al. (2006) argue that MDA does not capture the ordinal nature of credit ratings.  
Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) argue that MDA concentrates on differences between 
categories of variables, though it does not impose an interval scale on categorical data. 
By treating bond ratings as classifying bonds into separate categories, the approach does 
exploit the ordinal nature of bond ratings. The MDA treats rating categories as different 
outcomes, ignoring that categories can be viewed as partitions of perhaps unequal 
widths of a single risk dimension, the probability of default. It therefore avoids the 
interval scale assumption.  
The nature of credit rating variables has itself been a major influence on the choice of 
approach in more latter studies, where the relationship between the independent 
variables and the credit rating is analysed using the ordered choice models. The ordered 
choice model is a strictly nonlinear transformation of the numbered rating notches and 
takes into consideration the differences in rating scale intervals. The transformation is 
captured by thresholds, which are estimated parameters in an ordered choice model 
(Greene and Hensher, 2009). 
Moon and Stotsky (1993) argue that while past studies employ an OLS approach and 
other discriminant analysis techniques to analyse the determinants of credit ratings, 
other later studies employ econometric models that are more sophisticated (e.g. probit 
and logit models), and these are driven by the nature of the credit ratings. Interestingly, 
Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) make reference to a key assumption made by OLS regarding 
the distance or interval between rating notches (interval scale assumption), i.e. ratings 
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representing equal intervals on a firm ratings scale. This interval scale assumption 
makes it all the more inappropriate to employ OLS in the modelling of rating 
determinants. Further, the interpretation of the coefficients of an OLS regression is quite 
inappropriate for a model in which the dependent variable is ordinal, i.e. the number of 
units by which the dependent variable changes in response to a single unit change in an 
explanatory variable. This normal interpretation cannot be employed for a model in 
which the dependent variable is qualitative, as in the case of credit ratings. Each credit 
rating corresponds to a specific range within a notch and ratings also have a natural 
ordering (e.g. AAA is best, AA is next best and so on) which in turn results in higher 
ratings corresponding to a higher range of creditworthiness values. Two of the earliest 
studies adopting the ordered probit approach to model and predict the determinants of 
corporate bond ratings and credit ratings are Ederington (1985) and Gentry et al. (1988), 
and they base the choice of their approach on the qualitative nature of the credit ratings. 
The AI technique comes under the branch of modelling approach generally referred to 
as artificial neural network models. The motivation for an AI approach is that it is can 
recognise relationships between independent and dependent variables in data that are 
unknown or complex (Koh and Low, 2004). An artificial neural network (ANN) is a 
network made up of several simple processors, units or neurons, each one possibly 
having a local memory (Falavigna, 2012). Earlier studies using ANN (Dutta and 
Shekhar, 1988; Moody and Utans, 1994; Kim, 1993) all find that neural networks 
achieve a relatively higher accuracy in predicting bond ratings. Even though the ANN 
approach presents a promising approach in the area of investigating rating determinants 
and prediction, it has attracted considerable criticism. Neural networks rely on their 
computational efficiency and learning capabilities as they do not require any prior 
specification of a theoretical model. Similarly, due to the difficulty of interpretation, 
most studies that apply neural networks focus on prediction accuracy. Few efforts to use 
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neural network models to provide a better understanding of the bond-rating process 
have been reported in the literature (see Galindo and Tamayo, 2000; Huang et al., 
2004). 
 The choice of econometric model for modelling bank credit rating 5.2.1
determinants  
The nature of credit ratings confers on them special treatment when it comes to 
modelling their determinants. Credit rating as a dependent variable falls under the group 
of variables referred to as limited dependent variables. Limited dependent variable 
models are econometric models in which the dependent variable, 𝑦, has a range which is 
basically restricted or limited, and its value is not completely observed (Hill et al., 
2008). A credit rating is a qualitative, discrete-valued measure of relative 
creditworthiness. Each rating corresponds to a specific range within a notch, and ratings 
also have a natural ordering (e.g. AAA is best, AA next best, and so on), resulting in a 
higher ratings range equivalent to greater relative creditworthiness. Since credit ratings 
have this ordering characteristic, modelling ratings falls into the sub-category of limited 
dependent variable models referred to as ordered regression models (or latent variable 
models). The two popular models within this latter category are the ordered probit and 
logit models. Section 5.2.3 examines the ordered probit model in greater detail. 
The methodological approach in this component of the thesis follows the established 
practice of previous research in the investigation of the determinants of credit ratings. 
Most of the prior studies (Cheung, 1996; Bouzouita and Young, 1998; Nickell et al., 
2000; Adam et al., 2003; Poon, 2003; Poon et al., 2009; Jorion et al., 2009) in this area 
employ the ordered choice model due to its suitability for analysing a dependent 
variable that is naturally ordered and discrete in nature.  
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Cheung (1996) argues that it is important to consider the discrete nature of credit ratings 
which confers on them the distinctive characteristic of ordinality, as this makes an 
ordered probit model suitable for the estimation of credit rating determinants. She 
further posits that each rating corresponds to a specific range on a continuous 
unobserved creditworthiness index. Indeed, Bouzouita and Young (1998) also maintain 
that the ordered probit model should be employed when there is an underlying 
relationship between the different categorical responses.  
Further, Amato and Furfine (2004) argue that employing an ordered probit model 
results in the estimation of the maximum likelihood (ML) of the probability that a firm 
or its issue will obtain a certain ordered rating, which gives an indication of true 
creditworthiness by linking the observed credit rating variable to the latent quality one. 
The term latent is used to describe the unobserved credit quality of a firm. When 
considering rating classes or notches, say, AAA or BB, the former has a higher rating, 
but no assumption is made about the interval between the two classes. In addition, Gray 
et al. (2006) argue that rating notches are not evenly spaced. This confers another 
advantage on the use of an ordered probit model over a linear probability model which 
assumes equal spacing between rating classes.  
 The ordered regression variable model 5.2.2
In this component of the thesis, the limited dependent variable, i.e. bank credit rating, 
takes an ordinal form, i.e. all ratings along a credit rating scale are comparable. For 
example, Fitch assigns ratings as AAA, AA, A, and so on, as a gauge of the 
creditworthiness of banks. These ratings can be ascribed numerical values which are 
ranked from say, 1, 2, 3,…, n. The ranking is undertaken based on sentiment about the 
alternative outcomes. The sentiments are unobserved. When variables are unobserved in 
decision making they are referred to as latent variables, and hence sentiments towards 
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the ranked alternatives are denoted by 𝑦𝑖
∗ (the ‘star’ signifying that the variable is 
unobserved).  
The ordered logit and probit models present two alternatives to deal with the issue of 
latent dependent variables. Using either approach requires functions that effectively 
transform a regression model so that fitted values are bounded with a (0, 1) interval. The 
difference between the two models lies in the distribution of the error terms. The 
ordered probit follows a standard normal distribution, while the ordered logit assumes 
that the random errors follow a logistic distribution. Daykin and Moffatt (2002) argue 
that the ordered probit model serves as an appropriate framework for statistical analysis 
whenever the responses are ordinal as distinct from numerical. However, Long and 
Freese (2005) argue for the need to ensure that models are appropriate for the variable 
of interest.  
In general terms, if there are more than two (ordered) dependent outcomes, it can be 
assumed that 𝑦𝑖
∗, which is the latent dependent variable, lies between −∞ < 𝑦𝑖
∗ < +∞. 
Considering a latent variable, 𝑦𝑖
∗, that depends linearly on a set of explanatory variables, 
𝑥𝑖, the observed response can be modelled in a generalised way as 
  𝑦𝑖
∗ =  𝛽𝑥𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖     5.4 
where 𝛽 is a vector of parameters, i consists of n sample observations labelled as 1, 2, 
3,..., n, and 𝜀𝑖 are independent and identical distributed random variables. The 
measurement approach for the ordinal regression model involves dividing 𝑦𝑖, which are 
the observed credit ratings, into J ordinal categories, given that   
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑀 if 𝜏𝑀−1 < 𝑦𝑖
∗ ≤ 𝜏𝑀     5.5 
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where M is the number of rating categories from 1, 2,…  J, and the 𝜏1 through 𝜏𝐽−1 are 
the estimated cut points (or thresholds). The observed 𝑦𝑖 is obtained from 𝑦𝑖
∗ based on 
the following relationship: 
1 if 𝑦𝑖
∗ ≤ 𝜏1 
2 if 𝜏1 < 𝑦𝑖
∗ ≤ 𝜏2 
𝑦𝑖 = 3 if 𝜏2 < 𝑦𝑖
∗ ≤ 𝜏3       5.6 
⋮ 
J if 𝜏𝐽−1 < 𝑦𝑖
∗ 
 
The unknown cut-off points,𝜏1, 𝜏2, 𝜏3…….., 𝜏𝐽−1, satisfy 
 𝜏1 < 𝜏2 < 𝜏3 <  ⋯ < 𝜏𝐽−1     5.7 
The number of thresholds depends on the alternatives, which in the case of credit ratings 
are represented by the notches. Say there are M alternatives, and then the number of 
thresholds is given as 𝑀 − 1 (Hill et al., 2008). The value of the observed variable 𝑦𝑖 
depends on whether or not a particular threshold has been crossed. The logic underlying 
the ordered regression variable model is to estimate the probability that the outcome 
will cross a particular threshold following the probability distribution of the random 
error, which can be standard normal (ordered probit model) or following a logistic 
distribution (ordered logit model). Another way of understanding 𝑦𝑖 is to think of the 
variable as being a collapsed version of 𝑦𝑖
∗ where the latter can take an infinite range of 
values and the 𝑦𝑖 can be collapsed into J categories. Using the data in this thesis as an 
illustration, one might assume that a rating agency has a sentiment about the rating of a 
bank A. This sentiment may be denoted by 𝑦𝑖
∗, and the actual assigned rating may fall 
within a rating range say, AAA to D, which are numbered from say 1 to 9. These 
numbered ratings are the 𝑦𝑖s. 
The panel data employed in this thesis consists of cross-country variables and this 
presents another challenge around unobserved cross-country heterogeneity due to the 
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possibility of not being able to control for all of the potential country-specific 
determinants of bank credit ratings. In general, different banks across the sample size 
are subject to the influence of different factors. Ignoring effects that may exist but are 
not captured by the explanatory variables in the model can lead to parameter 
heterogeneity in model specification (Hsiao, 2003). Hsiao further maintains that the use 
of panel data allows for the control of individual heterogeneity. If one considers the 
probit model,  
𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ =  𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     5.8 
where 𝑐𝑖 captures the individual effect or individual heterogeneity which is unobserved 
and 𝑥𝑖 contains 𝑥𝑖𝑡 for all t, then the treatment of 𝑐𝑖 becomes important. Because of the 
presence of 𝑐𝑖, the 𝑦𝑖𝑡 are dependent across t, conditional only on the observables, 𝑥𝑖. 
The main assumption of this unobserved effects probit model within panel data is thus 
𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1⎸𝑥𝑖𝑡, 𝑐𝑖) = 𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1⎸𝑥𝑖𝑡, 𝑐𝑖)𝚽(𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑐𝑖),        𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 5.9 
Several studies (Maddala, 1987; Lechner, 1995; Wooldridge, 2002; Baltagi, 2009; 
Greene and Hensher, 2009) discuss whether to treat 𝑐𝑖 as a fixed or a random effect. The 
key issue here is the assumption for 𝑐𝑖 , i.e. whether or not it is correlated with the 
observed explanatory variables 𝑥𝑖𝑡 , 𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇. If 𝑐𝑖 is treated as a random effect it 
follows that there is zero correlation between the observed explanatory variables and the 
unobserved effect, i.e. 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑥𝑖𝑡 ,𝑐𝑖) = 0, 𝑡 = 1,2, … 𝑇. In most empirical studies where 𝑐𝑖 
refer to individual random effects, it assumes that the individual effect is uncorrelated 
with the 𝑥𝑖𝑡 , whereas the treatment of 𝑐𝑖 as fixed effects may be seen as allowing for 
arbitrary correlation between the unobserved effects 𝑐𝑖 and the other observed 
explanatory variables 𝑥𝑖𝑡 , i.e. 𝑐𝑖 is allowed to be correlated with 𝑥𝑖𝑡 (Wooldridge, 2002). 
He further argues that in a probit analysis, neglecting heterogeneity causes the probit 
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coefficients to be inconsistent even when the country specific variable is independent of 
the other explanatory variables.  
One way of capturing this individual country-specific effect is to include country 
dummy variables on the right-hand side of the equation. In this case, the quantities of 
interest, 𝑐𝑖 (country dummies) and the 𝑥𝑖𝑡 can be estimated without restricting their 
relationship. This fixed effects probit treatment hence treats 𝑐𝑖 as a parameter to be 
estimated along with the βs (i.e. coefficients of the explanatory variables), with no 
assumption about the distribution of 𝑐𝑖 given 𝑥𝑖. Greene and Hensher (2009), however, 
argue that estimating the 𝑐𝑖 (as dummy variables) alongside β introduces an incidental 
parameter problem which leads to inconsistent estimation of 𝑐𝑖 with a fixed number of 
time periods (T) and the number of individuals N approaching infinity, i.e. 𝑁 → ∞. It is 
worth pointing out that the treatment of  𝑐𝑖 when T is fixed is quite different from that of 
linear panel data estimation. In the latter, the estimate of β is consistent and this is 
achieved by first omitting 𝑐𝑖 using the within transformation. The country specific 
variable, 𝑐𝑖, does not change over time. The within transformation is achieved by 
differencing the error-component model similar to Equation 5.8 (but in this case linear), 
and averaging the equation over time for each i (between transformation). The equations 
are then subtracted from each other for each t (within transformation). The resulting 
model no longer has the 𝑐𝑖, hence no assumption needs to be made on its correlation 
with the 𝑥𝑖𝑡. Time-constant unobserved heterogeneity is no longer a problem. 
Hsiao (2003) maintains that the within transformation to eliminate 𝑐𝑖 is possible because 
the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) of β and 𝑐𝑖 are asymptotically independent 
in linear models. Similarly, Greene (2009) argues that despite the large number of 
incidental problems encountered in the estimation of a fixed effects limited dependent 
panel model, the performance of MLE by brute force (by adding a large number of 
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dummies) is possible. He maintains though that the fixed effects MLE is biased even 
when T is large, consistent with Hsiao (2003).  
To motivate a random effects probit model, an assumption is made that 𝑐𝑖 and 𝑥𝑖 are 
independent (𝑥𝑖 having a normal distribution), satisfying the condition, 
𝑐𝑖⎸𝑥𝑖~𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 (0, 𝜎𝑐
2)     5.10 
Thus, estimation of the random effects model requires very strong assumptions about 
the heterogeneity of the individual effects. Butler and Moffitt (1982) present a way 
round this strict assumption by suggesting a specification that has the same structure as 
the random effects linear regression model. Their random effects model specifies that 
the error can be decomposed into two parts, i.e. 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖      5.11 
where 𝑢𝑖𝑡  is normally distributed with mean zero and is independent across all periods 
and individuals and assumes that the individual specific term 𝑣𝑖 is uncorrelated with the 
included variables, 𝑥𝑖𝑡, in all periods, and is i.i.d. and time invariant. The expected 
values of the two terms, 𝑢𝑖𝑡 , 𝑣𝑖, and their covariance, conditional on the other 
explanatory variables, can be expressed as, 
𝐸[𝑢𝑖𝑡⎸𝑿] = 0; Cov[𝑢𝑖𝑡, 𝑢𝑗𝑠⎸𝑿] = Var[𝑢𝑖𝑡⎸𝑿] = 1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 = 𝑗 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡 = 𝑠; 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 
𝐸[𝑣𝑖⎸𝑿] = 0; Cov[𝑣𝑖 , 𝑣𝑗⎸𝑿] = 0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, Var[𝑣𝑖⎸𝑿] = 𝜎𝑢
2, 
Cov[𝑢𝑖𝑡, 𝑣𝑖⎸𝑿] = 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖, 𝑡, 𝑗,     5.12 - 5.14 
where the X are the exogenous data in the sample, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 for all i and t. Then  
 Cov[𝜀𝑖𝑡, 𝜀𝑖𝑠] = 𝜎𝑢
2      5.15 
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and  
 Corr[𝜀𝑖𝑡, 𝜀𝑖𝑠] = 𝜌 =
𝜎𝑢
2
1+𝜎𝑢
2     5.16 
Hence the new free parameter can be expressed as 
 𝜎𝑢
2 =
𝜌
(1 − 𝜌)⁄       5.17 
Greene and Hensher (2009) give the implied probit model as 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝛽′𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖,     5.18 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1(𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ > 0)      5.19 
Therefore, 
 Prob(𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ = 1⎸𝒙𝑖𝑡) = Prob(𝛽
′𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 > 0 
   = Φ(
𝛽′𝑥𝑖𝑡
1+𝜎𝑢
2)     5.20)  
              = Φ(𝛽∗
′𝑥𝑖𝑡)     5.21 
The implication of this is that the panel model does produce an appropriate estimator of 
the partial effects in the random effects probit model (Wooldridge, 2002). Maddala 
(1987) and Greene and Hensher (2009) argue that the random effects model is better 
suited for probit than logit models. Moreover, the random effects probit model estimates 
are consistent though inefficient.  
Baltagi (2009) argues that the common solution to the incidental parameter problem is 
to find a minimum statistic for 𝑐𝑖. Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1982) propose a 
middle ground between the incidental parameter problem of the fixed effects and the 
assumption that the country (individual) specific effects 𝑣𝑖 are uncorrelated with 𝑥𝑖 in 
the random effects model. Mundlak and Wooldridge (2002), propose that the effects in 
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the fixed effects models are projected on the mean of the time varying independent 
variables (Greene and Hensher, 2009), i.e. 
𝛼𝑖 = 𝛉′?̅?𝐢 + 𝑤𝑖    5.22 
where 𝑤𝑖 is normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation 𝜎𝑤 and is 
uncorrelated with the mean of the explanatory variable, ?̅?𝑖, or with 𝑥𝑖𝑡. Inserting 
Equation 5.22 into the fixed effects model produces 
       𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝛽′𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃
′?̅?𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝑤𝑖          5.23 
which in reality gives a random effects model. 
Similarly, Chamberlain (1980) finds that in a logit model, the summation of the 
dependent variables across the fixed period T, i.e. ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 , is a minimum sufficient 
statistic for 𝑐𝑖, and suggests maximizing the conditional likelihood function: 
𝐿 = ∏ Pr (𝑌𝑖1
𝑛
𝑖=1
= 𝑦𝑖1, … , 𝑦𝑖𝑇⃒𝑿𝑖, ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑖
𝑡=1
)                                               5.24   
to obtain an expression free of incidental parameters. He argues that the conditional 
logit estimation for β through this approach is consistent and unbiased. However, the 
conditional likelihood approach for a fixed effects logit model cannot be adopted for a 
fixed effects probit model. Rather, the popular specification for the latter is the random 
effects model (Greene, 2004; Wooldridge, 2002; Arellano and Hahn, 2006).  
A test for the choice between the fixed and random effects ordered model based on the 
likelihood function is not readily available. Unlike the linear model which employs the 
Hausman (1978) test, the nonlinear fixed effects estimator is inconsistent even when it 
appears to be the appropriate estimator, due to the incidental parameter problem 
(Greene, 2003). Baltagi (2009) proposes strategies for a choice between the fixed and 
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random effects ordered models. He bases his strategy on the variable addition test. He 
proposes that group means can be added to the random effects model to account for 
correlation between the common effects, and the explanatory variables. If the test shows 
the presence of correlation then the fixed effects approach is the appropriate model, 
otherwise a random effects model is appropriate. Greene and Hensher (2009) argue that 
the power of the test is unknown and propose a simple likelihood ratio variable addition 
test of the joint significance of the group means in the expanded random effects model. 
However, the usual choice of approach for treating the issue of heterogeneity in 
nonlinear panel data is via the random effect probit models (e.g. Baltagi, 2009). 
 Estimating the ordered probit model  5.2.3
Let us assume that the rating of a bank i at time t is denoted by 𝑦𝑖𝑡, and a vector of 
independent variables at time t that drives the ratings of bank i is denoted as 𝑋𝑖𝑡. Given 
a vector parameters of 𝛽 and error terms, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (normally distributed), then the ordered 
probit model can be derived in the form 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ =  𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    5.25 
Due to the non-linearity and specification, the model in Equation 5.25 is estimated using 
a maximum likelihood (ML) approach. Maddala (1987) and Cheung (1996) further 
argue that the asymptotic properties of ML estimators, i.e. consistency, normal 
distribution and efficiency make ML a suitable estimation method. Another important 
consideration in the estimation of the probit model is the functional form of the 
equation. The probit function follows a standard normal probability distribution such 
that if Z is a standard normal variable, then its probability density function can be 
expressed as  
 ϕ(𝑧) =
1
√2𝜋
𝑒−0.5𝑢
2
𝑑𝑢     5.26 
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The cumulative distribution function (cdf) is then 
 Φ(𝑧) = 𝑃[𝑍 ≤ 𝑧] = ∫
1
√2𝜋
𝑒−0.5𝑢
2
𝑑𝑢
𝑧
−∞
   5.27 
In order to perform a ML analysis, there is a need to derive from the underlying model 
the density of 𝑦𝑖 given 𝑥𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖. The ML estimation seeks to obtain the parameter values 
that maximize the likelihood of observing the outcomes actually obtained. In other 
words, the random effect probit model approach that fits the estimates via maximum 
likelihood is given as: 
Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑡 > 𝑗⎹𝝉, 𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝑐𝑖) = 𝛟 (𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑐𝑖 − 𝝉𝐽)    5.28 
for 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 panels, where 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇, 𝑣𝑖 are independent and identically distributed 
(𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑐
2)), and 𝝉 is a set of cutpoints or thresholds 𝜏1, 𝜏2, … , 𝜏𝐽−1, where J is the 
number of possible outcomes, and 𝛟 (∙)is the standard normal cumulative distribution 
function. 
As specified in Equation 5.6, the probit model links the 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  and 𝑦𝑖𝑡 according to 
following set of equations: 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1 if 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ ∈ (−∞, 𝜏1)      5.29 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑀 if 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ ∈ (𝜏𝑀−1, 𝜏𝑀)     5.30 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝐽 if 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ ∈ (𝜏𝐽−1, ∞)     5.31 
where M = 2, 3,…, J and the condition in Equation 5.7 is met, that is  𝜏1 < 𝜏2 < 𝜏3 <
 ⋯ < 𝜏𝐽−1 
Based on the above the maximum likelihood estimation, the following gives the 
probability of observing outcome j for response 𝑦𝑖𝑡 as 
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𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑗 ≡ Pr (𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑗⎹𝝉, 𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝑐𝑖) = Pr (𝜏𝑗−1 < 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝜏𝑗)      5.32 
 
    = Pr (𝜏𝑗−1 − 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 − 𝑐𝑖 < 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝜏𝑗 − 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 − 𝑐𝑖) 5.33 
 
    =Φ(𝜏𝑗 − 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 − 𝑐𝑖) − Φ(𝜏𝑗−1 − 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 − 𝑐𝑖)      5.34 
 
Here there is no constant term because its effect is absorbed into the cut-points (i.e. τ). 
Given a set of panel-level random effects 𝑐𝑖, one can define the ordered probit 
conditional distribution for response 𝑦𝑖𝑡as follows: 
                 𝑓(𝑦𝑖𝑡, 𝝉, 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑐𝑖) = ∏ 𝑝𝑖𝑡𝜏
𝐼𝜏(𝑦𝑖𝑡)
𝐽
𝜏=1
(5.35) 
                                                            = exp ∑{𝐼𝜏(𝑦𝑖𝑡)log (𝑝𝑖𝑡𝜏)}
𝑗
𝜏=1
(5.36) 
where 
                                                           𝐼𝜏(𝑦𝑖𝑡) =  {
1           if 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜏
0        otherwise 
     5.37 
For panel 𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛, Wooldridge (2002) gives the conditional distribution of 
𝒚𝑖 = (𝑦𝑖1, … , 𝑦𝑖𝑛)′ as 
 
∏ 𝑓(𝑦𝑖𝑡, 𝜏, 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑐𝑖)                                                                                   5.38
𝑛𝑖
𝑡=1
 
 
and the panel-level likelihood  𝑙𝑖 is given by 
𝑙𝑖(𝛽, 𝝉, 𝜎𝒄
𝟐) = ∫
𝑒−𝑐𝑖
2/2𝜎𝑐
2
√2𝜋𝜎𝑐
∞
−∞
 {∏ 𝑓(𝑦𝑖𝑡, 𝝉,
𝑛𝑖
𝑡−1
𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑐𝑖)} 𝑑𝑐𝑖                                   5.39 
                                        ≡ ∫ 𝑔(
∞
−∞
𝑦𝑖𝑡, 𝝉, 𝑥𝑖𝑡, 𝑐𝑖) 𝑑𝑐𝑖                                                    5.40 
The log-likelihood function is then maximized with respect to 𝛽 and the thresholds 𝜏1, 
𝜏2, 𝜏3, …, 𝜏𝐽−1 to give maximum likelihood estimates of all of the parameters. 
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 Interpreting the parameter estimates 5.2.4
The ordered probit model is estimated by means of a maximum likelihood approach. 
The interpretation of the estimates is quite different from that of a linear probability 
regression model due to the non-linear nature of the model as well as its specification. 
The 𝛽 in the probit model cannot thus be interpreted directly as the impact of a small 
change in x on the dependent variable y. Greene and Hensher (2009) maintain that 
dependent variable, y, is simply a label for the non-qualitative outcomes, and to give 
meaning to the estimated coefficients (?̂?), one should treat them as probabilities. Thus, 
the probit model describes the probability of outcomes and does not directly explain the 
relationship between the dependent and explanatory variables. In order to achieve this, 
the marginal effect is calculated of a small change in an independent variable on the 
probability that the observed dependent variable, 𝑦𝑖, falls into one of its ordinal notches 
as specified by the threshold parameters. The interpretation usually focuses on the sign 
of the coefficients and the magnitude of the marginal effects. The sign gives an 
indication of the direction of the effect, i.e. whether positive or negative. In calculating 
the marginal effect, (i.e. the effect of a change in the independent variable), everything 
else is held constant. The marginal effect of an ordered probit model may be expressed 
mathematically as: 
𝛿𝑗(𝑥𝑖) =
Pr(𝑦 = 𝑗⎸𝑥𝑖)
𝛿𝑥
=
𝛿Φ(𝛽𝑥𝑖)
𝛿𝑥
= [ϕ(𝜏𝑗−1 − 𝛽𝑥𝑖) − ϕ(𝜏𝑗 − 𝛽𝑥𝑖)]𝛽  
5.41 
where  ϕ(𝑥) =
𝑑𝛷(𝑥)
𝑑𝑥
 is the probability density function (standard normal).  
In order to interpret how a small increase in x affects the probability of obtaining, say, 
𝑦 = 1 (𝑃𝑟 (𝑦 = 1⎸𝑥) = 𝛷(𝛽𝑥𝑖)),  the estimated β is multiplied by the density estimated 
at 𝛽𝑥𝑖, ϕ(𝛽𝑥𝑖). 
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Apart from the coefficient parameters, the threshold parameters are also estimated. 
Daykin and Moffatt (2002) argue that in most treatments, the threshold parameters do 
not hold any meaning and hence are not interpreted. However, Greene and Hensher 
(2009) argue that the threshold estimates differentiate the adjacent levels of the response 
variable. These parameters help to separate the notches and thus give an indication in 
which category the 𝑦𝑖 actually falls.  
 Country Effects 5.2.5
The bank credit rating documents of the major CRAs show that sovereign (country) 
credit risk is important in assessing the credit standing of banks and corporations. This 
thesis recognises the need to capture this country effects within its bank credit rating 
determinant model. Section 5.2.3 discusses the issue of random and fixed effects and 
how these impact on the modelling of bank credit rating, and in particular the 
implications of employing too many country dummies. This thesis follows Poon (2003) 
and Poon and Chan (2010) by employing sovereign credit ratings (SOV) in the bank 
credit rating determinant models to explain the impact of country effects on bank credit 
ratings. Sovereign credit ratings are widely used measurements for “country risk” in 
international capital markets (Bissoondoyal-Bheenick et al., 2005). Country risk 
underlies the business risk assessment of a bank operating within a particular country. 
Gültekin-Karakas et al. (2014) argue that a sovereign credit rating is indicative of the 
performance of a national economy, and that changes in this rating, especially 
downgrades, frequently trigger a negative market response. A sovereign credit rating 
includes a variety of information about a country, and hence helps provide an efficient 
opportunity for cross-country comparisons. Caporale et al. (2011) model EU countries’ 
bank ratings using financial variables and allow for intercept and slope heterogeneity. 
They find that country-specific factors (in the form of heterogeneous intercepts) are a 
crucial determinant of ratings. This result is consistent with Bellotti et al. (2011) who 
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find that country-specific effects affect a bank’s rating within their ordered choice 
models and support vector machines.  
5.3 Econometric models and variables 
This section presents the empirical models and variables that are employed in this 
component of the thesis. Section 5.3.1 presents the ordered probit rating determination 
models and the corresponding independent variables. The definitions of the variables 
are explained, and issues related to the variables are discussed. 
 The rating determinants model 5.3.1
Table 5.3 presents the hypotheses tested within the first empirical component of this 
thesis. The study starts with a base model which draws upon the works of Poon (2003), 
Poon et al. (2009), Bissoondoyal-Bheenick and Treepongkaruna (2009), Distinguin et 
al. (2012) and Hau et al. (2012) for the purposes of examining the determinants of 
international bank credit ratings of the general form: 
𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑅1)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝐿𝐿𝑅/𝐺𝐿)𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽3(𝑅𝑂𝐴)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅)𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5(𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6(𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑂)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑛(𝑍 − 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8(𝐿𝑅)𝑖𝑡+𝛽9(𝐶𝑅𝐾)𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽10(𝐶𝐼)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11(𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐴)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12(𝑇𝐵𝑇𝐹)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13(𝑂𝑊𝑁)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14(𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇)𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽15(𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐷)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽16(𝑆𝑂𝑉)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽17(𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅)𝑖𝑡      5.52 
where: 
𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡 = bank i credit rating at time t. It is a discrete variable that ranges between 9 
(AAA) and 0 (BB+ and below)
4
. 
𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟1𝑖𝑡 = a measure of the level of liquid capital available to cover losses  
𝐿𝐿𝑅/𝐺𝐿𝑖𝑡 = a measure of the quality of assets held by the bank. It is the ratio of the loan 
loss reserve to gross loan. 
                                                 
4
The breakdown of the different rating grades are presented in Appendix C 
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𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 = a measure of profitability and is defined as net income/total assets 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 = a measure of the interbank ratio. It is the money lent to other banks (due 
from other banks)/money borrowed from other banks (due to other banks). 
𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 = market beta. The beta is defined as a measure of the volatility or systematic 
risk of a security (or portfolio) in comparison to the market as a whole. It gives an 
indication of the tendency of a bank’s equity securities to respond to ‘swings’ in the 
market. For the purposes of this research, it is calculated for each bank following the 
works of Amato and Furfine (2004) and Blume et al. (1998). This thesis follows Amata 
and Furfine by estimating the market model using 200 days of daily equity returns up to 
the end of the year for each bank in order to ensure consistency. 
(𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑂)𝑖𝑡 = idiosyncratic risk for a specific bank. This is defined as the risk specific to 
an asset or small group of assets. Evidence shows that no correlation exists between 
idiosyncratic and market risk, and idiosyncratic rather than market risk accounts for 
most of the variation in the risk of an individual stock (Amato and Furfine, 2004). 
𝐶𝑅𝐾𝑖𝑡 = a measure of a bank’s credit risk. It measures the net loan losses in the current 
period to the provision made in the bank’s book for these loan losses in the previous 
period. It represents the current riskiness of a bank’s loan portfolio and shows how 
accurate a bank is in anticipating short-term loan losses. 
(𝐶𝐼)𝑖𝑡 = a measure of bank’s cost to income ratio. 
𝐿𝑅𝑖𝑡 = a measure of a bank’s liquidity risk. It measures the short-term funding risk of a 
bank. The variable shows the relationship between short-term bank liabilities and short-
term assets. Hence, it can be seen as representing a measure of a bank run risk, i.e. the 
risk of a bank not being able to meet all of its short-term obligations. The variable 
shows the degree to which a bank can cover its liquidity demands with readily 
convertible assets.  
𝐼𝑛𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 = a measure of bank size defined as the natural logarithm of total assets for a 
particular year. 
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𝐼𝑛(𝑍 − 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒)𝑖𝑡 = is a measure of bank stability risk. It measures the sum of the returns 
on assets and the ratio of total equity to total assets divided by the standard deviation of 
the returns on assets. It gives an indication of a bank’s distance to solvency. Leaven and 
Levine (2009) suggest taking the natural logarithm of this variable because of its high 
degree of skewness.   
𝑇𝐵𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡 = a measure of the too-big-to-fail concept, that is, the impact of government 
intervention. This follows the Fitch Support Rating which is an assessment of the 
potential for a bank to receive support in a time of financial difficulty either from the 
government as lender of last resort or from other external sources. The Fitch Support 
Rating takes a value of 1 to 5, with 1 having the highest propensity to receive support. 
Thus the TBTF variable takes a value of 1 if the bank is assigned 1 or 2, and 0 
otherwise. 
𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡 = a measure of the impact of directors’ ownership. This is calculated by 
splitting the shareholdings of directors into ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ (Ashbaugh-Skaife et 
al., 2006), and is defined as the percentage of company shares held by inside and 
outside directors. Inside directors for the purpose of this study refers to executive 
directors, and outside directors refers to independent non-executive directors. 
𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 = a measure of the impact of institutional ownership. Following Roberts and 
Yuan (2010), institutional ownership is calculated as the total ownership held by 
institutional investors as a proportion of the total shareholding. Institutional ownership 
represents an important measure of corporate governance because it facilitates 
monitoring of executive activities.  
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑡 = a measure of the impact of independent directors. This is defined as the ratio 
of non-executive independent directors on the board of directors to the total number of 
board members. Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) find that independent directors have a 
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stronger governance culture, reduced agency risk, and have limited conflicts of interest, 
thus resulting in a positive impact on overall value of a bank. 
𝑆𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 = the change in a sovereign rating between time t and t+1. The sovereign rating is 
defined as the sovereign risk of a national government or sovereign entity and it 
indicates the level of risk of the operating and investing environment of a country. 
Importantly, it takes into account political risk. SOVAA (country takes dummy variable 
1 if assigned AA and above, 0 otherwise); SOVA (country takes dummy variable 1 if 
assigned A, and 0 otherwise); SOVBBB (country takes dummy variable 1 if assigned 
BBB and below). 
YEARD = this captures the asymmetry in rating agency actions between recession and 
expansion periods, i.e. downward rating are more prominent in recessions than in boom 
periods. This is measured by assigning a dummy equal to 0 in pre-crisis periods and 1 
otherwise. 
The alternative models to the base form models are presented below. 
Lagged form: 
𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑅1)𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2(𝐿𝐿𝑅/𝐺𝐿)𝑖𝑡−1  + 𝛽3(𝑅𝑂𝐴)𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅)𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝛽5(𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴)𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽6(𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑂)𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑛(𝑍 − 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒)𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽8(𝐿𝑅)𝑖𝑡−1+𝛽9(𝐶𝑅𝐾)𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝛽10(𝐶𝐼)𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽11(𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐴)𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽12(𝑇𝐵𝑇𝐹)𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽13(𝑂𝑊𝑁)𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽14(𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇)𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝛽15(𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐷)𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽16(𝑆𝑂𝑉)𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽17(𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅)𝑖𝑡.    5.53 
Predictive form: 
𝐶𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑅1)𝑖𝑡+1 + 𝛽2(𝐿𝐿𝑅/𝐺𝐿)𝑖𝑡+1  + 𝛽3(𝑅𝑂𝐴)𝑖𝑡+1 + 𝛽4(𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅)𝑖𝑡+1 +
𝛽5(𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴)𝑖𝑡+1 + 𝛽6(𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑂)𝑖𝑡+1 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑛(𝑍 − 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒)𝑖𝑡+1 + 𝛽8(𝐿𝑅)𝑖𝑡+1+𝛽9(𝐶𝑅𝐾)𝑖𝑡+1 +
𝛽10(𝐶𝐼)𝑖𝑡+1 + 𝛽11(𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐴)𝑖𝑡+1 + 𝛽12(𝑇𝐵𝑇𝐹)𝑖𝑡+1 + 𝛽13(𝑂𝑊𝑁)𝑖𝑡+1 + 𝛽14(𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇)𝑖𝑡+1 +
𝛽15(𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐷)𝑖𝑡+1 + 𝛽16(𝑆𝑂𝑉)𝑖𝑡+1 + 𝛽17(𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅)𝑖𝑡.    5.54 
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5.4 Econometric and variable issues 
The CAMELS classification presented by BANKSCOPE database classifies the 
financial/accounting ratios into four main categories. Within these categories, there are 
several ratios and this presents a high likelihood of multicollinearity between some of 
the variables. This study makes use of many such variables to ensure that no relevant 
variables are omitted. The classification by asset quality, capital adequacy, earnings, 
funding and liquidity means that the level of correlation among the variables within 
these different categories is potentially high. To resolve this, this thesis employs a 
stepwise analysis of the level of correlation within each category by first running a 
correlation matrix, and then measuring variance inflation factors in order to choose the 
most appropriate variable under the CAMELS specification. The econometric and 
variable measurement issues that warrant additional explanations are thus the treatments 
of multicollinearity, the calculation of a bank’s systematic risk (beta), endogeneity (with 
specific reference to omitted variables and reverse causality), persistence in variables, 
and measures of corporate governance.  
 Multicollinearity 5.4.1
Multicollinearity occurs when two or more independent variables in the model are 
approximately determined by a linear combination of other independent variables in the 
model. For example, we would have a problem with multicollinearity if we had both 
height measured in inches and height measured in feet in the same model. The degree of 
multicollinearity can vary and can have different effects on the model. When perfect 
collinearity occurs, that is, when one independent variable is a perfect linear 
combination of the others, it is impossible to obtain a unique estimate of regression 
coefficients with all the independent variables in the model. What an econometric 
package such as Stata does in this case is to drop a variable that is a perfect linear 
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combination of the others, leaving only the variables that are not exactly linear 
combinations of others in the model to assure unique estimate of regression coefficients. 
When severe multicollinearity occurs, the standard errors for the coefficients tend to be 
very large (inflated), and sometimes the estimated logistic regression coefficients can be 
highly unreliable.  
This thesis deals with multicollinearity by following a step-wise approach by employing 
the variance inflation factor (VIF). The thesis calculates the VIF for the regression of 
one independent variable on the other independent variables within that category (e.g. 
those measuring profitability). The presence and magnitude of multicollinearity in the 
estimation is then considered be examining the size of the respective VIFs. This thesis 
follows the rule of thumb is that if VIF is greater than 10, then multicollinearity is high 
(Studenmund, 2006). As a means of validating the choice, the thesis dropped sone or 
more of the regressors and re-ran the model to see if the multicollinearity improves. 
Following these two steps, the study was able to select the final independent variables it 
employed in its model.  
 Endogeneity 5.4.2
This thesis recognises the impact of the presence of endogeneity within its modelling 
approach. The endogeneity relates to the correlation between the explanatory variables 
and the error term in a regression (Roberts and Whited, 2012). This could potentially 
lead to bias and inconsistent parameter estimates that make reliable inference difficult. 
One of the issues relating to endogeneity is the omitted variable bias. This relates to 
variables that should be included in the model as explanatory variables, but for various 
reasons are not. This thesis accounts for this within its fixed variable models for the 
determinants of bank credit ratings. Apart from omitted variables, there is the potential 
for reverse causality whereby the credit ratings drive the independent variables, and not 
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the other way round. This study follows Poon (2003) by replacing current variables by 
lagged variables for all both the financial and non-financial variables in the alternative 
bank credit rating models (lag specification. It further adopts Wooldridge (2002) 
instrumental variable (IV) approach to account for any endogeneity in the models. In 
the context of omitted variables, an instrumental variable is redundant in the structural 
model and is uncorrelated with the omitted variable. Stata software package allows for a 
choice of IV within its application.  
 Beta and idiosyncratic risk 5.4.3
Amato and Furfine (2004) present two measures of business risk obtained from 
estimating the market model. Their study follows Blume et al. (1998) and separates 
equity risk into its systematic (or beta) and idiosyncratic (or non-beta) components, with 
the latter estimated using the standard error of the residuals of the market model. A 
higher beta indicates that bank operations may be relatively sensitive to aggregate 
business conditions in the market. It thus provides a measure of ‘the relative cyclicality 
of the firm’s operations’ (Amato and Furfine, 2003, p. 8). A higher idiosyncratic risk, 
the risk unique to a bank, proxies for firm-specific factors, and in particular the ability 
of management. It is obtained from the standard errors of an estimation of the market 
model. The market model from which the beta and idiosyncratic variation are computed 
employs 200 days of daily equity returns in any given year. The estimates of the beta 
and standard errors are further averaged across all bank estimates for the year in order to 
standardize them. In addition, the market indices employed as the benchmark index are 
those on which banks are primarily listed. 
 Corporate governance factors 5.4.4
The issue of corporate governance is very important to banks, especially following the 
financial crisis. For this study, the measures of corporate governance are the degree of 
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director’s ownership (OWN), the proportion of institutional shareholding (INST), as well 
as the number of independent directors on the board (INDD). Fama and Jensen (1983) 
maintain that increasing share ownership by directors enables them to accumulate 
considerable voting power to ensure their position within the firm. However, evidence 
also shows that increasing directors’ shareholdings provides them with the incentive to 
improve governance due to sharing some of the financial risk of the company with other 
shareholders (Minow and Bingham, 1995). This study measures the level of directors’ 
ownership as the percentage of company shares held by inside and outside directors. For 
institutional ownership, the percentage of outstanding shares held by institutional 
investors is employed to compute INST. Following Robert and Yuan (2010), this thesis 
employs the proportion of ownership held by institutional block investors (those holding 
more than 5%) to proxy for significant shareholders. The presence of independent 
directors on the board of a bank is very important as this gives rise to a monitoring 
incentive for board members. In this thesis, the INDD is measured as the proportion of 
outside directors to the total number of board members, consistent with existing studies 
(e.g. Bhagat and Black, 2002; Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Robert and Yuan, 2010). 
5.5 The data sample 
This section presents the data employed in this study and discusses a number of data-
related issues. In addition, it discusses the sampling methods employed and briefly 
describes the sample of the study. This thesis examines three aspects of bank credit 
ratings: i) the determinants of bank ratings, ii) an event study on the impact of bank 
rating changes on bank stock returns, and iii) bank rating transitions over the sample 
period, i.e. 2000-2012.    
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 Data of this study 5.5.1
This thesis employs secondary data for listed commercial banks operating across the 
world over the period 2000-2012. The following are the reasons for choosing the time 
period as well as the data set: 
1. The data span a thirteen-year period from 2000-2012 and this cover periods of 
the 2007/08 financial crisis. This presents added value during the analysis 
because its enables the effects of the crisis on the banks in the sample to be 
captured. Thus, this differentiates the current study from the previous related 
studies in the area of bank credit ratings.  
2. The data for the period 2000-2012 presents an update for similar studies 
employing earlier data periods. It therefore gives the opportunity to inform and 
update the empirical evidence in the areas of bank credit ratings, especially 
against the backdrop of the global financial crisis. Further, it allows comparisons 
to be made with empirical evidence from previous studies. 
3. The 13-year period (2000-2012) is employed in order to maximize available data 
and, at the same time minimize missing observations for the bank credit rating 
variables
5
. Since the banking industry is relatively well regulated, there is a 
relative stability in rating actions within the industry; hence the number of bank 
credit rating actions (upgrades and downgrades) captured is enhanced by 
employing longer period of coverage.  
4. The data set employed in this thesis consists of banks whose country of primary 
domicile varies, that is from developed to emerging and developing economies. 
Hence, the period is also sufficient to provide an insight into the issue of bank 
                                                 
5
 It is worth noting that there were a lot of consolidation, i.e. mergers and acquisitions in the banking 
industry across the world during the 1990s and early to mid-2000. This resulted in new ratings being 
issued to several banks. More importantly, the depth of rating varies markedly across different economies 
and geographical locations. 
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rating stability and to investigate the effects of crisis on banks operating in 
different economies.   
The sample of this study consists of three types of data: 
1. Banks’ financial and non-financial information over the period 2000-2012. The 
sources of these data are BANKSCOPE, DATASTREAM and the REUTERS 
3000Xtra databases, as well as the annual financial reports of the banks in the 
sample size. The latter is employed primarily to generate non-financial 
information of the banks e.g. ownership structure and the number of independent 
directors during the same sample period. 
2. Banks’ market information, that is, daily stock price information over the period 
2000-2012. The sources of this data are BANKSCOPE and the REUTERS 
3000Xtra databases. The raw bank stock prices are not use directly, but rather 
daily bank stock returns are calculated for each bank over the sample period as 
well as sub-sample periods. These data are employed in the empirical 
investigation in the event study. Similarly, the market index used in the 
calculation of the betas in the market model is the index for the exchange on 
which the banks are primarily listed. 
3. The banks’ credit rating over the period 2000-2012. The source of this data is 
BANKSCOPE, the REUTERS 3000Xtra and FITCH SOLUTION databases for 
the period 2000-2012, which have been employed by a number of other related 
studies in the past (e.g. Poon, 2003, Poon and Firth, 2005). BANKSCOPE 
contains comprehensive information for over 30,000 banks across the globe, 
including up to 16 years of detailed accounts for each bank. The Fitch Bank 
Credit Model which is a statistical model that produces financial implied ratings 
for over 11,000 banks across the globe is incorporated in BANKSCOPE search. 
This make BANKSCOPE appropriate for accessing ratings and ratings reports 
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from Fitch Ratings as well as stock data for listed banks. Any gap in the credit 
rating data is supplemented by the FITCH SOLUTION and the REUTERS 
3000Xtra databases. The bank credit rating data employed are the long-term 
local currency during the period 2000-2012. In addition Fitch Support Ratings 
are also employed as part of the independent variables to help assess the concept 
of too-big-to-fail (TBTF) within this study. 
An important novelty in this thesis is the inclusion of the TBTF variable which presents 
a significant addition to the bank credit rating determinant model. The global financial 
crisis of 2007/08 highlights the importance of the concept of TBTF, a situation where 
national governments perceive that the failure of a financial institution would cause 
severe disruption to the overall financial system due to its size or interconnectedness 
(Molyneux et al., 2010). Labonte (2015) argues that this may create a moral hazard 
issue if TBTF firms believe that government will protect them from losses in times of 
economic shock or downturn. Thus, such firms may have more incentive to take on 
greater risks because of their supposed protection from the negative consequences of 
those risks. Alfonso et al. (2014) find that banks that are classified by CRAs as being 
more likely to receive government support engage in more risk taking. The importance 
of including a variable to measure a bank’s propensity to receive external help has 
significant policy implications. This thesis relies on ratings issued by Fitch that 
explicitly measure external support, independent of the intrinsic credit quality of the 
bank. Support ratings (SRs) rely on Fitch’s assessment of a supporter’s propensity and 
ability to support a bank. External support can be of two types: sovereign states and 
institutional owners. The use of the Fitch support ratings is consistent with the studies 
by Gropp et al. (2011) and Gadanecz et al. (2012). Following the global financial crisis, 
there have been global regulatory reforms, e.g. the Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (2010), the Financial Stability Board (FSB, 2010), and the Basel III 
Accord, to address the TBTF problem. In addition, these current regulatory reforms 
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present an interesting area for future research on the extent to which the new regulations 
impacts on the likelihood of governmental support, bank risk-taking policies and overall 
bank creditworthiness. 
 The treatment of outliers 5.5.2
This study employs non-financial data as well as international bank credit rating data 
that need to be transformed into numerical values to investigate bank credit ratings. 
Hence, due to the nature of the investigation to be carried out in this study, the need to 
address outliers presents an important issue. Outliers are observations or measures that 
are suspicious because they are either much smaller or much larger than the vast 
majority of the observations, i.e. numerically distant from the rest of the data included 
in the data set (Cousineau and Chartier, 2010). They may cause distortions in model 
estimation and may affect the performance of such models leading to biased or spurious 
estimates.  
There exist arguments for the inclusion of outliers in studies around the modelling of 
credit risk involving the use of ratio-based models (e.g. Hossari et al., 2007). The main 
argument has to do with the nature of such studies. Hossari et al. argue that credit rating 
studies essentially focus on examining the ‘abnormalities in the financial ratios of 
companies’ (p. 18) and eliminating such outliers might lead to the removal of certain 
key features from the dataset, thus distorting the objective of these studies. Similarly, 
removing such outliers from the sample may grossly undermine the predictability of 
such models and significantly reduce the number of firms remaining in the dataset. 
Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) further contend that the removal of outliers for statistical 
reasons (assumptions of specific modelling techniques) takes away valuable information 
and reduces the volatility in the data that is central to the estimation of relative credit 
risk.  
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For the purposes of this thesis, the presence of outliers within the data, e.g. financial 
data (ratios), the ratings of banks and share prices, is taken into consideration in the 
interpretation of the model out. Within this thesis, outliers might be correct values 
which are distant from the rest of the observations, but only contextual in nature. The 
financial ratios this thesis employs have a tendency to be skewed, flat or dominated by 
issues of sample variance. However, the use of a large dataset helps to solve this 
problem. Ghosh and Vogt (2012) argue that studies employ various techniques to treat 
the concern of extreme values (or outliers) in the data, including winsorizing, trimming, 
and transformation into logarithmic, squared or inverse form. Literature around credit 
rating determination, (e.g. Poon et al., 2000) suggests transformation of data and tends 
to use winsorising and trimming, depending on the sample size. It is argued however, 
that the issue of extreme observations may not be completely resolved by simple log or 
square transformation (Deakin, 1976; Frecka and Hopwood, 1983)  
The treatment of outliers for the purposes of this study follows the established process 
in the existing literature in this field (e.g. Gonis et al., 2012) by performing some data 
transformation and winsorizing (replacing the smallest and largest values, i.e. extreme 
values of a dataset with a certain percentile from each end) of the independent variables 
due to their non-normality. This latter strategy sets all outliers to a specified percentile 
of the data (usually at the 5% level). The data winsorized includes stock prices and the 
book value of assets, as well as the financial ratios employed.   
 The sample and sampling method employed in this study 5.5.3
The banks within the sample are drawn from across the globe and this gives a holistic 
treatment to the issues around bank credit ratings determination and market reaction to 
rating changes. Following previous studies related to the investigation of credit rating 
determinants and events studies (Horrigan, 1966; Pogue and Soldofsky, 1969; Pinches 
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and Mingo, 1973, 1975; Wansley and Clauretie, 1985; Hand et al., 1991; Adam et al., 
2003; Poon, 2003; Richard and Deddouche, 2003; Amato and Furfine, 2004; Poon and 
Firth, 2005; Jorion et al., 2009; Bremer et al., 2011), the criteria for selecting the sample 
of the study are: 
1. The sample includes listed international banks engaging in commercial banking 
activities from around the world, and operating in different geographical regions 
during the period 2000-2012. 
2. The sample includes only banks in order to maintain a level of homogeneity 
among the individual firms in the sample (e.g. Poon, 2003; Distinguin et al., 
2012). Further, the use of firms in the same industry allows for uniformity in the 
interpretation of financial ratios (Poon and Firth, 2005) as well as the fact that 
most of the banks follow to a large extent similar global regulations, e.g. Basel 
(or some variant of it). This is true particularly in the case of the requirement for 
a minimum capital buffer as stipulated by Basel regulations. While Basel 
requirements are not binding, virtually all national governments incorporate an 
aspect of them into their banking industry requirements.  
3. In terms of the concentration and geographical distribution of banks, the sample 
consists of commercial banks operating in more than one country (i.e. branches 
and subsidiaries exist outside the country in which the banks primarily operate). 
This allows a more holistic approach in the investigation of bank credit ratings 
and enables the thesis to examine the impact of any credit changes on markets 
across the world. There is the argument that credit rating employs the same 
criteria and methodology in their approach (following strictly the specifications 
for US standards) in rating across other geographical locations (Fight, 2000). In 
addition, credit rating agencies maintain that they employ a comparable rating 
methodology across the same industry; the analysis of the determinants of credit 
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ratings for banks on a global scale should therefore be comparable, i.e. across 
geographical locations for a specific industry. CRAs also argue that their models 
are calibrated to take into account other country-specific variables. 
4. This study employs the Fitch Long Term Local Currency credit ratings for the 
banks in the sample. The ratings are those assigned to the parent companies in 
the country where they are primarily domiciled. Evidence shows that the major 
credit rating agencies, e.g. Fitch, rely on consolidated accounts to carry on the 
assessment of a company’s creditworthiness (Pasiouras et al., 2007). The data 
shows that most subsidiaries of a bank are assigned the same rating as the parent 
firm; however, in the case where this is to the contrary, say due to reasons such 
as a peculiarly hostile operating environment, or for the purpose of debt 
issuance, the study takes into account only the parent bank credit ratings. 
Fitch, along with the other major credit rating agencies, Moody’s and Standard 
and Poor’s, assigns credit ratings to entities and their issues. This study employs 
only Fitch ratings due to data availability issues (cost). Although CRAs have 
different methodological approaches and definitions of what constitutes the 
probability of default, studies comparing the ratings of the major agencies find 
great similarity for their grading (Cantor and Packer, 1996; Ammer and Packer, 
2000). The BCBS (2000) however argues that there might be differences 
attributed to sample selection bias amongst the three largest CRAs. They 
maintain that regardless of rating differences, the market appears to reward 
issuers with lower interest costs when a second or third rating is assigned, 
especially when the ratings are higher. It is interesting to note that Fitch and the 
Egan-Jones Rating Companies have accused the big two CRAs (Moody’s and 
S&P) of practising the "notching", a practice whereby they initiate an automatic 
downward rating of structured securities if the two agencies were not hired to 
rate them (Egan-Jones Ratings Company, 2002). Elkhoury (2010) finds ratings 
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to be a trade-off between accuracy and stability, with the major CRAs being 
averse to reversing ratings within a short period of time.  
5. The study includes only active banks whose daily bank stock prices as well as 
financial statements are available on BANKSCOPE and DATASTREAM 
databases. Only banks rated by Fitch Rating Inc. are employed due to data 
availability issues. The study employs market information on the banks in the 
sample, that is, stock prices, betas, market returns, hence non-listed banks and 
delisted banks are excluded from the final sample. The use of these databases 
thus allows for access to the information required for the variables to be 
included in the empirical models employed by this study. It further allows the 
study to obtain a relatively large sample of banks from across different 
geographical markets.  
6. The event study component of this thesis is designed to capture the impact of 
specific types of new information (bank credit ratings). Konchitchki and O'Leary 
(2011) argue that if another event type occurs at roughly the same time as the 
event of interest, there would be a question as to what was the true cause of a 
change in market price. Hence, this thesis conducts a thorough research design 
to investigate other announcements during the window of interest to determine 
whether there are any confounding events. Apart from news events relating to 
bank credit ratings, the financial market is impacted upon by the flows of other 
firms or industry related news announcements that could potentially trigger 
changes in bank stock prices (Brown and Warner, 1985; Morck and Yeung, 
1992; Cannella and Hambrick, 1993). Specifically, Brown and Warner (1985) 
argue that a longer event window makes it more difficult to eliminate potential 
confounding events. Hence, the focus of short event windows in this thesis 
which reduces the potential for confounding events to interfere with the markets’ 
response to the event of interest.  
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DeFond et al. (2010) suggest a stepwise approach to dealing with contamination 
or confounding events. The authors suggest a first step of gathering event data 
on related news announcements around the event window. Second, news 
published about firms are then analysed using major news channels such as the 
Bloomberg and Reuters databases. The analysis can then take multiple stages, 
culminating with the removal of all confounding events around the event 
window. Such an analysis can provide an investigation of the robustness and 
causality of the evidence. 
In this thesis, for every event day t, i.e. the day of the bank credit rating news 
announcement, other unrelated news items (such as dividend or earnings 
announcements, merger and acquisition activities) are identified. Whenever 
there is conflicting news around day t-1 to t+1, the credit rating announcement 
is classified as being contaminated and removed from the sample. The study 
further considers the impact of unanticipated news and conditions the rating 
actions (upgrades/downgrades) on any previous announcements regarding credit 
rating outlooks and placement on a Watchlist.   
7. The structure of the data is an unbalanced panel data. This implies that there are 
missing observations. Banks with missing observations for any of the variables 
and for any year in the models are still included in the sample. This is to prevent 
the loss of data which may reduce the overall efficiency of the models. This 
thesis follows Allsion (2001) by employing the conditional mean imputation. 
This involves selecting cases with complete information and regressing this on 
all the other independent variables. The estimated equation is then used to 
predict the missing value for those cases it is missing. 
8. The study employs the EViews and STATA econometrics software to analyse 
the determinants of banks credit ratings as well as the event study component. 
The software enables model estimations with samples that have missing 
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observations. The missing variables particularly relates to the first component of 
the study on the determinants of bank credit ratings. More importantly, the 
STATA software presents an advantage due its robustness and the fact that it 
facilitates the estimation of all statistical and econometric techniques that this 
study employs. 
The cut-off for the initial sample of the set of all banks for which credit ratings are 
available on BANKSCOPE database is 31/12/2012. Following the criteria above, the 
initial and final sample are presented in Table 4.1 for banks rated within the period 
2000-2012 of this study. Table 4.1 shows that 738 commercial banks and bank holding 
companies (BHC) are assigned Long Term credit ratings by Fitch on BANKSCOPE at 
the end of 2012. The exclusion of inactive banks (e.g. due to bankruptcy, liquidation, 
M&A, or active but no longer with accounts on BANKSCOPE) results in a reduced 
number of 726. An important criterion for the data set in this study is that banks must be 
publicly listed. This is to allow for the collection of market data, e.g. share price. This 
further limits the sample size to 322. These factors yield the study’s final sample of 322 
banks over the period 2000-2012. 
This thesis considers the issue of survival bias (Carpenter and Lynch, 1999), that is, the 
effects of the exclusion of inactive banks on the interpretation of the results. The 
inactive banks that fail during the sample period drop out, so the sample may be biased 
towards the healthier institutions. To assess the potential extent of this source of bias, 
the study examines the percentage of banks on BANKSCOPE database that are 
assigned Fitch Long Term credit ratings but are however inactive during the sample 
period. Of the 738 commercial banks and BHCs that assigned the Fitch Long Term, 726 
of these are active. This implies that only 1.62% of the initial sample is inactive. This 
percentage of inactive banks is relatively small compared to the active banks and hence 
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the results are not expected to be significantly affected by their non-inclusion. The final 
sample of banks employed in the thesis survived throughout the sample period.  
 The distribution of banks  5.5.4
The sample includes 322 international banks whose ratings are assigned by Fitch 
Rating. The geographical locations where the banks are primarily domiciled are 
presented in Table 5.1
6
. Column (2) provides the number of banks rated by Fitch Rating 
in the sample size for each of the regions. Columns (3) and (4) provide the relative and 
cumulative frequencies respectively for the regional distribution of banks.  
In addition, the results in Table 5.1 can be represented graphically in Figure 5.1. Table 
5.2 and Figure 5.1 show that the majority of the banks in the sample are primarily 
domiciled in the Far East and Central Asia.  
Table 5.1: Sample collection of rated banks for the period 2000-2012 
Criterion Subtotals Number of sample banks 
Initial sample (Commercial banks 
assigned the Fitch long term credit 
rating)  
 
Inactive banks  
Non-publicly trading banks 
 
Geographical distribution 
Western Europe 
Eastern Europe 
Middle East and North Africa 
Far East and Central Asia 
South and Central Asia 
Sub-Sahara Africa 
Oceania 
North America 
 
Number in final sample 
 
 
 
 
 
(12) 
(404) 
 
 
56 
27 
44 
74 
34 
13 
8 
66 
 
 
738 
 
 
 
726 
322 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
322 
 
 
Notes: The distribution of banks in the final sample spans the different geographical regions. A large number of banks 
rated by Fitch on BANKSCOPE are non-commercial banks or subsidiaries of banks involved in other areas of 
financial activities.  
 
                                                 
6
 BANKSCOPE database geographical classification benchmark was adopted in the distribution of banks 
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Banks from the Far East and Central Asian region account for 74 banks (23% of the 
entire sample). This is not surprising because of the deregulation in the banking industry 
within that region. North America is second in terms of the number of banks in the 
sample, and the banks within this region have longer rating history, and are much more 
established. A close examination of Table 5.2 reveals that Oceania consists of only eight 
banks, and makes up only 2% of the sample. The remaining regions, Western Europe, 
Eastern Europe, Middle East and North Africa, South and Central Asia, and Sub-Sahara 
Africa account for 17%, 8%, 14%, 11% and 4%, respectively. 
Table 5.2: Distribution of Fitch rated banks in the sample 
Geographical Location 
(BANKSCOPE benchmark) 
                  (1) 
Number of banks 
(Rated) 
(2) 
Relative frequency 
(%) 
(3) 
Cumulative frequency 
(%) 
(4) 
Western Europe 
Eastern Europe 
Middle East and North Africa 
Far East and Central Asia 
South and Central Asia 
Sub-Sahara Africa 
Oceania 
North America 
 
 
Total 
56 
27 
44 
74 
34 
13 
8 
66 
 
 
322 
17 
8 
14 
23 
11 
4 
2 
21 
 
 
100 
17 
25 
39 
62 
73 
77 
79 
100 
 
 
 
 Bank credit ratings 5.5.5
The sample consists of 322 Fitch long term rated international banks over the period 
2000-2012. The credit ratings of banks in the sample are spread from AA to CCC over 
the study period. For the purposes of this thesis, the credit rating of a bank for any given 
year is the letter assigned to it by Fitch on the year’s financial reporting date. Table 5.3 
and Figures 5.2 and 5.3 present information on the distribution of bank credit ratings 
over the sample period 2000-2012
7
.  
                                                 
7
 The detail of the banks and their rating over the sample period is presented in Appendix B. 
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An examination of Table 5.3 and Figure 5.3 reveal some patterns in the distribution and 
changes in rating over the period 2000-2012: 
1. Table 5.3 shows that none of the banks in the sample are assigned the top rating 
(AA+ and above) at the cut-off date of 31
st
 December 2012. The investment 
grade rated banks constitute about 72% of the total sample, while the speculative 
or noninvestment grade makes up the rest.  
Figure 5.1: Geographical distribution of banks in the sample 
 
2. The period witnessed a significant increase in the number of rated banks in the 
international market. Banks rated by Fitch in the sample size increased from 150 
in 2000 to 322 by the end of 2012, representing an increase of 114%. This surge 
in rating assignment may be attributed to the increase in the importance of the 
rating process, and the opening of new markets, especially the emerging and 
developing economies of South America, and the Far East. It also highlights the 
positive propensity for banks to want to take on ratings in order to have access to 
cheaper funds in international markets. Again, it serves as a form of public risk 
disclosure for investors willing to invest in the banks.   
 
17 
8 
14 
23 
11 
4 
2 
21 
Western Europe
Eastern Europe
Middle East and North
Africa
Far East and Central Asia
South and Central Asia
Sub-Sahara Africa
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Table 5.3: Bank credit rating distribution 
Notes: Credit rating distribution per year for the 322 credit rated banks in the sample. A bank’s credit 
rating for any given year is the rating assigned to the banks on its year-end date. 
Figure 5.2: Bank credit rating distribution per category 
Notes: Credit ratings of 322 rated banks by Fitch per category as at 31
st
 December 2012  
 
1. There is a diverse range of rating categories for banks in the sample. An 
examination of the sample shows that the banks Fitch assigns rating to varies in 
creditworthiness from (AA+ and above) highest rating grades to (BB+ and 
below) lowest rating with the highest riskiness. 
 
 
 
 
Ratings 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
AA+ and above 1 1 3 5 5 5 4 4 1 0 0 0 0
AA 10 12 10 9 8 8 11 9 8 6 6 5 2
AA- 21 23 26 25 28 30 31 34 34 27 28 19 19
A+ 19 18 18 21 21 18 21 30 36 34 31 28 29
A 15 15 19 21 29 35 39 35 31 33 29 41 36
A- 14 18 25 32 32 32 35 32 39 36 40 33 33
BBB+ 18 25 26 32 25 27 26 27 24 29 23 31 32
BBB 11 14 19 22 31 34 27 25 28 31 33 36 46
BBB- 8 10 19 26 25 20 24 30 29 32 41 37 36
BB+ and below 33 43 68 84 90 101 100 96 92 94 91 92 89
Total 150 179 233 277 294 310 318 322 322 322 322 322 322
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Figure 5.3: Growth of bank credit ratings 
Notes: Classification of bank credit ratings of 322 rated banks per category over the period 2000-2012 
 
2. During the period under investigation, the highest bank credit rating assigned by 
Fitch is AA+. On the other, the lowest credit rating assigned is within the 
speculative grade (BB+ and below). Overall, this shows a diverse range of credit 
ratings in the sample and thus the banks in the sample vary markedly in their 
creditworthiness.  
5.6 Bank fundamental characteristics 
The banking industry is very unique and quite different from other non-financial 
industry firms
8
, and thus the drivers of performance and riskiness vary as well. 
Commercial banks are unique in terms of the types of assets and liabilities they hold. 
This section reports the descriptive statistics related to bank fundamental characteristics 
within the sample of banks in this study. The analyses in this section focus on 
examining selected financial characteristics of banks, particularly those related to the 
measure of a bank’s riskiness. Evidence from existing studies shows that bank 
fundamental characteristics are related to bank risk. Leung et al. (2015) investigate the 
impact of US bank holding company (BHC) fundamental variables on bank risk before, 
                                                 
8
 The specific issues relating to bank credit risk which this thesis examines are discussed in great details in Chapter 3 
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during and after the 2007/09 financial crises. Employing a sample of 227 publicly 
traded US BHCs with $500 million or more consolidated assets, they find that Tier 1 
capital, profitability, and the presence of an effective internal control system relate 
negatively to bank risk. Hence, banks with larger capital buffers and higher profitability 
are less risky.  
Financial indicators represent important information about banks’ credit default risk. 
The first part of this section examines the bank fundamental characteristics for the 
sample of banks in this study. Ötker-Robe and Podpiera (2010) argue that bank specific 
fundamentals, that is, the elements of the CAMELS structure, are crucial in measuring 
the performance of a bank and give an indication of the level of its inherent risk. 
Evidence from previous studies (e.g. Poon, 2003; Caporale et al. 2009; Bissondoyal-
Bheenick and Treepongkuruna, 2011) shows significant results for accounting/financial 
independent variables when modelling the determinants of bank credit ratings.  
This section investigates the trends in the fundamental characteristics of the banks in the 
sample. The choice of ratio follows the approach of Poon (2003) who tested for 
multicollinearity within each category of financial ratio. The author chose the financial 
ratios with the least collinearity as representative of each category. This study employs 
both the fine and coarse rating granularity in its empirical investigation. However, for 
the purposes of providing statistical/descriptive analyses of the bank financial ratios, a 
coarse rating granularity is adopted. The coarse-grading has fewer, larger discrete 
components than the fine-grading. The coarse ratings are presented in four categories, 
AA-AAA, A, BBB, and below BBB. In addition, the analyses of the banks’ 
fundamental characteristics across the sample period present results of the test 
differences in mean between pre- and post-crisis periods. These provide evidence of 
statistical differences between the mean of the financial ratios. The selection of the 
periods follows Obstfeld and Rogoff (2009) who argue that there was a general 
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contraction in the balance sheet of the European Central Bank (ECB) immediately 
following the Lehmans Brothers’ event. Further, Petitjean (2013) supports the argument 
of the existence of financial cycles in which financial booms follow busts. Borio (2014) 
argues that the financial cycle is best captured by the joint behaviour of credit and 
property prices. He suggests that there the period between 2000 and 2007 witnessed 
growth in credit and property prices, and defines this as the boom period. Conversely, 
the period following the global financial crisis (2008 to 2012) was marked by a 
downward trend in the amount of credit extended globally.  
 Capital  5.6.1
The first of the CAMELS measures, the level of capital held by banks as buffer for loss 
absorption, and thus, the capital adequacy of a bank, should relate negatively to bank 
credit risk. This requirement is directly linked to the Basel Accord regulation discussed 
in Section 3.4. Although, banks are required to maintain a minimum level of capital, 
losses suffered in their trading books during the 2007/08 financial crisis far exceeded 
the minimum capital requirements (BCBS, 2009). Table 5.4 shows the description of 
variables classified under the capital adequacy measure of bank fundamental 
characteristics. This is based on BANKSCOPE database classification. The database 
specifies eight variables under the capital adequacy categorization.  
Capital ratios have always been used by regulator to assess the stability of banks. An 
example is in the assessment of the impact of the EU‐wide stress test, which is 
measured in terms of Common Equity Tier 1 Capital ratios. Table 5.5 represents the 
summary statistics for capital adequacy ratio during the pre- and crisis periods.  
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Table 5.4: Capital adequacy measures 
Capital adequacy measure Description 
Tier 1 
T_CAP 
EQ_TA 
EQ_NL 
EQ_CSTF 
EQ_LIAB 
CF_TA 
CF_DSTF 
CF_LIAB 
SD_CF 
Tier 1 bank capital 
Total Capital Ratio 
Equity / Total Assets 
Equity / Net Loans 
Equity / Cust & Short Term Funding    
Equity / Liabilities 
Cap Funds / Tot Assets 
Cap Funds / Dep & ST Funding 
Cap Funds / Liabilities 
Subord Debt / Cap Funds 
Notes: This table provides the description and definition of the bank variables under BANKSCOPE 
classification ‘capital’. All values are calculated as yearly averages across all 322 banks.  
The table reports the full sample, pre-crisis and crisis subsample means, median and 
standard deviation (Stdev) of the capital adequacy ratios. In addition, it presents the 
average values of these ratios for subsamples of banks classified on the basis of the 
coarse rating grading. As expected, international banks rated in the top-tier of the 
investment-grade category have higher capital ratios than those in the non-investment 
category. As an example, the Tier 1 ratio gives an average of 17.21 for banks in the 
coarse rated category AA–AAA, while on average, international banks rated in the 
‘Below BBB’ rating category have a Tier 1 ratio of 6.94. The result is consistent for all 
of the capital adequacy ratios. Furthermore, the tests of the means show that there exist 
significant differences between the pre- and crisis period averages for the capital 
adequacy ratios. The mean value of the capital adequacy ratios is higher in the crisis 
period than in the pre-crisis period. This suggests that international raised additional 
capitals in the period following the 2007/08 global financial crisis. A 2013 report by the 
Federal Reserve Bank, Boston show that there was dramatic the improvement in capital 
ratios at large U.S. financial institutions between 2009 and 2012. Further, Demirguc-
Kunt et al. (2010) find that for undercapitalized and larger banks, better capitalization is 
associated with greater resilience in dealing with shocks, consistent with the spirit of 
capital regulation. The increase in the capital adequacy ratio following the financial 
crisis has brought into question previous views that capital in the financial sector had 
been both adequate and adequately regulated. 
159 
 
Table 5.5: Average capital adequacy ratios in the pre-and crisis periods and across bank coarse credit ratings grading 
Capital 
adequacy 
Mean 
value 
Median Stdev. Mean 
value 
Stdev. Mean 
value 
Stdev. Test of  
Mean 
Coarse grading 
 
 
 
 
Full sample 
 
 
 
 
Pre-crisis period Post-crisis period t-test AA – AAA 
 
A 
 
BBB 
 
Below BBB 
 
Tier 1 
T_CAP 
EQ_TA 
EQ_NL 
EQ_CSTF 
EQ_LIAB 
CF_TA 
CF_DSTF 
CF_LIAB 
SD_CF 
12.35 
15.92 
5.98 
14.18 
9.52 
6.47 
7.63 
12.39 
8.26 
18.93 
10.91 
14.36 
5.74 
13.95 
9.39 
6.17 
7.46 
12.44 
8.07 
18.35 
4.98 
6.29 
0.62 
1.40 
0.84 
0.71 
0.59 
0.71 
0.69 
2.84 
12.75 
17.66 
4.21 
6.32 
4.21 
3.29 
5.39 
8.31 
4.22 
10.98 
2.66 
3.94 
0.25 
0.78 
0.54 
0.33 
0.21 
0.48 
0.37 
1.15 
16.95 
19.62 
8.94 
19.51 
16.23 
8.91 
9.54 
15.95 
8.33 
21.67 
6.66 
4.82 
1.64 
2.65 
1.14 
1.16 
2.21 
1.65 
2.09 
4.11 
7.21 
5.22 
3.34 
3.64 
4.01 
3.29 
2.99 
3.68 
3.85 
3.62 
17.21 
18.93 
10.22 
18.71 
12.99 
11.59 
13.65 
22.31 
18.21 
29.31 
16.92 
17.99 
9.31 
15.21 
10.62 
8.81 
9.21 
16.64 
12.24 
22.61 
13.32 
14.93 
6.24 
14.10 
9.99 
7.01 
6.21 
12.87 
9.61 
19.21 
6.94 
10.21 
3.05 
8.21 
6.65 
6.48 
5.55 
12.01 
8.05 
16.98 
 
Notes: Mean, median and standard deviation of the capital adequacy ratios. Table 5.5 also shows the averages for these ratios for banks categorized using the coarse rating gradation. The 
test of mean (t test) presents a test of level of significance (at a 95% confidence level) between the averages of financial ratios in the pre- and post- crisis periods
160 
 
Rosengren (2013) argues that despite the dramatic improvement in bank capital 
positions, examination of capital erosion during the financial crisis highlights how 
significant and quick the capital erosion was at some of the largest financial institutions. 
He restated the need to examine how other tools such as stress tests, tougher liquidity 
requirements, and resolution plans supplement the higher and more stringent capital 
standards. 
 Asset quality 5.6.2
Most of the assets on a bank’s balance sheet are made up predominantly of its loan 
portfolio. It is therefore a major driver of bank earnings and any impairment of this 
category of item could result in severe consequences for the bank. Asset quality 
measures the quality of the assets held by banks. Section 4.3.2 discusses the importance 
of asset quality and the provisions banks make to offset any non-performing or impaired 
loans. BANKSCOPE provides eight measures of asset quality, all of which focus on 
loans, i.e. non-performing loans, loan loss provisions, and net charge-offs. Table 5.6 
presents descriptions for the asset quality ratios for the banks in the sample.  
Table 5.6: Assets quality measures 
Assets quality measure Description 
LoanR_GL 
LoanP_NIR 
LoanR_IL 
ImpairedL_GL 
NCO_GL 
NCO_NI 
ImpairedL_EQ 
UImpairedL_EQ 
Loan Loss Reserves / Gross Loan 
Loan Loss Provisions / Net Interest Revenue 
Loan Loss Reserves / Impaired Loans 
Impaired Loan to Gross Loans 
NCO / Average Gross Loans 
NCO / Net Income Before Loan Loss Provisions 
Impaired Loans / Equity 
Unreserved Impaired Loans / Equity 
Notes: This table provides the description and definition of the bank variables under BANKSCOPE 
classification of ‘assets quality’. All values are calculated as yearly averages across the 322 banks.  
 
Table 5.7 presents statistics of selected asset quality ratios from BANKSCOPE data. 
The results show the asset quality ratios for both the pre- and crisis period and the 
results of the sub sample means tests. In addition, the results present the average value 
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of the asset quality ratio for banks categorized into the four coarse ratings grading. The 
results show that the asset quality of banks was much better in the pre-crisis period, 
with a mean value of asset quality ratios lower than the corresponding figures in the full 
sample. The banks rated in the investment categories, particularly those in the top 
grades have healthier asset quality. On average, the loan loss reserves to gross loan for 
banks in the top investment grade is 1.21 compared with the 4.21 for banks in the 
noninvestment category. This ratio indicates how much of the total portfolio has been 
provided for but not charged-off. It is a reserve for losses expressed as a percentage of 
total loans. Given a similar charge-off policy, the higher the ratio, the poorer the quality 
of the loan portfolio will be.  
Similarly, the loan loss provisions to net income revenue for investment grade rated 
banks are on average 15.96 compared to the 32.84 for noninvestment grades. This ratio 
shows the relationship between provisions in the profit and loss account and the interest 
income over the same period. Ideally this ratio should be as low as possible and in a 
well-run bank if the lending book is higher risk then this should be reflected by higher 
interest margins. If the ratio deteriorates it means that risk is not being properly 
remunerated by margins. Generally, the results suggest that the asset quality of loans 
within the portfolio of a bank is a major driver for the level of assigned ratings. The 
mean values of all the other asset quality measures show consistent results in Table 5.7, 
and imply that banks with better asset quality get assigned higher ratings. 
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Table 5.7: Average asset quality ratios in the pre-and crisis periods and across bank coarse credit ratings grading 
Capital 
adequacy 
Mean 
value 
Median Stdev. Mean 
value 
Stdev. Mean 
value 
Stdev. Test of 
Mean 
Coarse grading 
 
 
 
 
Full sample 
 
 
 
 
Pre-crisis period Post-crisis period t-test AA – AAA 
 
A 
 
BBB 
 
Below BBB 
 
LoanR_GL 
LoanP_NIR 
LoanR_IL 
ImpairedL_GL 
NCO_GL 
NCO_NI 
ImpairedL_EQ 
UImpairedL_EQ 
 
2.69 
22.66 
83.23 
3.33 
   2.99 
35.55 
25.76 
4.82 
2.91 
30.24 
77.21 
1.85 
1.21 
42.21 
29.64 
6.24 
0.74 
9.76 
8.17 
1.18 
0.42 
15.14 
10.13 
3.58 
2.33 
18.62 
60.24 
2.84 
1.02 
20.84 
16.21 
2.22 
7.21 
5.22 
3.34 
3.64 
4.01 
3.29 
2.99 
3.68 
 
6.32 
28.21 
106.82 
6.62 
5.93 
42.62 
32.58 
9.82 
1.20 
10.54 
12.14 
2.22 
1.51 
21.36 
11.62 
5.99 
4.01 
3.32 
3.48 
2.98 
3.36 
5.21 
3.62 
3.29 
 
1.21 
15.36 
66.94 
3.14 
1.02 
18.95 
15.01 
2.94 
2.85 
10.24 
50.21 
2.47 
1.85 
20.21 
21.39 
3.37 
2.99 
12.20 
56.81 
3.48 
3.97 
41.58 
26.34 
5.55 
 
4.21 
32.84 
110.98 
5.21 
6.97 
62.54 
33.24 
35.61 
 
 
Notes: Mean, median and standard deviation of the capital adequacy ratios. Table also shows the averages for these ratios for banks categorized using the coarse rating gradation. The test of 
mean (t test) presents a test of level of significance (at a 95% confidence level) between the averages of financial ratios in the pre- and post- crisis periods. 
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 Operations 5.6.3
BANKSCOPE classification under operations contains ratios that measure profitability 
and the earning power of banks. Table 5.8 shows the 13 earnings ratios based on 
BANKSCOPE classification. The earnings measures range from the popular return on 
assets, return on equity and net income margin, to recurring earnings power and 
dividend pay-out ratios.  
Table 5.8: Earnings (operations) measures 
Earnings measure Description 
NIM 
NIR_A 
OOI_A 
POIT_A 
PTOI_A 
NOTA_A 
ROA 
ROE 
DPO 
IND_E 
NOI_NI 
C_I 
REP 
Net Income Margin 
Net Income Revenue / Avg Assets 
Other Operating Income / Avg Assets 
Non-Interest Expense / Avg Assets 
Pre-Tax Operating Income / Avg Assets 
Non-Operating Items & Taxes / Avg Assets 
Return on Assets (ROA) 
Returns on Equity (ROE) 
Dividend Pay-Out 
Income Net of Distribution / Avg Equity 
Non-Operating Items / Net Income 
Cost to Income Ratio 
Recurring Earning Power 
Notes: This table provides the description and definition of the bank variables under BANKSCOPE 
classification ‘operations’. All values are calculated as yearly averages across the 322 banks.  
The results in Table 5.9 show that the majority of the profitability ratios presented are, 
on average, higher for investment grade banks than noninvestment banks. The net 
income margin ratio, NIM, is net interest income expressed as a percentage of earning 
assets. The higher this figure, the cheaper the funding or the higher the margin that the 
bank is commanding. Higher margins and profitability are desirable as long as asset 
quality is being maintained. The results show that investment grade banks have higher 
net income margins than noninvestment grade banks. The investment grade banks have 
close to three times the net income margin of the noninvestment grade banks. The 
returns on assets, ROA, and the return on equity, ROE, are popular ratios employed in 
modelling the determinants of bank ratings (Poon, 2003, Distinguin et al., 2012). 
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Table 5.9: Average operations (earnings) ratios in the pre-and crisis periods and across bank coarse credit ratings grading 
Capital 
adequacy 
Mean 
value 
Median Stdev. Mean 
value 
Stdev. Mean 
value 
Stdev. Test of  
Mean 
Coarse grading 
 
 
 
 
Full sample 
 
 
 
 
Pre-crisis period Post-crisis period t test AA – AAA 
 
A 
 
BBB 
 
Below BBB 
 
NIM 
NIR_A 
OOI_A 
NOIT_A 
PTOI_A 
NOTA_A 
ROA 
ROE 
DPO 
IND_E 
NOI_NI 
C_I 
REP 
2.16 
1.90 
2.05 
2.81 
1.05 
-0.35 
0.74 
12.29 
44.19 
7.87 
-23.17 
61.17 
1.51 
1.99 
1.82 
1.06 
1.10 
1.11 
0.64 
0.99 
8.81 
20.52 
3.24 
2.85 
23.52 
0.60 
0.34 
0.25 
0.80 
0.72 
0.34 
0.11 
0.29 
5.22 
27.06 
3.61 
57.04 
3.78 
0.31 
3.54 
4.22 
3.85 
5.38 
3.33 
1.24 
2.62 
16.38 
50.21 
9.95 
11.84 
17.24 
2.02 
0.39 
0.29 
0.63 
0.77 
0.22 
0.11 
0.18 
3.33 
4.27 
1.86 
20.24 
3.47 
0.22 
1.97 
1.76 
1.34 
2.32 
0.76 
-0.27 
0.49 
7.66 
52.78 
4.78 
-47.02 
59.49 
1.26 
0.12 
0.09 
0.21 
0.17 
0.26 
0.06 
0.22 
3.14 
41.51 
3.03 
81.95 
3.80 
0.21 
3.51 
3.94 
3.42 
3.33 
4.65 
3.86 
2.98 
3.01 
3.21 
4.35 
3.35 
3.84 
3.35 
2.21 
8.63 
4.21 
4.95 
2.78 
1.84 
7.65 
19.31 
69.14 
6.32 
5.21 
12.95 
1.85 
2.01 
7.62 
3.33 
3.54 
1.85 
1.55 
5.31 
13.95 
58.32 
4.51 
4.98 
8.87 
1.52 
1.25 
5.54 
2.29 
2.22 
1.34 
1.09 
3.54 
10.22 
44.78 
3.61 
2.10 
5.09 
0.99 
0.84 
1.55 
1.29 
1.97 
0.88 
-0.55 
0.37 
4.47 
28.24 
3.88 
-55.21 
60.20 
0.49 
 
Notes: Mean, median and standard deviation of the operations ratios. The table also shows the averages for these ratios for banks categorized using the coarse rating gradation. The test of 
mean (t test) presents a test of level of significance (at a 95% confidence level) between the averages of financial ratios in the pre- and post- crisis periods. 
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ROA indicates that top investment grade rated banks achieve a better rate of return from 
the utilisation of their assets (7.65% against 0.37%), while the ROE ratio indicates that 
top investment grade rated banks enjoy a considerable higher return on equity than 
noninvestment banks (19.31% versus 4.47%). Distinguin et al. (2012) find that banks 
that are significantly more profitable are associated with higher ratings. In a related 
study, Poon (2003) argues that the level of profitability is a key factor in the assignment 
of ratings to banks. Poon find that companies that solicit credit ratings exhibits, have on 
average, higher ROA, ROE and ROCE ratio values. Table 5.8 clearly shows that banks 
performed better in terms of profitability measures in the pre-crisis period when 
compared to their performance in the crisis period. The mean value of the NIM ratio for 
banks in the pre-crisis period is 3.54 against 1.97 in the crisis period.   
 Liquidity 5.6.4
The examination of the liquidity ratio in the sample of international banks is based on 
the six categories of BANKSCOPE categorization of the variable. The ratios include the 
interbank ratio, the net loan to total assets ratio, and the net loans to deposit and short 
term funding ratio. Others include the net loans to total deposits and borrowings ratio, 
the liquid assets to deposit ratio, and the liquid assets to total deposits and borrowing 
ratio. These ratios are shown in Table 5.10.  
Table 5.10: Liquidity measures 
Earnings measure Description 
INTER 
NL_A 
NL_DSTF 
NL_TDB 
LA_DSTF 
LA_TDB 
 
Interbank Ratio 
Net Loans /Total Assets 
Net Loans / Deposit and Short Term Funding 
Net Loans / Total Deposit and Borrowings 
Liquid Assets /Deposits and Short Term Funding 
Liquid Assets / Total Deposits and Borrowings 
 
Notes: This table provides the description and definition of the bank variables under BANKSCOPE 
classification ‘liquidity’. All values are calculated as yearly averages across the 322 banks.  
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Table 5.11 shows the average values of the liquidity ratios based on the classification in 
Table 5.10. The results present the pre- and crisis-period values, as well as the average 
values of the ratios based on the coarse rating categorization of bank ratings in the 
sample. The variable INTER represents money lent to other banks divided by money 
borrowed from other banks. A relatively higher value indicates the bank is net placer 
rather than a borrower of funds in the market place, and is therefore more liquid. The 
average INTER across the entire sample period is 87.20. When this ratio value is 
compared with the pre- and crisis-period, the results show that banks were generally 
more liquid in the pre-crisis era (92.75) compared to the crisis period (66.32). In terms 
of the coarse rating classification, banks that are rated in the higher rating grades are 
associated with higher liquidity (112.20 against 63.21 for noninvestment grade banks). 
Similarly, the variable, NL_A, which is a liquidity ratio that indicates what percentage 
of the assets of the bank is tied up in loans, shows results consistent with the variable, 
INTER. The higher this ratio the less liquid the bank will be. On average, the results 
show that the pre-crisis value is lower than the crisis period, suggesting that banks are 
more liquid prior to the crisis relative to the crisis period.  
In addition, higher credit ratings are associated with relatively lower NL_A (30.25 for 
the AA-AAA vs 50.29 for the below BBB). The other liquidity ratios show results 
consistent with the variables, INTER and NL__A. The variable LA_DSTF is very 
important for banks as it the so called deposit run off ratio. It presents the percentage of 
customer and short term funds that could be met if they were withdrawn suddenly. The 
higher the LA_DSTF, the more liquid the bank is and less vulnerable to a classic run on 
the bank. Table 5.10 shows that banks were on average more liquid in the pre-crisis era, 
with an average of LA_DSTF ratio of 43.55 against the crisis period value of 34.69. 
Further, it suggests that banks with higher ratings are associated with higher LA_DSTF, 
that is, higher liquidity.  
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Table 5.11: Average liquidity ratios in the pre-and crisis periods and across bank coarse credit rating grading 
Capital 
adequacy 
Mean 
value 
Median Stdev. Mean 
value 
Stdev. Mean 
value 
Stdev. Test of  
Mean 
Coarse grading 
 
 
 
 
Full sample 
 
 
 
 
Pre-crisis period Crisis period t test AA – AAA 
 
A 
 
BBB 
 
Below BBB 
 
INTER 
NL_A 
NL_DSTF 
NL_TDB 
LA_DSTF 
LA_TDB 
87.20 
41.30 
66.14 
49.76 
40.81 
31.11 
 
 
 
 
 
52.15 
36.26 
55.84 
36.96 
39.28 
25.25 
 
9.31 
2.47 
5.67 
2.70 
4.35 
3.83 
92.75 
30.91 
43.44 
48.53 
43.55 
33.83 
9.01 
1.90 
5.56 
2.39 
3.00 
1.63 
66.32 
43.64 
73.21 
56.69 
34.69 
19.32 
6.96 
1.56 
1.85 
2.08 
4.31 
2.57 
2.87 
3.92 
3.25 
3.51 
4.23 
3.11 
 
112.20 
30.25 
51.21 
40.25 
52.89 
36.19 
101.54 
36.65 
58.93 
44.98 
49.30 
35.99 
89.21 
40.13 
61.39 
50.21 
44.02 
25.14 
63.21 
50.29 
77.32 
63.01 
31.29 
18.62 
 
Notes: Mean, median and standard deviation of the liquidity ratios. Table also shows the averages for these ratios for banks categorized using the coarse rating gradation.  
The test of mean (t test) presents a test of level of significance (at a 95% confidence level) between the averages of financial ratios in the pre- and post- crisis periods. 
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5.7 Summary 
This chapter presents a review of the methodological approaches, data and econometric 
models that this study employs. First, the data and sampling of the study are presented. 
The banks within the sample are drawn from across the globe. The banks employed are 
publicly listed and assigned a Fitch long term local currency rating. The final sample 
consists of 322 international banks from all geographical regions. The largest grouping 
of banks in the sample is from the Far East and Central Asia, with about 23% of the 
sample size. The remaining 77% is made up of banks from the Western Europe (17%), 
Eastern Europe (8%), Middle East and North Africa (14%), South and Central Asia 
(11%), Sub-Sahara Africa (4%), Oceania (2%), and North America (21%). Some 
preliminary descriptive statistics are reported for the growth of the bank credit ratings 
during the period of study (2000–2012). Over time, an increasing number of banks 
obtained credit ratings, with a growth in bank ratings in the sample of 114% (from 150 
banks in 2000 to 322 in 2012). There is also an observed monotonic decrease in the 
number of investment-grade bank ratings relative to banks with lower ratings during the 
period of the study.  
A close examination of the bank fundamental characteristics shows that higher banks 
credit ratings are associated with improved financial ratios. Using BANKSCOPE 
financial ratio classification (which mirrors the CAMELS system), the results show that 
there is a positive relationship between the capital adequacy ratio, as well as the 
earnings and liquidity ratios. Similarly, the higher the quality of assets of a bank, the 
higher is the assigned credit rating. In addition, there is a deterioration of these 
fundamental bank ratios in the crisis period (2008-2012) relative to the pre-crisis period.    
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 RESULTS OF THE EMPIRICAL CHAPTER 6.
INVESTIGATION OF BANK CREDIT RATING 
DETERMINANTS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 examines the significant factors driving the assignment of credit ratings to 
international banks. The review of literature shows that bank credit rating assignment is 
a complex process and that rating agencies attempt to maintain a balance between rating 
timeliness and rating stability. Further, Chapter 5 reviews methodological approaches in 
the existing studies and the approach that this thesis adopts. This current chapter aims to 
build on the previous discussions and presents the results of the first empirical 
component of this thesis which concerns the modelling of international bank credit 
rating determinants.  
This chapter presents a number of different specifications of the ordered probit model 
employed in the estimation of the rating determinant equation. Existing evidence 
suggests the use of ordered response models, that is, the probit or logit model to capture 
bank credit ratings. The choice is based on the nature of the credit ratings themselves, 
that is, their discrete-values and natural ordering. The structure of the data, which in this 
study is a panel-data framework, confers additional constraints on the choice of 
modelling technique in terms of allowing for both fixed and random parameter 
measurements. The study employs a sample of 322 international commercial banks and 
bank holding companies from 70 countries. The bank rating determinant models include 
both financial and non-financial variables that potentially influence the assignment of a 
specific credit rating notch to a bank. These variables are extracted from Bankscope 
database, as well as the annual reports of the individual banks over the period 2000-
2012. Preliminary analysis of the financial data in Chapter 5 shows significant levels of 
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correlation among the different categories of variables employed, i.e. the CAMELS 
variables. The variance inflation factor analysis gives an indication of the appropriate 
financial variables to employ as discussed in Chapter 5. In addition, the hypotheses that 
this component of the study test are presented in Section 5.3.  
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 6.2 discusses three different 
time specifications of the bank credit rating determinant model, and presents the 
intuitions behind these specifications. Section 6.3 presents the results of the alternative 
specifications of the bank credit rating determinant model empirically investigated in 
this thesis. Section 6.4 discusses the results of the ordered probit tests for the presence 
of rating strictness over time. Finally, Section 6.5 summarises the main findings of this 
chapter. 
6.2 Bank rating determinant model time specifications 
This section examines the modelling of the time dynamics associated with the 
assignment of credit ratings to international banks by credit rating agencies. This thesis 
proposes and tests empirically, a number of different time specifications. Some of these 
tests serve as robustness check and provide valuable insights into the nature of the 
rating assignment process by credit rating agencies. Broadly speaking, the thesis 
presents the result of estimations under the lagged, contemporaneous and predictive 
(lead) time specifications. This approach falls under an area of study referred to time-
impact analysis (Odder-White and Ready, 2006). The need to incorporate a time-
specification element in the bank credit rating determinant econometric model is linked 
to suggestions in empirical literature that rating agencies are sometimes slow to respond 
to new information (Weinstein, 1977; Hand et al., 1992; Hite and Warga, 1997; 
Johnson, 2003). Odder-White and Ready find that rating changes can be predicted using 
changes in the level of financial ratios, which is an additional support for the slow 
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response of rating agencies. Hence, rating agencies may in fact be backward-looking 
relying more on past information (thus, lagging the market). The use of different time-
specifications in this thesis, including current year information (contemporaneous 
specification), future performance indicators (predictive specification) and past data 
(lagged specification) presents a value-added approach to this investigation. Figure 6.1 
shows the details of the alternative specifications this thesis adopts.  
Figure 6.1: Alternative model specifications ratings determinant models 
 
The first model alternative is the contemporaneous time specification. This specification 
suggests that credit rating agencies effect a rating action (e.g. upgrade, downgrade) 
following a review of the overall financial and non-financial position of a bank in the 
same period. Put differently, this specification makes the assumption that the impact of 
bank specific characteristics on the assignment of credit rating is of a simultaneous 
nature with rating agencies reacting to changes in bank’s position instantly, that is, 
within the same period. Many of the existing literature studies in the area of ratings 
determinant modelling follow the contemporaneous specification (Poon et al., 2009; 
Poon and Firth 2005; Van Roy 2006; Shen et al., 2012; Fracassi et al., 2014). 
This thesis extends the specifications employed by the earlier studies in the field of 
bank credit rating determination by examining and presenting the results of other 
Alternative model specifications 
 
Contemporaneous 
specification 
 
Lagged  
Specification 
  
Predictive 
specification 
Coarse vs. fine rating 
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alternative time specifications. For the purpose of this thesis, two additional 
specifications are presented. The motivation behind these alternatives is that the rating 
decision by credit rating agencies may be affected by factors that are not of a 
contemporaneous nature. Although, rating agencies, in their rating process have access 
to private information, their decision to effect a rating action may not be undertaken in a 
timely manner. Thus, this thesis introduces a time-lag into the analysis. This responsive 
specification employs one-year lagged values of variables included in the model in 
order to test whether rating agencies are backward-looking and slow in their rating 
assignment process. Hence, the independent variables in this specification are from the 
year t-1 relative to a rating action in year t. This specification thus makes the 
assumption that the credit rating assignment to international banks is triggered by past 
specific events related to the bank.   
However, one may argue that bank credit rating assignment is on the basis of future 
bank performance, thus supporting a predictive specification (Boot et al., 2006). Banks 
seek to disseminate forward-looking information to the market through their various 
meetings with credit rating agencies. Hence, rating action generally should convey new 
information to the market (Thompson and Vaz, 1990). This is consistent with the 
position of the major rating agencies that the ratings they assign are forward looking. 
For example, Standard and Poor’s maintains that their credit ratings “express forward-
looking opinions about the creditworthiness of issuers and obligations.” (Standard and 
Poor’s, 2009). In addition. Fitch argues that their opinions are forward looking and 
include analysts’ views of future performance (Fitch, 2007). Further, they maintain that 
these views on future performance may include forecasts, which may in turn be 
informed by non-disclosable management projections, and therefore are based on 
trends, as well as on historical performance. Thus, one may argue that ratings are 
inherently forward-looking and embody assumptions and predictions about future 
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events. Fitch Solutions further maintains that the firm employs a variety of credit risk 
indicators to meet growing market demand for forward-looking risk indicators across 
the full spectrum of Fitch content.  Hence, the predictive specification approach 
presented within this chapter employs all future numerical values (ratios) in the 
estimation of a model. The specification therefore assumes that the rating assignment in 
year t is determined by bank estimates for year t+1 (Sufi, 2009). Further, the firm and 
its analysts will have some indications about what is happening in the current financial 
year (to be published in year t+1 annual report) in addition to the most current accounts 
(year t). In particular, the ability to forecast comes from this and the ability to discuss 
with the management of the company, the current and likely near term position and 
performance of the company. 
These time specifications may also be linked to the objectives and performance of rating 
agencies. Credit rating provides probabilistic opinions about the future creditworthiness 
of an issue or issuer (Moody’s, 2005). For it to be useful and relevant, (re)assignment of 
credit ratings need to timely and accurate. However, there is a conflict between the 
accuracy and timeliness of rating assignments. Following the global financial crisis, 
there has been an increase in the monitoring of rating accuracy (e.g. regular third party 
reports on rating performance) (CFA, 2014). Thus, in modelling the determinants of 
credit rating, it is important to incorporate elements of time within the model variables, 
as this gives more information on the level of ratings performance.   
6.3 Rating determinants model results 
Section 6.3 presents the results of the rating determinant model, incorporating the 
alternative time-specifications. The reporting of the results includes the estimation of 
the ordered probit models, their marginal effects, and the out-of-sample forecast 
estimates for the model outcomes for each rating category. The financial data employed 
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follows the established data from the CAMELS criteria, i.e. measures of capital 
adequacy, assets quality, management quality, earnings, liquidity and sensitivity to the 
market. In order to ensure consistency with existing studies, this thesis employs selected 
financial ratios that proxy these criteria
9
 . 
Consistent with Poon and Firth (2005), all the model specifications account for any 
country related unobserved variables by including the sovereign credit rating of the 
home country. This aims to proxy for a change in macroeconomic variable effects. 
Further, it helps to avoid the incidental parameter issue highlighted by Greene and 
Hensher (2009) and Wooldridge (2010) by avoiding the use of many country dummies.    
The remainder of this section is as follows: Section 6.3.1 presents the results of the 
econometric model assuming a contemporaneous specification, with the assumption that 
international bank credit rating is determined in the same year as financial and non-
financial information becomes available. Section 6.3.2 assumes a predictive 
specification, in which bank’s credit ratings are forward-looking and are determined on 
the basis of expected financial information. Further, Section 6.3.3 presents results for 
the model assuming lagged specification. These sections employ the fine bank credit 
rating grading as a measure of the dependent variable. In addition to the use of fine 
grading, this section presents results of the robustness check employing the coarse 
grading. The results of the coarse rating specifications are positioned in the appendix.  
 The contemporaneous specification 6.3.1
This section presents the estimates of the results of the contemporaneous model 
specification. The specification follows the tradition of a number of existing studies. It 
assumes that international bank credit rating is determined by bank financial and non-
                                                 
9
The final set of CAMELS variables, TIER1, LLR/GL, LTA, INTERBANK, ROA, are based on the analysis 
in Chapter Five and are consistent with the existing literature (Poon, 2003; Poon and Firth, 2005) 
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financial performance in a simultaneous manner. The results presented include the 
estimation of the ordered probit models, their marginal effects, and the out-of-sample 
forecast estimates for the model outcomes for each rating category. Table 6.1 presents 
the estimates of the contemporaneous bank rating determinant model using the fine 
rating grading (the dependent variable is the bank credit rating). Panel A shows the 
fitted coefficients of three models, Models I–III. Model I includes only the financial 
variables hypothesised to affect a bank’s rating. Model II includes only the non-
financial variables, while Model III gives the full specification (including both the 
financial and non-financial variables). Panel B shows a selection of model statistics.  
In addition, Table 6.2 presents the marginal effects (for the full specification) which are 
estimations of the effect of a change in an independent variable on the probability of a 
bank rating falling in a particular rating notch (grade). As a reminder, marginal effects 
measure the change in a response (in the case of this thesis, a bank credit rating) given a 
change in an independent variable. The estimation of the marginal effects makes it 
easier to interpret how changes in the independent variable affect a nonlinear response 
from a fitted model. Most of the findings based on the contemporaneous specification 
modelling are qualitatively similar to results from existing literature in the area of bank 
credit rating determinants.  
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___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel A Parameter estimates 
    Hypothesised   Model I    Model II   Model III   
Independent variables         Sign  Coefficient  Z-stat  Coefficient Z-stat  Coefficient Z-stat 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Intercept      -7.2147  -4.11*** 1.2547  27.22***             -7.3225  -4.65*** 
TIER1    + (H1)    0.0874   6.11***            -         -   0.0905   6.17***   
LLR/GL    − (H2)   -0.0366  -5.14***           -         -  -0.0411  -5.21*** 
ROA    + (H3)    0.0952   2.22**            -         -   0.0991   2.17** 
LTA    − (H4)   -0.0061  -1.26*            -         -  -0.0079  -1.33* 
INTER    + (H4)    0.0754   3.10***            -         -   0.0687   3.02*** 
BETA    − (H5)   -0.0006  -0.11            -         -  -0.0006  -0.18 
IDIO    − (H6)   -0.0013  -1.28*            -         -  -0.0017  -1.72* 
In(Z-Score)   + (H7)    0.0541   2.03**            -         -   0.0554   2.31** 
LR    − (H8)   -0.0417  -3.47***           -           -  -0.0488  -3.49*** 
CRK    − (H9)   -0.0267  -6.14***           -         -  -0.0284  -7.55***  
CI    − (H10 )   -0.0001  -0.88            -          -  -0.0014  -1.74* 
lnTA    + (H11 )    0.5147  12.26***      0.6214  12.65*** 
TBTF    + (H12 )             -        -  0.0354   4.21***   0.0383   4.33*** 
OWN    + (H13 )             -        -  -0.0014  -1.77*  -0.0014  -1.73*  
INST    + (H14 )             -        -  -0.0011  -2.23**  -0.0016  -2.20** 
INDD    + (H15 )             -        -   0.0009   1.03   0.0010   1.77* 
SOVAA    + (H16 )             -        -   0.0104   6.87***   0.0119   6.94*** 
SOVA    + (H16 )             -        -   0.0157   5.69***   0.0168   5.87*** 
SOVBBB   + (H16 )             -        -  -0.0064  -2.18**  -0.0063  -2.17** 
YEARD    − (H17 )             -        -  -0.2147  -0.89  -0.2149  -0.85 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel B: Selected model statistics 
Log-likelihood       -1,124.144   -1,219.201   -1,019.514   
Restr.log-lik.       -1,351.287   -1,621.658   -1,309.198 
No. of group obs.         3,682      3,682      3,682 
χ2 statistic       684.0147***   628.1574***   712.012*** 
Pseudo- R2ϛ       39.15%    36.21%    42.35% 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 6.1: Contemporaneous bank rating determinants model results 
177 
 
Notes: The dependent variable of all ordered probit models is the categorical variable CR (fine ratings). All significance levels are determined using the two-tailed Z-test. ***, **,* denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Ϛ This measure of goodness-of-fit is a simple computational statistic [pseudo − 𝑅2 =
χ2
χ2+N
] proposed by Aldrich and Nelson (1984). The 
upper boundary represents the threshold for each of the rating categories; in this model the categories represent the fine ratings. The SOV (dummies) captures any country related variables 
as this measure the sovereign ratings of the countries. The data employed are for 322 international banks covering a period 2000-2012. 
   
 
 
Table 6.2: Marginal effects of Model III (full specification)  
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Rating Category 
   _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variables  Below BB+               BBB-               BBB                BBB+                 A-                A                A+               AA-                AA               Above AA 
TIER1           -0.02*      -0.06*  -0.11*            -0.10         0.05 0.08    0.13           0.11     0.12*  0.08* 
LLR/GL            0.04*       0.02    0.01             0.00        -0.02             -0.08   -0.16*          -0.19*    -0.23*              -0.09* 
ROA           -0.02*      -0.01*    -0.01*             0.02         0.03*  0.05*    0.06*           0.09*     0.01*  0.03* 
LTA            0.02       0.00    0.03             0.01        -0.01             -0.04   -0.01          -0.01*    -0.02  0.00 
INTERBANK          -0.07      -0.01*  -0.04             0.06         0.06  0.11    0.07*           0.11*     0.06*  0.10*  
BETA            0.00       0.00     0.00             0.00         0.00  0.00    0.00           0.00     0.00  0.00 
IDIO            0.01*       0.01*   0.03*             0.02         0.01 -0.04*   -0.03          -0.04*    -0.01*              -0.04*  
In(Z-Score)          -0.09*      -0.05*  -0.01*            -0.06         0.08*             0.07*       0.10               0.12*              0.11*               0.08*  
LR            0.07*       0.06*   0.02*             0.01         0.03 -0.09*   -0.13*          -0.08*    -0.11*              -0.07* 
CRK            0.06*       0.01*   0.03             0.07         0.08 -0.06   -0.08*          -0.12*    -0.03*              -0.04* 
CI            0.04*       0.10   -0.03*            -0.01        -0.06 -0.02*   -0.03*          -0.06*    -0.04*              -0.06*  
InTA           -0.09*      -0.02*  -0.06*            -0.02        -0.01 0.04*    0.06*           0.04*     0.02*  0.05*  
TBTF           -0.03*      -0.01*  -0.06*            -0.01         0.02*  0.08*    0.07*           0.11*     0.10*  0.21*  
OWN            0.01*       0.04*   0.02*             0.02        -0.03 -0.01   -0.02*          -0.01*     -0.02*             -0.05* 
INST           -0.02*      -0.01   -0.04*            -0.03         0.02  0.06    0.07*           0.05*      0.03*  0.04*   
INDD            0.00      -0.01    0.00            -0.04         0.00     0.00    0.00           0.01*      0.02*  0.02*  
SOVAA           -0.03*      -0.01   -0.01             0.00         0.06  0.04    0.04*           0.03*      0.02*  0.07*   
SOVA           -0.01*      -0.04*  -0.02*             0.05         0.01  0.00    0.03*           0.01*      0.06*  0.02*  
SOVBBB
 
          0.02       0.01*   0.04             0.03         0.00 -0.02*   -0.01*          -0.03*     -0.01*             -0.03*  
YEARD            0.01*       0.04    0.02             0.01        -0.02 -0.06*    0.02*           0.01      0.02  0.08* 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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The results in Table 6.1 show that the measure of regulatory capital adequacy (TIER1) 
is significantly positively related to bank credit ratings at the 1% level, in both Models I 
and III. This is consistent with Poon and Firth (2005), who provide support for the 
highly significant positive relationship between a bank’s capital and its rating. Poon and 
Firth argue that, as equity is considered a cushion available to absorb losses; their 
results suggest that banks with better credit ratings have capital to absorb losses on their 
loan portfolios. Similarly, Salas and Saurina (2003) find that banks with lower capital 
tend to operate with higher levels of credit risk, consistent with the moral hazard 
hypothesis. 
Some of the theoretical literature offers conflicting results regarding the effects of 
capital requirements on bank-risk taking (Freixas and Rochet, 2008), particularly in the 
area of monitoring incentives, leading to a possible reduction in the quality of a bank’s 
portfolio (Besanko and Kanatas, 1996; Boot and Greenbaum, 1993). However, there is 
strong evidence that banks with higher capital adequacy ratios tend to have higher credit 
ratings, thereby providing support for hypothesis H1. The results from Table 6.2 show 
that the probability of a bank rating falling in the top notch increases by 8% with every 
percentage increase in the variable TIER1, everything else held constant. Conversely, 
there a 2% decrease in the probability of a bank being rated in the lowest speculative 
grades (below BB+) with every percentage increase in the variable TIER1. Hence, one 
may argue that within a contemporaneous setting, there is a greater tendency to obtain 
higher ratings when a bank’s capital is adequately maintained 
The assets quality ratio (LLR/GL) shows the expected negative relationship, and is 
significant at the 1% level in both Models I and III. The result is consistent with Poon 
and Firth (2005), Poon et al. (2009) and Distinguin et al. (2012). At the heart of many 
commercial banking institutions’ activities is lending, and loans thus constitute a 
significant percentage of bank’s assets portfolio. The quality of a bank’s loan portfolio 
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affects the viability of that bank. Any impairment of a bank’s asset portfolio can 
increase the risk of insolvency, thus resulting in a negative credit rating. Hence, there is 
a negative relationship between bank LLR/GL and credit ratings. The results from the 
marginal effects estimation in Table 6.2 indicate that an increase in the assets quality 
ratio LLR/GL decreases the probability of a bank being rated in the higher rating 
notches, particularly the investments grades, but results in an increasing chance of being 
assigned ratings that fall in the speculative grades. For example, there is a 9% decrease 
in a bank’s chance of being rated in the ‘Above AA’ rating grade for every 1% increase 
in the assets quality ratio LLR/GL. Similarly, there is a 4% probability of a bank being 
rated below the BB+ grade for every 1% increase in this assets quality ratio.  
The higher earnings capacity of a bank is usually associated with reduced riskiness. 
This may explain the positive sign of the earnings coefficient (ROA) in Models I and III. 
The results show a significant positive relationship between earnings and bank credit 
ratings at the 5% level. Pettit et al. (2004) and Poon et al. (2009) argue that profitability 
is important in credit rating assignment because higher profitability is necessary for 
banks to support growth and other long-term strategic plans. Further, Packer and 
Tarashev (2011) argue that rating agencies consider banks that consistently retain a 
greater share of their earnings during tranquil times as more creditworthy. The marginal 
effects estimations in Table 6.2 indicate that a 1% increase in the ROA ratio results in a 
3% increase in the probability of being assigned a rating above the AA category. There 
is a decrease in the likelihood of a bank being assigned grades in the speculative 
category for every one percent point increase in the ROA variable.  
In the same vein, the liquidity measures (LTA and INTER) both show the relationship 
expected from theory. The coefficient of the LTA is negative and significant at the 10% 
level, whilst the INTER measure is positive and significant at the 1% level. The LTA 
measures the proportion of a bank’s assets tied up in loans, hence the lower this ratio the 
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more the amount of cash or near cash items available to banks to meet their obligations. 
Liquidity is very important to a bank, particularly in its maturity transformation role, in 
addition to its ability to meet obligations to deposit customers at short notice. The result 
is consistent with the argument of Fight (2000) who maintains that liquidity is an 
indicator of financial flexibility. Poon and Firth (2005) find that LTA is negatively 
correlated with bank’s credit ratings, as the higher the ratio is, the less liquid is the bank. 
Similarly, Poon et al. (2009), using other liquidity measures, find liquidity to be an 
important determinant of the credit ratings of banks. This result is also consistent with 
Poon (2003) and Doumpos and Pasiouras (2005) who find that liquidity ratios are 
significantly positively related to credit ratings. Hypothesis H4 is thus supported. The 
marginal effects estimations for the liquidity variables, LTA and INTER both show the 
expected directions for the probabilities of a bank being assigned into particular rating 
notches when there is a unit change in these variables. The implication of these results 
is that the Fitch rating agency pays particular attention to bank liquidity in a 
contemporaneous way. With the requirements of the Basel III liquidity ratios, banks 
continue to pay closer attention to their levels of liquidity. These results strongly 
suggest the need for banks to be adequately liquid in light of the stress testing 
framework currently in place in most regions across the world.  
The relationship between business risk and the credit rating of a bank is measured by 
the variables, bank stock beta (BETA) and the idiosyncratic risk (IDIO). Both of these 
variables evidence a negative relationship with a bank credit rating. However, only the 
variable IDIO is significantly negatively related to a bank’s credit rating at the 10% 
level in Models I and III. The result is consistent with Amato and Furfine (2004) and 
Blume et al. (1998) who find the idiosyncratic (non-beta) risk variable to be negative 
and significant at the 10% level. However, in contrast with the two studies, Models I 
and III show an insignificant result for the BETA. Iannotta and Pennacchi (2011) 
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maintain that if raters differentiate between idiosyncratic and systematic default risk, 
then ratings might reflect risk-neutral probabilities of default if defaults in bad 
economic times are weighted more heavily than defaults in good economic times. 
Generally, bank rating assignments are influenced by both business and financial risks, 
and the interplay of these risks presents an interesting consideration in the rating 
process. The earlier findings relating to financial risk (as measured by the CAMELS 
framework) suggest that a bank’s level of credit quality may be heavily influenced by 
its business risk. The implication of this contemporaneous approach to estimating the 
determinants of a bank’s credit rating shows that international banks’ credit ratings are 
influenced not only by risk specific to the banks. This may be linked to the level of 
competition in the market and the need for banks to expand internationally and diversify 
their portfolio of assets.  
The results from Table 6.2 indicate that a percentage increase in the variable BETA does 
not have any marginal effects on the probability of assigning a bank into any particular 
rating category; however, a percentage change in the variable IDIO results in a 
corresponding decrease in the likelihood of a bank having a higher rating of between 
1% and 4%. Conversely, there is an increase in the probability of a bank rating falling in 
the lower rating classes by between 1% and 3%.  
Table 6.1 shows that the variable Z-score is positively related to bank credit ratings at 
the 5% level in both Models I and III. This is consistent with the sign expected from 
theory and shows that there is a greater likelihood of being assigned a higher rating as 
the Z-score increases. In other words, banks with a lower Z-score are riskier. Consistent 
with this, the marginal effects show the same sign and the effects of a 1% change in this 
variable is relatively high (between 7% and 12%) when compared with the other 
financial variables. This thesis follows Laeven and Levine (2009) and Imbierowicz and 
Rauch (2014) in applying a natural logarithm transformation to the Z-Score because of 
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its highly skewed distribution. The results support hypothesis H7. These results further 
suggest the importance credit rating agencies pay to risk exposure of banks in assigning 
those ratings. The use of the Z-Score is an innovative addition to the modelling of the 
determinants of bank credit rating,  
The results from Models I and III show a negative relationship between a bank liquidity 
risk and credit ratings. The liquidity risk variable, LR, is significantly negatively related 
to bank credit ratings at the 1% level. Similarly, the credit risk variable, CRK is 
significantly negatively related to bank credit rating at the 1% level in both Models I 
and III. Liquidity risk and credit risk are important drivers of bank survival. There is 
evidence in existing studies that there are individual and joint relationships between 
these two variables in terms of their impact on bank default probability (Imbierowicz 
and Rauch, 2014). This highlights the importance of a bank’s overall risk measure in the 
assignment of a credit rating. This finding is broadly consistent with Shin and Moore 
(2003) and Amato and Furfine (2004) who argue that credit ratings are linked to a 
bank’s overall risk outlook. The results support hypotheses H8 and H9. Further support 
for the probability of a bank rating falling in an investment or a speculative grade 
following a percentage change in these two risk classes is evident in Table 6.2. A 
percentage point increase in the variable CRK decreases the probability of a bank rating 
falling within the investment grade by between 3% and 12%; and an increase the 
likelihood of being assigned a speculative grade by 6%. For the liquidity variable LR, a 
percentage increase results in a decrease in the probability of a bank rating falling 
within the investment grade category by between 1% and 13%. Conversely, there is a 
corresponding increase of falling in the speculative grade of 7%.   
The coefficient relating to bank efficiency (CI), measuring the relationship between the 
average ratio of costs to net income of bank and a bank rating, is negative and 
significant, though only in the full specification and at the 10% level. Thus, there is 
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weak support for hypothesis H10. The marginal effects of the efficiency variable, CI, 
show that a percentage point increase leads to between a 3% and 6% probability of not 
being rated in the top investment grade categories. Only a minority of existing studies 
(Shen et al., 2012; Öğüt et al., 2012) employ a variant of bank efficiency in their 
models. These studies find that efficiency plays an important part in bank rating. The 
results of the impact of bank efficiency on bank credit ratings indicate that a bank that is 
able to drive its costs down relative to others may be perceived to be more efficient and 
therefore awarded a higher rating. Fiordelisi et al. (2011) maintain that lower bank 
efficiency with respect to costs and revenues Granger-causes higher bank risk, which 
may consequently lead to a bank being assigned a lower rating. Similarly, Berger and 
De Young (1997) and Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) argue that the concept of bank 
efficiency needs to be recognised explicitly when modelling the determinants of bank 
risk. In addition, Berger and DeYoung suggest that the increase in problem loans is 
usually a result of cost inefficiency, particularly in thinly capitalized banks. Thus, 
despite the weak relationship between the variable CI and bank credit rating, the 
marginal effects within a contemporaneous setting shows that CRAs take into account 
the cost structure of a bank in assigning ratings. 
The size measure (lnTA) shows a positive relationship with bank credit ratings, and it is 
significant at the 1% level. Consistent with existing studies such as Poon (2003), Poon 
and Firth (2005), and Van Roy (2006), and providing support for hypothesis H11, there 
is a positive relationship between bank size and credit rating. Fitch (2007) maintains 
that bank size and the diversification of assets are key factors in their rating process. 
Other things being equal, larger banks are awarded higher ratings than smaller banks. 
Similarly, UBS believes that ‘larger companies tend to have higher credit ratings’ and 
that ‘size metrics offer the strongest statistical correlation with credit ratings, reflecting 
important qualitative factors such as geographic and product market diversification, 
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competitive position, bargaining power, market share and brand stature’ (UBS, 2004: 
9). Further, Demsetz and Strahan (1997) point out that the large bank holding 
companies use their size and diversification to operate with lower capital ratios in order 
to pursue riskier activities. There is a greater potential for banks to incur huge losses as 
a result of exposure from riskier activities, hence resulting in the lowering of their credit 
ratings. Evidence from the marginal effects estimation shows that a unit percentage 
increase in the lnTA variable leads to between a 4% and 6% probability of a bank rating 
falling within the investment grade and a 9% decrease in the chance of being rated 
within the speculative rating grade. 
In addition, Hau et al. (2012) argue that there is an incentive for rating agencies to be 
biased towards large banks despite their complexity, opacity and difficulty to rate. In 
this thesis, the Fitch index measuring the likelihood that a financial institution will 
receive extraordinary support to prevent it defaulting on its senior obligations (TBTF) 
has a positive sign and is significant at the 1% level in Models II and III. This further 
demonstrates the importance of size in the rating process. Larger banks not only tend to 
have better access to capital markets, they are also more likely to receive government 
support. This is connected to the too-big-to-fail argument, and the contagion effects that 
allowing a bank to fail might have on the rest of the banking system. Hypothesis H12, 
which states that there is a positive relationship between the Fitch support rating for a 
bank and credit rating, is thus supported by this result. The marginal effects for these 
two variables (InTA and TBTF) in Table 6.2 further underline the significance of these 
results. The size effect increases the chances of receiving higher credit ratings and 
decreasing the possibility of a bank being assigned lower ratings. The results are 
consistent with existing studies such as Pasiouras et al. (2007) and Distinguin et al. 
(2012), which find positive relationship between bank size and the credit rating assigned 
by rating agencies. 
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The variable that captures director’s shareholdings in a bank (OWN) is negatively 
related to bank credit ratings at the 10% level in both Models II and III. This result is 
contrary to the proposed hypothesis H13, and suggests that rating agencies do not favour 
directors owning higher proportions of a bank’s equity since this can lead to them 
making decisions at the expense of other stakeholders, particularly bondholders, 
creditors and even other shareholders. The result is also consistent with some existing 
studies (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Laeven and Levine, 2009). However, other 
studies (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Minow and Bingham, 1995) argue that increasing the 
shareholding of directors provides them with an incentive to improve corporate 
governance. This may however lead to an accumulation of voting rights, giving them 
the power to keep themselves in office. The marginal effects estimation in Table 6.2 
shows that a unit percentage increase in the OWN variable leads to between a 1% and 
5% probability of a bank not being assigned an investment grade rating, and a 1% 
probability of being assigned a speculative grade. 
The degree of institutional ownership (INST) is positively related to bank credit ratings 
in the full specification, and is significant at the 5% level. The sign is expected and is 
consistent with existing study evidence (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Wilson and 
Williams, 2000; Goddard et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2006; Mehran and Rosenberg, 2008) 
and thus hypothesis H14 is accepted. Existing studies find a strong negative relationship 
between ownership and the creditworthiness of a firm. The results appear to show that 
credit rating agencies are more likely to assign lower ratings to banks where ownership 
is concentrated in the hands of individual owners. This is also consistent with Shleifer 
and Vishny (1986) who argue that large institutional investors have an incentive to 
monitor and influence bank behaviour to the detriment of bondholders. Such behaviour 
may be perceived by rating agencies as being positive.  
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The variable which measures the proportion of independent directors on a bank’s board 
(INDD) is positively related to bank credit rating, though only at the 10% level in the 
full model specification. The results indicate that a higher number of independent 
directors is more likely to lead to a higher credit rating, providing only weak support for 
hypothesis H15, and consistent with existing studies of the impact of independent 
directors on bank risk taking and overall corporate governance (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 
2006; Buch and Delong, 2008; Hau and Thum, 2009; Switzer and Wang, 2013). The 
current reforms (e.g. the UK House of Commons Reform of the Banking Sector, 2013) 
noted the corporate failures in the banking sectors and argue for greater use of 
independent directors in order to align the interests of the other board members with 
those of the shareholders. This may potentially be seen as playing a significant role in 
the rating process because rating agencies can view such a trend as positive impact on 
bank rating assignments. Therefore, any increase in the number or activity of 
independent directors warrants a higher rating from credit rating agencies.  
Consistent with Poon and Firth (2005), the measure of the impact of changes in the 
operating environment (SOV) all have the expected positive signs from theory, except 
for SOVBBB. It is more likely for a bank to be rated in the lower credit ratings 
categories if their primary operations are in a country whose sovereign ratings are low. 
Generally, a higher sovereign rating should lead to banks being rated in the higher 
investment grade credit rating categories. The coefficient of the year dummy, YEARD, 
is negative and significant at the 10% level. This is an indication of asymmetry in 
international bank ratings between the pre- and post-crisis period.  
In the full specification (Model III), the log likelihood ratio 𝜒2 of 712.012 is reported 
which is significant at the 1% level. In addition, the pseudo-𝑅2 which measures the 
goodness-of-fit is relatively high at 42.35% in the Model III compared with the results 
obtained for Models I and II. Poon and Firth (2005) employ the adjusted R2 and report a 
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value of 53% (although this cannot be interpreted in the same way as the pseudo-R2). 
However, this study achieves a relatively close adjusted R
2
 figure of 50.87%. Model III 
is therefore the best at explaining the variables which drive the assignment of a bank 
credit rating. All of the variables employed in Model III are significant and exhibit the 
expected signs, and are significant except for the variables BETA, OWN, YEARD and 
SOV BBB. The full contemporaneous rating determinant model shows that the following 
variables: TIER1, LLR/GL, ROA, LTA, INTER, IDIO, ln(Z-Score), LR, CRK, CI, lnTA, 
TBTF, OWN, INDD, SOVAA, SOVA impact on bank credit rating assignment. 
Table 6.3 shows results of the out-of-sample prediction evaluation. This thesis employs 
data from 2000 to 2008 for estimating the fit period. The results presented, are for the 
accuracy of the assigned banks rating in the period 2009 –2012. Hence, the holdout 
sample is for the period 2009 and 2012. The table displays the root-mean square error 
deviation (or error) RMSE. This measures the difference between values (rating classes) 
predicted by the model and the values actually observed. Put differently, it is the sample 
standard deviation of the differences between predicted and observed values. In 
addition, the table displays the mean absolute percentage error, MAPE. This expresses 
the forecast error as the mean or average of the absolute percentage errors of forecasts. 
Panels A to D present the actual and predicted values of the dependent variable (i.e. the 
credit rating notch). The results show a total observed (actual) value for bank rating 
grades of 322 for the sample. For example, in Panel A, only 47% of the top investment 
grade ratings (A- to AA+ and above) are correctly predicted for 2009. This is in contrast 
to the 83% correctly predicted for the speculative grades.  
A comparison of the results in Panel A to D shows that the measures of the forecast 
errors tend to increase as one move forward into the future. The lower these errors are, 
the more reliable is the forecasting model. The AA+ and above is consistently correctly 
predicted. 
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Table 6.3: Contemporaneous rating determinants specification: Prediction Evaluation (Model III) 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Estimated Equation (2000-2008):  
Panel A Year: 2009   
Dependent Variable Dependent Actual  Predicted Forecast                Absolute              Absolute (%)  Squared Error 
________________________________Value___________Obs.____________Obs.____________Error___________Deviation______of Error__________________________ 
 BB+ and below  0     97  63  34  34  35.05  1,156 
 BBB-   1     32  26    6    6  18.75             36 
 BBB   2     28  32                  -4    4  14.29       16 
 BBB+   3     29  34                  -5    5  17.24       25 
A-    4     37  26  11  11  29.73     121 
 A   5     32  12  20  20  62.50     400 
 A+   6     34  16  18  18  52.94       324 
 AA-   7     27    8   19  19  70.37        361 
 AA   8       6    3    3    3  50.00               9 
 AA+ and above  9       0    0    0    0    0.00         0 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________                           
 Total    322              220       
Mean Absolute Percentage Error: 35.09% Root-Mean-Squared-Error Magnitude: 15.65 Total percentages predicted: 68.32% 
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel B Year: 2010   
Dependent Variable Dependent Actual  Predicted Forecast  Absolute  Absolute (%)  Squared Error 
________________________________Value__________ Obs.____________Obs.____________Error___________Deviation________of Error__________________________  
BB+ and below  0     90  60  30  30  33.33     900 
 BBB-   1     41  23  26  26  63.41             676 
 BBB   2     36  22                 14  14  38.89     196 
 BBB+   3     23  22                   1    1    4.35         1 
A-   4     40  29  11  11  27.50     121 
 A   5     28  19    9    9  34.14       81 
 A+   6     31  17  14  14  45.16       196 
 AA-   7     28  12   16  16  57.14        256 
 AA   8       5    2    3    3  60.00               9 
 AA+ and above  9       0    0    0    0    0.00         0 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________                           
 Total    322              206       
Mean Absolute Percentage Error: 36.39% Root-Mean-Squared-Error Magnitude: 15.61 Total percentages predicted: 63.97% 
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_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel C  Year: 2011 
 Dependent Variable Dependent Actual              Predicted          Forecast Absolute                Absolute (%)  Squared Error 
_______________________________ Value___________ Obs.__________Obs.__________Error______Deviation________of Error_____________________________  
BB+ and below  0     92  57          35  35  38.04  1,225 
 BBB-   1     37  32            5    5  13.51                  25 
 BBB   2     36  28            8    8  22.22       64 
 BBB+   3     31  16          15  15  48.39     225 
A-   4     33  12          21  21  63.64     441 
 A   5     41  21          20  20  48.78     400 
 A+   6     28  16          12  12  42.86       144 
 AA-   7     19  12             7    7  36.84          49 
 AA   8       5    4            1    1  20.00               1 
 AA+ and above  9       0    0            0    0    0.00         0 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________                            
 Total    322             198       
Mean Absolute Percentage Error: 33.43% Root-Mean-Squared-Error Magnitude: 16.04 Total percentages predicted: 61.49% 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel D Year: 2012 
Dependent Variable Dependent Actual                Predicted            Forecast          Absolute       Absolute (%)       Squared Error 
________________________________Value___________Obs.___________Obs.__________Error__________Deviation______of Error__________________________  
BB+ and below  0     89  49  40  40  44.94       1,600 
 BBB-   1     36  21  15  15  41.67                225 
 BBB   2     46  23                 23  23  50.00          529 
 BBB+   3     32  12                 20  20  62.50          400 
A-   4     33  14  19  19  57.58          361 
 A   5     36  20  16  16  44.44          256 
 A+   6     29  19  10  10  34.48          100 
 AA-   7     19  11     8    8  42.10               64 
 AA   8       6    2    4    4                 66.67            16 
 AA+ and above  9       0    0    0    0    0.00              0 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________                            
 Total    322             175       
Mean Absolute Percentage Error: 44.44% Root-Mean-Square-Error Magnitude: 18.84 Total percentages predicted: 54.35% 
 
 
 
190 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel E:  
Year  Mean Absolute Percentage Error   Root-Mean-Squared-Error   Total percentage predicted  
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 2009   35.09%     15.65     68.32% 
 2010   36.39%     15.61     69.97%  
 2011   33.43%     16.04     61.49% 
 2012   44.44%     18.84     54.35% 
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Similarly, the AA category has a relatively lower forecast error across the n-step-ahead 
forecast models. Generally, bank ratings in the speculative categories seem to be better 
predicted on average, compared with the bank ratings in the investment categories. This 
is contrary to expectation because it could be argued that the investment-grade banks 
are more followed by analysts and rating agencies. Hence, there is an expectation for 
more responsiveness on the part of the rating.  
The relatively high predictive accuracy of the lower rating categories could be attributed 
to lack of monitoring, and thus these ratings tend to be more ‘static’, compared to banks 
rated in the higher investment grades (which appears to be more volatile, consistent 
with their assumed level of monitoring). The average for the MAPE and RMSE for the 
one-step ahead forecasting models are 35.09% and 15.65 error points, respectively 
compared with the four-step ahead forecast error estimates of 44.44% and 18.84 error 
points respectively. There are several possible explanations for this deterioration 
through time. An immediate implication of the global crisis was the review of rating 
methodologies by the major credit rating agencies. Evidence in existing literature shows 
that this has resulted in increased stringency in the way credit rating agencies rate firms 
(Kondo, 2011, Baghai et al., 2013). Further, results from the examination of the 
strictness in credit rating assignments for international banks are presented in Section 
6.4. 
 The predictive specification 6.3.2
This section presents another set of model results for this component of the thesis based 
on the predictive specification. The predictive specification employs independent 
variables from year t+1, relative to the credit rating action taking place in year t. This 
specification allows this study to test empirically the claims by the major rating 
agencies that the ratings they assign are forward looking.  
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Table 6.4: Predictive bank rating determinants model results 
  
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel A Parameter estimates 
    Hypothesised   Model IV   Model V   Model VI 
Independent variables         Sign  Coefficient  Z-stat  Coefficient Z-stat  Coefficient Z-stat 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Intercept      -5.0154  -7.26*** 1.3624  12.32***             -5.2518  -5.24*** 
TIER1    + (H1)    0.1026   6.89***            -         -   0.3514   12.54***  
LLR/GL    − (H2)   -0.0854  -6.58***           -         -  -0.0941  -6.24*** 
ROA    + (H3)    0.1247   4.35***            -         -   0.1298   2.98** 
LTA    − (H4)   -0.0154  -3.20**            -         -  -0.0187  -2.20** 
INTER    + (H4)    0.0856   2.00**            -         -   0.0584   2.09** 
BETA    − (H5)   -0.0012               -2.78***            -         -  -0.0107  -2.21** 
IDIO    − (H6)   -0.0109  -2.30*            -         -  -0.0098  -1.95* 
ln(Z-Score)   + (H7)    0.0847   2.03**            -         -   0.0665   2.22** 
LR    − (H8)   -0.0847  -4.68***           -           -  -0.0752  -4.98*** 
CRK    − (H9)   -0.0924  -6.22***           -         -  -0.0885  -5.98***  
CI    − (H10)   -0.0241  -1.72*            -          -  -0.0254   1.88* 
lnTA    + (H11)    0.5477  10.25***      0.6221  11.55*** 
TBTF    + (H12)             -        -   0.1054   9.25***   0.1254   8.54*** 
OWN    + (H13)             -        -   0.0101   1.78*   0.0185   2.00*  
INST    + (H14)             -        -   0.0547   2.20**   0.0625   2.23** 
INDD    + (H15)             -        -   0.0111   2.23**   0.0160   1.81* 
SOVAA    + (H16)             -        -   0.0198   6.84***   0.0188   6.54*** 
SOVA    + (H16)             -        -   0.1009   6.22***   0.1254   6.25*** 
SOVBBB   + (H16)             -        -  -0.0857   5.384**  -0.0895   6.66** 
YEARD    − (H17)             -        -  -0.0014  -1.67*  -0.0102  -1.78* 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel C: Selected model statistics 
Log-likelihood       -1,152.241   -1.207.665   -1,001.527   
Restr.log-lik.       -1,201.847   -1.421.654   -1,175.217 
No. of group obs.         3,682      3,682      3,682 
χ2 statistic       721.5477***   695.216***   754.258*** 
Pseudo- R
2ϛ       46.21%    43.29%    48.68%  
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____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: The dependent variable of all ordered probit models is the categorical variable CR (fine ratings). All significance levels are determined using the two-tailed Z-test. ***, **,* denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Ϛ This measure of goodness-of-fit is a simple computational statistic [pseudo − 𝑅2 =
χ2
χ2+N
] proposed by Aldrich and Nelson (1984). The 
upper boundary represents the threshold for each of the rating categories; in this model the categories represent the fine ratings. The SOV (dummies) captures any country related variables 
as this measure the sovereign ratings of the countries. 
 
 
Table 6.5: Marginal effects of Model VI (full specification) 
  
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Rating Category 
   _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variables  Below BB+               BBB-               BBB                BBB+                 A-                A                A+               AA-                AA               Above AA 
TIER1           -0.03*      -0.07*  -0.06*            -0.02         0.05 0.09    0.03*           0.06*     0.10*  0.10* 
LLR/GL            0.05*       0.01    0.02             0.01        -0.03             -0.12   -0.17*          -0.09*    -0.18*              -0.12* 
ROA           -0.11*      -0.03*    -0.08*             0.03         0.02*  0.06*    0.08*           0.03*     0.06*  0.08* 
LTA            0.03*       0.01    0.02             0.02        -0.06             -0.02   -0.04          -0.03*    -0.08*              -0.03* 
INTER           -0.03*      -0.02*  -0.03             0.05         0.07  0.05    0.02*           0.01*     0.03*  0.09*  
BETA            0.02*       0.01*   0.01             0.03        -0.02 -0.03   -0.01          -0.04    -0.05              -0.06* 
IDIO            0.02*       0.02    0.02             0.01        -0.03 -0.03*   -0.03          -0.03*    -0.03*              -0.04*  
ln(Z-Score)          -0.08*      -0.04*  -0.01*            -0.02         0.04*             0.10*       0.05               0.02*              0.04*               0.07*  
LR            0.08*       0.05*   0.05*             0.02         0.01 -0.07*   -0.11*          -0.10*    -0.07*              -0.13* 
CRK            0.02*       0.03*   0.16*             0.03         0.07 -0.11*   -0.08*          -0.06*    -0.10*              -0.06* 
CI            0.01*       0.03   -0.03            -0.01        -0.02 -0.01*   -0.01*          -0.03*    -0.02*              -0.04*  
InTA           -0.05*      -0.03*  -0.08*            -0.05        -0.02 0.11*    0.10*           0.02*     0.08*  0.09* _ 
TBTF
a
           -0.01*      -0.02*  -0.02*            -0.01         0.03*  0.05*    0.03*           0.05*      0.10*  0.03*  
OWN           -0.02*      -0.06*  -0.04*             0.02         0.01  0.04    0.06*           0.10*      0.07*               0.04* 
INST           -0.01*      -0.02   -0.02*            -0.02         0.02  0.04    0.06*           0.04*      0.02*  0.03*   
INDD           -0.01      -0.01    0.00            -0.04*         0.02     0.01    0.03           0.04*      0.03*  0.03*  
SOVAA           -0.05*      -0.01   -0.02*             0.00         0.04  0.01*    0.02*           0.02*      0.04*  0.06*   
SOVA           -0.04*      -0.03*  -0.03*             0.01         0.01  0.02    0.06*           0.02*      0.05*  0.07*  
SOVBBB
 
         -0.02*      -0.03*  -0.02*            -0.04         0.00  0.03*    0.02*           0.04*      0.02*               0.06*  
YEARD            0.02*       0.03*   0.01*             0.03*        -0.01* -0.03*   -0.01*          -0.03*     -0.05*             -0.02* 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Models IV–VI employs a one-year lead value of the independent variables. For the 
dependent variable, the fine grading of bank credit ratings is employed. Tables 6.4, 6.5 
and 6.6 present the parameter estimates of the predictive rating model specifications, the 
marginal effects of the full specification, and the prediction evaluation results, 
respectively. Consistent with the hypotheses in Table 4.2, all of the variables in Model 
VI have the hypothesised signs, and are statistically significant. Most of the results 
obtained for the predictive model specification are qualitatively similarly to the 
contemporaneous model specification. The results show that the determinants of 
international bank rating include the entire CAMELS structure. CAMELS combine the 
financial soundness (credit risk) and market (market risk) indicators, and is commonly 
employed by the credit rating agencies (Rawcliffe et al., 2008) to assess soundness of 
banks.  
The measure of capital adequacy, TIER 1, shows the expected positive relationship with 
bank credit rating. The coefficient of the variable TIER 1 is significant at the 1% level in 
both Model IV and VI. This result is similar to the corresponding contemporaneous 
specification. This result reinforces the strong relationship between capital requirements 
and the assignment of ratings to international banks. This implies that the higher the 
bank’s capital adequacy ratio, the higher the capital buffers for loss absorption and thus 
this should correlate negatively with bank credit risk. The results thus support H1.  
The assets quality ratio, LLR/GL, the profitability ratio, ROA, and the liquidity ratios, 
INTER and LTA show expected results in support of their related hypotheses. The 
results are qualitatively similar to those for the contemporaneous model specifications. 
The marginal effects of each element of the CAMELS variables are similar to those in 
Table 6.2.  
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The relationship between business risk and the credit rating of a bank is captured by the 
variables, bank stock beta (BETA) and idiosyncratic risk variation (IDIO). Both of these 
variables evidence a negative relationship with bank credit ratings. The variable BETA 
is negative and significant at the 5% level in the full specification in Model VI. This is 
consistent with hypothesis H5. Similarly, the variable, IDIO, is significantly negatively 
related to credit ratings at the 10% level in Model VI. These results are consistent with 
the earlier models of this thesis and with studies by Amato and Furfine (2004) and 
Blume et al. (1998) who find the idiosyncratic (non-beta) variable to be negative and 
significant at the 10% level. The results for the marginal effects estimation for BETA 
and IDIO support the estimates in Table 6.5, and show that a bank is less likely to be 
rated in the higher rating categories if it has a high business risk based on the predictive 
nature of the independent variables. In terms of the magnitude of probability changes, 
there are higher observed values in the predictive models for these variables than those 
observed for the contemporaneous models. This suggests that Fitch are more influenced 
by the predictive nature of these variables. 
Table 6.4 shows that the variable Z-score is positively significantly related to bank 
credit ratings at the 5% level in Model VI. This is consistent with the sign expected 
from theory and shows that there is a greater likelihood of being assigned a higher 
rating as the Z-score increases. Consistent with this, the marginal effects show the 
expected sign and the effects of a unit increase in this variable leads to between a 4% 
and 7% probability of a bank being rated in the top investment category. The result 
supports hypothesis H7 and is consistent with the earlier models.  
Results from Model VI show a negative relationship between bank liquidity risk and 
credit ratings. The liquidity risk variable, LR, is significantly negatively related to bank 
credit ratings at the 1% level. In the same vein, the credit risk variable, CRK, is 
significantly negatively related to bank credit rating at the 1% level in the full 
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specification Model VI. These results highlight the importance of a bank’s overall risk 
measure in the assignment of a credit rating and give further support for hypotheses H8 
and H9. Further support for the probability of a bank rating falling in an investment or a 
speculative grade following a percent change in the LR and CRK variables is evident in 
Table 6.8. The marginal effects show that banks are more likely to be rated in the 
speculative grade categories with every percentage rise in the LR and CRK variables. 
The coefficient relating to bank efficiency (CI), which measures the relationship 
between the average ratio of costs to net income of a bank, and bank credit ratings is 
negative and significant, both in the Model IV and Model VI and at the 10% level. 
Thus, there is a weak support for hypothesis H10 and the results are consistent with the 
results for the contemporaneous model specification in Table 6.1. The marginal effects 
of the variable CI show that a unit increase leads to between a 2% and 4% probability of 
not being rated in the investment categories; similarly there is between 1% and 3% of a 
bank being assigned a speculative rating.  
The size measure (lnTA) is significantly positively related to bank credit ratings. 
Consistent with existing studies such as Poon (2003), Poon and Firth (2005), and Van 
Roy (2006), and providing support for hypothesis H11, there is a significant positive 
relationship between bank size and credit rating. Fitch (2007) maintains that bank size 
and the diversification of assets are key factors in their rating process. Evidence from 
the marginal effects estimation shows that a unit increase in the lnTA variable leads to 
between a 2% and 11% probability of a bank rating falling into the investment grade. 
Similarly, the other measure of size, TBTF, has a positive effect and is significant at the 
1% level in Model VI. This further demonstrates the importance of size in the rating 
process. Hypothesis H12, which states that there is a positive relationship between the 
Fitch support rating for a bank and its credit rating, is thus supported by this result.  
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The corporate governance variables, OWN, INST and INDD, are all statistically 
significant. The variable that captures directors’ shareholdings in a bank (OWN) is 
significantly positively related to bank credit ratings at the 10% level in the full 
specification, Model VI. This result provides some weak support for hypothesis H13, 
and is consistent with the earlier models. The degree of institutional ownership (INST) 
is significantly positively related to bank credit ratings in the full specification, and is 
significant at the 5% level. Existing studies find a strong negative relationship between 
ownership and the creditworthiness of a firm. The results appear to show that credit 
rating agencies are more likely to assign lower ratings to banks where ownership is 
concentrated in the hands of institutional owners. Similarly, the variable which 
measures the proportion of independent directors on a bank’s board (INDD) is 
positively related to bank credit ratings, though only at the 10% level in the full model 
specification. The results indicate that a higher proportion of independent directors is 
more likely to lead to a higher credit rating, providing only weak support for hypothesis 
H15. Interestingly, all the marginal effects for the variable show higher values when 
compared to the contemporaneous approach. Thus, further supporting the forward-
looking view by Fitch of assigning credit ratings to banks. 
Consistent with Poon and Firth (2005), the measure of the impact of change in the 
operating environment (SOV) has the sign expected from theory. It is more likely for a 
bank to be rated in the higher credit rating categories if their primary operations are in a 
country whose sovereign rating is high. Generally, a higher sovereign rating should lead 
to banks being rated in the higher investment grade credit rating categories.  
In the full specification (Model VI), the log likelihood ratio 𝜒2 is 754.258 which is 
highly significant at the 1% level. In addition, the pseudo-R2 that measures the 
goodness-of-fit is relatively high at 48.68% in the Model VI compared with the results 
obtained for Model III. Model VI is therefore more appropriate in explaining variables 
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driving the assignment of a bank’s credit rating. All the variables employed in Model VI 
are significant and have the expected signs. 
Table 6.6 presents the out-of-sample predicted outcome for the different rating grades. 
For the predictive specification, this thesis employs data from 2001 to 2009 for 
estimating the fit period. The holdout sample is then for range of period 2009 to 2012.  
The table displays the root-mean square error deviation (or error) RMSE magnitude, the 
mean absolute percentage error, MAPE, and the total percentage prediction.  
The results show a total observed (actual) value for bank rating grades of 322. In Panel 
A, which displays the results of the one-step-ahead out-of-sample prediction, a total of 
78.26% correct predictions are observed. This is higher than the corresponding figure 
(68.32%) for the contemporaneous rating determinant specifications in Table 6.3. 63% 
of the investment grade ratings are correctly predicted for 2009, while 74% predicted 
value is observed for the speculative grade. For the two-step-ahead forecast, 71.43% of 
the actual observations are correctly predicted. Again, this is higher than the results for 
the contemporaneous prediction evaluation (68.97%) in Table 6.3. (Panel B). 69 out of 
the 90 actual speculative grade ratings (i.e. 77%) are correctly predicted. Consistent 
with earlier prediction evaluations, and with intuition, as one moves forward into the 
future the reliability of forecast decreases. The percentage of correctly predicted 
observations is 67.08% and 57.14% for the year 2011 and 2012, respectively. A 
comparison of the results in Panel A to D shows that the measures of the forecast errors 
tend to increase as one moves forward in time. The lower these errors, the more reliable 
is the forecasting model. The AA+ and above category is consistently correctly 
predicted, similar to earlier prediction evaluation results. Further, the forecast accuracy 
for the predictive models are better than those of the contemporaneous approach, hence 
providing additional support for the forward-looking view in in their rating assignments.   
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Table 6.6: Predictive rating determinants model specification: Prediction Evaluation (Model IX) 
Estimated Equation (2001-2009): 
Panel A   Year: 2009  
Dependent Variable Dependent Actual  Predicted Forecast Absolute  Absolute (%)  Squared Error 
____________________________ Value__________Obs.__________Obs.__________Error__________Deviation______of Error_______________________________  
BB+ and below  0     94  72  25  25  25.77     625 
 BBB-   1     32  36   -4    4  12.50                  16 
 BBB   2     31  31                  -3    3  10.71         9 
 BBB+   3     29  28                   1    1    3.45         1 
A-   4     36  31    6    6  16.22       36 
 A   5     33  18  14  14  43.75     196 
 A+   6     34  19  15  15  44.12       225 
 AA-   7     27  12   15  15  55.56        225 
 AA   8       6    5    1    1  16.67               1 
 AA+ and above  9       0    0    0    0    0.00         0 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________                          
   Total    322             252       
Mean Absolute Percentage Error: 18.46% Root-Mean-Squared-Error Magnitude: 11.55 Total percentage predicted: 78.26% 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel B: Year: 2010  
Dependent Variable Dependent Actual  Predicted Forecast Absolute  Absolute (%)  Squared Error 
____________________________ Value__________Obs.__________Obs.__________Error__________Deviation______of Error_______________________________  
BB+ and below  0     91  69  21  21  23.33     441 
 BBB-   1     41  33    8    8  19.51                            64 
 BBB   2     33  28                   8    8  22.22       64 
 BBB+   3     23  18                   5    5  21.74       25 
A-   4     40  28  12  12  30.00     144 
 A   5     29  17  11  11  39.29     121 
 A+   6     31  21  10  10  32.26       100 
 AA-   7     28  15   13  13  46.43        169 
 AA   8       6    1    4    4  80.00             16 
 AA+ and above  9       0    0    0    0    0.00         0 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________                          
   Total    322             230       
Mean Absolute Percentage Error: 31.48% Root-Mean-Squared-Error Magnitude: 10.69 Total percentage predicted: 71.43% 
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__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel C: Year: 2011  
Dependent Variable Dependent Actual  Predicted Forecast Absolute  Absolute (%)  Squared Error 
____________________________ Value__________Obs.__________Obs.__________Error__________Deviation______of Error_______________________________ 
 BB+ and below  0     92  66  26  26  28.26     676 
 BBB-   1     37  33    4    4  10.81            16 
 BBB   2     36  31                 5    5  13.89       25 
 BBB+   3     31  17               14  14  45.16     196 
A-   4     33  16  17  17  51.51     289 
 A   5     41  19  22  22  53.66     484 
 A+   6     28  19    9    9  32.14         81 
 AA-   7     19  13     6    6  31.58          36 
 AA   8       5    2    3    3  60.00               9 
 AA+ and above  9       0    0    0    0    0.00         0 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________                          
   Total    322             216       
Mean Absolute Percentage Error: 32.70% Root-Mean-Squared-Error Magnitude: 13.46 Total percentage predicted: 67.08% 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel D  Year: 2011 
  
Dependent Variable Dependent Actual  Predicted Forecast Absolute  Absolute (%)  Squared Error 
____________________________ Value__________Obs.__________Obs.__________Error__________Deviation______of Error________________________________ 
 BB+ and below  0     89  55  34  34  38.20  1,156 
 BBB-   1     36  21  15  15  41.67           225 
 BBB   2     46  29                 17  17  36.96     289 
 BBB+   3     32  16                 16  16  50.00     256 
A-   4     33  18  15  15  45.45     225 
 A   5     36  22  14  14  38.89     196 
 A+   6     29  12  17  17  58.62       289 
 AA-   7     19  10     9    9  47.37          81 
 AA   8       2    1    5    5                83.33             25 
 AA+ and above  9       0    0    0    0    0.00         0 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________                          
   Total    322             184       
Mean Absolute Percentage Error: 44.05% Root-Mean-Square-Error Magnitude: 16.56  Total percentage predicted: 57.14% 
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___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel E:  
Year  Mean Absolute Percentage Error   Root-Mean-Squared-Error   Total percentage predicted  
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 2009   18.46%     11.55     78.26% 
 2010   31.48%     10.69     71.43%  
 2011   32.70%     13.46     67.08% 
 2012   44.05%     16.56     57.14%     
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 The lagged specification 6.3.3
This section presents the results of the third time-specification, that is, the lagged 
specification. This lagged specification employs one-year lagged values of independent 
variables in the model in order to test whether rating agencies are backward-looking or 
lag the market in their assessment of bank creditworthiness. The independent variables 
are from the year t-1 relative to a rating action in year t. Consistent with the earlier bank 
credit rating models this specification employs the fine rating grades as dependent 
variable. Tables 6.7 and 6.8 present the estimated models and the marginal effects for 
Models VII–IX respectively, assuming a fine grading in the dependent variable. Panel A 
of Table 6.7 presents the model estimation. Model VII employs only financial variables. 
Model VIII includes only non-financial variables, while model IX gives the results of a 
combination of the variables in both Models VII and VIII in a full specification model. 
In addition, Panel B presents model statistics for the three models.  
The results for the lagged estimations are again qualitatively similar to the earlier full 
model specifications (III and VI) employing the fine bank credit ratings. However, the 
magnitudes of the marginal effects of the changes in the independent variables are lower 
than in the contemporaneous and predictive time-specifications. For example, the 
marginal effects for the variable, TIER1 show a 5% probability of a bank being rated in 
the top notch (Above AA).  This is lower than the 8% and 10% probabilities observed 
for the contemporaneous and predictive specifications, respectively. Similarly, the 
marginal effects of the variable, LLR/GL, is higher for the contemporaneous and 
predictive specification. The results show that with every percentage change in the 
variable LLR/GL, there is a decrease in probability by 12% and 9% in the 
contemporaneous and predictive specifications respectively, compared to the 6% for the 
lagged specification. Similar results are obtained for the measures of earnings, liquidity 
and sensitivity to the market.  
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Table 6.7: Lagged bank credit rating determinants specification results 
Panel A Parameter estimates 
    Hypothesised   Model VII   Model VIII   Model IX  
Independent variables         Sign  Coefficient  Z-stat  Coefficient Z-stat  Coefficient Z-stat 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Intercept                 -10.6584  -4.11*** 2.5414  27.22***             -7.9541  -6.88*** 
TIER1    + (H1)    0.2145   8.22***            -         -   0.2204   6.97***  
LLR/GL    − (H2)   -0.0458  -6.29***           -         -  -0.0467  -5.62*** 
ROA    + (H3)    0.0141   2.13**            -         -   0.0265   2.21** 
LTA    − (H4)   -0.0098  -2.02**            -         -  -0.0103  -2.23* 
INTER    + (H4)    0.0554   3.66***            -         -   0.0541   3.99*** 
BETA    − (H5)   -0.0081  -0.88*            -         -  -0.0012  -0.84** 
IDIO    − (H6)   -0.0054  -1.09*            -         -  -0.0083  -1.21* 
ln(Z-Score)   + (H7)    0.0629   2.22**            -   -   0.0865   2.30** 
LR    − (H8)   -0.0484  -2.29**           -            -  -0.0529  -2.38** 
CRK    − (H9)   -0.0354  -7.01***           -  -  -0.0395  -8.01*** 
CI    − (H10)   -0.0025  -1.78*            -          -  -0.0111  -1.82* 
lnTA    + (H11)    0.5947  13.33***      0.6001  13.88*** 
TBTF    + (H12)             -        -   0.0625   4.61***   0.0776   4.84*** 
OWN    + (H13)             -        -  -0.0105  -1.79*  -0.0119  -1.88*  
INST    + (H14)             -        -   0.0084   1.36*   0.0099    2.28** 
INDD    + (H15)             -        -   0.0016   1.19*   0.0063    1.81* 
SOVAA    + (H16)             -        -   0.0254   7.22***   0.0325    7.65*** 
SOVA    + (H16)             -        -   0.0262   6.59***   0.0339    6.21*** 
SOVBBB   + (H16)             -        -   0.0106   2.98***   0.0128    3.65** 
YEARD    − (H17)             -        -  -0.1224  -1.29  -0.1625   -1.75* 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel C: Selected model statistics 
Log-likelihood       -1,325.165   -1,401.225   -1,306.110   
Restr.log-lik.       -1,621.544   -1,845.214   -1,688.214 
No. of obs.       3,682    3,682    3,682 
χ2 statistic       781.1244***   726.0154***   812.5844*** 
Pseudo- R
2ϛ       33.25%    34.06%    38.56% 
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Notes: The dependent variable of all ordered probit models is the categorical variable CR (fine ratings). All significance levels are determined using the two-tailed Z-test. 
***, **,* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Ϛ This measure of goodness-of-fit is a simple computational statistic [pseudo − 𝑅2 =
χ2
χ2+N
] proposed by 
Aldrich and Nelson (1984). The upper boundary represents the threshold for each of the rating categories; in this model the categories represent the fine ratings. The SOV 
(dummies) captures any country related variables as this measure the sovereign ratings of the countries. 
 
 
 
Table 6.8: Marginal effects of Model IX (full specification) 
Rating Category 
   _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variables  Below BB+               BBB-               BBB                BBB+               A-                 A               A+                AA-                AA               Above AA 
TIER1           -0.03*      -0.05*  -0.05*            -0.06         0.01 0.05    0.04*           0.02*   0.04*  0.05* 
LLR/GL            0.02*       0.03    0.02             0.01        -0.02            -0.09   -0.02*          -0.04*          -0.03*              -0.06* 
ROA           -0.01*      -0.02*   -0.02*             0.02         0.04*           0.04*    0.04*           0.10*   0.02*  0.02* 
LTA            0.04       0.01    0.04             0.02        -0.02            -0.02   -0.06          -0.02*  -0.03  0.01 
INTER           -0.03      -0.02* -0.03             0.03         0.07             0.02    0.05*           0.06*   0.06*  0.03*  
BETA            0.04*       0.05*  0.02             0.00        -0.02*          -0.00   -0.01          -0.02*  -0.05*              -0.02* 
IDIO           -0.02*     -0.02*              -0.02*             0.01         0.03             0.05*    0.02           0.06*   0.03*  0.03* 
In(Z-Score)          -0.05*     -0.06*              -0.03*            -0.05         0.01*           0.02*         0.01               0.03*           0.02*                  0.04** 
BB           -0.03*     -0.05*              -0.03*            -0.03         0.01             0.06*    0.11*           0.04*   0.02*  0.05*  
CRK           -0.05*      -0.02*  -0.05             0.04         0.05 0.04    0.20*           0.03*   0.02*  0.03* 
CI            0.02*       0.03  -0.02*            -0.02        -0.04            -0.08*   -0.04*          -0.09*          -0.05*              -0.06* 
lnTA           -0.02*      -0.03*  -0.10*            -0.02        -0.02 0.05*    0.06*           0.04*   0.04*  0.02*   
TBTF           -0.04*     -0.02*              -0.07*            -0.02         0.01*           0.06*    0.04*            0.04*   0.07*  0.03*  
OWN           -0.01*     -0.03*              -0.03*             0.03         0.01            0.02    0.03*            0.01*   0.03*               0.03* 
INST           -0.03*     -0.02               -0.02*            -0.04         0.01             0.05    0.06*            0.08*   0.05*  0.02*   
INDD            0.00     -0.02   0.00            -0.01         0.00             0.00    0.00            0.03*      0.03*  0.03*  
SOVAA           -0.03*     -0.03               -0.01            0.00         0.07             0.02    0.04*            0.04*   0.03*  0.08**  
SOVA           -0.05*     -0.01*              -0.04*            0.03         0.02             0.01    0.08*            0.03*   0.04*  0.06*  
SOVBBB 
 
                                   0.03      0.02*                0.01            0.02         0.01            -0.01*   -0.04*           -0.02*         -0.02*              -0.09*  
YEARD            0.03      0.06   0.03             0.02        -0.05           -0.07*    0.03*            0.02   0.04  0.04 
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The non-financial variables show expected signs, however their explanatory powers are 
less than those observed in both the contemporaneous and predictive specifications. As 
in earlier models, the log-likelihood and 𝜒2 statistics for Models VII – IX are significant 
and fit the data well. However, in terms of the goodness-of-fit, the pseudo-R
2
 is slightly 
lower than in Models III and VI. Table 6.9 shows the prediction evaluation results for 
the out-of-sample estimation based on the Model IX specification. 
The table presents the four-step-ahead forecast, including the predicted observations and 
forecast errors. Panel A of Table 6.9 shows the one-step-ahead forecast results. A total 
of 239 bank ratings out of the 322 are correctly predicted (74%). This is higher than the 
corresponding value in Table 6.3 which shows a total predicted value of 68%. The 
speculative rating grade has an absolute percentage error of 23% which is lower than 
the 35.05% in Panel A of Table 6.3. The top investment grades (AA+ and above to A-) 
have a combined predictive power of 67.64%, while the one-step-ahead prediction for 
banks rated in the lower investment categories (BBB) is 81%. The MAPE and the 
RMSE are 27.64% and 10.23 error points, respectively. These are lower than the 
corresponding values in Panel A of Table 6.9. Interesting, the out-of-sample one-step-
ahead predictive evaluation for the lagged rating determinant specification performs 
better in forecasting bank ratings than in the contemporaneous specification.  
At the other end of the forecast, the four-step-ahead forecast in Panel D shows that 175 
out of the 322 bank credit ratings are correctly predicted. This corresponds to 57% 
correctly predicted observations against the 54% in Panel D of Table 6.3.  Consistent 
with earlier forecast results, the AA+ and above category is correctly forecasted. 
Overall, the results in Table 6.9 support the argument that the lagged specification 
provides better out-of-sample prediction for the fine rating notches than the 
contemporaneous specification. However, the forecast power for the predictive 
evaluation shows the best forecast results. 
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Table 6.9: Lagged rating determinants model specification: Prediction Evaluation (Model IX) 
Estimated Equation (2000-2008): 
Panel A  Year: 2009  
Dependent Variable Dependent Actual  Predicted Forecast Absolute  Absolute (%)  Squared Error 
____________________________ Value__________Obs.__________Obs.__________Error__________Deviation______of Error_______________________________  
BB+ and below  0     97  75  22  22  22.68     484 
 BBB-   1     32  26    6    6  18.75             36 
 BBB   2     28  25                 3    3  14.29         9 
 BBB+   3     29  21                 8    8  27.59       64 
A-   4     37  32   5    5  13.51       25 
 A   5     32  19  13  13  40.62     169 
 A+   6     34  22  12  12  35.29       144 
 AA-   7     27  17   10  10  37.04        100 
 AA   8       6    2    4    4  66.67             16 
 AA+ and above  9       0    0    0    0    0.00         0 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________                          
   Total    322             239       
Mean Absolute Percentage Error: 27.64% Root-Mean-Squared-Error Magnitude: 10.23 Total percentage predicted: 74.22% 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel B  Year: 2010 
 Dependent Variable Dependent Actual  Predicted Forecast Absolute  Absolute (%)  Squared Error 
____________________________ Value__________Obs.__________Obs.__________Error__________Deviation______of Error_______________________________  
BB+ and below  0     90  56  34  34  37.78                 1,156 
 BBB-   1     41  29  12  12  29.27              144 
 BBB   2     36  21               15  15  41.67     225 
 BBB+   3     23  16                 7    7  30.43       49 
A-   4     40  26  14  14  27.50     196 
 A   5     28  18  10  10  35.71     100 
 A+   6     31  26    5    5  16.13         25 
 AA-   7     28  14   14  14  57.14        196 
 AA   8       5    3    2    2  40.00               4 
 AA+ and above  9       0    0    0    0    0.00         0 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________                          
   Total    322             209       
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Mean Absolute Percentage Error: 31.56% Root-Mean-Squared-Error Magnitude: 14.47 Total percentage gain: 64.91%  
Panel C  Year: 2011  
Dependent Variable Dependent Actual  Predicted Forecast Absolute  Absolute (%)  Squared Error 
____________________________ Value__________Obs.__________Obs.__________Error__________Deviation______of Error_______________________________  
BB+ and below  0     92  62  30  30  32.61     900 
 BBB-   1     37  23  14  14  37.84     196 
 BBB   2     36  22               14  14  38.89     196 
 BBB+   3     31  19               12  12  38.71     144 
A-   4     33  20  13  13  39.39     169 
 A   5     41  27  14  14  34.15     196 
 A+   6     28  17  11  11  39.28       121 
 AA-   7     19  12     7    7  36.84          49 
 AA   8       5    3    2    2  40.00               4 
 AA+ and above  9       0    0    0    0    0.00         0 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________                          
   Total    322             205       
Mean Absolute Percentage Error: 33.77% Root-Mean-Squared-Error Magnitude: 14.05 Total percentage gain: 63.66% 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel D  Year: 2012  
Dependent Variable Dependent Actual  Predicted Forecast Absolute  Absolute (%)  Squared Error 
____________________________ Value__________Obs.__________Obs.__________Error__________Deviation______of Error_______________________________  
BB+ and below  0     89  52  47  47  52.81  2,209 
 BBB-   1     36  26  10  10  27.78           100 
 BBB   2     46  29               17  17  36.96     289 
 BBB+   3     32  13               19  19  59.38     361 
A-   4     33  18  15  15  45.45     225 
 A   5     36  19  17  17  47.22     289 
 A+   6     29  12  15  15  51.72       225 
 AA-   7     19  11     8    8  42.10          64 
 AA   8       6    4    2    2               33.33               4 
 AA+ and above  9       0    0    0    0    0.00         0 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________                          
   Total    322             184       
 
Mean Absolute Percentage Error: 39.68% Root-Mean-Square-Error Magnitude: 19.41 Total percentage gain: 57.14% 
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Panel E:  
Year  Mean Absolute Percentage Error   Root-Mean-Squared-Error    Total percentage gain 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 2009   27.64%     10.23      74.22% 
 2010   31.56%     14.47      64.91% 
 2011   33.77%     14.05      63.66% 
 2012   39.68%     19.41      57.14% 
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In addition to the use of the fine rating grading as dependent variable, this thesis 
employs the coarse ratings within a robustness check framework. The results of the 
various estimations are presented in Tables D.1 to D.9 in Appendix D. The results for 
the coarse rating grading for the various time specifications are qualitatively similar to 
their fine rating gradation counterparts. Pagano and Volpin (2010) argue that if ratings 
are set on a discrete scale, complacent rating agencies can suggest to issuers how to 
structure their securities or their tranches so that they can just attain a given rating. 
Further, Johnson (2003) argues that credit rating studies should utilise coarse rating 
grades, that is, grades that ignore the + and – distinctions (notches) since analysing 
ratings according to finer distinctions may lead to small samples sizes and low statistical 
power. In the same vein, there is an increase in the number of observations contained 
within each coarse grade, thus increasing the efficiency of the model. 
In the contemporaneous coarse rating specification, the CAMELS variables show the 
expected signs with much higher magnitudes of change effects. For example, the 
liquidity variables (LTA and INTER) are both statistically significant at the 1% level in 
Table D.1. The LTA is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level in both 
Models X and XII. This is a stronger result than the weak relationship reported in 
Models I and III where the LTA is significant only at the 10% level. The stronger 
relationship may again be related to the use of coarser credit rating grading in the 
modelling of bank credit rating determinants.  
Similarly, the results relating to the bank risk measure Z-Score are consistent with 
theory. The ln(Z-Score) is a significant positive driver of bank credit rating. The results 
from Models X and XII show that the coefficients of the Z-Score variables are 
significant at the 1% and 5% levels respectively. In terms of the impact of an expected 
change, this measure has more significant impact in Model XII compared with Model 
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III. The clustering of rating notches (coarse grading) thus enables greater impacts to be 
observed for this variable across a wider range of banks within a given classification. 
The global financial crisis has reinforced the need for credit rating agencies to take a 
holistic approach to assessing the creditworthiness of a bank. Packer and Tarashev 
(2011) maintain that the creditworthiness of a bank depends on the overall bank 
exposures the financial system, as well as its interconnectedness in the system. 
Within the predictive coarse rating specification, there is evidence of a higher level of 
significance and impact of variables on the assignment of bank credit ratings. The 
results further reinforce the importance of these independent variables in the credit 
rating process. For example, the measure of capital adequacy, TIER 1, shows the 
expected positive relationship with bank credit rating. The coefficient of the variable 
TIER 1 is significant at the 1% level in both Model XIII and XV. This result is similar 
to the corresponding contemporaneous specification. It reinforces the strong 
relationship between capital requirements and the assignment of ratings to international 
banks. This implies that the higher the bank’s capital adequacy ratio, the higher the 
capital buffers for loss absorption and thus this should correlate negatively with bank 
credit risk. The results thus support H1. 
Further, results from Model XV show a negative relationship between bank liquidity 
risk and credit ratings. The liquidity risk variable, LR, is significantly negatively related 
to bank credit ratings at the 1% level. In the same vein, the credit risk variable, CRK, is 
significantly negatively related to bank credit rating at the 1% level in the full 
specification Model XV. These results highlight the importance of a bank’s overall risk 
measure in the assignment of a credit rating and give further support for hypotheses H8 
and H9. Further support for the probability of a bank rating falling in an investment or a 
speculative grade following a unit change in the LR and CRK variables is evident in 
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Table D.2. The marginal effects show that banks are more likely to be rated in the 
speculative grade categories with every percentage rise in the LR and CRK variables, 
with the values for the change being higher for the coarse than the fine rating 
specification.  
In terms of the lagged coarse specification, most of the results are qualitatively the 
same. The majority of the variables in the full specification, Model XVIII have the signs 
expected from theory. For example, the coefficients for the bank size proxies, lnTA and 
TBTF, are positive. lnTA is strongly positively related to bank credit ratings. The Table 
D.7 shows that the variable InTA is significant at the 1% level in Models XVI and 
XVIII. The marginal effects for InTA support the results in Table D.8. In the same vein, 
TBTF is significantly positively related to bank credit ratings, and this shows the 
importance of having a high probability of external support if the bank were to need it. 
The results show that large banks and those with a greater chance of receiving external 
support are more likely to be assigned higher ratings. This result is consistent with 
extant studies such as Poon and Firth (2005) and Fitch (2007).  
6.4 The results of the ordered probit testing for effects of ratings stringency over 
time 
This section presents the results of ordered probit model specifications with the 
inclusion of the main financial variables employed in the previous rating determinant 
models. These models attempt to explain the effects of time on rating assignment. In 
addition, these current models employ year dummy variables, with the year 2000 
assigned as the benchmark year (thus omitted from the model). This approach builds 
upon the results presented in the previous sections by further testing the impact of both 
changes in financial variables and time on the (downward) trend in bank ratings across 
banks. Further, the results provide further explanation for the observed significant 
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downward rating moment discussed in Chapter 8 (Section 8.5.3). Table 6.10 presents 
the results of the estimates employing a contemporaneous model specification (Model 
I), with year dummies, while Model II presents the estimates employing a predictive 
model specification. The use of the year dummy variables enables the capture of the 
trend in rating migration due to changing standards of the rating agencies and/or 
downward rating drifts. Hence, the focus of the results is on the coefficients of the year 
dummy variables. Panel A shows the parameter estimates, Panel B presents the 
estimates of the thresholds for each rating category, and Panel C displays selected 
model diagnostic statistics.  
The results of the two models are very similar. The estimates of the coefficients of the 
financial variables in both models have the hypothesised signs. All of the coefficients 
are statistically significant, except for the measure of business risk (BETA). The other 
business risk variable (IDIO) has a weak negative relationship with the bank credit 
rating. The overall explanatory power of Models I and II is relative high compared to 
the models without the year dummies, as seen in the previous chapter. The estimates of 
the coefficients of the year dummy variables give an indication of the level of rating 
standards. An increase in rating standards has the potential of strengthening a downward 
rating drift within the sample of banks. The year dummy variable for 2000 is omitted, 
and thus the interpretation of the other dummy coefficients is made relative to this year. 
All of the estimated coefficients of the dummy variables are negative and significant, 
with the exception of the dummy for 2001. There is a weak relationship between the 
estimated dummy coefficients between 2002 and 2004 and credit standards (ratings) for 
banks, while the coefficients for the dummy variables between 2007 and 2012 are 
significant at the 1% level. There is an observed increase in the magnitude (negative) of 
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the dummy coefficients, and this may suggest that the Fitch rating standards have 
gradually increased through the entire period covered by the sample. 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel A Parameter estimates 
    Model I     Model II      
Independent variables  Coefficient  Z-statistics  Coefficient Z-statistics 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Intercept    -8.5141  -5.22***   -8.2511  -5.98*** 
TIER1     0.1084   3.51***     0.0995   4.22***  
LLR/GL    -0.0847  -2.98***   -0.1008  -4.99*** 
ROA     0.1159   3.02***     0.0854   3.51*** 
LTA    -0.0514  -3.33***   -0.0253  -3.38*** 
INTER     0.1165   3.22***    0.0547   3.12*** 
BETA    -0.0283  -0.54   -0.0022  -0.13 
IDIO    -0.0251  -1.58*   -0.0117  -1.62* 
ln(Z-Score)    0.0115   2.88***    0.0054   2.89*** 
LR    -0.0684  -3.69***   -0.0444  -3.05*** 
CRK    -0.0654  -5.84***   -0.0184  -4.54***  
CI     0.0120   2.62***   -0.0088  -3.29*** 
InTA     0.6584   9.32***    0.5024  10.11*** 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Year dummy variables 
D2001    -0.2888  -0.88   -0.2684  -0.76  
D2002    -0.2954  -1.51*   -0.2711  -1.32* 
D2003    -0.3055  -1.66*   -0.2850  -1.55* 
D2004    -0.3111  -1.81*   -0.2917  -1.67* 
D2005    -0.3284  -2.03**   -0.3051  -1.99** 
D2006    -0.3320  -2.23**   -0.3115  -2.01** 
D2007    -0.3333  -4.72***   -0.3258  -2.11** 
D2008    -0.6521  -5.23***   -0.6832  -3.99*** 
D2009    -0.7514  -6.21***   -0.7821  -5.39*** 
D2010    -1.1598  -7.77***   -0.9812  -7.02*** 
D2011    -1.1665  -8.81***   -1.0072  -6.95*** 
D2012    -1.2020  -7.32***   -1.1136  -6.28*** 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel B: Cut-off points upper boundary for rating category 
BB+ and below   0.000                          -               0.000                         -             
BBB-    0.425  7.32***    0.365                7.61*** 
BBB    1.264                9.99***    1.051                8.21*** 
BBB+    1.495              11.25***    1.332              12.65***              
A-                                           2.658              15.39***    2.125              17.82***  
A    2.854              21.23***    2.524              21.33***  
A+    3.235              27.65***    3.369              29.95***  
AA-    3.785              26.36***    3.854              30.69***  
AA    3.999              28.65***    4.625              35.22***   
AA+, AAA                                              +∞    -     +∞                  -                          
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel C: Selected model statistics 
Log-likelihood   -1,326.854    -1,415.173   
Restr.log-lik.   -1,651.378    -1,784.261   
No. of group obs.     3,682       3,402      
χ2 statistic   598.267***    587.214***   
Pseudo- R2ϛ   42.88%     44.26%  
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: The dependent variable of all ordered probit models is the categorical variable CR (fine ratings). All significance levels are determined using 
the two-tailed Z-test. ***, **,* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Ϛ: this measure of goodness-of-fit is a simple 
computational statistic [pseudo − 𝑅2 =
χ2
χ2+N
] proposed by Aldrich and Nelson (1984). The upper boundary represents the threshold for each of the 
rating categories, and in this model the categories represent the fine ratings. 
 
Table 6.10: Results of the ordered probit regression model with independent 
variables being financial variables with the inclusion of year dummies (2000-2012) 
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The coefficient of the dummy variables becomes increasingly negative over the years, 
moving from -0.2888 in 2001 to -0.333 (2007) and -1.2020 (2012). This partial 
monotonic decrease therefore suggests either that Fitch’s rating review of bank 
creditworthiness has become stricter or that the credit positions of banks in the sample 
have become worse over the years. 
Further, it is interesting to observe from Table 6.10 that there is a considerable negative 
increase in the magnitude of the coefficients between 2007 and 2008 (Model I: 0.319; 
Model II: 0.357). This may signify a paradigm change in the way rating agencies 
measure, review and estimate the creditworthiness of banks. In other words, this is 
consistent with changes carried out by rating agencies regarding their rating 
methodologies. Overall, this may have an influence on the downward rating drift found 
in the Section 8.5.3. 
The sample of bank data employed in this thesis consists of a large number of new 
ratings. There is a strong tendency for these new bank ratings to have been awarded an 
inflated initial rating. Hence, there is a high likelihood for such ratings to be 
subsequently reviewed downward, and this may have an influence on the falling year 
dummy variable.  
This is consistent with Du and Suo (2005) who argue that such reclassification of 
ratings due to inflated new ratings is sufficient to explain the pattern of declining year 
dummy coefficients. However, Kondo (2011) suggests that there should not be an 
annual decline in the coefficients of year dummies if the number of such new ratings 
remains constant as the effects will be the same each year.  
This thesis investigates further the observation of an apparent convergence of ratings 
towards the investment-grade threshold as observed in the discussion of the results from 
215 
 
the transition matrix. Models employing separate sets of year dummies for investment-
grade year dummies (Model III) containing financial variables and another model 
containing non-investment-grade dummies (Model IV) are constructed. This is to allow 
for a formal test of whether there has been a general downgrading or simply a 
convergence of bank ratings towards the investment grade threshold. Table 6.11 
presents ordered probit result employs year dummy variables.  
The results presented in Table 6.11 show the coefficients of the financial variables in 
both models III and IV, as well as those for the year dummies. The financial variables 
measuring the CAMEL factors and size are significant at the 1% level. The size factor 
shows a positive relationship with bank credit ratings. Both the liquidity and credit risk 
measures are significantly negative at the 1% level. The coefficients of the measure of 
business risk (BETA and IDIO) are both significantly negative at the 10% level. The 
coefficients of the investment grade year dummies are positive, but show a gradual 
decrease in magnitude over time, particularly in the period following the financial crisis. 
This suggests that the review of Fitch rating methodology increasingly made it more 
difficult for banks to be assigned higher investment grade credit ratings, particularly in 
the post-2007 period. This leads to a downward momentum in bank credit ratings.  
The results of the coefficients of the non-investment grade year dummies in Model IV 
are negative and statistically insignificant. Focusing on the magnitude of the 
coefficients, the results do not present any discernible pattern. There is a relative 
decrease in the coefficients of the dummy variables in the period between 2008 and 
2012, indicating that rating agencies may have tightened their standards for this 
category of ratings. Overall, the results suggest that it might be relatively easier for 
banks in the non-investment category to have their ratings upgraded in the pre-financial 
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crisis period, with a stronger likelihood of being downgraded rather than upgraded in 
the period after 2008 
Table 6.11: Ordered probit regression results for bank credit ratings with financial 
factors as independent variables with the inclusion of category year dummies 
(2000-2012) 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel A Parameter estimates 
    Model III    Model IV      
Independent variables  Coefficient  Z-statistics  Coefficient Z-statistics 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Intercept    -7.2541  -5.68***   -8.8410  -6.02*** 
TIER1     0.2152   3.33***     0.1054   3.54***  
LLR/GL    -0.1547  -3.01***   -0.1364  -4.29*** 
ROA     0.2084   2.99***     0.1846   3.01*** 
LTA    -0.0847  -3.61***   -0.0758  -3.21*** 
INTER     0.1254   3.98***    0.1021   3.47*** 
BETA    -0.0656  -1.69*   -0.0219  -1.72* 
IDIO    -0.0365  -1.60*   -0.0521  -1.66* 
ln(Z-Score)    0.0654   2.51***    0.0984   2.54*** 
LR    -0.0783  -3.55***   -0.0593  -3.26*** 
CRK    -0.0841  -4.96***   -0.0325  -4.26***  
CI     0.0235   3.59***   -0.0157  -3.12*** 
InTA     0.7902   8.29***    0.6052   9.19*** 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Year dummy variables 
D2001INV / D2001NINV   3.1051  8.62***   -7.5122  0.00  
D2002INV / D2002NINV   2.9998  9.21***   -9.1261  0.00 
D2003INV / D2003NINV   2.6547  9.86***   -8.6579  0.00 
D2004INV / D2004NINV   2.4331  8.81***   -8.7481  0.00 
D2005INV / D2005NINV   2.2214  8.23***   -8.9254  0.24 
D2006INV / D2006NINV   1.9292  7.96***   -9.1511  0.09 
D2007INV / D2007NINV   1.8664  7.51***                  -8.2257  0.00 
D2008INV / D2008NINV   1.8325  6.21***                  -7.2541  0.00 
D2009INV / D2009NINV   1.7685  5.82***   -7.7643  0.00 
D2010INV / D2010NINV   1.5601  4.27***                  -8.5812  0.00 
D2011INV / D2011NINV   1.2822  4.01***                  -9.5269  0.00 
D2012INV / D2012NINV   0.8658  3.78***                  -9.9584                 0.00               
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel B: Cut-off points upper boundary for rating category 
BB+ and below   0.000                          -              0.000                         -                 
BBB-    0.551  7.88***   0.684                9.62***   
BBB    1.325              16.21***   1.547              17.65***   
BBB+    1.547              19.24***   1.954              20.54***                
A-                                           1.984              21.22***   2.265              23.95***    
A    2.251              25.14***   2.684              28.65***    
A+    2.895              27.98***   3.865              32.24***    
AA-    3.214              29.24***   3.924              35.55***   
AA    3.547              32.33***   4.695              38.62***    
AA+, AAA                                         +∞        -   +∞        -                          
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel C: Selected model statistics 
Log-likelihood   -1,421.547   -1,620.858   
Restr.log-lik.   -1,762.050   -1,952.214    
No. of group obs.     3,682      3,682       
χ2 statistic     660.141***     695.853***    
Pseudo- R2ϛ     45.32%      43.21%  
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: The dependent variable of all ordered probit models is the categorical variable CR (fine ratings). All significance levels are determined using 
the two-tailed Z-test. ***, **,* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Ϛ: this measure of goodness-of-fit is a simple 
computational statistic [pseudo − 𝑅2 =
χ2
χ2+N
] proposed by Aldrich and Nelson (1984). The upper boundary represents the threshold for each of the 
rating categories, and in this model the categories represent the fine ratings. 
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6.5 Summary 
This section gives a summary of the main findings of this chapter with a view to 
discussing the main determinants of credit ratings. It further discusses the nature and 
implications of the rating process by comparing across the specifications of the 
estimated models used. This chapter, which investigates the key variables influencing 
bank credit ratings, introduces a number of innovations. First, the credit rating 
determinants models test both the individual, as well as joint, significance of a number 
of financial and non-financial variables that have been hypothesised to affect a bank’s 
creditworthiness. The chapter further introduces unique variables such as the Fitch 
measure of the propensity to receive external help when needed (TBTF), specific 
measures of credit and liquidity risks (LR and CRK), and a proxy for country specific 
variables, that is, the sovereign rating. The issue of corporate governance as a key driver 
in the rating process is highlighted in various sections within the chapter. Thus this 
study adds to the existing body of literature by critically examining the contribution of a 
more holistic set of variables impacting upon the credit rating process.  
The results suggest that bank capitalization (TIER1) is important in the bank credit 
rating process. The coefficient of this variable is positive in all of the full specification 
models and is statistically significant at the 1% level. In addition, the marginal effects 
show that a percentage increase in this capital adequacy ratio results in a higher 
probability of being rated in the investment category. These results are consistent with 
many of the existing studies (Estrella et al., 2000; Poon, 2003; Poon and Firth, 2005; 
Bissoondoyal-Bheenick and Treepongkaruna, 2009; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Cole and 
White, 2012; Distinguin et al., 2012) and confirm the importance for a bank of having 
adequate capital, particularly in times of financial crisis. The rating process involves an 
assessment of the potential of a bank to continually generate higher returns, whilst 
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providing an adequate cushion to absorb expected and unexpected losses. Generally, 
banks with higher Tier I capital and a higher ratio of loans to total assets perform better 
in the initial stages of a financial crisis (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012). Further, Berger and 
Bouwman (2011) show that during banking crises, higher capital levels improve bank 
performance. Similarly, Cole and White (2012) argue that higher levels of capital and 
stronger CAMELS ratings lower the likelihood of bank failure.  
With reference to asset quality (LLR/GL), the results are consistent with the expected 
negative sign and show a strong relationship with bank credit ratings. The results show 
that this variable is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level in all the models 
that combine both the financial and non-financial variables. In all of the six full models, 
banks with low asset quality are more likely to receive lower ratings. Asset quality is at 
the heart of the drivers of credit risk in banks as it represents the credit risk associated 
with the entire portfolio of assets held by a banking institution and is usually associated 
with the root cause of most bank failures. Nonperforming loans usually have loan-loss 
reserves set aside against them which may be ultimately written off due to non-
recovery. Golin and Delhaise (2013) argue that such provisioning against loan-loss 
reserves cuts into profits, and thus impairs the bank’s ability to create new capital. In the 
same vein, writing off a non-performing loan directly reduces existing capital. The 
marginal effects results for each of the full models show that banks with higher LLR/GL 
ratios have a higher probability of being assigned lower ratings. These results suggest 
that the rating agencies might place a higher importance on the level of the quality of 
bank assets vis-à-vis the value of nonperforming loans as well as the amounts set aside 
as loan-loss reserves. The continued monitoring of asset quality enables rating agencies 
to assess bank creditworthiness more accurately.  
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Profitability (ROA) is statistically significant in all the full models and exhibits a 
positive sign as expected. Profitability features as an important determinant of credit 
ratings, with higher profitability driving up bank ratings. The estimated coefficients for 
ROA are significant at the 1% level in only the coarse predictive model (XV), while at 
the 5% in the rest of the full models. The findings for the impact of ROA are consistent 
with the marginal effects in all models, which indicate that a rise in profitability leads to 
an increase in the likelihood of banks being assigned higher ratings. The results support 
the expected hypothesis of a positive relationship between profitability and bank credit 
rating; and are consistent with earlier studies (Adams et al., 2003; Poon et al., 2009; 
Hau et al., 2012) which establish a strong positive relationship between profitability and 
credit ratings. The findings indicate that banks with higher profits have a lower 
probability of default, as these results in higher earning capacity and less riskiness in 
terms of debt repayments or meeting customers’ deposit demands.  
The liquidity variables (LTA and INTER) are statistically significant in all of the models 
and both exhibit the hypothesised negative and positive signs, respectively. Liquidity 
features as a very important determinant of bank credit ratings, with higher liquidity 
impacting positively on such ratings. The LTA measure of liquidity evidences negative 
coefficients in all of the models and is significant at the 1% level in the coarse 
specification models. Similarly, the variable INTER shows a strong positive relationship 
with bank credit ratings and is statistically significant in all of the models at the 1% 
level, except for Model VI where it is significant only at the 5% level. The majority of 
the existing studies establish a similar strong relationship between liquidity and bank 
credit ratings (Fight 2000; Poon, 2003; Doumpos and Pasiouras, 2005; Poon et al., 
2009). In a related study, Poon and Firth (2005) finds that banks with unsolicited ratings 
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are less liquid than banks with solicited ratings. The results indicate that the higher the 
liquidity of bank, the greater the probability of it being assigned higher ratings.  
The results relating to the business risk variables (BETA and IDIO) are less straight 
forward. The coefficients of the variables of BETA and IDIO are negative as expected, 
though there is mixed evidence in terms of their level of significance. The beta (BETA) 
variable is significant in all six (full) models, except Model III. The results of the latter 
models indicate that the bank credit rating process is independent of market dynamics 
(Fitch, 2007, Standard and Poor’s, 2005). This is consistent with the results of Purda 
(2008) who reports an insignificant negative beta coefficient and suggests that market 
risk does not affect credit ratings at all. The majority of the results are however 
consistent with Blume et al. (1998) and Shin and Moore (2003) who find a strong 
negative relationship between the market model beta and credit ratings, and argue that 
as equity risk increases firms are less able to service their debt obligations. The bank 
specific risk (IDIO) is significantly negatively related to bank credit ratings in all six 
models. This suggests that the higher is IDIO the less likely a bank will be assigned a 
higher rating. In addition, the Z-Score is statistically significant in both the 
contemporaneous, lagged and predictive models, and bears the hypothesized positive 
sign. This suggests that higher Z-Score banks are more likely to be awarded a higher 
credit rating. This variable is significant at the 1% level in the predictive models for 
both the fine and coarse grading.  
Liquidity risk (LR) and credit risk (CRK) are statistically significant in all of the models, 
and both exhibit the hypothesized negative signs. The results indicate that the higher is 
LR the lower the chances of a bank being assigned a higher rating. LR shows the degree 
to which a bank is capable of dealing with sudden and unexpected liquidity demand. 
However, Imbierowicz and Rauch (2014) argue that in some cases, a higher level of 
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liquidity risk might be desired by bank management to generate higher profit. Similarly, 
CRK is statistically significant, with a negative sign in all six (full) models and shows 
the impact of capturing this risk variable in the assessment of a bank credit rating. 
Taken together, these two risks (LR and CRK) have a significant influence on bank 
default probability. Banks experiencing high liquidity risk might not be able to cover 
short-term withdrawals by customers, and hence may experience a bank run. Employing 
the LR measure in the modelling of bank credit rating determination allows for 
incorporation of the immediate funding risk a bank might face in the case of sudden 
liquidity withdrawal or asset deterioration. Similarly, the use within this thesis of the 
CRK variable helps to capture a bank’s ability to cover near-term future loan losses. 
These two measures have not been employed in previous studies relating to bank credit 
rating determination. This indicates a valuable addition within this current study. 
Further, the measures of bank size (InTA and TBTF) have the hypothesised positive 
signs and are statistically significant at the 1% level in all six (full) models. The results 
are consistent with the existing studies (e.g. Amato and Furfine, 2004; Poon et al., 2009; 
Caporale et al., 2009; Distinguin et al., 2009) and confirm the importance of size in the 
assignment of credit ratings as it is perceived as a proxy for a bank’s geographical 
presence, competitive position, market share and product and brand recognition 
(Pasiouras et al., 2007). This thesis introduces the Fitch support rating which captures 
the role of government and external support in keeping a bank afloat when needed. This 
may suggest that rating agencies perceive big banks as arguably too-big-to-fail, hence 
assigning them higher ratings.  
Bank corporate governance is represented by three different variables in this thesis. 
Directors’ ownership (OWN) is positively related to a bank’s creditworthiness in all six 
(full) models. However, this relationship is a weak one, being significant at only the 
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10% level, except in Model XVIII where it is significant at the 5% level. The results 
suggest that rating agencies perceive an increase in directors’ ownership of a bank 
positively and may assign correspondingly higher ratings in such cases. This is 
consistent with earlier studies (e.g. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006). The second corporate 
governance dimension (INST) has the hypothesised positive sign in all the models. The 
strength of the relationship between the variable, INST, and bank credit rating varies 
among the specifications.  The results indicate that increasing ownership by institutional 
investors does benefit banks in terms of achieving a better rating. The contemporaneous 
specifications show a weak relationship at the 10% level. The proportion of independent 
directors (INDD) on a bank’s board exerts a positive influence on credit ratings. The 
results show that credit rating agencies perceive the independent oversight of the 
outside directors as being beneficial in the rating process. Hence, banks that ensure 
tighter outside monitoring are more likely to achieve a better rating. This result is 
consistent with hypothesis H15 and is consistent with existing studies (Ashbaugh-Skaife 
et al., 2006). 
Further, the results of the sovereign rating variables (SOV) which capture the effects of 
country specific changes on bank credit rating assignment is positive and significant in 
all the six models. The results show that credit rating agencies pay particular attention to 
the sovereign ratings of the home country in which a bank is operating when assessing 
their creditworthiness. There is a strong positive relationship between the SOV and a 
bank credit rating, and this is significant at the 1% level.  
In general terms, the results in this chapter suggest that assigning a credit rating to a 
bank is a forward-looking process. The predictive models estimated are found to enjoy 
higher classification accuracy than the contemporaneous models. This finding is 
consistent with the argument of credit rating agencies that they are forward-looking in 
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their rating process. It further underscores the importance of future projections and 
involvement of a bank’s management team in providing information to the CRAs about 
the business and its prospects. The results show that a CRA’s ability to forecast a bank’s 
performance is enhanced based on their access to private information.  
The results show that non-financial information adds value to the overall classification 
accuracy as well as the model fit, as evidenced by the higher goodness-of-fit (pseudo – 
R
2
) in the full specifications. This finding is consistent with the results by Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. (2006) who show a significant improvement following the inclusion of 
both sets of attributes (financial and non-financial information) in the full models. The 
results from the tables further indicate that financial information is the major driver of 
bank credit ratings and that rating agencies assign significant weight to it. The use of 
non-financial information in this thesis, particularly with regard to corporate governance 
variables, as well as the dummy variables to capture the impact of the size effects 
(TBTF) and sovereign ratings (SOV), potentially adds to the understanding of the bank 
rating determinant process. 
Finally, the findings with respect to the test of stringency suggest that the review of 
Fitch rating methodologies may have had resulted in a progressively tighter rating 
process, a consequence of which is the tendency for more observed downgrades 
particularly within the investment category. Further, the results provide an indication 
that banks within the non-investment category may have had their ratings positively 
reviewed in the period before the crisis than afterwards. Similarly, the increased 
magnitude in the coefficients of the year-dummies suggests that Fitch increasingly made 
it more difficult for banks to be assigned investment grade credit ratings.
224 
 
 AN EMPRICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE CHAPTER 7.
EFFECTS OF BANK CREDIT RATING NEWS 
ANNOUNCEMENTS ON BANK EQUITY RETURNS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Credit rating agencies have become an integral part of the financial system and are 
considered an important source of information for the market. There are suggestions 
that rating agencies do not react fast enough to new developments relating to a 
particular issue or issuer. Nickell et al. (2000), Altman and Rijken (2004) and Loeffler 
(2005) maintain that rating agencies perform the dual role of managing rating timeliness 
and providing rating stability. The leading credit rating agencies claim to employ a 
through-the cycle approach neglecting short-term variations in credit quality when 
assigning ratings. An example is the case of Moody’s Investors Services that takes a 
rating action only ‘when it is unlikely to be reversed within a relatively short period of 
time (Cantor, 2001: 175). There is an expectation on the part of the market for stability 
in the assignment of ratings to banks. However, timely reaction to significant changes in 
factors affecting the creditworthiness of banks is important in making the market more 
efficient. 
A rating change conveys to the market that there is a change in opinion of a credit rating 
agency, regarding the relative creditworthiness of an entity or its issue (Konijn and 
Rijken, 2010). One may argue that in order to maintain the balance between rating 
stability and rating timeliness, credit rating agencies may signal to the market the 
possibility of effecting a rating change. This may be in the form of issuing a rating 
review or a rating outlook. Whilst a rating outlook gives an indication of the likely 
direction of an issuer’s credit quality, a rating review (or placement on a Watchlist) 
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gives a much stronger indication about the possible future of a rating change (Langohr 
and Langohr, 2008). 
Over the last few years, particularly in the period following the global financial crisis, 
there has been a need to revisit the claim by the rating agencies that they provide timely 
and valuable information to the market. The relationship between credit ratings and the 
market prices of financial assets has been the focus of a number of empirical studies 
(e.g. Konijn and Rijken, 2010; Bedendo et al., 2013; Grothe, 2013) which examine the 
effect of new ratings, reviews, outlooks and rating changes (upgrades and downgrades) 
on bond, share and derivatives prices. If credit ratings provide information about the 
credit quality of companies to capital markets, a change in a company’s rating will stem 
from a reassessment of the company’s risk by market participants, thus leading to 
changes in the prices of securities, such as the bonds issued by the company. A reliable 
evaluation of the impact of credit rating agency announcements on stock prices depends 
largely upon the accuracy and precision with which the announcement dates can be 
identified as well as the way in which abnormal returns around such announcements are 
measured. In addition, Gannon et al. (2006) argue that if one assumes that the stock 
market is in a semi-strong form efficient state (where share prices rapidly incorporate all 
publicly available price-sensitive information), then the impact of a news event on a 
company’s share price is captured by measuring the event day return (abnormal return) 
immediately after such an announcement. 
This chapter aims to investigate the information relevance of bank credit ratings, and in 
particular the way bank stock returns behave around ratings announcements for 
international banks. More specifically, it tests the hypothesis that, on average, bank 
credit rating announcements have no impact on the behaviour of bank stock returns.  
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The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 presents the theoretical 
background by focusing on the theoretical and empirical studies in the area of news 
announcement effects, specifically the effects of credit rating changes. Section 7.3 
investigates existing methodological event studies approaches, and explains the 
approach employed in this study. Section 7.4 discusses some extensions to the 
traditional event study approach. Section 7.5 discusses issues around the data employed. 
Section 7.6 presents the results, while the Section 7.5 presents a summary to the 
chapter.  
7.2 An overview of the theoretical foundation in an event study 
This component of the thesis aims to provide an insight into the relationship between 
bank credit risk and the equity market. This section provides an overview of the main 
theoretical arguments on which the empirical analysis in this component of the thesis is 
based. At the core of the theoretical framework is the assumption that the financial 
market is efficient and incorporates news information in a timely manner. Further, it 
assumes that the market participants are rational.  
 The Efficient Market Hypothesis 7.2.1
The theoretical framework for this component of the thesis centres on the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis (hereafter referred to as EMH). Howells and Bain (2008) suggest 
that the term efficiency within the context of a financial market investigation can mean 
one of several things. They argue that efficiency may refer to either operational, 
allocation or information efficiency. This thesis focuses on answering the question of 
whether financial markets are informationally efficient in the sense that prices 
incorporate all available information in a timely manner. More specifically, it 
investigates whether credit rating agencies possess information not already available to 
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the market (and incorporated in bank stock prices). Price efficiency has a significant 
effect on operational and allocation efficiency in the sense that markets rely on the 
release of timely and relevant information to be able to operate at minimal cost and 
allocate funds and resources in a productive way. In order for the market to be efficient, 
therefore, security prices must fully reflect all available information. According to the 
EMH, no information or analysis can provide investors with a superior opportunity to 
consistently outperform the market. Hence, any ‘new’ information coming to the market 
about, say, a change in a bank’s creditworthiness, is rapidly incorporated into its stock 
price. However, one cannot rule out the impact of market expectations on the behaviour 
of stock returns. If there is information that relates to an expected increase in, say, 
bank’s cash flows (e.g. year-end results are better than expected), or lower risk, then 
stock prices may increase even before the actual announcement of the event.  
There is evidence to suggest that financial markets may not be operating at the strong 
level of market efficiency (Schwert, 2002; Park and Irwin, 2007). An indication of the 
non-conformity to the strong level of market efficiency may be seen in the case of rating 
agencies being able to access non-public information. The announcement of a credit 
rating news event could thus potentially impact on the market and give rise to an 
abnormal stock return reaction. Any action by the market upon release of this news 
announcement by rating agencies can be said to constitute semi-strong form efficiency. 
Further, there have been several reported cases of insider trading which may suggest 
that the price at which a bank stock is trading does not incorporate all available 
information (Seyhun, 1998; Chakravarty and McConnell, 1999; Fernandes and Ferreira, 
2009). It is interesting to note that the EMH makes no assertion on whether prices will 
always be correct, nor does it require agents to use all information in forming rational 
expectations (Elton and Gruber, 1995).  
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This thesis examines short event windows for stock returns with the aim of providing 
more accurate inferences using an appropriate econometric approach. With the level of 
news releases relating to firms, a short window market efficiency study is, at least 
theoretically, less susceptible to other contaminating news events. This is consistent 
with the view of Fama (1991) who suggests that the short-horizon tests represent the 
cleanest evidence on market efficiency.  
 The Information Content Hypothesis 7.2.2
It is worth noting that the relevancy of information is a crucial consideration for any 
financial markets news announcement study. Does the information contained in the 
news announcements by credit rating agencies constitute relevant information to 
influence the market, such that changes in bank stock behaviour are triggered? Is the 
market sufficiently rational to make market agents and the market as whole form a 
rational expectation about the new information? The EMH maintains that individual 
agents act rationally; hence one should not expect to record a series of abnormal stock 
returns around the release of bank credit rating news. If abnormal returns and/or market 
corrections are observed, then the EMH suggests that these will be nothing more than 
random disturbances from efficient prices. Thus, stock behaviour in the long run 
represents an aggregation of short term behaviour (hence making the latter relatively 
unimportant). Put differently, if there is, say, exactly a zero cumulative abnormal effect 
in the short term then there will be exactly zero abnormal effects in the long term as 
well.  
The notion of information content draws precedence from agency theory and is 
connected with information asymmetry and signalling hypotheses. The information 
content hypothesis assumes that there is information asymmetry between the credit 
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rating agencies and the market (Bruno et al., 2011). The implication of this is that rating 
related news announcements by the agencies should potentially convey additional 
relevant information to the market about the value of a firm. One may argue that, since 
rating agencies aim to maintain rating stability, there may be a lag between the time 
taken to process relevant and significant rating information and when the market 
actually receives it. Thus, in semi-strong form market efficiency, one would not expect 
a change in a firm’s credit rating to impact on security prices. Similarly, credit ratings 
may reflect irrelevant or incomplete information, thus not resulting in any significant 
movement in stock prices. Further, due to the conflicts of interest that may exist 
between the rating agencies and their clients (the issuers), rating agencies may not act 
upon price-relevant information in a timely manner (Bai, 2010). The business model 
within the rating industry is an issuer-pay model in which issuers pay rating agencies to 
assign them credit ratings. Hence, one may argue that in order to maintain this stream of 
revenue and not lose their clientele, rating agencies may not always act in the best 
interests of the market. However, credit rating agencies maintain that they have their 
reputation to uphold and hence are incentivised to act in the interest of investors (Golin, 
2001; Langohr and Langohr, 2008). Another factor that might reduce the information 
relevance of rating agencies is that certain market participants (e.g. institutional 
investors, banks, insiders) may also have access to private, privileged information. 
Consistent with this argument, Kaplan and Urwitz (1979), Wakeman (1984) and 
Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) show that rating agencies merely reflect public 
information.  
However, the major credit rating agencies claim to have access to private information 
obtained through discussion with their clienteles’ top management. Such information, 
they maintain, is not available to other investors. The process of assigning and 
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monitoring a rating is a costly one, hence the rating agencies, by their actions, 
potentially provide information to the market at a low cost. Similarly, Micu et al. (2006) 
argue that issuers engage credit rating agencies in confidential discussions about their 
current and future strategic plans, rather than giving full public disclosure to investors 
and the market. If rating news announcements convey new and relevant information, 
then one would expect that negative rating news (e.g. downgrades, reviews of 
downgrades and negative outlooks) should lead to negative abnormal stock returns 
around the news announcement date. In the same vein, positive rating news (e.g. 
upgrades, reviews of upgrade and positive outlook) should lead to positive abnormal 
stock returns around the announcement date. Goh and Ederington (1999) maintain that 
the potential impact of a rating news announcement on stock prices depends critically 
on the reason for the announcement. Announcements relating to fundamental valuation 
or the financial prospects of a firm (e.g. prospective increase in market share, earnings, 
or mergers and acquisitions) should have either a positive or negative impact on stock 
prices of the issuer.  
The Information Content Hypothesis is also connected to the Signalling Effects 
Hypothesis which suggests that a change in a firm’s rating not only signals to the 
market the value, future earnings and cash flows of the firm, but also about the industry 
in which the firm operates (Akhigbe et al., 1997; Caton and Goh, 2003). Akhigbe et al. 
(1997) argue that the downgrade of a rival firm may be good news for other firms in 
that industry. Further, a downgrade may be expected to be followed by a negative stock 
price reaction for the firm because this signals negative information about the declining 
value of a firm and leaves the firm potentially vulnerable to attacks. It may also lead to 
herding behaviour on the part of the market participants, resulting in negative share 
231 
 
price reactions for other firms within the industry. The reverse may be the case for an 
upgrade. 
 The Price Pressure Hypothesis 7.2.3
The relevance of a bank credit rating news announcement is important in triggering a 
market reaction. However, if a rating announcement conveys no new information to the 
market about the creditworthiness of an issuer (e.g. a bank), there may still be a market 
reaction due to institutional and regulatory pressure or constraints. Section 2.3 describes 
the role of credit rating agencies in the financial market and how they perform a 
delegated monitoring role. Market participants and regulators often delegate these roles 
to rating agencies due to the reduced cost of doing so and the specialist skills on the part 
of the agencies. Further, investors may be restricted by the mandate given to them by 
their clients in buying and selling of securities within certain risk categories, and thus 
rely on the pronouncements by credit rating agencies on the creditworthiness of an 
issuer (or issue). Hence, price changes might be effected due to buying or selling 
pressure from these ‘restricted’ investors. Investment grade assets are particularly 
important to institutional investors as they seek to maximize returns and target a higher 
level of income by utilizing assets issued by higher quality companies (Fabozzi, 2012).  
There are several studies in the existing literature (Hand et al., 1992; Kliger and Sarig, 
2000) which support the price pressure hypothesis. The studies find that downgrades, 
particularly those from investment- to speculative-grade ratings result in considerable 
negative price movement. This may be the result of the price pressure hypothesis which 
triggers the mutual funds, pension funds or other institutional investors to sell (or buy) if 
there is a downgrade (or an upgrade) of securities. This ensures consistency with 
investors’ mandates. Similarly, rating announcement effects are greater for firms with 
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higher leverage (many of which are in the speculative-grade) than for firms with lower 
leverage (typically investment-grade). The threshold rating grade (e.g. the BBB- in the 
Fitch rating grading) is the lowest investment-grade category, and rating announcements 
that cross this threshold may contravene an investor’s investment mandate. This may 
cause investors to sell such downgraded assets, hence triggering negative price 
movement. 
Table 7.1 shows a prediction of share price reaction following bank credit rating 
announcements, assuming that credit rating news possesses information relevant to the 
market. In general, a positive news announcement leads to a positive price reaction 
based on the Information Content and Signalling Hypotheses. On the contrary, a 
negative news announcement will be expected to lead to a negative stock price reaction 
based on the Information Content and Signalling Hypotheses.  
Table 7.1: Prediction of share price direction 
Rating action Information content 
hypothesis 
Signalling hypothesis 
Upgrade 
Positive outlook   
Increase 
Increase 
Increase 
Increase 
CreditWatch list (positive) Increase Increase 
Downgrade 
Negative Outlook 
Decrease 
Decrease 
Decrease 
Decrease 
CreditWatch list (negative) Decrease Decrease 
 
The issue of the relevance and timeliness of bank credit rating information, as well as 
the degree to which market participants react to this rating news announcement, shapes 
the nature of the hypothesis to be tested. The magnitude of the effects and in particular 
the potential asymmetry between upgrades and downgrades adds to the dynamic nature 
of market reactions. 
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This component of the thesis aims to investigate the significance and magnitude of 
abnormal returns around bank credit rating news announcements. In order to answer the 
question of whether there is a systematic relationship between credit ratings 
announcements and the returns pattern of bank stocks, this thesis postulates the 
following generalised hypothesis: 
H0: On average, bank credit rating news announcements have no impact on the 
behaviour of bank stock returns  
 A review of previous empirical evidence  7.2.4
Credit rating agencies provide information to the market on the credit quality of firms 
and their issues. At times, this information reflects a change in the creditworthiness or 
the future direction of the credit qualities of such firms and/or their issues. The 
relationship between credit ratings and the market prices of assets and other instruments 
has been the focus of a number of empirical studies which mainly examine the effect 
new ratings, placements on a credit Watchlist, and rating changes (upgrades and 
downgrades) on the price of a firm’s shares, bonds and derivatives. If credit ratings 
provide information about the credit quality of firms to capital markets, a change in a 
firm’s rating should trigger abnormal stock price behaviour. 
A review of the existing literature indicates the existence of information asymmetry in 
the way financial markets react to rating related news announcements. The majority of 
existing studies focus on the stock price impact of rating announcements, particularly 
for sovereign entities as well as non-financial firms and their issues. A cross section of 
selected results from existing studies is presented in Table 7.2. Very few of the studies 
(e.g. Richard and Deddouche, 1994; Apergis et al., 2011; Jones and Mulet-Marquis, 
2014; Fieberg et al., 2013) employ bank credit rating related data to draw inference on 
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the behaviour of bank stocks around rating news announcements. This thesis focuses 
specifically on banks due to their importance to the economy, and aims to investigate 
short-horizon bank stock reactions to rating related announcements.  
There have been many studies which examine whether ratings add information to 
market prices, and most of these studies relate to the US. Early studies such as Katz 
(1974), Pinches and Singleton (1978) and Griffin and Sanvicente (1982) follow the 
traditional event study approach developed by Fama, French, Jenson and Roll FFJR 
(1969), and consistent with other studies around that time employ monthly data in their 
models, and find little evidence of bond and stock prices responding to bond rating 
changes. Thus, in general, most of these early studies conclude that the market fully 
anticipates rating changes.  
A seminal study by Hand et al. (1992) examines the effect of rating agency 
announcements on both bond and stock prices in the US between 1977 and 1982. The 
study includes 1,548 S&P and Moody’s rated bonds from 1977 to 1982. They measure 
bond excess returns for a time period 11 days prior to a rating change announcement to 
60 days after that announcement, and report that rating downgrades by Standard and 
Poor’s and Moody’s result in a mean excess bond return of -1.27%, with non-
investment grade bonds on average losing 3.82% compared to the significantly lower 
loss of 0.55% for investment-grade bonds.  
The evidence on upgrades is weaker since the estimated excess return coefficient is only 
marginally statistically significant, while the excess return differences between 
investment-grade and speculative-grade bonds are very small (0.33% versus 0.40%, 
respectively). 
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Table 7.2: An overview of existing studies on credit rating news announcements 
Market studied Data Main Results 
Stock Pinches and Singleton (1978) 
 
 Griffin and Sanvicente (1982) 
 
Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) 
 
Glascock et al. (1987)  
 
Hand et al. (1992) 
 
 
Goh and Ederington (1999) 
 
 
Followill and Martell (1997) 
 
Dichev and Piotroski (2001) 
 
Vassalou and Xing (2003) 
 
 
Purda (2008) 
 
 
Feiberg et al. (2013) 
 
 
1959-1972, Moody’s 207 firms, monthly abnormal stock returns [-
30,12]  
S&P, 180 rating changes, monthly abnormal stock returns [-11, 1] 
 
1977-1982, Moody’s and S&P, 1014 rating changes, 256 additions to 
S&P Credit Watch, daily abnormal stock returns [-300, 60] 
1977-1981, Moody’s 162 rating changes, daily abnormal stock 
returns [-90,90] 
1977-1982/1981-1983, Moody’s and S&P, 1100 rating changes and 
250 additions to S&P Credit Watch, window spanning stock and 
bond returns. 
1984-1986, Moody’s, daily abnormal stock returns [-30, 30]. 
 
 
1985-1988, Moody’s, 64 reviews and actual rating changes, daily 
abnormal stock returns [-5,5]. 
1970-1997, Moody’s, 4747 rating changes, daily abnormal stock 
returns. 
1971-1999, Moody’s, 5034 rating changes, monthly abnormal returns 
of stock portfolio [-36,36] . 
 
1991-2002, Moody’s ratings, daily abnormal returns [29,-29]. 
 
 
2000-2012, Moody’s, S&P, Fitch ratings, 154 countries, daily 
abnormal returns, [-20,10] 
 
Anticipation before rating changes, no abnormal reactions afterwards. 
 
Significantly negative reaction after downgrades, no significant 
abnormal performance for upgrades. 
Significantly negative reaction after downgrades, no significant 
abnormal performance for upgrades. 
Significant negative abnormal stock returns before and around 
downgrades, reversals after day zero (publication date). 
Significantly negative abnormal returns stock and bond returns for 
downgrades and unexpected additions to S&P Credit Watch, no 
significant abnormal returns for upgrades. 
Significantly negative returns for downgrades due to earnings 
deterioration, positive abnormal returns for downgrades due to 
increased leverage. 
Significantly negative returns at review for downgrade, negligible 
abnormal performance around actual downgrades. 
Significantly negative returns during the first month after a downgrade, 
no significant reaction for upgrades. 
Stock returns in rating event studies should be adjusted by size, book-
to-market and default risk, increase of default loss indicator before and 
decrease after downgrades. 
Downgrades are easier to predict than upgrades, no evidence that the 
level of anticipation is related to the stock price reaction to the eventual 
change 
Bank credit rating upgrades not associated with significant abnormal 
stock returns, downgrades have significantly negative effects. 
Notes: [ ] represents the event window over which the impact of the credit rating news event is studied
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Market studied Data Main Results 
Bond Katz (1974) 
 
Grier and Katz (1976) 
 
Hettenhouse and Sartoris (1976) 
 
Weinstein (1977) 
 
Wansley et al. (1992) 
 
Hite and Warga (1997) 
 
Steiner and Heinke (2001) 
 
 
CDS     Hull et al. (2004) 
 
Norden and Weber (2004)  
1966-1972, S&P, 115 bonds from 66 utilities, monthly yield changes 
[-12,5]  
1966-1972, S&P, 96 bonds from utilities and industrials, monthly 
bond returns [-4,3] 
1963-1973, S&P and Moody’s, 46 bonds from utilities, monthly yield 
changes [-6, 6] 
1962-1974, Moody’s, 412 bonds from utilities and industrial, 
monthly abnormal bond  returns [-6,7] 
1982-1984, S&P, 351 bonds, weekly abnormal bond returns[-12,12] 
 
1985-1984, S&P and Moody’s, 1200 rating changes, monthly 
abnormal bond returns [-12,12] 
1985-1996, S&P and Moody’s, 546 rating changes, 182 
watchlisting, daily abnormal bond returns [-180,180] 
 
1998-2002, Moody’s rating changes reviews and outlook, adjusted 
CDS spread changes [-90,10] 
1998-2002, Moody’s, S&P, Fitch’s actual rating changes and reviews 
for rating changes (Watchlistings), daily abnormal returns [-90,90] 
 
 
No anticipation, abnormal performance during 6-10 weeks after 
downgrades 
Anticipation only for industrials, price changes after downgrades 
stronger. 
Little anticipation before downgrades, no reaction to upgrades. 
 
Early anticipation but no abnormal performance during 6 months 
before the event and no reaction afterwards. 
Significantly negative returns in the week of downgrades, no 
significant response to upgrades. 
Significantly negative abnormal returns during 6 months before 
downgrades. 
Significantly negative abnormal returns starting 90 days before 
downgrades and downgrades and negative watch listings, evidence for 
overreaction directly after the event 
Significantly positive adjusted CDS spread changes before negative 
rating events 
Strong abnormal pre-announcement performance in both CDS and 
equity market 
Notes: [ ] represents the event window over which the impact of the credit rating news event is studied
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The authors also account for confounding contemporaneous news announcements 
around the time of rating changes and in addition examine the effect of the placement of 
securities on the Credit Watch list on financial markets. They find significantly negative 
abnormal bond returns for downgrades already on Watchlist and no significant 
abnormal returns for upgrades. Further, the results for CreditWatch placement were not 
significant. 
Followill and Martell (1997) use data specifying a press release date not only for rating 
changes, but also for announcements that a corporation’s debt rating is to be reviewed. 
Their examination of the informational value of rating changes and market efficiency is 
based on the hypothesis that the higher the efficiency of stock markets, the less 
informational value a rating change carries, and consequently the smaller the reaction of 
markets to that change. However, they argue that due to extant empirical evidence 
suggesting that markets are neither perfectly efficient nor inefficient, an accurate and 
precise evaluation of the impact of rating changes on share prices is required. In 
addition, they criticise previous studies for not ensuring that the stock price reactions 
they intend to measure are caused exclusively by the rating changes that take place, 
rather than by any ‘extraneous, material event[s] occurring at the same time’ (p. 76). 
The results of Followill and Martell show that announcements of the review for the 
possible downgrading of debt have a significant negative effect on stock prices, while 
subsequent actual downgrades have a negligible impact. Hence, rating change 
announcements that are preceded by review announcements, however, provide little 
unanticipated information to the market place, and share values remain relatively 
unaffected by the announcement of a bond rating downgrade.  
The economic impact of rating announcements varies with the type of rating news, and 
whether these are anticipated or not. Typically, most upgrade announcements have 
limited impacts on stock returns, while downgrades are usually associated with greater 
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abnormal returns magnitudes on the news event day (Barron et al., 1997; Kliger and 
Sarig, 2000).  
The performance of emerging market bank stocks around the time of rating changes by 
major international agencies is examined by Richards and Deddouche (1999). They 
examine 219 rating changes between 1989 and 1998. The data span 49 different banks 
in 15 countries (mostly South American and Asian countries). Their weekly data study 
suggests that downgrades on average have followed periods of negative cumulative 
abnormal returns, but the same is not true for upgrades. Further, their study examines 
the cumulative abnormal returns prior to rating changes separate from the 
announcement-window returns. Stock prices appear to reflect most of the information 
contained in rating changes, on average a week before the change actually occurs, and 
do not respond to rating changes, or respond in the opposite direction to that expected if 
announcements convey value-relevant information about financial health. 
Dichev and Piotroski (2001) study long-run stock returns following bond rating 
changes, employing a comprehensive sample that comprises all of Moody’s bond rating 
changes data during the period 1970 to 1997. Their sample size comprises 4,700 
observations, including many small, low credit quality firms where analyst and investor 
following is expected to be low. The rationale for including this category of firms is that 
since they are small then there is a high likelihood that rating analysts and investors 
would ignore them. They examine both cumulative abnormal returns and buy-and–hold 
returns (for three-month, six-month, first-year, second-year and third-year abnormal 
stock returns following bond rating changes), and control for size and the book-to-
market ratio. They find no reliable abnormal returns following upgrades, whereas there 
are substantial negative abnormal returns following downgrades. With positive news, 
there is a trickle effect in the way news information flows in the market. The market 
tends to react more significantly to negative news. Similarly, investors take a worse-
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case approach to news information, reacting more to bad news than good news. This is a 
result of the asymmetry in the way market reacts to upgrades and downgrades. The poor 
results for downgrade firms are more pronounced for small and low-credit-quality 
firms. They conclude that downgrades are strong predictors of future deteriorations in 
earnings, and abnormal returns, hence tend to be more extreme “on the downside”.  
Choy et al. (2006) examine the impact that credit rating revisions have on the stock 
returns of Australian firms rated by Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s for the period 
1989–2003. They argue that the impact of rating change announcements can be inferred 
from the market’s reaction. In general, significant stock price reactions occur in 
response to the release of news. A significant reaction to the rating change 
announcement may occur if the market perceives that the announcement contains 
information that cannot be obtained from other sources. In addition, the credit rating 
analysts are assumed to have superior analytical skill and this confers an advantage on 
them in terms of providing reliable and relevant rating information. They suggest that 
this effect is studied traditionally by examining whether bond prices (or yield spreads) 
and stock prices change in response to such an announcement. They show that the 
reaction is most significant when the downgrade: (i) is unanticipated; (ii) is for an 
unregulated firm; and (iii) reduces the firm’s rating by more than one category. They 
also study the differential impact of rating changes that involves multiple steps or 
gradation. This also leads to the proposition that companies that fall below investment 
grade (BBB or below) will experience greater significant abnormal returns. 
In sum, early studies (Pinches and Singleton, 1978; Griffin and Sanvicente, 1982) make 
use of monthly data and find little reaction of share prices to rating changes and hence 
conclude that the market is efficient and fully anticipates rating changes. However, 
other  research (such as Holthausen and Leftwich, 1986; Glascock, et al., 1987; Hand et 
al. 1992) uses daily data and finds significant abnormal returns reactions, especially for 
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downgrades. Furthermore, by accounting for confounding contemporaneous news 
announcements around the credit rating news, studies such as Hand et al. are able to 
observe more security returns reactions. The studies differ on the choice of method for 
calculating the normal or expected returns and whether or not to use the pre- or post-
event date periods to estimate the model for normal returns. Other studies by Dichev 
and Piotroski (2001) and Choy et al. (2006) suggest that downgrades are strong 
predictors of future deteriorations in earnings and companies that fall below investment 
grade (BBB or below) will experience greater significant abnormal returns. This thesis 
focuses on testing for any significant stock return movement over a short event-window. 
Employing a relatively short event-window horizon ensures a reduction in news 
contamination. 
7.3 A review of the event study methodological approach  
The event study methodology has become the standard approach for measuring security 
price reaction to an announcement or event. In general, it focuses on announcement 
effects over a short-time horizon. The methodological approach assesses the effects of 
information arrival on the prices of stocks (Mackinlay, 1997; Campbell et al., 2010). 
Unlike the majority of existing studies, this thesis applies the event study approach to a 
multi-country sample in relation to the main market listing of bank stocks in each 
country and provides additional evidence of the performance of several specifications in 
such sample. According to Binder (1998), event studies have been employed in 
empirical finance for two functions: (i) to test the null hypothesis of market efficiency; 
and (ii) assuming markets are efficient, at least with respect to publicly available 
information, to examine the impact of some event on the wealth of a firm’s security 
holders. The use of the event study methodology became popular following the seminal 
paper of Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) (hereafter referred to as FFJR) who 
examined the adjustment of stock prices to new information (in this case, a stock split).  
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This section focuses on the design, implementation and statistical properties of the event 
study methodological approach. An event study starts by establishing a hypothesis 
concerning the effect of an event on the value of a firm. In specific terms, the 
hypothesis that this thesis tests is that, on average, bank credit rating news 
announcement has no effect on the value of bank stocks, across banks with similar 
information arrival. Persistent abnormal returns after a particular news announcement 
are inconsistent with market efficiency. Further, an event study provides a measure of 
the (un)anticipated effect of such an event on the wealth of the firm’s claimholders 
(Kothari and Warner, 2006). If the information in the market is already captured in the 
share price and investors have already taken this into account, then on average there 
should not be significant changes in stock returns around the announcement date of an 
event. It follows that the concept of abnormal returns is central to an event study. The 
abnormal returns are calculated as the difference between a stock’s actual return and its 
expected return. The expected returns are usually generated using the market model. 
The total impact of an event through a particular time period is typically captured by 
summing the abnormal returns, to arrive at the cumulative abnormal returns (CAARs).  
 The design of an event study 7.3.1
An event study typically aims to examine stock return reaction for a sample of firms 
experiencing a similar event. This event can be clustered on a particular date or can take 
place at different times within a calendar year. Mackinlay (1997) argues that there is no 
unique structure when establishing an event study approach, though there is a general 
flow of analysis. Following the initial definition of the event, the impact of which is to 
be gauged (in the case of this thesis, the news event is a bank credit rating 
announcement), the period over which the bank’s returns will be examined is decided.   
Figure 7.1 presents the timeline for a traditional event study model, showing that an 
event study typically consists of three windows.  
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Sources: Benninga (2014) *Used with permission of the publisher 
The first of the three windows in the traditional event study approach is the estimation 
window. The estimation window represents the period before the event and is included 
to help capture the ‘normal’ returns of the asset with respect to a market or industry 
index. The normal return represents the returns of a stock under ‘normal’ circumstances, 
that is, without conditioning on the event of study. The estimation window and the 
event window do not overlap in order to ensure that the results of the estimator 
measurement for the normal returns are not contaminated by the event itself. An 
estimation model for the normal stock behaviour is defined by, and in most cases it 
takes the form of, a regression model. The returns of the stock under investigation are 
regressed against the returns of the corresponding market index. Mackinlay (1997) 
suggests a minimum of 126 observations (days) in the estimation period, with the 
normal number of trading days being a maximum of 252 days. This is to ensure that 
robust results are produced in terms of representing true stock movements. The length 
of the estimation window is given as 𝑇0 to 𝑇1. 
Start date for 
estimation  
window 
End date for 
estimation  
window 
Start date for 
event window 
Event 
date 
End date for 
event window 
Start date for 
post-event  
window 
End date for 
post-event  
window 
 
 
 
ESTIMATION WINDOW 
 
The estimation window is 
used to determine the normal 
behaviour of a stock with 
respect to market factors. 
The most common 
regression model employed 
in existing literature is   
Rit = 𝛼 + 𝛽Rmt. 
EVENT WINDOW 
 
The data from this window is 
employed along with the estimates of 
α and β of the stock(s) to determine 
whether: 
i) The event announcement was 
anticipated or leaked; 
ii) The length of time it took the 
market to absorb the event 
information, i.e. the post 
announcement effects. 
POST-EVENT WINDOW 
This window is used to 
investigate longer term company 
performance following the event. 
Figure 7.1: An event study timeline 
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The second of the three windows in the traditional event study approach is the event 
window which is made up of the date of the event at t = 0. The event window is usually 
longer than the specific period of interest. This allows the model to measure the impact 
of the news announcement in the period surrounding the event. In practice, the specific 
date of announcement usually includes not only the event day but also the day following 
the announcement, and according to Campbell et al. (1997), this allows for the capture 
of market movement if the event was announced immediately before the market closed 
or after market closing. Assuming the event occurs at time 0, the event window is 
represented as 𝑇1 + 1 to 𝑇2. The event window usually starts a few trading days before 
the actual event day and continues afterwards until a pre-defined number of days. This 
allows for the capture or investigation of pre-event leakages of information. 
The post-event window represents the third and final window in the time line. It is 
sometimes included with the data from the estimation window when measuring the 
‘normal’ return. Campbell et al. (1997) argue that using this approach will increase the 
robustness of the normal market returns measure to gradual changes in its parameter. 
Further, it allows for a measure of the longer-term impact of an event. The length of the 
post-event window is given as 𝑇2 + 1 to 𝑇3, and could be as short as one month or as 
long as several years depending on the event in question. 
In terms of its practical implementation, the traditional event study approach consists of 
a two-stage procedure. The first stage involves modelling the ‘normal’ stock returns and 
this employs the data in the estimation period. The normal returns may be viewed as the 
expected returns of the stock without conditioning on the event taking place. The 
second stage in the process involves the measurement of the abnormal returns in order 
to gauge the impact of the event on the stock returns. Abnormal returns are the actual ex 
post returns of the security over the event window minus the normal returns of the firm 
over the estimation period.  
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Hence, in the traditional event study approach, the abnormal returns may be defined as, 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡 ⎸𝑋𝑡)      7.1 
where ARit, Rit and E(Rit ⎸Xt ) are the abnormal, actual and normal returns for time 
period t, respectively. Xt  represents the event under consideration, while the normal 
return is the expected return without conditioning on the event, while i represents the 
individual firm under investigation. 
There are a number of approaches to estimating the normal returns of a given security.  
Brown and Warner (1985) and Campbell et al. (1997) provide detailed descriptions of 
these models, including the market model, the constant expected returns models, and the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The approaches can be classified into statistical 
and economic models, the most popular of which are the market model (a statistical 
model) and the CAPM (an economic model). The market model relates the returns of a 
given security to the returns of the market portfolio. According to Khotari and Warner 
(2006), the linear specification of the market model follows from the assumed joint 
normality of asset returns. For a given security i,  
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡      7.2 
Where E[𝜀𝑖𝑡] = 0 and Var[𝜀𝑖𝑡] = 0. 
McKinlay (1997) argues that the benefit of using the market model depends on the 𝑅2 
of the model regression, with a higher goodness-of-fit leading to a greater variance 
reduction in abnormal returns. Binder (1998) argues that the relative ease of application 
of the market model makes it attractive. 
The economic models provide more constrained normal returns by restricting the 
parameters of the statistical model. The most popular of the economic models is the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) which controls for security risk in relation to 
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market risk. For a given security i in period t, the ex-ante expected return can be stated 
as: 
𝐸(?̂?𝑖𝑡) = (1 − 𝛽𝑖)𝑅𝑓𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝐸(?̂?𝑚𝑡)     7.3 
where 𝑅𝑓𝑡 is the return on a risk-free security in period t (e.g. Treasury Bills) and 𝛽𝑖 is 
the systematic risk of the security i relative to the market index. The implementation of 
this involves the estimation of 𝛽𝑖. The predicted abnormal return is given by:  
𝐴?̂?𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (1 − ?̂?𝑖)𝑅𝑓𝑡 − ?̂?𝑖(?̂?𝑚𝑡)    7.4 
The abnormal return over the event window is interpreted as a measure of the impact of 
the event on the value of the firm (or its equity). Hence, the assumption is that the event 
(an exogenous factor) gives rise to a change in the market value of the security. The 
abnormal return observations are aggregated in order to draw overall inferences for the 
event of interest (Campbell et al., 1997; Binder, 1998). Aggregation is conducted along 
two dimensions, through time and across securities, in order to provide the mean of the 
distribution of abnormal returns. Khotari and Warner (2006) argue that the cross-
sectional focus on the mean effect or variation (i.e. the first moment of the returns 
distribution) is appropriate for studying event-induced abnormal returns. The event 
window is usually an interval spanning more than one day, hence aggregation over the 
window is conducted over the entire event window to give a single measurement of the 
abnormal return across securities.  
This thesis follows the approach by Campbell et al. (2010) in the estimation of the 
market model. This thesis calculates individual bank stock returns from daily prices 
obtained from DataStream. The prices on the DataStream database are already adjusted 
for dividend and stock splits (Ince and Porter, 2006). The market indices and risk free 
rate employed are also downloaded from DataStream for the period under 
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consideration. DataStream provides information on the daily index prices and traded 
government securities. 
This is followed by a cross-sectional aggregation, the purpose of which is to aggregate 
the time-series aggregated returns. Average abnormal returns (AAR) are given as 
𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖𝑡 = (
1
𝑁
) ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏
𝜏
𝑖=1       7.5 
The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is a measure of the total abnormal returns 
during the event window and is estimated by summing all of the daily abnormal returns 
from the beginning of the event window. Assuming the event occurs at time 0, the event 
window is represented as 𝑇1 until a particular day 𝑇2 in the window, i.e. 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑇1, 𝑇2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1
(𝑡)     7.6 
The next stage involves aggregating the cumulative abnormal returns over the entire 
sample of events. This involves making the assumption that the abnormal returns are 
normally distributed and that there is no event window clustering (Karafiath, 2009). The 
average cumulative abnormal return (𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) is given as the arithmetic mean of all CARs. 
Thus,  
𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖(𝑇1𝑇2) =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑇1𝑇2) 
𝑁
𝑖=1     7.7a 
𝑉𝑎𝑅[𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖(𝑇1𝑇2)] = 𝜎
2(𝑇1𝑇2) =
1
𝑁2
∑ 𝜎𝑁𝑖=1 𝑖
2
(𝑇1𝑇2)  7.7b 
Equation 7.7b assumes that the event windows of the N securities do not overlap, in 
order to set the covariance terms to zero.   
The final step in the event study process involves the computation of a test statistic and 
then comparing it with the assumed distribution under the null hypothesis that mean 
abnormal returns equal zero. If the test statistic exceeds a critical value, in general at the 
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1% or 5% level, then the null hypothesis of no abnormal returns is rejected. Mackinlay 
(1997) provides several alternatives for test statistics that aggregate standardized 
abnormal returns.  Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) maintain that, empirically, short-
horizon event studies are typically not sensitive to the standardization or otherwise of 
abnormal returns, and thus it makes little difference to the empirical results. 
The simple t test statistic for the cumulative abnormal return based on average values is 
given as, 
𝑡𝑇1𝑇2 =
𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖(𝑇1𝑇2)
?̅?2(𝑇1𝑇2)
      7.8 
 Event study tests 7.3.2
One of the most popular parametric test statistics for testing the null hypothesis of zero 
abnormal returns is the Patell (1976) Z-statistic. Brown and Warner (1980, 1985), 
Mikkelson and Partch (1998), and Boehmer et al. (1991) all applied the Patell. The 
Patell statistic makes a strong assumption of independence of returns across security-
events, and that the event affects only mean returns. The test statistic ignores event-
induced variance in the event studies. Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) identify 
potential testing problems when an event-induced variance is present in an event study. 
In the presence of event-induced variance, the test statistic leads to rejection of the null 
hypothesis more frequently than it should. Boehmer et al. (1991) propose a variance-
change corrected version of the Patell test, the standardized cross-sectional test, which 
accounts for any event-induced increase in the variance of the returns. Campbell et al. 
(2010) argues that the use of the Boehmer et al. (1991) does not harm the performance 
of the test when there is no variance change.  
In order to implement the Boehmer et al. (1991) standardized cross-sectional test, it is 
important to incorporate the information from both the estimation and the event period. 
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The event-period abnormal returns are first standardized by the estimation-period 
standard deviation. This gives a test statistic in the form, 
𝑡𝐵𝑀𝑃 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑆𝑅𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
√
1
𝑁(𝑁−1)
∑ [𝑆𝑅𝑖−
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑆𝑅𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 ]
𝑁
𝑖=1
     7.9 
where SRi are the standardized abnormal returns of the ith stock, calculated by dividing 
the event-period abnormal returns on the ith stock on day t by the standard deviation of 
the estimation-period abnormal returns. For the estimators of the variance to be 
consistent, the abnormal returns must be uncorrelated in the cross-section. This 
requirement is fulfilled by not having clustering of event dates across the securities.  
7.4 Extensions of the traditional event study approach 
There have been several extensions to the traditional event study (apart from the 
extension of test statistic by Boehmer), with particular reference to the model’s structure 
and test statistics which now take account of the changing variance of the error term. 
Several studies account for temporal changes in the returns process during an event 
period by employing the GARCH approach (e.g. Corhay and Rad, 1994; Chu and 
Freud, 1996; Brockett et al., 1999; Reyes, 1999). Another strand of the literature 
employs a one-step approach to modelling abnormal returns by incorporating a dummy 
variable that captures security returns over the event window within the regression 
model (Binder, 1998; Karafiath, 2009; Tucker et al., 2012). 
 The dummy variable approach to event studies 7.4.1
The traditional event study approach has been extended to take account of issues such 
as the non-normality of daily stock returns as well as the intertemporal and 
contemporaneous correlation of abnormal returns over time and also along the cross-
section of assets. The traditional event study methodology follows a two-step approach 
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in which the normal return is first estimated from the data in the estimation period, and 
the abnormal return is then obtained as the difference between the actual returns over 
the event window and the normal return estimates. Salinger (1992) argues that the 
traditional two-step event study approach ignores both intertemporal and 
contemporaneous correlations of the residuals of the estimated model. The author’s 
approach makes the assumption that the estimated abnormal returns are intertemporally 
uncorrelated, enabling the individual variances to be summed when arriving at the 
variance of the cumulative abnormal returns. However, the estimated abnormal return is 
a forecast error rather than a true error because it is based on the estimated model 
parameters. Invariably, the same market model parameter estimates are employed in the 
calculation of all of the abnormal returns for a bank or set of banks, hence presenting a 
high probability of correlation between them. 
In order to account for any intertemporal or contemporaneous correlation of abnormal 
returns in the error terms during an event study, a model extension based on a 
multivariate regression approach including a dummy variable has been employed in a 
number of studies (Brown and Warner, 1985; Sefcik and Thomas, 1986; Binder, 1998; 
Karafiath 2009). The model proposed is the standard market model which has the 
following structure for obtaining abnormal returns: 
               𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑚𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                 7.10 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 are the actual returns on bank i at time t,  𝛼𝑖 is the intercept of the regression 
line, 𝛽𝑖 is the market beta coefficient for security i, 𝑅𝑚𝑡  is the market return at time t, 
and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is a zero mean independent error term in period t for security i. 
Estimating the equation specified in Equation 7.10, the abnormal returns are obtained as  
                  𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?𝑖(𝑅𝑚𝑡)                 7.11 
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The traditional procedure in an event study first involves computing abnormal returns, 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡, using an assumed model for normal returns and then, in the second stage, 
abnormal returns are averaged and/or cumulated and tested. Salinger (1992) shows that 
this approach leads to spurious results and suggests the use of a dummy variable 
approach.  
To illustrate Salinger’s event study approach, let N be the number of banks in a sample. 
The returns on bank i’s share where 𝑖 = (1, … , 𝑁) are 𝑅𝑖𝑡, 𝛾𝑖𝜏 is the abnormal return for 
the period τ (i.e. the event window of interest, from 𝑇1 to 𝑇2), and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is an error term. 
Further, a τ-day news event window is defined, where the potential impact on bank 
returns is captured. 𝐷𝑖,𝜏,𝑡 is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for period τ and 
zero otherwise. The idea of using a dummy variable is to pick up the unanticipated 
portion of the return, that is, the effects of the bank credit rating news announcement. A 
dummy variable is employed for each day within the event window (𝜏). As an 
illustration, if 𝜏 = 27, and assuming a 10-day period before the event date and 15 days 
after, then, 𝐷𝑖,1,𝑡 equals 1 ten days before the news announcement, 𝐷𝑖,11,𝑡 equals 1 on 
the first day of the bank credit rating related news announcement, and 𝐷𝑖,27,𝑡 equals 1 on 
the 15
th
 day of the post-event window, each equalling zero otherwise. Following this 
procedure, the estimated abnormal returns have the correct standard errors and are 
distinguished from the residuals. Consistent with previous studies (Hand et al., 1992; 
Goh and Ederington, 1999; Hull et al., 2004), the proposed extension typically employs 
a two-day event window, allowing for the averaging of the abnormal returns on the day 
of announcement and the following day (𝜏 = 11,12) to get a single value of event day 
abnormal returns. Using the above illustration, the total number of event ‘days’ is thus 
reduced to 26. 
The dummy variable (or regression) approach can thus be presented as, 
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𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑚𝑡) + ∑ 𝛾
𝑇2
𝜏=𝑇1 𝑖𝜏
𝐷𝑖,𝜏,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,    𝐷𝑖𝑡 {
1 𝑖𝑓 τ = 𝑇1 … 𝑇2
0     𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 7.12 
The primary advantage of the dummy variable approach is that it is a one-step 
procedure which estimates both the model and the abnormal returns in a single step. 
Further, both prediction errors and test statistics are conveniently obtained from any 
standard regression package. Salinger (1992) finds that the standard errors obtained 
from averaging individually estimated abnormal returns are incorrect. The dummy 
variable approach encompasses both the intertemporal correlation of individual 
estimated abnormal returns as well as the contemporaneous correlation of estimated 
cumulative abnormal returns. Employing the dummy variable approach thus produces 
estimates with correct standard errors. More importantly, the approach allows for 
correct estimates of the covariance between successive abnormal returns (Tucker et al., 
2012). Unlike the traditional event study approach, the dummy variable approach allows 
for the correct estimation of standard errors of average cumulative abnormal returns. 
The central hypothesis in this component of the thesis is that, on average, bank credit 
rating announcements have no abnormal impact on the behaviour of stock returns over a 
short term window. Assume that there are N banks within the sample, then, 𝜏 × 𝑁 
abnormal returns (𝛾𝑖𝜏, 𝑖 = 1, … 𝑁 ;  𝜏 = 1, … , 𝑡) are obtained. One dummy variable is 
used for each day and these are summed across the number of banks in the sample for 
each day. For the dummy variable model, the specified abnormal return, 𝛾𝑖𝜏, has a 
variance of ?̂?𝑖𝜏
2 . The estimations of the average abnormal returns, 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝜏, their variance, 
and the t-statistics for each event day, τ, are given respectively as,  
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝝉 = ?̅?𝜏 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝛾𝑖𝜏
𝑁
𝑖=1      7.13 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝐴𝐴𝑅𝝉) =
1
𝑁2
∑ ?̂?2𝑖𝜏
𝑁
𝑖=1      7.14 
252 
 
𝑡𝝉 =
𝐴𝐴𝑅𝜏
𝑆𝐷(𝐴𝐴𝑅𝜏)
       7.15 
The t-statistic test has the null hypothesis, 𝐻0 that on average bank credit rating 
announcements have no impacts on the behaviour of bank stock returns around the date 
of such announcements. The t-test assumes that abnormal returns are independent in 
cross-section. News announcements by credit rating agencies take place randomly and 
are rarely clustered. This assumption is therefore realistic and should not negatively 
impact on the inference drawn from the results.   
Consistent with the procedure in the traditional two-step event study approach, the 
dummy variable approach cumulates the abnormal returns over the event period in order 
to draw an overall inference on the impact of the news announcement on stock 
behaviour. Thus, on any given event day, cumulative abnormal returns before and after 
the announcement are obtained by accumulating the estimates of 𝛾𝑖𝜏. Let  ?̂?𝑖 =
(𝛾𝑖1, 𝛾𝑖2, … , 𝛾𝑖3) denote the vector of estimated abnormal returns. Further, let ?̂?𝑖 
represent the estimated variance-covariance matrix of these estimates.  
So, to test for the significance of the cumulative average abnormal returns in the pre- 
and post-event periods, the procedure involves defining a τ element vector 𝛿 having 
ones in the pre- or post-event window and zeros elsewhere. As an illustration, to 
evaluate cumulative returns in the 15-day post-event period, only the last 15 elements 
(i.e. the returns in the post event period) are set to one. Similarly, for the 10-day pre-
event period, only the first 10 elements of 𝛿 are set to one. 
For any specified window in an event i, Equations 7.16 and 7.17 represent the 
cumulative abnormal returns and the corresponding variance, respectively: 
𝐶?̂?𝑅𝑖(𝛿) = 𝛿
′?̂?𝑖      7.16 
?̂?𝑖
2(𝛿) = 𝛿′?̂?𝑖 𝛿      7.17 
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It is possible to test whether the cumulative abnormal return for the event is, on average, 
significant across all N bank credit rating news events. A simple t-statistic is constructed 
based on the average values,  
𝑡(𝛿) =
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝛿)
?̅?(𝛿)
      7.18 
where, 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝛿) =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐶?̂?𝑅𝑖(𝛿)
𝑁
𝑖=1      7.19 
𝜎2(𝛿) =
1
𝑁2
∑ ?̂?𝑖
2(𝛿)𝑁𝑖=1       7.20 
This further assumes that the standard t(𝛿) is well specified since the estimation window 
is large.  
 The GARCH (1, 1) specification for an event study 7.4.2
A key assumption of the traditional event study approach is that the abnormal returns 
estimators have an identical event effect on all of the sample firms. Further, event-
induced volatility is assumed to be insignificant (i.e. the variance of the error term is 
assumed to be constant). Bremer and Zhang (2007) argue that the event study approach, 
assuming constant event-induced abnormal returns and volatility over the event days, 
potentially inflates Type I error rates and has poor test power. The Boehmer et al. 
(1991) approach using the standardized cross-sectional test (Section 7.3.2) allows for 
non-constant variance across securities as well as for each security between the 
estimation and event windows. The Boehmer et al. approach however assumes that 
event-induced volatility is constant over the event window, and thus a change in 
volatility may result in the test statistics under- or overstating the true event effects. 
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An extension to the standardized cross-sectional approach to the short-horizon event 
study scales abnormal returns using conditional variance in one-stage estimation 
employs a GARCH(1,1) specification to account for heteroskedasticity in the residuals 
(De Jong et al., 1992; Kryzanowski and Zhang, 1993; Bacmann and Dubois, 2003; 
Bremer and Zhang, 2007). Hilliard and Savickas (2000) argue that following a 
GARCH(1,1) specification, the test statistics for the error terms in a market model have 
a higher explanatory power when compared with the traditional event study approach. 
Further, Corhay and Rad (1996) apply a market model which accounts for GARCH 
effects, leading to more efficient estimators.  
There are various tests to detect the non-linear structure of financial asset returns series 
(e.g. Ramsey’s RESET tests, the BDS test, after the initials of W. A. Brock, W. Dechert 
and J. Scheinkman) and these conclude that non-linear dependence in financial assets 
returns series can be best characterised by a GARCH-type process. Therefore, 
consistent with the De Jong et al. (1992), Kryzanowski and Zhang (1993) and Bacmann 
and Dubios (2003), the market model corrected for GARCH where residuals are 
conditionally heteroskedastic may be specified as 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑚𝑡) + ∑ 𝛾
𝑇2
𝜏=𝑇1 𝑖𝜏
𝐷𝑖,𝜏,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,     𝐷𝑖𝑡 {
1 𝑖𝑓 τ = 𝑇1 … 𝑇2
0     𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
           𝜀𝑖𝑡⎸𝜀𝑖𝑡−1, 𝜀𝑖𝑡−2, … ~𝑁(0, ℎ𝑖𝑡)      7.21 
           ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖0 + 𝑎𝑖1𝜀𝑖𝑡−1
2 + 𝑎𝑖2ℎ𝑖𝑡−1     
Where  the abnormal return 𝛾𝑖𝜏 is estimated for firm i on day τ. The event window is 
within the range τ = 𝑇1 … 𝑇2.  
The model in Equation 7.21 is a one-step approach that produces abnormal returns and 
their standard deviation in a single regression. In order to obtain the cumulative 
abnormal returns over the event window, the abnormal returns are cumulated over the 
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period (τ = 𝑇1 … 𝑇2) as Г𝑖. Brooks (2009) argues that conditional variance changes 
while the unconditional variance of the residual can be specified as  
               Var(𝑢𝑡) =
𝑎𝑖0
1−(𝑎𝑖1+𝑎𝑖2)
 , so long as 𝑎1 + 𝑎2 < 1   7.22 
To test the null hypothesis that the event has no impact on the behaviour of the mean 
returns at time τ, so that the average abnormal return is nil, one can specify the 
following, 
𝐻0,𝑡 : 
1
𝑁
∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1 = 0, and thus the cumulative effect of the event is aggregated through 
time at the firm level. Thus, the cross sectional hypothesis is specified as, 
𝐻0,𝑡 : 
1
𝑁
∑ Г𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 = 0.  
The test statistic is thus, 
𝑡𝑠 =
∑ 𝑆𝐶𝐴?̂?𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1
√𝑁?̂?𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑡
        7.23 
where  
 𝑆𝐶𝐴?̂?𝑖𝑡 =
?̂?𝑖𝑡
?̂?(?̂?𝑖𝑡)
  represents the standardized cumulative abnormal returns, and 
?̂?𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑡 is the standard deviation of 𝑆𝐶𝐴?̂?𝑖𝑡.  
Thus, under the null hypothesis of no abnormal returns, the 𝑡𝑠 statistic is distributed as a 
Student-t variable with 𝑁 − 1 degrees of freedom. The estimation of the parameters is 
obtained using the maximum likelihood technique. The log-likelihood function is 
formed and the values of the parameters that maximise it are estimated. 
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 The non-parametric approach for an event study  7.4.3
This thesis, in addition to employing parametric tests, reports non-parametric test results 
for measuring short-run abnormal returns following the announcement of bank credit 
rating related news. Many event studies employ parametric test statistics where                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
such tests rely on assumptions about the probability distribution of returns. Brown and 
Warner (1985) argue that an increase in event-induced variance exaggerates the 
reported price reaction in standard parametric tests. The advantage of reporting non-
parametric tests is that they do not require stringent assumptions about returns 
distributions, and returns variance is not an issue (Cowan, 1992). Some of the popular 
non-parametric tests include the sign test, the generalized sign test (which is a variation 
of the sign test), and the rank test (Corrado, 1989). The sign test presents the proportion 
of positive and negative abnormal returns against an assumed 50 percent split under the 
null hypothesis of no reaction to the event.  
Sanger and Peterson (1990) and Cowan (1992) employ a variant of the sign test referred 
to as the generalized sign test. This compares the proportion of positive abnormal 
returns around an event to the proportion from a period unaffected by the event. In so 
doing, the generalised sign test takes account of possible asymmetry in the returns 
distribution under the null hypothesis. Evidence suggests that the generalized sign test 
provides more power in terms of ability to detect abnormal returns than the parametric 
test based on standard errors from the cross-section of event date abnormal returns 
(Cowan 1992; Campbell et al., 2010; Kolari and Pynnonen, 2011). Cowan reports the 
generalized sign test to be well specified and powerful when applied to random samples 
of NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ stocks for the period 1972-1990.  
The null hypothesis of the generalized sign test is that the fraction of day-zero abnormal 
returns actually having a particular sign is equal to the fraction expected to have that 
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sign. In sum, the generalized sign test examines whether on average, the number of 
stocks with positive cumulative abnormal returns in the event window exceeds the 
number expected in the absence of abnormal returns. Cowan suggests that the number 
expected is based on the fraction of positive abnormal returns in, say, a 100 day 
estimation period and this can be represented as, 
?̂? =
1
𝑛
∑
1
100
𝑛
𝑖=1 ∑ 𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝐸100
𝑡=𝐸1
      7.24 
 
where, ?̂? is the observed fraction of the returns computed across stock in one particular 
event window and  𝑆𝑖𝑡 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 > 0
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  
     
The test statistic employs the normal approximation and the number of values of 
abnormal returns is a binomial distribution parameter, ?̂?. If the number of stocks in the 
event window (𝑇1 + 1, 𝑇2) for which the cumulative abnormal return 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗,(𝑇1+1,𝑇2) is 
positive is given as w, then the generalized sign test statistic is 
𝑍𝐺 =
𝑤−𝑛𝑝
[𝑛𝑝(1−𝑝)]
1
2
      7.25 
Campbell et al. (2010) describe this as the upper-tail alternative hypothesis (i.e. for 
positive cumulative abnormal returns). For a lower-tailed alternative hypothesis, the 
positive cumulative abnormal return is replaced by a negative return in the definitions of 
𝑆𝑖𝑡 and w. 
Similarly, Corrado (1989) proposes another non-parametric test, the rank test, which, as 
in the case of the generalized sign test, does not require symmetry in the cross-sectional 
abnormal returns distribution. The rank test transforms each security’s time series of 
abnormal returns into their respective ranks, (𝑘𝑖), over the combined period that 
includes the estimation and the event window (T0, T2). This is contrary to the 
generalized sign test which is based on the frequency of positive and negative returns. 
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The Corrado rank test provides statistics for a one-day event window (i.e. day zero). 
The rank statistic for day zero is given as, 
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘 = [(
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑘𝑖0
𝑁
𝑖=1 ) − ?̅?] 𝑠𝑘⁄      7.26 
where  𝑘𝑖0 is the rank of security-event i’s day zero abnormal return in security-event i’s 
combined M-day estimation period and τ-day event period time series, ?̅? is the expected 
rank, and 𝑠𝑘 is the time-series standard deviation of the sample mean abnormal return 
ranks. Corrado assumes that expected rank is constant across securities. The expected 
rank (?̅?) is defined as the empirical mean of the rank of the time-series,  
?̅? =
1
𝑇
∑
1
𝑁𝑡
∑ 𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝑁𝑡
𝑖=1
𝑇
𝑖=1        7.27 
where  𝑁𝑡 is the number of returns on day t and T is the total number of days in the 
time-series (M + τ). The standard deviation, 𝑠𝑘, for the portfolio of banks in the sample 
is then given as, 
𝑠𝑘 = {
1
𝑇
∑ [(
1
𝑁𝑡
∑ 𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝑁𝑡
𝑖=1 ) − ?̅?]
2
𝑇
𝑖=1 }
1
2⁄
    7.28 
The test compares the ranks in the event period for each firm, with the expected average 
rank under the null hypothesis of no abnormal returns. Cowan (1992) and Campbell et 
al. (2010) apply the rank test to a multi-day window CAAR by substituting security-
event i’s mean rank across the event windows (τ), in place of 𝑘𝑖0, and dividing 𝑠𝑘 by the 
square root of τ. Corrado (1989) shows the rank tests to be well specified and powerful 
for NYSE stocks. Similarly, Campbell and Wasley (1993) provide evidence to support 
this for the NASDAQ stocks, even when stock is infrequently traded. 
Overall, following the steps in the existing methodological literature (e.g. Campbell et 
al., 2010), this chapter employs the generalized sign test as well as the Corrado rank test 
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in forming an opinion on whether on average there are no significant abnormal returns 
around the date of a bank credit rating announcement. This is in addition to the choice 
of the three parametric tests, the Boehmer et al. (1991) test, the dummy variable 
approach, as well as the GARCH (1, 1) specification. By reporting the results of both 
parametric and nonparametric test results, this thesis adds to the understanding of the 
impact of employing different tests in an event study.   
 The choice of methodological approach in this thesis 7.4.4
This thesis follows the approach suggested in the existing literature, presenting an 
alternative to the returns (traditional event study) approach (e.g. Thompson, 1985; 
Salinger, 1992; Kramer, 2001; Karafiath, 2009). The methodological approach in this 
chapter employs three parametric and two non-parametric approaches to event studies. 
The methodological approaches used in this component of the thesis are presented in 
Figure 7.2. The parametric approach includes the Boehmer et al. (1991) standardized 
cross sectional approach, an extension of the traditional event study approach 
employing the dummy variable approach with a GARCH(1,1) specification to capture 
the unconditional variance of the error terms, and finally a dummy variable approach 
without accounting for heteroskedasticity. The choice of model for benchmarking 
returns is the market model to ensure comparability across the specifications and this is 
consistent with several existing studies (e.g. Boehmer et al., 1991; De Jong et al., 1992; 
Richard and Deddouche, 1999; Karafiath, 2007). The non-parametric approach includes 
the generalized sign test and the Corrado rank test. This chapter focuses on a number of 
different bank rating actions (e.g. upgrades, downgrades). First, the news events are 
split into good (upgrades) and bad (downgrade) news announcements.  
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The asymmetry between changes in ratings within investment and noninvestment 
grades is considered by further splitting the sample into investment and noninvestment 
grade bank stocks for announcement purposes. Lastly, the impact of news 
announcements relating to reviews and outlooks is considered, particularly in relation to 
whether or not they trigger any significant reactions prior to an actual rating change. 
7.5 Data 
This empirical component of the thesis employs bank credit rating data, bank stock 
prices and market indices. The bank credit rating data consists of actual rating changes, 
that is, upgrades and downgrades, as well as information on bank credit rating outlooks 
and Watchlist signals. The latter provides indications of potential upgrades or 
downgrades or confirmation of the ratings following outlook or Watchlist signals. By 
employing these different types of bank credit news announcements, the bank credit 
rating signalling effects are better captured. Thus, the sources of the market reactions to 
bank credit rating announcements are disentangled between the actual ratings and the 
signalling announcement (i.e. outlooks and Watchlist). Negative outlook signals contain 
changes to a negative outlook from a stable/positive outlook, and changes to a stable 
outlook from a positive outlook. Conversely, positive outlook signals contain changes to 
a positive outlook from a stable/negative outlook, and changes to a stable outlook from 
a negative outlook. Negative (positive) watch signals include placing bank i on watch 
for a possible downgrade (upgrade), and the action of confirming the rating of 
bank i after being on watch for a possible upgrade (downgrade). 
Thus, bank credit rating outlooks and Watchlists provide indicators of the likely 
direction and timing of future rating changes (Hamilton & Cantor, 2004). The CRAs 
have been criticised for their apparent slow reactions in changing ratings. However, it is 
a useful approach for the CRAs to rate “through the cycle”, considering the sound 
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reasons for stability in ratings (Altman and Rijken, 2006, Löffler, 2004 and Löffler, 
2005). In view of this, the Watchlists and outlook signals provide a good outlet for the  
CRAs to reveal more private information. Bannier and Hirsch (2010) analyse the 
economic function of the Watchlist, and find that CRAs employ watch signals to 
improve the delivery of information. Existing studies around the signalling effects of 
credit ratings suggest that outlook and Watchlist signals have a significant market 
impact. Hand et al. (1992), Hull et al. (2004), Hill and Faff (2010) argue that credit 
rating outlook and Watchlist events are timelier and more informative than rating 
changes.  
Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2012) argue that rating outlooks and Watchlist signals are 
“designed to signal when risks are imbalanced but a rating change is not certain” (p.46). 
Evidence suggests that actual rating changes usually follow a non-stable outlook or a 
creditwatch placements, however a strong or weak rating outlook/watch does not 
necessarily mean that a rating change will not occur (Hamilton and Cantor, 2004; Klaar 
and Riley, 2005; Vazza et al., 2005). The information content within these indicator 
type ratings thus provides a useful insight into the construction of the samples in this 
thesis. 
The data available, particularly those on bank credit rating signalling helps in the 
construction of the un/anticipated specification within the framework of an event study 
approach. Markets may anticipate, and not react directly after rating changes because 
outlooks/placement on a Watchlist may reveal more significant and new information 
about a bank’s creditworthiness. This thesis employs the daily historical share price of 
the bank stocks in the sample from which the lognormal returns are estimated by the 
market model. Following Mackinlay (1997), a total of a 252-day estimation window is 
employed. The market indices corresponding to the sample period are obtained for each 
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of the sample countries, from which market index returns are obtained. To estimate the 
market model, the returns of the stock are regressed against the market.  
 Treatment of contaminants 7.5.1
One of the important reasons for conducting a short-run event study test is to reduce the 
contamination of the event window from other firm or market related news 
announcements. Following Hand et al. (1991) and Richard and Deddouche (1999), this 
study identifies bank credit ratings that are preceded by anticipated rating actions in the 
form of rating outlook and placement on a Watchlist. These ‘contaminating’ events are 
employed in some of the model specifications within this chapter and help to add to the 
understanding of the market reactions to rating related news events. 
However, this thesis adopts a step-wise approach to eliminate credit rating news events 
contaminated with other non-bank credit rating related specific news events. For each 
bank credit rating upgrade and downgrade event day, the study manually checks the 
global market database using the Reuters news portal, Financial Times, and the Wall 
Street Journal, as well as country specific financial news portals for both firm and 
market related news events that could contaminate the event window. The search period 
for each of the bank credit rating news events is a 2-day period before and after the bank 
credit rating news event. Bank specific news events such as earnings and dividend 
announcements, M&A, litigations as well as general market news announcements such 
as regulatory changes are taken into account. If such an announcement occurs within the 
specified event window, such bank credit rating events are removed from the sample. 
7.6 Results  
This section presents the results of the second empirical component of this thesis which 
relates to testing the hypothesis that, on average, bank credit rating announcements have 
no impact on the behaviour of bank stock returns. It details the results of different 
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model specifications for capturing abnormal returns around the date of news 
announcements related to bank credit rating.  
This thesis employs models based on parametric and non-parametric approaches. The 
models employ a 27-day event window, which assumes a 10-day period before the 
event date and 15 days after. Further, a two-day event day is employed, which allows 
for the averaging of the abnormal returns on the day of announcement and the following 
day to get a single value of event day abnormal returns. This is consistent with existing 
methodological approaches to event studies. For each of the specifications, the thesis 
investigates the significance of the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) over 
the trading days -10 to +15.  
Thus, the thesis examines the effects of credit rating news announcements across 
several event windows for each specification within the parametric and non-parametric 
approach. Hence, the results present a test of significance for CAARs over these 
windows. The CAARs is quite important in addition to the statistical analysis of the 
daily average abnormal returns because it provides an idea of the aggregate effect of the 
abnormal returns over a particular event window. Thus, for this thesis results for 
CAARs for different event windows including a two-day event day, 11-day and 25-day 
windows centred on day zero are presented. In addition, the CAARs for the pre- and 
post-event day windows are examined. 
The first part of this section examines the results of positive bank credit rating change, 
that is, upgrades. In addition, for these upgrades, the results of subsamples within 
investment and noninvestment grade categories are presented. Further, results of 
unanticipated upgrades, which take into consideration upgrades not preceded by outlook 
or placement announcements, are discussed. The news event tests within each 
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specification employ both the parametric and non-parametric approaches in order to 
show robustness in the modelling of abnormal returns. 
 Results for bank rating upgrade announcements on bank stock returns 7.6.1
This section commences with three bank credit rating news event tests I–III, based on 
specifications employing the Boehmer et al. (1991), GARCH (1, 1) and the dummy 
variable approach, respectively. This initial set of news event tests are for all bank credit 
rating upgrades, irrespective of the news announcements being preceded by anticipated 
news in the form of outlook information or placement on a CreditWatch list (reviews). 
The section examines the results of the event study tests by gauging the reaction of bank 
stocks around the day of announcement of bank credit rating upgrades, that is, the event 
day reaction. This is followed by a study of the pre-event and post-event returns trends. 
The three news event tests (I–III) presented in this section are estimated using a 27-day 
event window covering the pre- and post-announcement dates (10 days before the event 
day and 15 days after). The estimation window employed is a 252-day period consistent 
with the suggestion of Mackinlay (1997). 
Table 7.3 presents the results of Models I–III. Panel A shows the average abnormal 
returns and the cumulative average abnormal returns over the 27-day event window 
period as well as the tests of significance of each day, while Panel B shows the results 
of cumulative average abnormal returns across a range of pre-defined event windows. In 
addition, Panel B presents tests of statistical significance for the CAARs across the two 
broad approaches (parametric and non-parametric). The news event test I (Boehmer et 
al.) shows that there is a positive bank stock return of 0.54% significant at the 10% 
level on day t-6. This is an indication of news leakage. Further, the test shows a positive 
return reaction to the upgrade announcement (0.38%) significant at the 10% level on the 
event day.  
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Table 7.3: Results showing bank stock return reactions to upgrade news announcement 
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The abnormal return on the event day is much lower than that of the day t-6, and this 
could suggest that the news leakage in the pre-event day period impacted on the 
magnitude of bank stock return on the news announcement day. The magnitude of the 
significant abnormal return on the event day is more than twice that of day t-1. The 
market partly corrected itself on day t+2 with a magnitude of the negative abnormal 
return of 0.16% which is lower than that of the event day abnormal return. This is 
significant at the 10% level. A further positive abnormal return of 0.10% was observed 
on day t+6 significant at the at the 10% level. The magnitude of the significant 
abnormal return following the news announcement (0.26%) partly offset the positive 
event day bank stock returns of 0.38%.  
The results are rather different for news event tests II (GARCH specification) and III 
(dummy variable specification). These latter models present no event day reaction. In 
addition, in the news event test II, there is evidence of news leakage with the day t-5 
showing positive abnormal bank stock return of 0.39% significant at the 10% level. The 
resulting effect of this new leakage is that there is no event day reaction. The test III 
shows information leakage. There is a positive abnormal return of 1.24% significant at 
the 10% level on day t-1. The result shows a day t+7 negative abnormal return of 0.14% 
significant at the 10% level. This suggests market correction to the positive trends in the 
returns series for the event window period preceding day t+7. The estimations for news 
event tests I to III, employing different empirical model specifications show a differing 
magnitude of market reaction to bank credit rating upgrades. There is a mixed literature 
on the market reaction to positive news (in this case a bank credit rating upgrade).  
Panel B shows the results of the CAARs across the three parametric and two non-
parametric approaches. These test the level of significance for a number of days over 
which the abnormal returns are cumulated. In terms of the CAAR over the two-day 
event-day (0, 0), only Model I shows positive abnormal returns of 0.38% significant at 
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the 10% level. The result observed for the partial market correction in Model I is 
consistent with the CAAR over the period (+1, +15) which shows a negative abnormal 
return of -0.46% significant at the 10% level. The CAAR (+1, +15) is higher than the 
event-day abnormal returns for the Boehmer et al., 1991 specification in Model I. This 
suggests that the market fully corrected for the abnormal returns observed on the event-
day over the post event day window. The only other event window specification that 
produced a significant CAAR is the Model I specification (-5, +5) with a positive 
CAAR of 0.79% significant at the 10% level. This suggests that for upgrade 
announcements, there is a significant bank stock return reaction over a relatively short 
event window spanning both sides of the news event day. This result is consistent with 
the observed news leakage and subsequent positive significant event day abnormal 
return.  
The non-parametric approach presents another alternative to examining the effects of 
bank credit rating announcements on bank stock returns. For the purposes of this thesis, 
the results of the CAARs for the Corrado Rank and the Generalized Sign Test are 
discussed. Panel B shows similar results for the CAARs in the pre- and post-event day 
periods for both the non-parametric approaches. The Corrado Rank approach shows a 
positive CAAR of 2.31% significant at the 5% level over the event window (-10, -1), 
and a negative CAAR of -1.34% significant at the 10% level over the event window 
(+1, +15). These results capture the leakage of the good news and suggest the good 
news trickle effect and its consequence on the event day abnormal return not being 
significant under this specification. The results present evidence of a weak and partial 
market correction in the event window (+1, +15).   
The results from the different specifications and approaches are mixed in their inference 
regarding market efficiency. There is a strong suggestion from the Boehmer et al. 
(1991) test specification, as well as the two nonparametric approaches of the market 
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anticipating the upgrade announcements for banks. This is particularly evident in the 
non-parametric approach where the CAARs in the pre-and post-event day windows are 
significant. Model I shows significant event day abnormal returns, but there is no 
evidence of information leakage as the CAAR (-10, -1) are not significant. This is 
however contrary to the day t-6 significant abnormal returns of 0.54% at the 10% level. 
There is however evidence of partial market corrections. Models II and III, show no 
significant CAARs over the pre-defined event windows. The results are consistent with 
the semi-strong form market efficiency. 
Chan (2001) argues that most of the results of stock returns after specific news items 
seem to fall on the side of underreaction, which he defines as average post-event 
abnormal returns of the same sign as event date returns (abnormal or raw). However, 
Fama (1998) presents a contrary position, arguing that investors do not show abnormal 
reactions to events. He suggests that the observed patterns present no consensus on 
investor reactions, and some disappear entirely after accounting for size and book-to-
market effects. Several studies that test market reactions to credit rating upgrades (Hand 
et al. 1992; Nayar and Rozeff, 1994; Followill and Martel, 1997; Steiner and Heinke, 
2001, Arezki et al., 2011; Kanli and Barlas, 2012) find that upgrade announcements 
generate no significant market reaction on the news announcement day. One can thus 
argue that the findings are consistent with the literature on rating effects that upgrades 
do not constitute positive news to stock markets, probably because the market already 
reflects most the information contained in the information.   
Björklund and Sharafuddin (2013) study the impact of credit ratings by Moody’s on the 
Swedish market and find that the Swedish stock market is susceptible to Moody’s 
negative credit ratings but is largely unaffected by the positive credit ratings. Models II 
and III are consistent with these findings in terms of the event day reaction, however 
Model I gives weak evidence of positive abnormal returns on event day and subsequent 
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partial correction. The weak evidence in Model I could be linked to the certification role 
of credit ratings, consistent with the findings by Elayan et al. (2003).  
Figure 7.3 shows bank stock cumulative abnormal returns for upgrades over the event 
window (-10, +15). The graph shows a positive (upward) movement in the cumulative 
returns for the three models in the pre-event day period. Despite being insignificant over 
most of the event window, Model III shows the highest CAAR around the event day. 
There are consistent partial market corrections as evidenced by the downward trends 
across the three models. Further, the graph shows that over the event period t+6 to 
t+15, the bank stock returns became less volatile as the event information is now 
reflected in stock prices. This is consistent with Tucker et al. (2012) who find that 
significant post-event reactions are all over-reactions followed by reversal corrections, 
with the large part of the reversal typically taking place within the first five days. This is 
similar to the findings of Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmayam (1998) who investigate 
investor psychology and security market under- and overreaction behaviours. 
Figure 7.3: Bank stock cumulative abnormal returns for upgrades 
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 Results for upgrade announcements for investment-grade bank stocks 7.6.2
This section presents results for bank stock reactions to bank credit upgrade 
announcements within the investment-grade category. It builds on the specifications in 
Section 7.4.1 by examining bank stock reactions to positive bank credit rating news 
announcements (upgrades) for this subsample of banks. By discriminating between 
bank rating categories (investment- vs noninvestment-grades), this thesis intends to add 
more to the understanding of market reaction to bank credit rating announcements. 
The estimations of the abnormal returns for the event windows are presented in the 
news event tests IV–VI. These models follow the Boehmer et al. (1991), GARCH (1, 1) 
and the dummy variable approach, respectively. Similar to the approach for Models I–
III, the estimations in this section make the implicit assumption that market participants 
are rational investors and that credit rating news announcements are made available to 
the public at the same time.  
Table 7.4 presents the results for Models IV to VI. Panel A presents the average 
abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns over the 27-day event window 
period covering the pre- and post- announcement dates. Panel B shows the results of 
cumulative abnormal returns across a range of pre-defined event windows. Tests of 
statistical significance for the CAARs employing both the parametric and non-
parametric approach are presented in Panel B. 
The results for the parametric approach show significant positive abnormal returns on 
the day of the event announcement. Further, the CAARs for the pre- and post- event day 
windows are significant across the three news event test specifications (IV–VI). This is 
contrary to the results in Models II and III where the CAARs are insignificant. The 
magnitudes of the abnormal returns for the event windows are significantly larger than 
those in the specifications employed for Models I to III. The news event test IV shows 
272 
 
no evidence of new leakages contrary to test I. Further, the results show event day 
positive abnormal returns of 0.52% significant at the 10% level. The magnitude of the 
event day abnormal returns for this subsample is greater than that of the entire sample. 
The higher magnitude in the event day abnormal returns may be linked with the non-
leakage of information in the pre-event period in Model IV. Similar to the results in 
Model I, there is evidence of market correction on day t+6. The market correction is 
partial, with a negative abnormal return of 0.33% significant at the 5% level. Similarly, 
the estimations for the abnormal returns for Models V and VI show results consistent 
with Model IV, except for Model VI where there is a weak evidence of news leakage in 
the pre-event day period.  
The news event test V shows event day positive abnormal returns of 0.47% significant 
at the 10% level. This is contrary to the corresponding result in Model II, where no 
significant bank stock return is observed. In addition, and consistent with the results 
obtained for Model IV, there is evidence of market correction on day t+6. The 
correction is partial and shows a negative abnormal return of 0.36% significant at the 
10% level. The estimation of the last parametric specification in Model VI shows 
evidence of news leakage on day t-2.   
There is a day t-2 positive abnormal return of 0.42% significant at the 10% level. It is 
interesting to note that despite this news leakage, the magnitude of event day abnormal 
returns is higher than in the other specifications. The news event test VI shows a 
positive abnormal return of 0.78% significant at the 5% level. The higher magnitude 
and level of significance observed for this specification (VI) may be as a result of the 
power of the test approach (a one-step approach) in capturing abnormal bank stock 
returns around news announcement date.  
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Table 7.4: Results showing bank stock returns reaction to upgrade news announcement within the investment-grade category 
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Consistent with the other parametric specifications, there is evidence of partial market 
correction. The day t+7 show a negative abnormal return of 0.66% significant at the 
10% level. An examination of Panel B shows results that differ from those obtained for 
entire (bank upgrade) sample estimates in Table 7.3. The CAARs for Model IV in the 
event window (-10, -1) and (+1, +15) show significant aggregate effects of bank rating 
upgrade news on bank stock returns. The aggregate effect of upgrade announcements 
for investment-grade bank stocks over the pre-event day window (-10, -1) shows 
positive abnormal returns of 1.55% significant at the 10% levels. There is evidence of 
partial market correction over the post-event day period (+1, +15) with a negative 
abnormal return of 0.94% significant at the 5% level. This result is slightly different 
from the corresponding estimate in Panel B in Table 7.3 which shows an insignificant 
CAAR over the pre-event day period. The significant positive CAAR in the (-10, -1) 
window suggest information leakages or anticipation by the market. However, this 
leakage is not captured in news event test IV in Panel A. Despite this, the significant 
abnormal returns observed on the event-day point towards the value-added effects of 
bank upgrade information within the investment-rating category.  
Contrary to the results in Panel B in Table 7.3 for the news event test Models II and III, 
Models V and VI show significant CAARs in the post-event day period. The news event 
test Model V shows a negative CAAR of 1.16% significant at the 10% level in the 
window (+1, +15). Consistent with the earlier results in the full sample (upgrades), there 
are no significant CAARs in the pre-event day period. For Model VI, there is a positive 
CAAR of 1.19% significant at the 10% level in the window (-10, -1) and evidence of 
full market correction in the post-event day window (+1, +15). The magnitude of the 
negative CAAR in the window (+1, +15) is 1.68%, significant at the 10% level. This is 
contrary to the corresponding results for the entire sample where there is no evidence of 
significance CAARs over the various pre-specified windows.  
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In terms of the results for the non-parametric approach, the estimates for the Corrado 
rank and generalized sign test both show similar results to the specifications in Figure 
7.3. However, for both approaches, the event-day CAARs are positive (1.09% and 
1.23% respectively) and significant at the 10% level. The Corrado rank test shows a 
positive CAAR of 2.42% significant at the 10% level for the window (-10, -1). The 
post-event day (+1, +15) estimation shows a negative CAAR of 1.65% significant at the 
10% level, and suggests partial market correction. For the generalized sign test, the 
result shows a pre-event day positive CAAR of 2.51% significant at the 10% level and 
post-event day negative CAAR of 1.26% significant at the 10% level. This gives an 
indication of partial market correction of the pre-event day CAAR and positive 
significant event day abnormal return.   
Overall, the results of bank stock return reactions to upgrade announcement news within 
the investment category show higher magnitudes in terms of the observed abnormal 
returns. Similarly, there are significant abnormal returns across both the parametric and 
non-parametric approaches for the event-day. The results also suggest market 
corrections in the post-event-day window (+1, +15) under the various specifications. 
This specification is an important addition within this thesis and allows for a better 
understanding of the market dynamics pertaining to bank credit rating upgrades.  Hence, 
despite the general argument in the existing literature that upgrades are seldom 
associated with significant market reactions around the announcement date, the results 
within these section are to the contrary. However, within an emerging economy study 
by Larrain, Reisen and von Matzlan (1997), the authors find that rating actions have a 
significant impact, even to a degree of market overshooting on investment grades. The 
strong drive for market reaction to investment grade bank rating upgrades could be 
associated with the certification role within an investment grade setting (Kiff et al., 
2012). 
276 
 
Figure 7.4 shows the bank stock cumulative abnormal returns for upgrades within the 
investment-grade category over the event window (-10, +15). The graph shows a 
positive (upward) movement in the cumulative returns for the three models in the pre-
event day period. Similar to the results for Model III, Model VI shows the highest 
CAAR around the event day. In addition, the graph shows that bank stock returns 
becomes less volatile after day t+6, which is the period after the market correction. The 
cumulative abnormal return for the Model VI is significantly higher than those of 
Models IV and V. This is consistent with the results in Table 7.4. The figure shows that 
between days t+6 and t+15, the prices of the bank stock have incorporated the 
information contained in the bank upgrade news announcement, hence the observed 
reduced volatility.  
Figure 7.4: Bank stock cumulative abnormal returns for upgrades within the 
investment category 
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 Results   for  upgrade announcements for  noninvestment-grade bank 7.6.3
stocks 
This section presents results for bank stock reactions to credit rating upgrade 
announcements for the noninvestment-grade category. The results presented in this 
section build on those in Sections 7.5.1 and 7.5.2 by examining the effects of upgrade 
announcements on bank stock returns for another subsample, the noninvestment grade 
bank stocks. The results obtained in this section present a good basis for comparison 
with those on Sections 7.5.1 and 7.5.2. The noninvestment grade category contains bank 
that are vulnerable to adverse business, financial and economic conditions. The 
estimations of the abnormal returns for the event windows for the banks within this 
category are presented in news event test Models VII–IX. These models follow the 
Boehmer et al. (1991), GARCH (1, 1) and the dummy variable approach, respectively. 
The results are presented in Table 7.5. The results for this subsample contrast those in 
earlier sections. The event-day abnormal returns for the three parametric approaches 
models are insignificant.  
The insignificant abnormal returns observed in Table 7.5 may be due to the net impact 
of the sum moderate effect (the full sample) less the subsample strong effect 
(investment grade subsample), leaving on average the remaining subsample weak effect 
in Table 7.5. This suggests that news announcements relating to the upgrades of 
noninvestment-grade banks do not convey any significant information to the market. 
The results are consistent with the estimation of CAARs for both the parametric and 
non-parametric approach. This is an indication that there is less information asymmetry 
in the way market reacts to credit ratings news for banks within the non-investment 
grade compared to the investment grades. More importantly, it may suggest that 
investment analysts do not follow these low-rated banks and therefore there are no 
reactions.  
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Table 7.5: Results showing bank stock returns reaction to upgrade news announcement within the noninvestment-grade category 
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Overall, the results in Sections 7.5.2 and 7.5.3 show that there is an asymmetry in bank 
stock return reaction to rating upgrade announcement for banks within the investment 
and noninvestment grades. On the one hand, bank stocks react to upgrade news 
announcements for investment grade banks, particularly on news event day, however, 
there is no observed significant abnormal for bank stock returns for the noninvestment 
grade banks.  
 Results for news announcements where there are unanticipated upgrades 7.6.4
This section presents results for bank stock price reactions to unanticipated bank credit 
upgrade announcements. The section is motivated by the argument that the stock price 
reaction to credit rating announcements is influenced by the market’s anticipation or 
otherwise of the news. Hsueh and Liu (1992) find that the magnitude of abnormal 
returns is more pronounced when there is no anticipation by the market, that is, when 
the rating change is a surprise. The failure to control for anticipated credit rating news 
announcements may indeed have significant effects on the estimation and may bias the 
test results.  
A model that takes into consideration the expectation of the market about possible credit 
rating changes could be a more powerful test of the effects of rating change 
announcements. By investigating a subset of the sample, conditioned on anticipated 
news in the form of outlook announcements or placements on Watchlist, this thesis 
intends to add more to the understanding of market reaction to bank credit rating 
announcements.  
Here, the assumption is made that upgrades preceded by a positive outlook, as well as 
placement on the Watchlist, are more anticipated in the market than those preceded by 
no such announcements. The estimation of the abnormal returns for the event windows 
is presented in news event test Models X–XII. 
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Table 7.6: Results showing bank stock returns reaction to unanticipated credit rating upgrade news announcement 
281 
 
These models follow the Boehmer et al. (1991), GARCH (1, 1) and the dummy variable 
approach, respectively. The results of the estimations are presented in Table 7.6. Panel 
A shows the abnormal returns over the 27-day event window, while Panel B presents 
the results of the CAARs over various event windows.   
The results of the bank stock return reactions to unanticipated credit rating news 
announcements are consistent across the three models. The results of the news event test 
Models X–XII show significant positive reactions on the announcement day. For Model 
X, there is a positive average abnormal return on the event-day of 0.74%. This is 
significant at the 5% level. The event-day abnormal return is higher than that observed 
in the corresponding full sample (upgrades) in Model I (0.38%). Contrary to the results 
in Model I, there is no evidence of news leakage in the pre-event window. Further, there 
is a market correction over a two day period, that is, negative average abnormal returns 
of 0.58% and 0.32% on days t+5 and t+6 respectively. The Model X shows a full 
market correction following the unanticipated bank rating upgrade news event, however 
only a partial market correction is observed for the Model I specification.  
Similarly, Models XI and XII show positive average abnormal returns of 0.82% and 
0.88% significant at the 5% level respectively, on the event day. Consistent with the 
result in Model X, there is no evidence of news leakage and there is full market 
correction to the observed event-day abnormal reaction. In terms of the CAARs over the 
pre-defined windows, there is significant stock reaction to unanticipated news credit 
rating news announcements in bank stocks.  
In the post event-day window (+1, +15), there is a negative CAAR of 0.62% which is 
significant at the 5% level for the Boehmer et al. model specification. Similarly, the 
CAARs for the GARCH and dummy variable approaches are negative at 0.55% and 
0.72%, both of which are significant at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. The results 
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of the CAARs in Panel B of Table 7.6 differ from those of the full sample in Table 7.3. 
Panel B in Table 7.3 shows no significant abnormal returns over the post-event day 
window (+1, +15) except for the Boehmer et al. specification. The results of the non-
parametric approach are presented in Panel B of Table 7.6. There are positive and 
significant CAARs on the event-day for both the Corrado rank and the generalised sign 
test. The Corrado rank test shows a positive and significant CAAR of 1.4% at the 5% 
level. Similarly, the CAAR for the generalised rank test is a positive 1.03% and this is 
significant at the 5% level. Both of the non-parametric approaches show evidence of 
market correction in the event window (+1, +15). There are CAARs of -0.65% and -
0.77% both significant at the 5% level for the Corrado rank and generalised sign test 
approach, respectively, in the post-event window.  
The results in Table 7.6 suggest that the magnitude and significance of abnormal returns 
is influenced by the level of un/anticipated news event. This implies that when there is 
no anticipation of news events, the tendency for news leakage is reduced and this 
potentially affects the magnitude of bank stock return reaction on the day of the news 
event. When compared with the results in the full sample (upgrades), estimates for the 
news event test conditioned on news anticipation are consistent across all the parametric 
approaches and there is full market correction in the post-event day period. Overall, the 
results within this section are consistent with the existing literature (e.g. Brooks, Patel 
and Su, 1998). By focusing on unanticipated events, this thesis provides new and unique 
evidence on how financial markets process information relating to rating 
announcements.   
Figure 7.5 shows the bank stock cumulative abnormal returns for unanticipated 
upgrades for the whole sample over the event window (-10, +15). The graph shows a 
positive (upward) movement in the cumulative returns for the three models in the pre-
event day period. This upward movement continued for a couple of days following the 
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news event announcement. The market fully corrected for the unanticipated news 
between days t+5 and t+8, and this is depicted by the sharp downward movement in 
bank stock returns around this period In addition, the graph shows that bank stock 
returns becomes less volatile after day t+8, which is the period after the full market 
correction.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Results for bank stock return reactions to upgrade news announcements on 7.6.5
bank rating reclassifications 
This section shows the results of bank stock returns reaction when there is an upgrade 
from noninvestment to an investment grade, that is, from BB+ to BBB- (Table 7.7). The 
motivation for investigating this category of rating upgrade is that, theoretically, 
movement across this noninvestment/investment grade threshold may trigger a response 
from institutional investors who may typically have mandates to invest only in 
investment grade bank stocks. Many institutional investors (e.g. pension funds, brokers, 
investment advisors) may be mandated to purchase assets in certain categories (e.g. 
investment grades), and this prohibits or restricts their portfolio. 
Figure 7.5: Bank stock cumulative abnormal returns for unanticipated upgrades 
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Hence, one may expect such reclassification (from noninvestment to investment grade 
or vice versa) to trigger greater abnormal returns around the corresponding news 
announcement date. The thesis allows for a test of whether there is a significantly larger 
stock price response when a bank is upgraded from noninvestment to investment grade, 
compared to upgrades that do not result in such reclassification.   
The estimations of the abnormal returns for the event windows are presented in Models 
XIII–XV. These models follow the Boehmer et al. (1991), GARCH (1, 1) and the 
dummy variable approaches, respectively. Panel A in Table 7.7 shows the abnormal 
returns over the 27-day event window, while Panel B presents the results of the CAARs 
over various event windows for both the parametric and non-parametric approaches. 
The results are mixed for this specification across the three parametric approaches 
employed. Only Model XIII shows significant abnormal returns on the event day. There 
is a positive abnormal return for day t=0 of 0.36% significant at the 10% level. In 
addition, there is evidence of market correction in the post-event period.  
The results show t+2 and t+6 negative abnormal returns of 0.22% and 0.06%, both 
significant at the 10% level. Model XIV shows evidence of news leakage. However, 
there are no significant abnormal returns when the returns are aggregated in the CAAR 
for the pre-event period. There are significant CAARs for the nonparametric approach 
over the pre- and post-event periods, though no significant returns are observed on the 
event day. The Corrado rank approach shows a positive return of 2.31% significant at 
the 5% level in the (-10, -1) window. Similarly, the generalized sign test shows a 
positive abnormal return of 2.44% significant at the 5% level over the same window. In 
the post-event day period, (+1, +15), there are negative abnormal returns of 1.34% and 
1.01%, respectively, significant at the 10% level in both the Corrado and the Sign test. 
.
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Table 7.7: Results showing bank stock return reactions to bank credit rating upgrade reclassification news announcements 
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The remaining part of Section 7.4 presents the results of different model specifications 
for capturing abnormal returns around the date of negative bank credit rating news 
announcements. The findings so far show that the degree of market reaction differs 
depending on the type of rating events. Consistent with the analysis for the positive 
news results, the estimation of the models is based on both the parametric and non-
parametric approaches. The models employ a 27-day event window, which assumes a 
10-day period before the event date and 15 days after. In addition, the thesis adopts a 
two-day event day period in order to capture any news announcement that occurs after 
the close of the market trading. For each of the specifications, the thesis investigates the 
significance of the cumulative average abnormal returns over the trading days -10 to 
+15.  
Using this approach, separate results for different event windows such as the two-day 
event day, and 11-day and 25-day windows centred on day zero, as well as the pre- and 
post-event day windows are examined. In addition, the section examines the results of 
subsamples within the investment and noninvestment grade categories, the impact of 
unanticipated downgrades, and downgrades from investment to noninvestment bank 
rating categories.  
 Results for downgrade announcements on bank stock returns 7.6.6
Table 7.8 presents the results of Models XVI–XVIII. Panel A shows the average 
abnormal returns and the cumulative average abnormal returns over the 27-day event 
window period as well as the tests of significance for each separate day. Panel B shows 
the results of cumulative average abnormal returns across a range of pre-defined event 
windows. In addition, Panel B presents tests of statistical significance for the CAARs 
across the two broad (parametric and non-parametric) approaches.  
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Table 7.8: Results showing bank stock returns reactions to downgrade news announcements 
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The results from the news event test employing the Boehmer et al. approach (Model 
XVI) show negative abnormal returns of 0.22% (significant at the 5% level), 0.25% 
(significant at the 10% level) and 0.07% (significant at the 10% level) on day t-6, t-5 
and t-1. This may suggest anticipation of the negative (downgrade) news announcement 
by the market, that is, the existence of news leakage. The economic and statistical 
significance of the abnormal returns in the pre-event period is higher than that estimated 
for upgrades (in Table 7.3). The event-day abnormal return shows abnormal return of -
0.86%, significant at the 5% level, which is higher in absolute value when compared 
with the stock market returns movement for upgrade news announcement.  
Consistent with the results obtained for upgrade news announcement effects, there is 
evidence of a partial correction of the abnormal bank returns around the day of the news 
announcement. The days t+3 and t+4 show positive abnormal returns of 0.36% and 
0.13% significant at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. The total magnitude of 
correction (0.49%) is lower than the event day abnormal returns of -0.86%. This market 
correction for bank credit rating downgrade is less in relative terms than the 
corresponding results for upgrades. The other parametric approaches in the news event 
tests Model XVII and XVIII show consistent results with the existence of news leakage, 
event day significant reaction, and subsequent market correct.  
Model XVII shows negative abnormal returns over day t-5 and t-4 of -0.30% and 0.18% 
significant at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. There is an event day abnormal return 
of -0.66%, and subsequent market correction on day t+6 of 0.59%, significant at the 
10% level. Similarly, Model XVIII shows pre-event day news leakage on day t-4 of -
0.33% significant at the 5% level. Consistent with the other parametric specifications, 
there is an event day negative abnormal return of 0.74% significant at the 5% level. The 
market subsequently reversed this partially on day t+3 with a positive abnormal return 
of 0.48% significant at the 10% level. 
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In addition, Model XVI results in Panel B of Table 7.8 show that the cumulative 
abnormal returns in the pre- and post-event windows are both significant for the 
parametric and nonparametric specifications. The event window (-10, -1) shows a 
CAAR of -0.40%, significant at the 10% level. There is an asymmetry in the way 
market reacts to upgrade and downgrade news information. This is evidence in the 
results for upgrades where the CAAR is insignificant. Similarly, the post event window 
(+1, +15) CAAR for downgrades shows a CAAR of 0.55%, significant at the 5% level. 
This is a higher correction response (in terms of magnitude) than the CAAR for upgrade 
news announcement for the same window. Further, Panel B shows that the results for 
Model XVII and XVIII are similar to those of Model XVI, with significant abnormal 
returns in both the pre- and post-event day periods. There is also strong evidence of 
partial market correction within the first week after the news announcement day. 
The non-parametric approaches, that is, the Corrado and Sign tests, show much higher 
bank stock reactions to bank credit rating downgrade news announcements than the 
parametric approaches. For the pre-event day period (-10, -1), there are CAARs of -
1.01% and -1.12%, significant at the 5% level for the Corrado and Sign tests, 
respectively. For the two specifications, there is a weak partial market correction over 
the post-event day period, with CAARs of 0.84% and 0.99%, significant at the 10% 
level for both the Corrado and Sign test. Further, for the event day reaction, the results 
in Panel B show strong negative abnormal returns of -1.38% and -1.41%, significant at 
the 5% level for the Corrado and Sign test, respectively. 
Figure 7.6 shows the bank stock cumulative abnormal returns for downgrades for the 
whole sample over the event window (-10, +15). The Figure 7.6 shows negative 
(downward) movement in the cumulative returns for the three models in the pre-event 
day period. These downward movements continued for a couple of days following the 
downgrade news event announcements. The market fully corrected for the unanticipated 
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news between days t+3 and t+10, and this is depicted by the sharp upward movements 
in bank stock returns around this period. In addition, the graph shows that bank stock 
returns becomes less volatile after day t+10, which is the period after the full market 
correction.  
 
Overall, the results in Table 7.8 show that downgrade news announcements result in a 
greater market reaction (in terms of magnitude) when compared with the results in 
Table 7.3 for upgrade news announcements. This is consistent with the findings of 
several existing studies (Hand et al., 1992; Schweitzer et al., 1992; Calderoni et al., 
2009). However, studies such as Abad-Romero and Roble-Fernandez (2006) find no 
reaction to downgrades and propose a wealth redistribution hypothesis to support their 
findings. 
 
Figure 7.6: Bank stock cumulative abnormal returns for downgrades 
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 Results of downgrade announcements for investment-grade for bank stocks 7.6.7
This section presents the results of an examination of the effects of bank credit rating 
downgrades for investment-grade bank stocks. It attempts to give more information on 
whether there is asymmetry in the market reaction to subsamples of rating grades (e.g. 
investment- versus non-investment-grade).  
Table 7.9 shows the results of Models IXX, XX and XXI which are estimates for the 
abnormal returns using the Boehmer et al., GARCH (1, 1) and the Dummy Variable 
approaches. Panel A shows the average abnormal returns across time and across event 
banks. Panel B shows the results of cumulative average abnormal returns across a range 
of pre-defined event windows. Further, it presents tests of statistical significance for the 
CAARs across the two broad (parametric and non-parametric) approaches. 
Model IXX shows negative abnormal returns in the pre-event period. There are 
abnormal returns of -0.21% and -0.39% on days t-6 and t-2, significant at the 10% level. 
Further, significant market returns reaction is observed on the event day. An abnormal 
return of -1.01%, significant at the 5% level, is observed on the event day. This is 
greater in magnitude than the -0.86% observed for the Model XVI, that is, the estimate 
of the whole sample. This suggests that downgrades within the investment-grade 
category result in a relatively higher magnitude of negative abnormal returns. There is 
an indication of partial market correction within the first week after the news 
announcement, with day t+4 showing abnormal returns of 0.55%, significant at the 10% 
level. The magnitude of the significant abnormal return is higher than that observed for 
this specification for upgrades, and this implies a greater market reaction to 
downgrades. The results of the other parametric specifications (Model XX and XXI) are 
similar to those for Model IXX. Models XX and XXI show abnormal returns of -0.88% 
and -1.21%, significant at the 5% level. 
292 
 
Table 7.9: Results showing bank stock return reactions to downgrade news announcements within the investment-grade 
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Consistent with Model IXX, they both provide evidence of partial market corrections on 
day t+4 of 0.63% and 0.78%, significant at the 5% level. 
The results of the CAARs over the specified periods are consistent across the parametric 
and non-parametric approaches.  Both the pre-and post-event windows show significant 
abnormal returns. The result shows a CAAR of -0.22% in the pre-event window (-10, -
1), significant at the 10% level. This aggregate abnormal return implies news leakage. 
There is full market correction as evidenced by the positive CAAR of 0.38%, significant 
at the 10% level in the (+1, +15) event window. For the Model XX specification, there 
is a negative CAAR in the pre-event window of -0.54%, significant at the 10% level. In 
addition, the post-event day period shows positive abnormal returns of 0.72%, 
significant at the 10% level. Model XXI shows a negative CAAR of -0.35%, significant 
at the 10% level. Consistent with the CAAR results of the other parametric approaches, 
there is a positive post-event window CAAR of 0.66%, significant at the 5% level. The 
Corrado and Sign test show event-day significant negative abnormal returns of -1.32% 
and -1.30%, respectively, significant at the 5% level. These magnitudes of negative 
abnormal returns are higher than those observed for the non-parametric approaches 
specifications in Table 7.8 where the whole sample is employed. 
Overall, the results in this section show that downgrades within a subsample of bank 
investment-grade stocks elicit a greater response from the market than when the entire 
sample is employed (Figure 7.7). There are generally economic reactions in terms of the 
abnormal returns in the pre-event period as well as the event-day compared with the 
corresponding responses for upgrades. There is also evidence of partial market 
adjustments in terms of the market correcting for the excess significant abnormal 
returns observed on the event-day within the first few days following the news 
announcement events. The findings are consistent with Micu, Remolona and 
Wooldridge (2004). The authors argue that the greater impact of the downgrade news 
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announcements on investment-rated entities possibly reflects investors’ aversion to 
issuers at risk of losing their investment grade status and becoming ‘fallen angels’ (p. 
61).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Results of downgrade announcements for noninvestment-grade bank stock 7.6.8
This section presents results for the effects of downgrade announcements within the 
noninvestment-grade. Table 7.10 shows the results for Models XXII, XXIII, and XXIV. 
These model specifications examine all bank credit rating downgrades within the 
noninvestment grades. Discrimination between investment and noninvestment-grade 
banks can potentially provide a better understanding of the way the market reacts to 
downgrade news announcements. Consistent with the earlier models, the three models 
presented in this section are estimated based on a 27-day event window. This event 
window covers the pre- and post-announcement dates (10 days before the event day and 
15 days after).  
Figure 7.7:  Bank stock return reactions to downgrade news announcements within 
the investment-grade 
295 
 
Table 7.10: Results showing bank stock returns reaction to downgrade news announcement within the noninvestment-grade 
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Panel B shows the results of cumulative average abnormal returns across a range of pre-
defined event windows. In addition, Panel B presents tests of statistical significance for 
the CAARs across the two broad (parametric and non-parametric) approaches. Figure 
7.8 shows the results of stock cumulative abnormal returns for downgrades within the 
noninvestment grades. The results across all the model specifications show that there 
are no observed significant abnormal returns for bank credit rating downgrades within 
the noninvestment grades. The magnitude of the abnormal returns is lower than that of 
other downgrade specifications discussed thus far. In terms of the signs of the abnormal 
returns in the event window, there are no clear patterns. Similarly, the CAARs show no 
significant abnormal returns in either the parametric or the non-parametric approaches. 
The results are opposite to those of Ederington and Goh (1998) who find that 
downgrades within the non-investment category result in greater stock movements than 
within the investment-category. 
Figure 7.8:  Bank stock cumulative abnormal returns for downgrades (noninvestment 
grade) 
 
 
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Model XXII
Model XXIII
Model XXIV
297 
 
 Results of news announcement bank stock return reactions to unanticipated 7.6.9
downgrades  
This section presents results for bank stock reactions to unanticipated bank credit 
downgrade announcements. It investigates a subset of the sample banks, conditioned on 
anticipated news in the form of outlook announcements or placements on the Watchlist. 
It makes the assumption that a downgrade not preceded by a negative outlook and/or 
placement on a Watchlist results in a greater market reaction than the case when there is 
an anticipation of the downgrade news. The estimations of the abnormal returns for the 
event windows are presented in Models XXV–XVII. The results of the estimations are 
presented in Table 7.11. These models follow the Boehmer et al., GARCH (1, 1) and 
the dummy variable approach respectively. Panel A shows the abnormal returns over 
the 27-day event window, while Panel B presents the results of the CAARs over various 
pre-specified event windows. There are no observable significant abnormal returns in 
the pre-event period, except for day t-1 in Model XXV where there is a negative 
abnormal return on 0.12%, significant at the 5% level. The event day abnormal returns 
are consistently significant across the three Models parametric specifications. The 
magnitudes of the abnormal returns are higher than those observed in earlier models for 
downgrades. There are significant negative abnormal returns of -1.33%, -1.42% and -
1.55% respectively across the Models XXV, XXVI and XXVII, respectively, all 
significant at the 5% level. Consistent with the earlier models, there is evidence of 
partial market correction within the first week after the event day. There is an abnormal 
return of 0.78%, significant at the 10% level in Model XXV, while Model XXVII 
shows an abnormal return of 0.12% (significant at the10% level) and 0.66% (significant 
at the 5% level). It is interesting to note that there are no observed significant CAARs 
for the parametric approach (Model XXV, XXVI and XXVII).
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Table 7.11: Results showing bank stock return reactions to unanticipated credit rating downgrade news announcements 
299 
 
The non-parametric approaches, the Corrado and the Sign tests, show an event-day 
CAAR of -1.66% and -1.77%, both significant at the 5% level. The post-event period 
CAARs are 0.53% and 0.89%, significant at the 10% level for the Corrado and Sign 
tests, respectively. Figure 7.9 shows the bank stock abnormal returns for unanticipated 
downgrades across the different specifications. 
Figure 7.9:  Bank stock cumulative abnormal returns for unanticipated downgrades  
 
 Results for stock return reactions to downgrade news announcements on 7.6.10
bank rating reclassifications 
This section presents the results of bank stock return reactions to downgrades across the 
investment threshold, that is, from BBB- to BB+. Again, the investigation of the 
category of downgrades is motivated by the potential behaviour of institutional 
investors who may have mandates to invest only in investment grade bank stocks. The 
estimations of the abnormal returns for the event windows are presented in Models 
XXVIII–XXX. The results of the estimations are presented in Table 7.12. These models 
follow the Boehmer et al. (1991), GARCH (1, 1) and the Dummy Variable approach 
respectively. Panel A shows the abnormal returns over the 27-day event window.   
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Table 7.12: Results showing bank stock return reactions to downgrade news announcements for bank rating reclassifications 
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Panel B presents the results of the CAARs over various event windows for both the 
parametric and non-parametric approaches.  The results are consistent across the three 
models and show significant negative abnormal returns on the event day. Model 
XXVIII shows an abnormal return of -0.66%, significant at the 5% level on day t=0.  
Similarly, the results for Models XXIX and XXX both show abnormal returns of -
0.52% and -0.61%, respectively, all significant at the 5% level.  
There is no indication of any significant post-event day abnormal returns, which may 
suggest that the market did not correct for the observed abnormal returns on the event 
day. The CAARs over the pre-specified event windows do not show significant 
abnormal returns. Similarly, the results from the nonparametric approach show no 
significant abnormal returns over the specified period. However, on the event day, the 
Corrado rank test shows an abnormal return of 0.81%, significant at the 5% level, while 
the generalized sign test shows an abnormal return of 0.88%, significant at the 5% level 
on the event day.  
Figure 7.10 shows the results of bank stock cumulative abnormal returns for 
downgrades (reclassifications). The results are consistent with Hand et al. (1992) and 
Kliger and Sarig (2000) who find that downgrades, particularly those from investment- 
to non-investment categories, result in considerable negative price movements. The 
results for the rating classification within this section could be linked to the widespread 
regulatory use of credit ratings. This has the potential of effecting an unintended action 
since downgrades across thresholds could lead to systemic reactions by a number of 
regulated market participants. Again, the use of credit ratings in private decision 
making-rules, e.g. in internal guidelines by institutional investors and private contracts, 
could result in a rating trigger. 
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Figure 7.10:  Bank stock cumulative abnormal returns for downgrade (reclassification) 
 
7.7 Summary 
This chapter presents evidence on bank stock return reactions to bank credit rating news 
announcements. By examining whether credit rating agencies possess information not 
already available to the market, it gives a better understanding of the roles of these 
agencies. The core of the theoretical framework for this component of the thesis is the 
EMH. Information efficiency is important within the context of an event study where 
market participants are assumed to be rational. The information content of news events 
becomes critical in the assessment of the efficiency or otherwise of the market.  
This chapter adopts the event study methodological approach in testing for the presence 
of significant abnormal returns over an event window. The approach adopts three 
parametric and two non-parametric news event test specifications. This is to ensure 
robustness in the estimations and specifications. Further, the thesis, apart from 
investigating broad upgrade and downgrade news effects on bank stock return 
behaviour, examines subsamples of these news announcements. Thus, the impact of 
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news announcements relating to the effects of upgrades/downgrades of banks within the 
investment and non-investment categories, and also the effects of unanticipated changes 
are examined. The general position in the existing studies is that there are asymmetries 
in the way market reacts to credit rating news announcements. Downgrade results are 
usually associated with a significant abnormal price movement around the date of news 
announcement, while for upgrades the reactions are minimal.  
This thesis shows that for bank stocks, there are also considerable market price 
movements for upgrades within certain credit rating notches. For example, upgrade 
announcements within the investment category show significant abnormal returns on 
the day of the event across all the specifications (both parametric and non-parametric). 
There is also some evidence of partial market correction in the post-event day period. 
Similarly, unanticipated bank credit rating upgrades produce event day significant 
positive market reactions to the news announcements. Within the sample of banks and 
different specifications employed in this chapter, the results for the downgrades are 
consistent with the findings in the literature. The results within the different model 
specifications show consistent negative abnormal returns on the event day, except for 
downgrade news announcement for noninvestment-grade bank stock. The magnitude of 
these abnormal returns varies considerably across the specifications. Downgrades for 
investment-grade bank stocks and downward reclassification (across rating thresholds) 
elicited greater negative abnormal returns. This negative reaction may be associated 
with institutional investors realigning their portfolio to reflect the mandate of clients for 
investment in top rated bank stocks. There is also evidence of partial market corrections 
to the negative significant abnormal returns in the full sample estimation following 
downgrade announcements.  Finally, the non-parametric results show a greater level of 
significance and economic magnitude for the abnormal returns than is the case in the 
parametric specifications. 
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 AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF BANK CHAPTER 8.
CREDIT RISK MIGRATION: A RATING TRANSITION 
ANALYSIS 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The subject of credit risk in the banking industry is critically important, especially 
following the global financial crisis. Credit rating agencies (CRAs) assign ratings to 
banks (as well as other companies) with the aim of assessing the credit quality of these 
entities. A change in credit rating reflects an assessment that a bank’s credit quality has 
improved (upgrade) or deteriorated (downgrade). This chapter builds on the empirical 
work in Chapters 6 and 7 by investigating bank credit rating migration. Chapter 6 
presents the results of models of the determinants of bank credit ratings. By 
incorporating both financial and non-financial information in alternative model 
specifications, the chapter provides an insight into the joint and individual significance 
of the variables expected to impact on the way rating agencies assign letter ratings to the 
credit qualities of banks. Chapter 7 examines the impact of changes in bank credit rating 
qualities, that is, upgrades and downgrades, as well as other rating related actions on 
bank stock prices, testing for the significance of abnormal returns around 
announcements relating to bank credit rating changes.  
This chapter deals with an equally important aspect of bank credit ratings by 
investigating credit rating dynamics, focusing on rating migration based on the 
historical pattern of ratings and ratings changes. The global financial crisis has given 
rise to a global review of the credit rating methodologies employed by rating agencies 
as well as the reclassification of rating notches, especially for banks. The post-crisis 
period witnessed an unprecedented number of downgrades and perhaps an overall 
decline in bank creditworthiness globally. Further, one might suggest that credit rating 
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agencies have become more conservative in their assessment criteria, methodologies 
and reviews of bank creditworthiness in the period following the global financial crisis 
years. Perhaps the need to err on the side of caution and atone for the apparently 
generous rating notches assigned to issuers and their issues in the boom period prior to 
the crisis, as well as the focus of regulators on their activities led to this tightening of 
requirements by the CRAs. This chapter employs various empirical models including 
those developed in earlier empirical components of this thesis to analyse changes in the 
credit rating quality of banks for the period 2000-2012.   
This chapter considers the estimation bank credit rating transition matrices based on the 
migration of ratings from one notch or rating category, i, at the beginning of a period to 
another notch,  j, at the end of the period. Specifically, the chapter explores the two 
approaches to measuring and estimating transition matrices as suggested in the literature 
(e.g. Lando and Skodeberg, 2002; Jafry and Schuermann, 2004). These are: (i) the 
discrete-time cohort method; and (ii) estimators based on continuous observations 
(duration or hazard approach). In both the cohort and the hazard approach, the 
estimates of the transition probabilities constitute the entries of the transition matrix. In 
addition, the chapter tests for the presence of non-Markovian behaviour. 
Following Lando and Skodeberg (2002), this thesis sets up a framework to test whether 
bank transition intensities are dependent on certain covariates. The covariate here refers 
to an indicator that keeps track of an influence on a bank’s transition intensity. One of 
the objectives of this component of the thesis is to test for non-Markovian effects on 
transition, such that the covariate will be a variable describing whether the previous 
move was an upgrade or a downgrade or the duration in the present state for each bank.     
The thesis recognises that these bank rating transitions could be influenced by 
macroeconomic variables or other factors capturing the business cycle (Nickell et al., 
2000). Thus, the framework model is constructed to capture any of these fluctuations 
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via baseline intensity as suggested by Lando and Skodeberg (2002). The thesis does not 
model the influence of bank financial and non-financial information within the 
transition matrix framework. 
The organisation of the rest of this chapter is as follows. Section 8.2 presents the 
theoretical framework around the basic approach to rating migration – the Markov 
process. A review of related literature and methodological approaches for the various 
empirical approaches within this chapter is presented in Sections 8.3 and 8.4, 
respectively. Section 8.5 discusses the results, focusing on the descriptive statistics for 
the data as well as the main empirical results. Section 8.6 summarises the findings. 
8.2 Theoretical framework – The Markov chain approach 
One strand of the credit risk modelling literature employs the use of a matrix of 
transition probabilities to explain the change in the credit quality of an entity. The 
accurate estimation of these transition matrices is very important. Banks, as well as 
other rated entities, take on letter ratings which measure their relative creditworthiness. 
A bank can stay in a particular grade or rating category as long as its credit assessment 
remains relatively stable and within the bounds of that category. The survival or 
otherwise of a bank in a particular rating grade can be observed by examining a 
transition matrix. Transition matrix reports, particularly those published by the major 
CRAs, form the basis of most credit risk management techniques such as McKinsey’s 
Credit Portfolio View and Credit Metrics developed by J.P. Morgan. The importance of 
bank credit rating migration is also crucial in portfolio risk assessment and assessments 
of regulatory capital. For the purpose of the analyses within this component of the 
thesis, the transition matrix gives an indication of the distance that rating 
downgrades/upgrades migrate, the average survival or duration within a particular rating 
notch, and hence the overall trends of credit rating during the sample period. So, given a 
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bank credit rating today, say A+,
10
 the letter rating of that bank one year from now will 
depend, among other things, on the probability that it will remain at A+, migrate to a 
higher or lower credit grade category, or even default at the year-end.  
According to Jarrow et al. (1997), the rating migration process is underpinned by two 
major assumptions:  
i) Markovian behaviour. This assumes that the probability of transiting from a current 
state i to a future state j (i.e. the transition intensity) depends only on the credit quality 
information contained in the current state i, and is independent of the rating history 
(Gallati, 2003). This implies that all information needed to predict the future rating 
direction of an entity is contained in the current rating.  
ii) Time homogeneity: Following from the above assumption, that is, when a one-step 
transition over a specified time horizon (𝑡 to 𝑡 + 𝛥𝑡) is time independent, then, the 
Markov chain process is assumed to be stationary (time-homogenous). The bank credit 
migration matrices depict the dynamic evolution of the credit quality of banks over 
time. These transition matrices are constructed by mapping the historical ratings of say, 
a bank, on to their transition probabilities. 
The traditional transition probability matrix follows the first-order, time-homogeneous 
Markov model, which is based on the two assumptions, (i) and (ii) above. A bank is 
rated in d categories ranging from 1 (i.e. AAA rating), the best rating category, to the 
category d (the worst rating), and ratings can transit between this finite set of categories. 
The raw data consists of a collection of migration events, which are rating movements 
(upgrades, downgrades or in most cases no change). Let 𝑁𝑖(𝑡) denote the number of 
banks at the beginning of year t rated i and 𝑁𝑖𝑗(𝑡, 𝑡 + 1) the subset of banks observed to 
                                                 
10 The letter is based on the Fitch fine grading nomenclature employed in this thesis. 
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have migrated to rating j by year beginning 𝑡 + 1. The relative frequency, that is, 
probability of migration from state i to j can be denoted by, 
                             ?̂?𝑖𝑗(𝑡, 𝑡 + 1) =
𝑁𝑖𝑗(𝑡,𝑡+1)
𝑁𝑖(𝑡)
     8.1 
 
in years 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇. 
If one assumes a time-homogeneous Markov rating process, the maximum likelihood 
(ML) estimator of the one-year credit risk migration is 
?̂?𝑖𝑗 ≡ ?̂?𝑖𝑗(1) =
∑ 𝑁𝑖𝑗
𝑇
𝑡=1 (𝑡,𝑡+1)
∑ 𝑁𝑖(𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1
=
𝑁𝑖𝑗
𝑁𝑖
  𝑗 ≠ 𝑖    8.2 
Thus, the total numbers of annual bank ratings migrating from state i to j, i.e.  ?̂?𝑖𝑗 is 
simply the total number of annual migrations between these two states divided by the 
total number of banks in state i at the state of the period (Fuertes et al., 2011). Hardle et 
al. (2005) suggest that to obtain an n-cohort migration matrix, ?̂?(𝑛) = 𝑄 ̂𝑛, where ?̂?  is 
obtained from 8.2, the Markov process must conform to the time-homogeneity 
assumption. A consequence of the above is that if a transition from i to j does not occur 
in a given period, then the estimate of the corresponding rate is 0. 
Therefore, the distribution of the ratings is independent over time and across banks and 
the probability of transition is constant over time. The method described thus far is the 
traditional discrete-time cohort approach, which is very popular with most of the major 
CRAs. It assumes a specific time horizon, typically 1, 2, 5 or 10 years. A major 
weakness of the cohort approach is that it neglects rating changes within a particular 
specified time horizon, and also the duration of a firm staying at that particular rating. 
One of the ways around this is the use of a continuous-time maximum likelihood 
(CTML) framework which presents the best way to capture all bank credit rating 
transition probabilities as it encompasses all necessary historical rating information. 
This latter approach is discussed in section 8.4. 
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There is empirical evidence, however, to support the presence of rating momentum or 
drift (Altman and Kao, 1992; Carty and Fons, 1994; Lando and Skodeberg, 2002; 
Christensen et al., 2004). These studies support the position that future directions of 
transition probabilities are not only conditional on the current state, but are influenced 
by rating history. In particular, Lando and Skodeberg show that a downgraded issuer is 
prone to further subsequent downgrades (downward momentum). Generally, this 
suggests that consecutive rating changes in the same direction are likely to be more 
frequent than in the opposite direction.  Others argue that over a short time horizon (say 
1 or 2 years) the first-order Markov assumption seems to hold. Similarly, empirical 
evidence suggests that different transition matrices should be considered in boom and 
contraction periods (Arvanitis et al., 1999; Bangia, et al., 2002; Lando and Skodeberg, 
2002; Mahlmann, 2006). Several previous studies also specify non-homogeneity in their 
models by arguing for cyclicality considerations in the treatment of credit rating 
migration (Nickell et al., 2000; Kiefer and Larson, 2004). They argue that the business 
cycle and other external variables (e.g. geographical location, the state of the economy) 
exert an impact on the probability of transiting from one state to the next. 
8.3 A brief literature review 
A measure of the credit rating of an entity or its issues is a key indicator of the inherent 
credit risk associated with such as an entity or its issues. The information provided on 
rating constitutes an important aspect for the calculation of the capital requirement of 
banks in light of the recommendation of the Bank for International Settlement that 
banks can employ a standardized approach for assessing the risk-weighted assets of 
their portfolio, thus reflecting the changes in the market yield spread charged. The 
possibility that CRAs will change the rating of a bank may also have repercussions for 
investment managers whose mandate may be restricted to banks or their issues that are 
of certain rating categories. This section reviews existing literature in the area of credit 
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rating transition, focusing on issues around measurement, estimation and the stability of 
rating transition. 
Since the seminal work of Jarrow et al. (1997), the use of credit rating transition 
matrices as key components in credit risk modelling has become more prominent. The 
major credit rating agencies (Fitch, Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s) adopt a system 
of averaging the annual transition frequency matrices, 𝑷, representing transition 
probabilities, with 𝑷𝑖𝑗 being the probability that a firm rated i at the beginning of the 
year is rated j at the end of the year. An implicit assumption here is that transition 
probabilities are constant over time. This time-homogeneity (which may also be 
referred to as stationary transition probabilities) means that the determination of an 
issuer’s credit risk (including that of transiting to a new rating state) is dependent only 
on the issuer’s current rating. Stationary transition probabilities thus refer to a situation 
whereby such probabilities are independent of the time variable, that is, historic states 
do not affect the current state. This assumption forms the basis of the Markov chain 
framework discussed in Section 8.2. This cohort approach to estimating rating transition 
matrices is still very popular with major rating agencies due to its simplicity. Under this 
assumption, the reported transition frequencies are only averages, and are not 
conditional on all available information.  
Fei et al. (2012) maintain that if the effects of cyclical considerations are ignored, a one-
year transition migration rate may not be constant over the age of a bond. There is 
possible dependence of transition probabilities on the duration that an entity spends in a 
rating category, which is referred to as the aging effect by Cathy and Fons (1994). 
Empirical evidence (e.g. Kavvathas, 2001; Lando and Skodeberg, 2002) finds that for 
firms in certain ratings, the prior rating is an important determinant of the likelihood of 
a downgrade versus that of an upgrade over a given time horizon. This argument relates 
to an aspect of rating transition referred to as momentum or rating drift. Despite two 
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firms having the same rating, their credit quality may be different. Put differently, a 
given entity with fixed ratings has a credit quality that changes over time. In light of the 
above, there is growing empirical evidence (Lando and Skodeberg, 2002; Keifer and 
Larson, 2004; Jafry and Schuermann, 2004; Jones, 2005; Frydman and Schuermann, 
2008) that supports non-Markov characteristics for credit migration matrices, and 
further proposes alternative treatments for such rating transitions. 
Lando and Skodeberg (2002) argue for the use of a continuous time approach (as 
opposed to a discrete-time setting). They estimate credit rating transition based on 
Standard and Poor’s data, while applying a semi-parametric regression technique to test 
for two types of non-Markovian effects in rating transition (rating drift or momentum, 
and duration dependence). The momentum or rating drift refers to the tendency for a 
higher likelihood of a downgrade if the current state was reached through a downgrade. 
They employ data covering 17 years of rating history based on S&P ratings from 1 
January 1981 and ending 31 December 1997. They find that the use of a maximum-
likelihood estimator to estimate the generator and transition matrices (assuming time 
homogeneity, i.e. the Markov framework) is still valid for a one-year transition matrix. 
However, they propose a non-parametric method which replaces the cohort method for 
longer time periods (say, 5-year or 10-year transition matrices). Further, when testing 
for duration dependency, their study employs an exponential form model as this keeps 
the transition intensity
11
 positive. The study neglects industry effects which have been 
shown by Nickell et al. (2000) and Kavvathas (2001) to be significant. Lando and 
Skodeberg find that there is a strong non-Markov effect for downgrades in the 
aggregated data set. Similarly, both the time taken to remain in a given state (duration) 
and the direction from which the state was reached have significant effects on the 
                                                 
11 The transition intensity represents the rate of moving from a current state i to a new state j. 
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downgrade transition intensity. However, the effect is less pronounced when they 
examine a subcategory of financial firms.  
The simple, time-homogeneous Markov model, even though restrictive, is still 
considered useful for describing short-run changes in portfolio risk. Evidence of this 
Markovian behaviour is also present in issue ratings. Keifer and Larson (2004) consider 
testing the time-homogeneity assumption of the Markov approach over the short-run, 
that is, whether the transition from an initial state i to the next state j is constant over a 
short-time period (i.e. 1 and 2 years). They employ three sets of data, municipal bonds 
(obtained from S&P, from 1986 to 2000), commercial paper (from a study by Moody’s 
in 2000, covering the period1972-1999), and sovereign debt (from S&P, covering the 
period 1975-2002). Their study is set against the backdrop that a given credit ratings 
change in reality exhibits ‘momentum’. Put differently, rating change is conditional on 
the current rating level such that a future credit downgrade (upgrade) is perhaps likely if 
the entity had experienced a downgrade (upgrade) in the previous period than if it had 
experienced an upgrade (downgrade). They argue that since rating changes do not occur 
often, the transition rates reported are essentially estimators of very small probabilities. 
The method employed follows the basic Markov estimation framework, involving the 
use of the likelihood ratio test for hypothesising the time-homogeneity of rating 
transition. Their results indicate that municipal bond ratings as well as commercial 
paper ratings can be adequately described as time-homogeneous over as much as five-
years. With respect to the sovereign ratings, Markov specifications are rejected, 
possibly due to the very small sample size. 
In a similar study, Jafry and Schuermann (2004) attempt to compare two approaches to 
the measurement and estimation of credit rating migration matrices. They explore the 
cohort and two variants of duration (i.e. one imposing, and the other relaxing, time 
homogeneity). They further develop a testing procedure based on the bootstrap 
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technique to statistically assess the differences between migration matrices. Despite the 
cohort method being the industry standard due to its straightforward approach, it ignores 
any rating activity which occurs within the period. The variant of duration the authors 
propose follows a strand of literature on survival analysis applied by Lando and 
Skodeberg (2002). The idea underlying the duration approach is to be able to account 
for the time a rating spends in a particular notch and its contribution to estimating the 
transition probability. They maintain that for a time-homogeneous Markov chain, the 
transition probability matrix is a function of the distance between dates (time), but not 
the dates themselves.  
The case for the non-Markov property of credit rating dynamics is further examined by 
Frydman and Schuermann (2008), particularly as it relates to the future distribution of a 
firm’s ratings and how two firms with identical current ratings can have substantially 
different transition probability vectors. They propose a model consisting of a mixture of 
two independent continuous time homogeneous Markov chains. The assumption of the 
model is that the two Markov chains differ only in the speed at which they transit into a 
new state. The model they propose consists of two populations of firms, each moving in 
accordance with its own Markov chain. A continuous time homogeneous Markov chain 
assumes that duration in a particular state follows an exponential distribution with a 
constant hazard function. They employ two subsamples (independent, and moving 
according to their own Markov chain). They argue that the duration in a particular state 
is generated by one or other chain following two exponential distributions so that the 
observed durations in a given state come from a mixture of two exponential 
distributions. The implication of this is that the model’s framework does not restrict 
firms, but rather allows them to migrate at their own speed, thereby allowing them 
arrive at future ratings in different ways. Employing a set of corporate credit rating 
histories from S&P spanning the period 1998 to 2002, they show that the mixed model 
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not only statistically dominates the simple Markov model but that the differences in the 
two models is economically meaningful. They maintain that future ratings depend on 
the historical ratings of entities and that unlike the Markov model; all firms with a 
particular current rating are not assigned the same future distribution of ratings. There is 
also a case for heterogeneity in credit rating dynamics as firm-specific transition 
probabilities can vary significantly, which is a position not supported by the Markov 
framework. 
The test for non-Markovian behaviour has also been conducted using a dataset from the 
finance industry. Employing credit rating histories for Columbian commercial banks, 
Gomez-Gonzalez and Kiefer (2009) show that the process of rating migration exhibits 
significant non-Markovian behaviour. Their study considers all ratings of commercial 
banks and financial companies from December 1996 to November 2005, including 
macroeconomic and bank-specific variables. The rating categories are in four categories 
based on the perceived riskiness of the banks. Following the traditional Markov chain 
approach and the approach employed by Lando and Skodeberg (2002), they find that 
the process of rating migration in Colombian banks exhibits significant non-Markovian 
behaviour, in the sense that the transition intensities are affected by macroeconomic and 
bank-specific variables. The study employs macroeconomic and bank specific variables 
including the monthly average interest rate on loans, the real production index, as well 
as bank capitalization ratios. As with earlier studies, they find that the continuous time 
framework improves the estimation of transition probabilities, and information provided 
by migrations alone is not enough to forecast the future behaviour of ratings.   
8.4 A review and choice of the methodological approach 
Section 8.2 presents the Markovian chain process and focuses on the cohort approach 
based on a discrete-time setting. It forms the basis of estimates presented by most of the 
315 
 
rating agencies and in several academic studies, and it has become the industry 
standard. Hence statistical assessments using this approach seem to be appropriate. As a 
reminder, the transition rates are estimated as follows: For a given set of firms 𝑁𝑖 in a 
certain rating category i at the beginning of the year, out of this set 𝑁𝑖𝑗 migrate to the 
category j, then one can estimate the one year transition rate as: 
?̂?𝑖𝑗(𝛥𝑡) =
𝑁𝑖𝑗
𝑁𝑖
 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖      8.3 
where 𝛥𝑡 is the time horizon (or sampling interval), say, 1 year.  
This simply shows the proportion of firms at the end of the period, say, at the end of the 
year for an annual matrix, with rating j having started out with rating i.  Equation 8.3 
implies that if there is no transition from a state i to j in a given period, then the estimate 
of the transition rate is 0. The rating change events that occur within this period are not 
captured and are unfortunately ignored. Hence, there is a need to employ continuous-
time data on rating transition to capture events such as multiple rating changes within a 
year. Under the condition of equation 8.3, Carty and Fons (1997) suggest that firms 
whose ratings are withdrawn or migrated to the Not Rated (NR) status are removed from 
the sample. The cohort method treats the NR state as non-informative. Similarly, the 
cohort method neglects what Jafry and Schuermann (2004) refer to as censoring and 
truncation, both linked with using rating histories. The censoring refers to situations 
where the approach does not take into account what happens to the firm after the sample 
window closes; and truncation is where firms only enter into the sample if they have 
survived long enough or have received a rating.   
Building on the traditional Markov (1-year discrete-time) process described in Section 
8.2, the first part of this section explores the hazard-rate or duration approach which 
comes under the class of empirical study referred to as survival analysis. Consider an N-
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state homogenous Markov chain where the rating notch with the highest rating ‘AAA’ 
is assigned 1, and notch d is the worst denoting say, the default state. Following Jafry 
and Schuermann (2004), for a time homogeneous Markov chain, the transition 
probability matrix is a function of the distance between dates (i.e. time) but not of the 
dates themselves (i.e. the current state in time). The specification estimation method 
employed depends on accepting or relaxing the time homogeneity assumption.  
Assuming time-homogeneity, a collection of transition probabilities of the Markov 
chain for a given horizon in an N x N matrix 𝐏(𝑡) can be described by an N x N 
generator or intensity matrix 𝜆. Lando and Skødeberg (2002) present the N x N 
transition probability matrix 𝐏(𝑡) in the form: 
𝐏(𝑡) = exp (𝜆t), t ≥ 0      8.4 
where 𝜆t is the matrix 𝜆 multiplied by t on every entry and the exponential is the matrix 
exponential. This framework assumes that an estimation of maximum-likelihood (ML) 
of the transition probability matrices can be evaluated by first obtaining the ML 
estimate of the generator and then applying the matrix exponential function on the 
estimate (Bangia et al., 2002). The entries of the generator 𝜆 satisfy: 
𝜆𝑖𝑗(𝑡) ≥ 0 for all 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗      8.5 
𝜆𝑖𝑖(𝑡) ≡ 𝜆𝑖(𝑡) = − ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑗𝑗≠𝑖 (t)     8.6 
The equation (8.6) refers to the on-diagonal elements which ensure that the rows sum to 
zero. Further, Lando and Skødeberg argue that the entries describe the probabilistic 
behaviour of the holding time in notch i as exponentially distributed with parameter 𝜆𝑖, 
where 𝜆𝑖(𝑡) = −𝜆𝑖𝑖(𝑡), and the probability of jumping from notch i to j over an 
arbitrarily small time horizon τ is given by. 
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𝑃[𝑅(𝑡 + 𝜏) = 𝑗⎹ 𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑖] = 𝜆𝑖𝑗(𝑡)𝜏]    for 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗    8.7 
The final task is to obtain estimates of the elements of the generator matrix 𝜆. Under the 
assumption of time-homogeneity (𝜆𝑖𝑗(𝑡) = 𝜆𝑖𝑗), the elements are estimated using the 
maximum likelihood estimator: 
?̂?𝑖𝑗 =
𝑁𝑖𝑗(𝑇)
∫ 𝑌𝑖(𝑠)𝑑𝑠
𝑇
0
      for 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗     8.8 
where  𝑌𝑖(𝑠) is the number of banks in rating class i at time s and 𝑁𝑖𝑗(𝑇) is the total 
number of transitions over the period from i to j, where 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. 𝐷𝑖 ≡ ∫ 𝑌𝑖(𝑠)𝑑𝑠
𝑇
0
, the 
denominator, is effectively the number of ‘bank years’ spent in state i. Thus any period 
spent by a bank in this state is captured through the denominator (rating duration). The 
implication of this is that, given a time horizon say, one year, even if a bank spends a 
short duration in transiting from, say ‘AAA’ to ‘AA’ before ending up in ‘A’ at the end 
of the year, the portion of time spent in ‘AA’ will contribute to the estimation of the 
transition probability, i.e. P𝐴𝐴𝐴→𝐴.
12
  
The transition risk-matrix estimator is therefore 
?̂?(𝛥𝑇) ≡ ?̂?(𝑇 + 𝛥𝑡) = 𝑒
(𝛥𝑡)𝜆     8.9 
Where the transition matrix 𝑃(𝑇) = 𝑒(𝛥𝑡)𝜆 can be derived from the generator matrix as 
follows: 
𝑃(𝑇) = 𝑒(𝛥𝑡)𝜆 = exp(𝛌𝑇) = ∑
𝛌𝑘𝑇𝐾
𝑘!
∞
𝑘=0     8.10 
                                                 
12 Firms rated as NR within the year are still counted as part of the denominator and contribute to 
explaining the rating migration. 
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where 𝛌T is the generator matrix multiplied by the scalar 𝑇 and exp() is the matrix 
exponential function. The advantage of equation 8.9 is that allows for the measurement 
of bank credit risk migration over any arbitrary time horizon, 𝛥𝑡. It makes use of rating 
transitions that occur at any point within the sample as well as rating duration. 
 Covariates and bank rating transition intensities:   The empirical 8.4.1
framework   
This section provides the framework for investigating the impact of covariates on the 
transition intensities of a Markov model specification. This allows for a test of the non-
Markovian behaviour, that is, rating drift (dependence on previous rating) and the 
waiting-time effects as suggested by Lando and Skodeberg (2002). The main 
assumption here is that the transition intensity for each category of rating migration is 
influenced by the pathway taken to arrive at the current state. Further, Lando and 
Skodeberg (2002) argue that “an external, time varying covariate” (p. 433) influences 
the transition intensity for each type of rating migration.  
Assuming that 𝑌𝑖𝑘 (Y being a dummy variable), denote an indicator process, which is 1 
when the process is in state i, and 0 otherwise, one can present the intensity of transition 
from state i to state j for bank k in the form: 
𝜆𝑖𝑗𝑘(𝑡) = 𝑌𝑖𝑘(𝑡)𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑘(𝑡, 𝑍𝑘(𝑡)),     8.11 
where  𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑘(𝑡, 𝑍𝑘(𝑡)) has the multiplicative form 
𝛼ℎ𝑗𝑖(𝑡, 𝑍𝐼(𝑡)) = 𝛼ℎ𝑗0(𝑡)exp (𝛽ℎ𝑗𝑍𝑘(𝑡)).    8.12 
Equation 8.11 is a semi-parametric specification employed to estimate and test for 
influence of the covariate process 𝑍𝑘 on the transition intensity from state h to j. 
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Following Lando and Skodeberg, the base-line intensity
13
 𝛼𝑖𝑗0(𝑡) is left unspecified, 
and thus a full likelihood function cannot be employed. As an alternative, the regression 
parameter 𝛽ℎ𝑗 (the parameter of interest here) is estimated by maximising a partial 
likelihood: 
𝐿(𝛽𝑖𝑗) = ∏ ∏
exp (𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑍𝑘(𝑡)
𝑆𝑖𝑗
0 (𝛽𝑖𝑗,𝑡)
𝑡𝑡      8.13 
 
where  
𝑆𝑖𝑗
0 (𝛽𝑖𝑗, 𝑡) = ∑ 𝑌𝑖𝑘(𝑡)𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑘(𝑡, 𝑍𝑘(𝑡))    8.14 
 
The maximization is undertaken by setting the (partial) score function of 𝐿(𝛽) equal to 
zero. The covariate 𝑍𝑘 tracks the influence on k’s transition intensity. Lando and 
Skodeberg argue that the non-zero values of the product of covariates and the parameter 
cause the intensities to deviate from the baseline hazard. It therefore means that if the 
process of rating transition exhibits non-Markov behaviour, the regression coefficients 
will be significantly different from zero. 
Thus, the above specification allows for a test of whether the last rating change 
influences the transition probability of moving away from the present category. The 
covariates are defined as: 
            𝑍𝑘(𝑡) = {
1
0
 
Hence, the statistical test for the hypothesis of no rating drift is 𝐻: 𝛽 = 0, and is 
equivalent to no serial correlation in any class of previous up- and downgrades. In other 
words, this thesis tests for non-Markov effects of transition by specifying covariates as 
                                                 
13
 Any fluctuations in macroeconomic influences or business cycles are absorbed through the baseline intensity. This 
thesis recognises that macroeconomic variables (and business cycles) influence rating intensities (Bangia et al., 2000; 
Nickell et al., 2000). However, the test within this component focuses more specifically on examining the deviations 
from Markovian behaviour due to the last rating change as well as duration dependencies. 
individual 𝑘 was upgraded to the present rating class 
     otherwise 
8.15 
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variables describing whether the previous move was an upgrade or a downgrade, as well 
as the waiting-time in the present state for each bank k.   
Further, the specification allows for a study of the duration dependence, by defining the 
duration covariates 𝑍𝑘 as: 
𝑍𝑘 (𝑡) = ′time since last entry into the present state′  8.16 
Following Lando and Skodeberg, the model employed in this thesis follows an 
exponential form which keeps the transition intensity positive as well as allowing the 
effect to ‘die out’ as the duration increases when the regression parameter is negative. In 
order to ensure enough data, only transition from the current state, R, to a neighbouring 
state is considered. In addition, all of the possible ways of reaching a particular current 
state are considered, though all downgrades into this current state, R, are grouped 
together and assigned the same value of the covariate for banks in this category. 
Similarly, all upgrades into the current state R are grouped together.  
The next section presents the various results on bank credit rating migration. Section 8.5 
starts by presenting the descriptive statistics to show the number and movements of 
banks in each rating grade for each year. This facilitates an initial view of the broad 
pattern of changes within the sample size. Further, the section present the results of a 
number of specifications of transition matrices based on both the cohort and the 
duration approach. In order to account for sampling errors, the confidence intervals for 
the estimated transition probabilities within each matrix are presented. In addition, this 
section presents the results of the ratings drift, and seeks to answer the question of 
whether the transition intensity of a bank being upgraded from a state depends on the 
current state being reached through a downgrade or an upgrade. Similarly, for 
downgrades: is there a tendency for a downgrade to be more likely if the current state 
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was reached through a downgrade? Finally, an ordered probit model estimate is 
presented to show the relative importance of the drivers of rating transition. 
8.5 Results 
 Descriptive statistics 8.5.1
Table 8.1 presents the credit rating distribution and relative frequencies per year across 
ratings classifications for the banks in the sample. The sample of banks employed in this 
study consists of 322 international commercial banks from 70 countries across the 
world. The ratings for these banks consist of Fitch’s Long Term bank credit ratings over 
the period 2000–2012. Panel A shows the actual number of ratings per category, while 
Panel B presents the relative frequencies for each rating category over time. The 
categories employed for this purpose are AA and above (‘very good rating’), A (‘good 
rating’), BBB (‘Fair rating’) and BB+ and below (‘Poor rating’). The study employs 
these four ‘coarse’ rating granularities in order to examine the transition of bank ratings 
across a shorter spectrum compared with say 9 categories. Further, it helps provide 
more rating data within each coarse category. Table 8.1 shows evidence of a shift in the 
distribution of credit ratings over time. The results provide a visual indication of the 
trends in changes in the credit quality of international banks over the sample period. An 
initial observation of the top rating class shows that ‘AA and above’ ratings have 
progressively increased up until 2007 when there was a global financial crisis. 
Conversely, the threshold rating category (BBB) and the speculative grades have been 
on the rise throughout the sample period, especially following the financial crisis. This 
trend is also evident in Figure 8.1, which displays a monotonic decrease in the 
proportion of banks in the higher investment-grade rating categories, as opposed to the 
increase in the number of banks in the lower rating categories.  
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Table 8.1: Banks credit rating distribution and relative frequencies per year 
 
The distribution shows that there are more banks in the lower rating categories (BBB 
and below) than the higher ones after the year 2000. An examination of the investment-
grade ratings (i.e. ratings in the category AA and above) shows a decline by 34% in the 
number of bank ratings in this category over the observed time period. Interestingly, the 
A-rated banks in the sample increased by 50% over the sample period. The lowest 
rating category (BB+ and below) experienced a 178% increase in the number of banks 
rated in this category between the start and end of the sample period.  
 
 
 
Panel A: Fitch Ratings, 2000-2012  
Rating            2000    2001    2002    2003    2004    2005    2006    2007    2008    2009    2010    2011    2012 
AA  
and above           32       36         39        39        41         43        46       47          43        33        34          24        21 
A            48       51         62        74        82         85        95       97        106      103      100        102        98  
BBB            37       49         64        80        81         81        77       82          81        92        97        104      114        
BB+ 
and below          33       43         68        84        90        101      100       96         92        94        91          92        89 
Total         150     179       233      277       294       310      318      322       322     322       322        322      322      
Panel B: Fitch Ratings, 2000-2012 (relative frequencies in %) 
Rating            2000    2001    2002    2003    2004    2005    2006    2007    2008    2009    2010    2011    2012 
AA  
and above           21       20         17        14        14         14        14       15         13        10         11         7          7 
A            32       28         27        27        28         27        30       30         33        32         31        32        30 
BBB            25       27         27        29        28         26        24       25         25        29         30        32        35  
BB+ 
and below           22       25         29        30        30         33        32      30         29        29         28         29        28 
Total (%)           100     100       100      100      100       100      100    100       100       100       100      100      100     
Note: Rating distribution per rating category for each year for the 322 rated banks in the sample. The figures represent the bank 
ratings in the different categories at the end of the calendar year. The 322 banks employed within this study are from the Bankscope 
database. The banks in the sample consists of listed banks commercial banks operating across the world for the period 2000-2012. 
Further, the banks employed are those rated as Long Term ratings by Fitch credit rating for the sample period. 
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Figure 8.1.  
Note: Yearly rating movement of the 322 speculative- and investment-grade banks in the sample.  
 
Figure 8.2 shows a downward sloping curve for the top investment rating grades (AA 
and above) and the speculative grade (BB+ and below), whereas the low investment- 
grade is represented by upward curves particularly after the financial crisis of 2007/08. 
Table 8.2 shows the movement in bank credit ratings for the sample period. There are 
831 year-end rating changes from 2000 through to 2012 for the 322 banks in the 
sample.  
These rating changes only reflect transitions at the beginning and year end and ignore 
changes during the year. The Table shows an increase in the number of rating changes 
between 2000 and 2012. The transition to a higher rating category (upgrade) is more 
prevalent in the period leading up to the financial crisis, while in the post crisis period, 
there were relatively more downgrades. For example, over the period the end of 2008-
2009, 69 banks were downgraded relative to 27 banks that had their ratings upgraded. 
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Figure 8.1: Yearly credit rating movements for investment- and speculative-
grade banks 
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Note: Yearly rating movement for 4 broad rating categories of the 322 rated banks in the sample  
 
Table 8.2: Year-on-Year bank credit rating movement 
 
 
Panel A: Fitch Ratings Bank Rating Movement, 2000-2012  
Rating          1999-   2000-    2001-     2002-   2003-    2004-     2005-    2006-   2007-     2008-   2009-     2010-    2011-     
movement          2000     2001     2002      2003     2004     2005      2006     2007     2008      2009     2010      2011     2012 
Downgrades       15      16         18           17        15        12            9          18         28     69 30           47        45 
Upgrades              8      10 13           37        51        51          82          51        48     27 43           33        34                    
Total            23      26 31          54        66         67          91          69        76     96          73           80        79 
Panel B: Fitch Ratings, 2000-2012 (relative frequencies in %) 
Rating          1999-   2000-    2001-     2002-   2003-    2004-     2005-    2006-   2007-     2008-   2009-     2010-    2011-     
movement          2000     2001     2002      2003     2004     2005      2006     2007     2008      2009     2010      2011     2012 
Downgrade         65       62         58         31        23        20           10          26        37            72         41          59         57             
Upgrades            35           28  42         69        77        80           90          74        63            28         59          41         43 
Total (%)         100        100       100       100      100       100         100       100        100        100      100         100       100     
Note: Credit rating movement per year for the 322 rated banks in the sample. It represents movement in rating at the end of each 
year. 
 
Year  
Figure 8.2: Yearly credit rating movements for investment- and speculative-
grade banks 
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 The Transition Matrix 8.5.2
Table 8.3 shows an unconditional one-year matrix for the 322 banks in the sample based 
on the cohort approach. The matrix displays the migration probabilities for international 
bank credit ratings over the period 2000-2012. In constructing the matrix, each year is 
weighted according to the number of ratings for that year in relation to the total of 
ratings for the whole period. Each row shows the ratings at the start of the period, while 
each column represents the final rating at the end of the period (in this case of the cohort 
approach, the year-end). The sum of the probabilities for each row is 100%. Based on 
the transition matrix in Table 8.3, an AA- rated bank has a 4% probability of being 
downgraded to A+, a 2% probability of being downgraded by two and three notches to 
A and A- respectively, and a 4% probability of an upgrade to AA rating. Although, the 
cohort approach is the traditional technique and is widely established, it does not make 
full use of the available data. The estimates within each cell do not take account of the 
timing and sequencing of a transition within a year. This is a major drawback as the 
approach only accounts for the beginning and end rating of the 13 year period, thus 
reflecting more long-term dynamics, without capturing the short-term dynamics. 
Another consequence is that the transition to low grade notches is often zero for high-
quality issuers (Loffler and Posch, 2011).  
Generally, credit risk migration matrices are said to be diagonally dominant, with most 
of the probability mass residing along the diagonal (Bangia et al., 2002). Table 8.3 
shows the large values that lie along the diagonal denote the probability of no change or 
migration. The next large entries are the one-step off diagonal entries. The Table shows 
that the chances of experiencing downgrades are more prevalent for the investment-
grade banks.  
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Table 8.3: Unconditional one-year transition matrix of 322 International rated banks 
(2000-2012) - Cohort approach 
       
  AAA AA+ AA AA- A+ A A- BBB+ BBB+ BBB- BB+ BB- BB B+ B B- CCC+ CCC D 
AAA 67% 33%                     
AA+   100%                     
AA   2% 89% 5% 2% 1% 1%                
AA-    4% 88% 4% 2% 2%                
A+     1% 91% 5% 2% 1%              
A      8% 80% 8% 3%  1%             
A-       2% 93% 5%              
BBB+        15% 81% 4%             
BBB-        2% 11% 84%       2%      
BBB-         3% 6% 88% 3%          
BB+           5% 9% 68% 18%         
BB-               100%         
BB             5% 15% 13% 45% 12% 10%      
B+                15% 62% 8% 15%     
B                3% 22% 44% 31%     
B-                  35% 65%     
CCC+                   29% 71%    
CCC                     100%   
D                                     100% 
Notes: The blank spaces on the diagonals are due to no observations. The matrix is unconditional, i.e. does not reflect the impact of previous ratings on current ratings. The weightings for each year are on the 
basis of the number of observations that each year contributes to the total number of observations. The shaded cells along the diagonal show the probabilities of a bank staying within the rating category. The 
values to the left of the shaded cells indicate upgrades, while those to the right of the shaded cells indicate rating downgrades. Following Hu et al. (2002), if there are no observations in a particular category, 
such as CCC and D, 100% is placed in the corresponding diagonal position in the matrix
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Similarly, banks within this classification are more likely to experience further 
downgrades, and hence may be said to travel a greater distance. For example, this can 
be observed in the case of AA- rated banks. This finding is consistent with earlier 
studies (DeServigny and Renault, 2004; Gonzalez et al. 2004; Ali and Zhang, 2008). 
Table 8.3 indicates that AA-rated banks have a 4%, 2% and 2% chance of being 
downgraded by one, two, and even three notches respectively, which constitute rather 
substantial rating changes. Conversely, there is a relatively higher probability of 
upgrades for the banks in the speculative rating categories than downgrades. 
The results are interesting when the sample is split into an expansion and contraction 
period. The thesis takes the period 2000-2007 as an expansion (or boom period), while 
the period 2008-2012 is assumed to be a contraction due to the impact of the global 
financial crisis and associated economic slowdown. The transition matrices for these 
two periods are presented in Tables 8.4 and 8.5. Table 8.4 shows that during the time of 
expansion, the values of the default diagonal probabilities are higher, with relative low 
level of movements in the investment grades. The banks in the speculative grades show 
more movement in their transition to higher rating notches during the expansion period. 
Table 8.5 which displays the transition matrix during a contracting period shows a 
higher likelihood of downgrades, especially in the investment rating categories. Banks 
tend to experience subsequent downgrading particularly in the investment categories 
during the contraction periods. In addition, Tables 8.3 and 8.5 show significant 
volatility in bank ratings for investment grades, biased in particular towards the right of 
the diagonal. Further, the Tables show that rating upgrades for investment categories 
involve single rating notch improvement. For the lower rating categories (speculative-
grades) in the two tables, there is a higher likelihood of upgrades, while in Table 8.5, 
despite the contraction period, the level of downgrades is relatively lower than those 
experienced for upgrades. 
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Table 8.4: Unconditional one-year transition matrix of 322 International rated banks (2000-2007) - Cohort approach 
        
  AAA AA+ AA AA- A+ A A- BBB+ BBB+ BBB- BB+ BB- BB B+ B B- CCC+ CCC D 
AAA 67% 33%                     
AA+   100%                     
AA   1% 92% 2% 3% 2%                 
AA-    2% 91% 4% 3%                 
A+     4% 85% 5% 4% 2%              
A      8% 80% 8% 3%  1%             
A-       2% 93% 5%              
BBB+        15% 81% 4%             
BBB+        2% 11% 84%       2%      
BBB-         3% 6% 88% 3%          
BB+           5% 9% 68% 18%         
BB-               100%         
BB             5% 15% 13% 45% 12% 10%      
B+                15% 62% 8% 15%     
B               10% 3% 12% 44% 31%     
B-                 13% 22% 65%     
CCC+                   29% 71%    
CCC                     100%   
D                                     100% 
Notes: The blank spaces on the diagonals are due to no observations. The matrix is unconditional; i.e.it does not reflect the impact of previous ratings on current ratings. The weightings for each year are on the 
basis of the number of observations that each year contributes to the total number of observations. The shaded cells along the diagonal show the probabilities of a bank staying within a rating category. The 
values to the left of the shaded cells indicate an upgrade, while those to the right of the shaded cells indicate rating downgrades. Following Hu et al. (2002), if there are no observations in a particular category, 
such as CC and C, 100% is placed in the corresponding diagonal position in the matrix  
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 Table 8.5: Unconditional one-year transition matrix of 322 International rated banks (2007-2012) - Cohort approach 
        
  AAA AA+ AA AA- A+ A A- BBB+ BBB+ BBB- BB+ BB- BB B+ B B- CCC CC  C 
AAA 100%                      
AA+   100%                     
AA   3% 81% 10% 3% 2% 1%                
AA-    6% 78% 7% 6% 4%                
A+     4% 85% 5% 4% 2%              
A      8% 80% 8% 3%  1%             
A-       2% 93% 5%              
BBB+        15% 81% 4%             
BBB+        2% 11% 84%       2%      
BBB-         3% 6% 88% 3%          
BB+           5% 9% 68% 18%         
BB-               100%         
BB              13% 75% 12% 10%      
B+                15% 62% 8% 15%     
B                3% 22% 44% 31%     
B-                  35% 65%     
CCC                   29% 71%    
CC                      100%   
C                                     100% 
Notes: The blank spaces on the diagonals are due to no observations. The matrix is unconditional, i.e. it does not reflect the impact of previous ratings on  current ratings. The weightings for each year are on the 
basis of the number of observations that each year contributes to the total number of observations. The shaded cells along the diagonal show the probabilities of a bank staying within a rating category. The 
values to the left of the shaded cells indicate an upgrade, while those to the right of the shaded cells indicate rating downgrades. Following Hu et al. (2002), if there are no observations in a particular category, 
such as CC and C, 100% is placed in the corresponding diagonal position in the matrix 
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 Table 8.4 shows that banks rated in the speculative grade mostly benefit from an 
expansion period compared to banks in the investment grades. The latter are relatively 
more stable and show higher values along the diagonal entries of the transition matrix.     
Overall, the results show that there are adverse effects of downgrades between 2008 and 
2012, particularly for banks in the investment grades. There is an element of rating drift 
or momentum as depicted by the ‘distance travelled’ by ratings over time. This is in 
contrast to Johnson (2003) who finds a tendency for downgrades to travel more grades 
for lower investment categories than for higher categories. Splitting the sample into 
expansion and contraction periods is also informative in the sense that the directions 
(upgrades/downgrades) can be more clearly examined. In an expansion regime, there is 
greater stability for investment grade banks, while banks in the speculative grades 
benefit more from movement to the higher notches. However, in a contraction period, 
there is more prevalence of downgrades for investment rated categories than in the 
lower grades. Further, banks in the investment grades appear to travel a longer distance 
than is the case for the speculative grades.  
This next section presents the results of the maximum-likelihood estimator of the 
generator of bank credit rating transition based upon the continuous-time observation 
over the sample period. The one-year transition matrix estimated from continuous-time 
data over the period 2000-2012 as the matrix exponential of the transition of the 
maximum likelihood estimator of the generator is presented in Table 8.6. The results of 
the one-year transition matrix are based on the continuous-time duration approach. 
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Table 8.6: Conditional one-year transition matrix of 322 International rated banks (2000-2012) - Duration approach 
  AAA AA+ AA AA- A+ A A- BBB+ BBB+ BBB- BB+ BB- BB B+ B B- CCC CC  C 
AAA 52% 48%                     
AA+   68% 26% 6%                   
AA  1% 5% 72% 13% 4% 3% 2%                
AA-   2% 6% 69% 10% 5% 4%  4%              
A+     4% 80% 4% 4% 6% 2%             
A     3% 5% 81% 8% 3%  1%             
A-      1% 2% 82% 6% 5% 4%           
BBB+       6% 10% 77% 4% 3%           
BBB+       1% 3% 5% 88%  2%     1%      
BBB-         2% 6% 89% 3%          
BB+           5% 14% 69% 10% 2%        
BB-           3%  4% 8% 82% 1% 2%       
BB           1% 5% 5% 9% 70% 6% 4%      
B+              1% 3% 10% 66% 8% 12%     
B                8% 16% 52% 11% 13%    
B-                  35% 65%     
CCC                   33% 77%    
CC                      100%   
C                                     100% 
 Notes: The blank spaces on the diagonals are due to no observations. The matrix is conditional, i.e. it reflects the impact of previous ratings on current ratings. The weightings for each year are 
on the basis of the number of observations that each year contributes to the total number of observations as well as the duration of the ratings on each grade. The shaded cells along the diagonal 
show the probabilities of a bank staying within the rating category. The values to the left of the shaded cells indicate an upgrade, while those to the right of the shaded cells indicate rating 
downgrades. Following Hu et al. (2002), if there are no observations in a particular category, such as CCC and D, 100% is placed in the corresponding diagonal position in the matrix. 
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The approach takes into consideration the duration spent on each rating grade, before 
transiting (either to a lower or higher grade
14
). 
The initial observation shows that the diagonal values are much lower when compared 
to the corresponding results for the cohort approach in Table 8.3. This suggests that the 
duration approach presents a dynamic view to rating transition, enabling the capture of 
more movement within each rating category. There is a greater tendency for downward 
movements (downgrades) within the investment category. This might be related to the 
concept of downward momentum. Ratings also tend to travel greater distance within the 
higher investment grades, particularly towards the right of the matrix. For banks that are 
within the non-investment grade categories, there is an observed movement towards the 
left of matrix; however, the distance travelled within this category is much smaller than 
that observed for the investment category. Overall, the increase in rating movements 
could be attributed to the ability of the duration approach to capture ratings within 
periods, and account for the impact of duration of the shift in rating gradation.  
When taken together, these descriptive statistics show an interesting pattern in the 
behaviour of bank credit rating agencies in the pre and post crisis periods. The pre-crisis 
period shows a progressive increase in the proportion of banks assigned top ratings. One 
may argue that there were high levels of complacency in the rating industry, particularly 
with the over reliance of the market on ratings. The oligopoly nature of the credit rating 
industry, where only three CRAs dominate, results in reduced marketplace competition. 
With very minimal threats to competition, these agencies are likely to be more 
complacent in their methodologies. Further, the regulatory reliance on credit ratings, 
                                                 
14
 The first entry is via a generator matrix 𝜆, and the elements of the matrix are estimated using the 
maximum likelihood estimator given in Equation 8.10. The generator matrix is then multiplied by the 
scalar T and expressed as an exponential function (see Equation 8.12). 
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particularly the Nationally Recognised Statistically Rating Organisations (NRSRO), 
suggests that regulations may have artificially boosted the demand for ratings. One also 
cannot rule out the lack of investors’ due diligence and monitoring of the credit rating 
agencies on the complacency in the industry. This may also be attributed to the pressure 
by the market on the CRAs and their need to err on the side of caution whilst 
(re)assigning ratings to banks.  
 Results of the test for non-Markovian behaviour in bank credit rating 8.5.3
migration  
This section presents the findings of the tests for non-Markovian behaviour, i.e. rating 
drift. This is based on the argument that the history of the rating migration process, and 
not just the current state, provides information about transition probabilities. In addition, 
it presents the results of the waiting-time effects, i.e. the effects of the duration that a 
bank stays on a particular rating on its transition to another state. 
The analysis thus examines if the transition intensity of being upgraded from a 
particular state depends on whether the current state was reached through a downgrade 
or an upgrade. Similarly, it considers whether downgrades are more prevalent if the 
current state was reached through a downgrade
15
. Table 8.7 presents the results of the 
effects of a previous downgrade on the transition intensities of a downgrade to a 
neighbouring rating state. The Table shows an estimate of the parameter of interest ?̂? as 
well as the hazard ratio, exp(?̂?). To recall, the statistical test is for the hypothesis of no 
rating drift (𝐻: 𝛽 = 0), i.e. no serial correlation in any rating class of previous upgrades 
and downgrades. The findings show strong evidence of downward momentum or drift 
                                                 
15
 This thesis follows Lando and Skodeberg (2002) by considering different ways of reaching the current. 
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in the upper investment categories (i.e. rating class AAA to A-). The estimates of the 
beta coefficients for the investment grades are statistically significant at the 1% level. In 
contrast, the lower investment rating categories and speculative grades have beta 
estimates that are insignificant; hence the hypothesis of no rating drift is accepted for 
these categories. In addition, the magnitude of this drift increases as one move down the 
rating categories, from a higher to a lower rating. The rating drift diminishes once the 
speculative grade category is crossed.   
This result in Table 8.7 is consistent with Lando and Skodeberg (2002) who find no 
evidence of rating momentum in their subsample of financial institutions within the 
speculative categories. The finding suggests that there is a strong tendency for banks to 
lose their competitive edge in the market once their ratings cross the BBB- threshold. In 
such a case, the bank may be forced to merge or be acquired by a bigger financial 
institution. Hence, the likelihood of finding a significant downward drift within the 
speculative grade for bank diminishes. 
Table 8.8 presents similar results for rating upgrades, where the intensity of an upgrade 
is estimated on the basis of the pathway into the current state being an upgrade. In 
contrast to the results obtained in Table 8.7, there are no significant beta estimates 
except for categories A+ and BBB+. Hence, the results presented in Tables 8.7 and 8.8 
are consistent with those found in literature (Lucas and Lonski, 1992; Carty, 1997; 
Lando and Skodeberg, 2002; Guettler and Raupach, 2007) for the existence of rating 
drift for downgrades.  
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__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Ratings 
_____________________ 
From  To  ?̂? exp(?̂?)  std(?̂?)  𝑛1  𝑛2  p 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
AA+ AA  0.714 2.042  0.221    25  23  <0.01 
AA AA-  0.822 2.275  0.254  107  18  <0.01 
AA- A+  0.802 2.230  0.209  347                 36  <0.01 
A+ A  0.839 2.094  0.185  324                 42  <0.01 
A A-  1.005 2.732  0.339  380                 46  <0.01 
A- BBB+  1.154 3.711  0.286  400                 58  <0.01 
BBB+ BBB  1.099 3.001  0.299  645                 63  <0.01 
BBB BBB-  0.867 2.380  2.256  357                 59  <0.01 
BBB- BB+  0.684 1.981  2.015  336                 53    0.66 
BB+ BB  0.154 1.166  0.083  196                 36                   0.89   
BB BB-  0.264 1.302  0.025  268                 43    0.20 
BB- B+  0.361 1.435  0.116  310  55    0.42 
B+ B  0.514 1.672  0.108  175  42  <0.01 
B B-  0.551 1.734  0.126  148  23  <0.01 
B- CCC+  3.214     24.878               16.141  166         9    0.36 
CCC+ CCC  5.551   257.495  6.611    15    3    0.49 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: The first column in Table 8.7 shows the type of transition being examined. The estimate of β is presented in the second column. The sign of the 
β coefficient shows the direction of the downgrade intensity. A positive (negative) β means that the downgrade intensity is increased (decreased) by a 
factor of exp(β) compared to the case of a previous upgrade. std(?̂?) shows the standard deviation of the estimate. 𝑛1  represents the number of times a 
bank is rated and exposed to the given rating  type of transition at the start of the year , i.e. the total number of observations in the ‘From’ rating 
category. 𝑛2  shows the actual number of transitions observed. The p-value is the test statistic and a result <0.01 is significant at below the 1% level.  
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Ratings 
_____________________ 
From  To  ?̂? exp(?̂?)  std(?̂?)  𝑛1  𝑛2  p 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
AA+ AAA  -0.237 0.789  0.514     25    0  0.75 
AA AA+  -0.106 0.900  0.318   107  13  0.36 
AA- AA  -0.098 0.907  0.295   347  19  0.29 
A+ AA-  -0.384 0.681  0.254   324  38              <0.01 
A A+  -0.216 0.806  0.236   380  26  0.11 
A- A   0.254 1.299  0.594   400  32  0.26 
BBB+ A-   0.609 1.839  0.397   645  44               <0.01 
BBB BBB+   0.554 1.740  0.484   357  39  0.22 
BBB- BBB   0.235 1.265  0.398   336  40  0.31 
BB+ BBB-  -0.627 0.534  1.214   196  38  0.18 
BB BB+  -0.189 0.828  0.192   268  22                 0.32   
BB- BB   0.226 1.254  0.354   310  44  0.66 
B+ BB-  -3.647 0.026               11.647   175   23  0.49 
B B+  -2.214 0.109                 5.251   148  31  0.53 
B- B   0.506 1.659  0.268   166  49  0.18 
CCC+ B-                 -2.661      0.070                4.581     15    6  0.26 
CCC CCC+                -6.524       0.001               19.515     20     2  0.94 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: The first column in Table 8.8 shows the type of transition being examined. The estimate of β is presented in the second column. The sign of the 
β coefficient shows the direction of the upgrade intensity. A positive (negative) β means that the upgrade intensity is increased (decreased) by a factor 
of exp(β) compared to the case of a previous downgrade. The estimate, std( ?̂?) shows the standard deviation of the estimate. 𝑛1  represents the number 
of times a bank is rated and exposed to the given rating  type of transition at the start of the year, i.e. the total number of observations in the ‘From’ 
rating category. 𝑛2  shows the actual number of transitions observed. The p-value is the test statistic and a result <0.01 is significant at below the 1% 
level.  
 
 
 
 
 
Tables 8.9 and 8.10 show the results of the waiting-time effects (duration) in the initial 
rating grade (labelled ‘From’) on the transition intensity of a downgrade to a 
neighbouring state. Again, these aim to test whether the time a bank rating stays on a 
particular rating grade influences downgrade or upgrade intensity. The hypothesis being 
tested in this case is that duration has no influence on bank rating transition intensity. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8.7: Results showing the effects of a previous downgrade on the transition 
intensities of a downgrade to a neighbouring state 
Table 8.8: Results showing the effects of a previous upgrade on the transition 
intensities of an upgrade to a neighbouring state 
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__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Ratings 
_____________________ 
From  To  ?̂? exp(?̂?)  std(?̂?)  𝑛1  𝑛2  p 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
AAA AA+  -0.401     0.669  0.195      0    0  <0.01 
AA+ AA  -0.395 0.674  0.151    25  23  <0.01 
AA AA-  -0.255 0.775  0.028  107  18  <0.01 
AA- A+  -0.613 0.542  0.147  347  36  <0.01 
A+ A  -0.224 0.799  0.209  324  42  <0.01 
A A-  -0.509 0.601  0.072  380  46  <0.01 
A- BBB+  -0.457 0.633  0.093  400  58  <0.01 
BBB+ BBB  -0.358 0.699  0.138  645  63  <0.01 
BBB BBB-  -0.251 0.778  0.051  357  59  <0.01 
BBB- BB+  -0.361 0.696  0.064  336  53  <0.01 
BB+ BB  -0.284 0.753  0.107  196  36                 <0.01   
BB BB-  -0.368 0.692  0.039  268  43  <0.05 
BB- B+  -0.254 0.776  0.074  310  55  <0.01 
B+ B  -0.528 0.590  0.118  175  42  <0.01 
B B-  -0.351 0.704  0.261  148  23  <0.01 
B- CCC+  -1.624     0.197                 0.681  166    9  <0.01 
CCC+ CCC  -0.821     0.440  0.021    15    3  <0.01 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: The first column in Table 8.9 shows the type of transition being examined. The estimate of β is presented in the second column. The sign of the 
β coefficient shows the direction of the downgrade intensity. A positive (negative) β means that the downgrade intensity is increased (decreased) after 
duration of t by a factor of exp(βt) compared to the case where the duration has no effect. std( ?̂?) shows the standard deviation of the estimate. 𝑛1  
represents the number of times a bank is rated and exposed to the given rating type of transition at the start of the year, i.e. the total number of 
observations in the ‘From’ rating category. 𝑛2  shows the actual number of transitions observed. The p-value is the test statistic, and a result <0.01 is 
significant at below the 1% level. There is a high level of significantly negative effects of duration in all rating grades. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8.9 shows that in all cases of downgrade transition, the hypothesis that the 
waiting-time effects (duration) has no influence on downward drift are rejected. The 
estimate of beta (?̂?) shows a negative sign, which suggests that the intensity is 
negatively affected by a change in duration. In other words, the longer a bank stays in a 
particular rating grade, the lower the chances of it being further downgraded.  It is 
observed that the exp(?̂?) function is less than 116, and this supports the explanation of a 
negative effect of waiting-time. 
Similar to the results obtained for downgrades in Table 8.9, the results in Table 8.10 
show highly significant negative effects of waiting-time for transition intensity of an 
upgrade to a neighbouring state. In Table 8.10, the longer a bank stays in the particular 
                                                 
16 When the exp(?̂?) function is 1, then the hypothesis that duration has no effect on transition intensity is 
accepted. However, a value of more than 1 shows a positive influence, while a value of less than 1 shows 
a negative influence. If 𝛽 is negative, the exp(?̂?) function is less than 1. Thus, the intensity 𝛼𝑗𝑖(𝑡) =
𝛼𝑗0(𝑡)exp (𝛽𝑍(𝑡)𝑗𝑖 is negatively affected by a change in duration (the longer a bank stays on a rating class, the lower 
its likelihood of transiting to a downgrade category). 
Table 8.9: Results from a test of the effect of duration (waiting-time effects) in an 
initial rating category (‘From’) on the transition intensity of a downgrade to a 
neighbouring state 
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__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Ratings 
_____________________ 
From  To  ?̂? exp(?̂?)  std(?̂?)  𝑛1  𝑛2  p 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
AA+ AAA  -0.124 0.883  0.021    25    0    0.91 
AA AA+  -0.328 0.720  0.084  107  13  <0.01 
AA- AA  -0.147 0.863  0.066  347  19  <0.01 
A+ AA-  -0.267 0.766  0.102  324  38                 <0.01 
A A+  -0.443 0.642  0.118  380  26  <0.01 
A- A  -0.254 0.776  0.038  400    32  <0.01 
BBB+ A-  -0.548 0.578  0.069  645  44                 <0.01 
BBB BBB+  -0.638 0.528  0.110  357  39  <0.01 
BBB- BBB  -0.251 0.778  0.054  336  40  <0.01 
BB+ BBB-  -0.333 0.717  0.039  196  38  <0.01 
BB BB+  -0.235 0.791  0.061  268  22                 <0.01 
BB- BB  -0.284 0.753  0.055  310  44  <0.01 
B+ BB-  -0.355 0.701                 0.101  175    23  <0.01 
B B+  -0.284 0.753                 0.183  148  31  <0.01 
B- B  -0.506 0.603  0.324  166  49  0.21 
CCC+ B-                -0.847       0.427                0.515    15    6  0.32 
CCC CCC+                -6.524       0.001               19.515    20    2  0.94 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: The first column in Table 8.10 shows the type of transition being examined. The estimate of β is presented in the second column. The sign of 
the β coefficient shows the direction of the upgrade intensity. A positive (negative) β means that the upgrade intensity is increased (decreased) after 
duration of t by a factor of exp(βt) compared to a case where the duration has no effect. The estimate, std( ?̂?) shows the standard deviation of the 
estimate. 𝑛1  represents the number of times a bank is rated and exposed to the given rating  type of transition at the start of the year , i.e. the total 
number of observations in the ‘From’ rating category. 𝑛2  shows the actual number of transitions observed. The p-value is the test statistic and a result 
<0.01 is significant at below the 1% level. There is a high level of significantly negative effects of duration in most ratin g grades.
grade of interest (labelled ‘From’ in the table), the lower its chances of being upgraded. 
Taken together, the findings in Tables 8.9 and 8.10 show that the longer a bank stays on 
a particular (current) rating, the lower the probability of moving to a neighbouring 
rating.  
It should be noted that this thesis only tests the duration relating to downward and 
upward drifts. The results are also consistent with the position of most of the major 
credit rating agencies in terms of maintaining rating stability. In addition, existing 
studies (e.g. Altman and Rijken, 2004) argue that rating information shows a high level 
of stability over time. 
 
The direction, from which a rating grade is attained, as well as the duration in the 
previous state, has considerable influence on the downward intensity. However, for 
upgrades, the results show that the pathway to the current rating grade is insignificant in 
Table 8.10: Results of a test of the effect of duration (waiting-time effects) in an initial 
rating category (‘From’) on the transition intensity of a upgrade grade to a 
neighbouring state 
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most cases. Further, consistent with the results for downgrades, the waiting-time effects 
appear to be very prominent, and significantly affect the transition intensity for a 
neighbouring rating state. 
8.6 Summary 
This chapter presents an examination of bank credit rating migration. It seeks to 
investigate trends in bank credit quality over time by examining the movements of 
banks in each rating grade for each year. By constructing transition matrices on the 
basis of both discrete and continuous observations, as well as presenting separate 
matrices for boom and contraction periods, this study provides an insight into the 
distance that rating downgrades/upgrades travel. Put differently, the chapter provides 
more explanation of the nature of the overall trend of bank credit ratings during the 
period of the study. In addition, data on global banks is employed to address the 
question of rating drift and duration effects on transition migration, as well as the 
influence of covariates. The study employs the ordered probit model specifications 
developed in the previous chapter (and employed in Blume et al., 1998), and extends 
these to include year dummy variables for both investment grade and non-investment 
grade banks in order to test whether there  exists downward rating momentum or simply 
a convergence towards the investment grade threshold. 
The initial results from the 831 year-end rating changes from 2000 through to 2012 for 
the 322 banks in the sample show a downward sloping curve for the top investment 
rating grades, while the lower grades are represented by upward curves. This suggests 
one of three things: (1) a simple convergence towards the investment threshold; (2) an 
observed downward rating drift for the top rated banks; and (3) the presence of duration 
effects. Both the cohort and duration approach to the transition matrix are further 
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explored to investigate bank credit rating transition. The unconditional one-year 
transition matrix based on the cohort approach shows more stability than the duration 
approach that employs continuous rating data. This is evidenced by the higher value 
observed along the diagonal of the matrices. This suggests that the duration approach is 
more appropriate in capturing the behaviour of bank ratings over time. Further, the 
distance travelled within the different rating grades, particularly those in the top 
investment grades, is higher than for lower grades.  
In order to test for ratings drift, this thesis follows the approach by Lando and 
Skodeberg (2002) and finds strong evidence of a downward momentum or drift in the 
top investment categories. In contrast, the hypothesis of no rating drift is accepted for 
those rating in the lower rating categories. For upgrades, insignificant results are 
observed, suggesting no rating drift for upgrades within the sample. In addition, the 
thesis presents the results of the impact of duration on rating transition. The general 
conclusion is that the longer a bank stays on a particular (current) rating, the lower the 
probability of moving to a neighbouring rating. The results are consistent with the 
position of most major CRAs in terms of maintaining rating stability.  
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 CONCLUSION CHAPTER 9.
 
9.1 Introduction 
Company credit ratings and the agencies that issue them have become a critical 
component of financial markets. The spotlight on credit rating agencies has become 
very intense, particularly following the 2007/08 financial crisis. The primary role of a 
credit rating is to serve as a benchmark for the likelihood of default for companies and 
their issue. For rating agencies, there exists a trade-off between rating stability and 
rating accuracy. Langohr and Langohr (2008) argue that this trade-off aims to achieve 
the maximum accuracy for a given level of stability, or, reflecting the maximum 
stability for a given degree of accuracy. Due to the complexity of the rating process and 
the many issues around the role of ratings in financial markets, this study sets out to 
investigate empirically three important aspects of bank credit ratings. 
Following the establishment and application of several testable frameworks and models, 
this study achieved its main objectives of empirically investigating the determinants and 
impact of bank credit ratings. The first main objective of this thesis is to examine the 
variables driving the assignment of ratings to banks. The thesis identifies the main 
determinants of international bank credit ratings by employing a unique data set over 
the period 2000-2012. Further, it employs various model specifications, both parametric 
and non-parametric, within an event study methodological approach to investigate the 
impact that bank credit rating news announcements have on the behaviour of bank 
equity returns. In addition, the thesis investigates bank credit rating growth and 
dynamics, focusing on rating migration, that is, the historical pattern of ratings, and 
examines the presence of non-Markovian behaviour in bank credit rating transition. 
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One of the main motivations of the thesis is to provide an in-depth understanding of the 
issues surrounding bank credit ratings in the face of a paucity of empirical studies in this 
area. Whilst studies by Poon (2003), Poon et al. (2009), Poon and Chan (2010) focus on 
the determinants of bank unsolicited ratings, others, e.g. Bissoondoyal-Bheenick and 
Treepongkaruna (2009) examines solicited ratings. In addition, whereas, Jafry and 
Schuermann (2004) employ financial data as part of their study, no single study 
investigates the issue of non-Markovian behaviour, particularly rating drift or 
momentum within a bank rating transition setting. 
This thesis employs a sample of listed international banks over the period 2000–2012. 
The sample consists of 322 Fitch rated banks. Further, it employs further secondary data 
from a variety of sources. The financial and market data are taken from BANKSCOPE 
database. Most of the non-financial data are manually collected from bank annual 
financial statements. Finally, the bank credit ratings are themselves collected from 
BANKSCOPE and Fitch long-term credit rating database. 
9.2 Main findings 
The discussion of the main findings of this thesis focuses on the three areas 
investigated. Chapter 6 presents the empirical results of the determinant models for 
international bank credit ratings. The study finds that across all the specifications 
employed, the CAMELS framework components, that is, capital adequacy, asset quality, 
earnings, liquidity and sensitivity to the market are all statistically significant 
determinants of international bank credit ratings. The measure of the capital adequacy, 
TIER 1, shows a positive relationship with a bank’s credit rating. The quality of bank 
assets, as measured by, LLR/GL, is negatively related to bank credit ratings. The 
variable measuring bank earnings (ROA), and liquidity (INTER), both have a  positive 
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relationship with bank credit ratings. The results obtained within this empirical 
component of the thesis broadly support the hypotheses stated and are consistent with 
the limited number of existing studies employing bank data. These findings reinforce 
the importance of a bank-specific, quantitative measure of balance sheet strength in the 
assigning of a credit rating to a bank. Langohr and Langohr (2008) argue that in the 
determination of a bank’s probability of default, the financial strength rating evaluation 
comes first. The importance of financial strength ratings on banks further highlights the 
importance of the CAMELS system in the rating process.  
This thesis makes a significant contribution to the body of knowledge in the area of 
bank credit rating determination, by employing variables that capture the too-big-to-fail 
notion as well as corporate governance factors related to this. It indicates that the 
variable too-big-to-fail is consistently significant across all model specifications. Credit 
rating agencies perceive the propensity to receive external support by banks as 
beneficial, and reward banks based on their size and connectedness within the financial 
system and economy at large. The coefficient of the variable, too-big-to-fail, shows a 
positive relation with bank credit ratings. This result is important since it confirms the 
necessity of initiatives to reduce systemic risk ‘too-big-to-fail’ banks pose Following 
the financial crisis of 2007/08, there has been a global response on tackling the too-big-
to-fail issue in banking. The efforts in the EU are led by the UK government following 
the recommendation of the Vickers Commission and the subsequent passing into law of 
the UK Banking Reform Act (2013). One of the key sections relates to the proposed 
implementation of the ring-fencing, which has a significant implication for the structure 
and business model of banks in the UK. Within the EU, the Liikanen Report (2012) 
draws from the Vickers and makes recommendations similar to those in the UK. These 
regulatory changes have significant implications for the rating processes and the way 
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credit rating agencies assign ratings to banks. A move away from the ‘size’ factor, 
towards a ‘smaller’ and more efficiently run banking institutions presents an interesting 
development, not just for the rating agencies, but for the market as whole.   
In addition to the too-big-to-fail impact on the rating framework, the results from the 
thesis confirm the importance of a range of corporate governance measures (directors’ 
shareholdings, institutional ownership and the proportion of independent directors on 
the board of directors) as important factors in determining bank ratings, thereby 
supporting the hypotheses stated. Directors’ shareholdings, institutional ownership and 
the proportion of independent directors all exhibit a significant and positive relationship 
with bank credit ratings.  
With the continued efficiency in the way financial markets are run, Chapter 7 
investigates the information relevance of bank credit ratings, and conducts an event 
study over a short horizon. It tests the hypothesis that, on average, bank credit rating 
announcements have no impact on bank stock returns around the announcement date. 
This empirical component of the study is based on the theoretic framework that the 
financial market operates in an efficient manner and all available information is 
incorporated rapidly into security prices. There is, however, strong existing evidence 
that financial markets may not be operating with strong-form market efficiency 
(Schwert, 2003, Park and Irwin, 2007). The claims of major credit rating agencies to 
possess private information, reported cases of insider trading, and the sophistication of 
institutional investors in accessing non-public information support this position. The 
general results from the existing literature are that upgrade announcements are not 
associated with any significant stock price movement, whereas downgrade 
announcements produce significant negative abnormal returns around the date of the 
news announcement.  
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The results of the news events tests provide evidence of asymmetric reactions in bank 
stock returns to credit rating news announcements across announcement types. For the 
full sample of bank upgrades, the parametric approaches show significant (positive) 
news leakage and partial correction in the market following the date of a bank rating 
upgrade announcement. Overall, the results for the bank stock reactions for upgrades 
are consistent with the existing literature. This thesis adds to the body of knowledge by 
investigating subsets of rating announcements within both upgrade and downgrade 
settings. For upgrades within the investment grades, the results show significant positive 
event-day reactions for both the parametric and non-parametric approaches. This is an 
interesting finding considering that most of the existing studies on the effects of 
‘positive news’ provide evidence of no significant market reactions. 
Contrary to the results for bank stocks within the investment-grades, the bank upgrade 
announcements within the speculative-grade show neither significant daily abnormal 
returns, nor cumulative average abnormal returns in either the parametric or 
nonparametric approaches. This asymmetry in market reaction may be due to investors 
(and in particular institutional investors) paying less attention to speculative grade bank 
stocks. In addition, the major credit ratings agencies may be more interested in actively 
monitoring bank stocks in the investment-grades. The results of bank stock reactions to 
unanticipated news show no evidence of news leakages, and the magnitude of event day 
reactions are higher across all the parametric and nonparametric approaches than in the 
other specifications. The bank stock downgrade news announcements are studied using 
the same specifications as for the upgrades. The general results for the downgrade 
specifications are consistent with existing studies and suggests that ‘bad’ news in the 
form of downgrades triggers significant market reactions. Hence, the market pays more 
attention to downgrade announcements than it does to upgrades. 
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Chapter 8 examines the trends in credit rating transition for the sample of international 
banks. The bank credit rating migration matrices are more diagonally dominant in the 
cohort approach than in the duration approach. This implies that the duration approach 
presents a more dynamic view of rating transition by allowing for the capture of more 
movement within each rating category. Generally, the probability of experiencing 
downgrades is higher for investment-grade banks than for speculative-grade banks. In 
addition, during a period of economic expansion the values of the diagonal probabilities 
are more dominant relative to periods of economic slowdown.   
The chapter goes on to discuss the results of the tests for the presence of non-Markovian 
behaviour in bank credit rating transition. The results of the two non-Markovian 
behaviour tests, the rating drift and the waiting-time effect tests, show very strong 
evidence of downward momentum or drift in the top investment-grades (AAA to A-). In 
contrast, the hypothesis of no rating drift is accepted for banks in the lower investment-
grade and speculative-grade ratings. Further, the magnitude of the rating drift increases 
from higher to lower rating categories, diminishing once the speculative-grade category 
is crossed. With regard to the hypothesis that duration has no influence on bank rating 
transition intensity, the results show that the longer a bank stays in a particular rating 
grade, the lower the chances of it being further upgraded or downgraded. In addition, 
the pathway direction from which a rating grade is attained and the duration it was 
situated in the previous state have a significant impact on downgrade intensity, but not 
on upgrade intensity.  
9.3 Policy implications and recommendations of the thesis 
The three empirical issues around international bank credit ratings which this thesis 
addresses have significant policy implications for both the credit rating and the banking 
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industry. The 2007/08 financial crisis shows that the decision by credit rating agencies 
to assign ratings to banks has important systemic consequences. This is driven by the 
strong link between the credit rating actions and the continued over-reliance on credit 
ratings by regulators, banks and investors, as well as market reactions to ratings. This 
thesis further reinforces the current policy debates around the reliability and over-
reliance of credit ratings, the need for regulatory reforms and oversights of the credit 
rating industry and the need to hold credit ratings accountable for their rating actions. 
With regulatory reforms already initiated in the US (the Dodd-Frank Act, 2010) and the 
EU (with the emergence of the European Securities and Market Authority - ESMA in 
2011) to tackle the issues of disclosure, transparency and conflicts of interest, this thesis 
presents empirical evidence of the continued importance of ratings in the financial 
market.  
9.4 The contributions of the thesis 
This thesis contributes to the existing body of knowledge on credit ratings in many 
different ways. Firstly, the thesis employs a novel and rich dataset of international banks 
from the period 2000–2012. By employing this dataset, it is able to update the empirical 
literature on bank credit ratings, and enables a comparison with existing studies. It 
provides a detailed insight into the main determinants of bank credit ratings, and as such 
contributes to the formulation of a conceptualised framework for modelling rating 
determinants. Most of the earlier studies of rating determination employ a 
contemporaneous specification where credit rating agencies effect rating actions 
following the review of the financial and non-financial position of a bank within the 
same period. This thesis employs both responsive and predictive time-specifications in 
addition to the contemporaneous specification, modelling the exact time dynamics 
concerning the determinants of international bank credit ratings.  
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Secondly, this thesis extends the current literature by employing several new non-
financial variables that are hypothesised to influence international bank credit ratings. It 
employs sovereign rating information to capture the diverse operating environment of 
banks across countries within the different model specifications. Another important 
extension to the existing literature is the incorporation of a variable that measures the 
propensity of a bank to get external support, that is, Fitch’s too-big-to-fail index. This is 
an important addition, particularly against the backdrop of the 2007/08 global crisis.  
Thirdly, the thesis provides a detailed insight into the behaviour of bank stock returns 
around the period of bank credit rating news announcements. The thesis contributes in 
several respects to the existing literature. The general position in the extant literature is 
that rating upgrades are not associated with stock market reactions, while rating 
downgrades elicit significant negative reactions. This thesis employs several 
specifications in modelling bank stock behaviour by examining subsamples of bank 
upgrades and downgrades. More specifically, it examines bank credit rating changes 
within subsamples of bank stocks rated in the investment-grade, speculative-grade, 
across investment thresholds, as well as unanticipated rating actions. This study is 
among the first, to the author’s knowledge, to test for bank stock reactions to credit 
rating change announcements. The reported results are insightful and indicate that 
market reactions vary significantly by rating category. 
Fourthly, the thesis extends the bank credit rating literature by employing a robust news 
event testing technique using both parametric and non-parametric approaches. It adopts 
an extension of the traditional two-stage event-study parametric approach, by 
employing a one-stage dummy variable approach within the testing framework. In 
addition, the thesis accounts for changing variances of abnormal returns across the 
banks by employing two other variants of the traditional event study approach, that is, 
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the Boehmer et al. (1991) specification and the GARCH (1,1) specification. To the 
author’s best knowledge, this is the only study that does so for a sample of international 
banks. 
Fifthly, by investigating the behaviour of international bank credit ratings over time, 
this thesis addresses two major issues: testing for the presence of non Markovian 
behaviour in bank credit rating transitions and issues around the evident downward 
trend in bank ratings, particularly following the 2007/08 financial crisis. These are 
important considerations because the major credit rating agencies adopt transition 
frameworks that make the strong assumption of the existence of Markovian behaviour 
in bank stock credit rating transition. In addition, the major credit rating agencies have 
reviewed their rating methodologies following the credit crisis due to pressure from 
regulators, particularly in the US and Euro zone. Thus, the thesis allows for a test of the 
level of impact this tightening has had on rating assignments for international banks.  
9.5 Limitations of the thesis 
The limitations of this thesis can be summarised as follows. First, the sample of 
international banks is taken from the period 2000–2012. The sample of international 
banks is reduced significantly by the data requirements of this study. Second, the study 
employs international bank credit ratings obtained from Fitch over the period 2000–
2012. The credit rating industry is assumed to be oligopolistic in structure, being 
controlled by the three major credit rating agencies: Fitch, Moody’s and Standard and 
Poor’s. Hence, their outputs (ratings), as well as the empirical results acquired using 
rating data from any of the agencies are argued to be homogenous and representative of 
the entire credit rating industry. Pottier and Sommer (1999) argue that the assumption of 
homogeneity of the credit rating industry is restrictive and works well only for 
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investment grades, while it is more difficult to compare ratings across the rating 
agencies for speculative grades. It may be argued that the results of this thesis can be 
applied directly to Fitch ratings and it would be interesting to see whether this is the 
case by comparing them with results obtained from other rating agencies. The use of 
Fitch rated bank data is consistent with several existing studies: Poon (2003), Poon and 
Firth (2005), Van Roy (2006), which employs bank rating data from Fitch. However, 
one would not expect the results to vary significantly across the credit rating agencies 
because the parameter inputs to these models are a reflection of the variables that the 
rating agencies and academic researchers collectively consider as important in the credit 
rating process, as well as other market data relevant to testing rating news 
announcement impacts.  
9.6 Opportunities for further research 
This thesis models the determinants of credit ratings of international banks and confirms 
the importance of the CAMELS framework in the rating process. In addition, it 
establishes the individual, as well as joint, significance of a number of non-financial 
variables. Further, it provides an empirical investigation of the effects of credit rating 
news announcements on bank stock returns. By examining the historical transition of 
bank credit ratings, it tests for the presence of non-Markov behaviour in the form of 
rating drift and rating momentum. Following the presentation of several empirically 
testable conceptual frameworks within the three empirical components, its contribution 
to the existing body of knowledge can be extended further as follows.  
Firstly, the analyses can be extended to bank issue ratings. This thesis focuses on long 
term issuer (international bank) credit ratings. By analysing international bank bond 
issues, it would be possible to develop a model that could predict bond ratings and 
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hence enable international banks take actions to reduce the perceived risk and lower 
their cost of borrowing.  For investors, "ratings are the principal source of information 
about the "quality" and marketability of various bond issues" (Pinches and Singleton, 
1978, p. 29). Hence, international investors seeking to invest in international bank 
bonds can be better informed about the level of inherent risks in these issues. In 
particular, further research employing bank data from emerging economies may be 
viewed as valuable by investors because financial information in these markets is much 
less transparent than in developed markets.  
Basel II and III Accords both place emphasis on stress testing banks, and this has 
implications for international bank credit rating. In particular, the supplemental Pillar II 
of the Basel III Accord framework stresses the need for regular stress testing of banks. 
This thesis can be extended to study the impact of stress testing credit risk for banks on 
the stability of the financial system. Despite stress testing being part of the banks’ risk 
management toolkit for a long time, it has received special attention from regulators 
following the 2007/08 financial crisis. According to Foglia (2009), stress testing allows 
for an assessment of the vulnerabilities of financial systems to credit risk, focusing in 
particular on methods used to link macroeconomic drivers of stress with bank-specific 
measures of credit risk. By introducing a macroprudential approach to the analysis of 
credit risk for banks, the empirical investigation on bank stress testing can help assess 
the resilience of international banks to adverse economic developments. 
Thirdly, the framework of this thesis presents an opportunity to examine credit risk 
interdependence between large financial institutions within the Eurozone area. The 
financial crisis has shown that the credit risk of large financial institutions is higher due 
to the linkages between entities and exposures to one another. These linkages bother on  
cross shareholdings, inter-bank, loans, subsidiary structure, to mention a few. This 
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offers an opportunity to examine the nexus of credit risk exposure interdependence, 
typically brought about by common exposure of banks to systemic shock, and 
dependence between the idiosyncratic shocks of individual financial institutions.  
Fourthly, the empirical components within this thesis offer a chance to develop more 
econometric innovations in extending the research. In the modelling of international 
bank credit rating, the artificial neural network analysis (ANN) offers an alternative to 
the modelling of the determinants of bank credit ratings.  The ANN are particularly 
appropriate for modelling the determinants of ratings, as they do not require prior 
specification of theoretical models (Trigueiros & Taffler, 1996; Nazari, 2013).The 
efficiency of neural network and logistic regression in forecasting credit risk shows that 
both models have similar efficiency (Salehi and Mansoury, 2011). This approach has 
already been applied in modelling sovereign ratings (Bennell et al., 2006). The authors 
show that ANN offers a superior technology for calibrating and predicting sovereign 
ratings relative to ordered probit modelling, which has been considered by the previous 
literature to be the most successful econometric approach. Extending the econometric 
approach (from the more established ordered probit/logit) by employing the ANN can 
produce improvements on the classification of credit rating accuracy within the context 
of bank ratings.  
Further, another potential extension of this study is to analyse the lead-lag relationships 
in bank credit ratings across the three largest CRAs. The motivation for this is that 
CRAs would rationally treat a rating adjustment by another agency as a trigger for 
reviewing their own ratings, and it could be viewed as cost-effective to follow up a 
competitor’s rating action (Güttler and Wahrenburg, 2007). Alsakka and ap Gwilym 
(2010) argue that an issuer experiencing a permanent credit quality improvement desires 
this to be reflected in its ratings as quickly as possible in order to benefit from reduced 
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borrowing costs and/or enhanced capital inflows. Thus, an agency’s credibility is 
enhanced by prompt rating actions (or rating leadership) following any permanent 
change in an issuer’s creditworthiness (Ellis, 1998 and Güttler and Wahrenburg, 2007).  
This thesis conducts an event study that captures the impact of bank credit rating news 
announcements on the bank stock returns. This empirical component of the thesis offers 
an opportunity to extend some of the econometric discussions and analyses around the 
area of news event impact modelling. An important aspect of the modelling of an event 
study framework is the capture of the correct stock return patterns. The Fama and 
French (2014) five-factor asset pricing model provides a different approach to capturing 
the returns pattern of banks’ stocks. By employing a measure of bank size, value, 
profitability, book-to-market ratio and investment patterns, the Fama and French (2014) 
approach provides a better capture of the average stock returns across a pool of banks. 
However, one of the problems that this approach faces is its failure to capture the low 
average returns on small stocks whose returns behave like those of firms that invest a lot 
despite low profitability (Fama and French, 2014).  
Within the bank credit risk migration component, this thesis can be extended by 
modelling the influence of macro-economic variables and business cycle on the 
transition intensities of banks’ credit ratings. A bank’s credit risk is influenced by 
certain macro-economic factors and these have the likelihood of impacting of the 
(re)assigning of credit ratings. Since the earlier empirical works of Nickell et al. (2000) 
and Bangia et al. (2002) which have demonstrated the link between credit rating 
movements and business cycle (as characterized by the NBER index, the GDP growth 
rates, the issuer’s industry and country), numerous studies have focused on the 
dependence between the credit quality and the business, financial and economic 
environments (e.g. Hu et al., 2002; Chava and Jarrow, 2004; Duffie et al., 2007; 
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Figlewski et al., 2012; Fei et al., 2012). However, due to the cross-country nature of the 
bank credit ratings, the macroeconomic factors displaying the state of the economy 
might not be evenly report across the different countries. This thesis can also be 
extended by incorporating bank specific information in the context of transition 
probabilities. 
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF BANKS AND ISIN NUMBERS 
 
Appendix I
S/n Bank Name Country Name Specialisation ISIN Number
1 Banco Macro SA ARGENTINA Commercial Banks ARBANS010010
2 Raiffeisen Bank International AG AUSTRIA Commercial Banks AT0000606306
3 Erste Group Bank AG AUSTRIA Bank Holding & Holding Companies AT0000652011
4 Commonwealth Bank of Australia AUSTRALIA Commercial Banks AU000000CBA7
5 Bank of Queensland Limited AUSTRALIA Commercial Banks AU000000BOQ8
6 Australia and New Zealand Banking 
Group
AUSTRALIA Commercial Banks AU000000ANZ3
7 Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Limited AUSTRALIA Commercial Banks AU000000BEN6
8 National Australia Bank Limited AUSTRALIA Commercial Banks AU000000NAB4
9 Westpac Banking Corporation AUSTRALIA Commercial Banks AU000000WBC1
10 Suncorp Group Limited AUSTRALIA Bank Holding & Holding Companies AU000000SUN6
11 Macquarie Group Ltd AUSTRALIA Bank Holding & Holding Companies AU000000MQG1
12 Demirbank Open Joint Stock 
Company
AZERBAIJAN Commercial Banks DE0005140008
13 Ahli United Bank BSC BAHRAIN Commercial Banks BH0005508765
14 Arab Banking Corporation BSC BAHRAIN Commercial Banks BH0008794115
15 National Bank of Bahrain BAHRAIN Commercial Banks BH0005508773
16 BBK B.S.C. BAHRAIN Commercial Banks BH0004659916
17 KBC Groep NV/ KBC Groupe SA-KBC 
Group
BELGIUM Bank Holding & Holding Companies BE0003565737
18 Dexia BELGIUM Bank Holding & Holding Companies BE0003796134
19 Bank of Africa - Benin BENIN Commercial Banks BJ0000000048
20 Bank of N.T. Butterfield & Son Ltd. 
(The)
BERMUDA Commercial Banks BMG0772R1097
21 Itau Unibanco Holdings BRAZIL Bank Holding & Holding Companies BRITUBACNPR1
22 Banco do Brasil S.A. BRAZIL Commercial Banks BRBBASACNOR3
23 Banco PanAmericano S.A. BRAZIL Commercial Banks BRBPNMACNPR6
24 Banco BTG Pactual SA BRAZIL Commercial Banks BRBPACACNOR7
25 Banco Daycoval SA BRAZIL Commercial Banks BRDAYCACNPR2
26 Banco da Amazonia SA BRAZIL Commercial Banks BRBAZAACNOR0
27 Banco Santander (Brasil) S.A. BRAZIL Commercial Banks BRSANBACNOR8
28 Banco Bradesco SA BRAZIL Commercial Banks BRBBDCACNPR8
29 Banco do Estado do Rio Grande do 
Sul S.A. BANRISUL
BRAZIL Commercial Banks BRBRSRACNOR3
30 Banco ABC - Brasil SA BRAZIL Commercial Banks BRABCBACNPR4
31 Banco Pine SA BRAZIL Commercial Banks BRPINEACNPR8
32 First Investment Bank AD BULGARIA Commercial Banks BG1100106050
33 Royal Bank of Canada RBC CANADA Commercial Banks CA7800871021
34 Toronto Dominion Bank CANADA Commercial Banks CA8911605092
35 Canadian Imperial Bank of 
Commerce CIBC
CANADA Commercial Banks CA1360691010
36 Bank of Montreal-Banque de 
Montreal
CANADA Commercial Banks CA0636711016
37 National Bank of Canada-Banque 
Nationale du Canada
CANADA Commercial Banks CA6330671034
38 Bank of Nova Scotia (The) - 
SCOTIABANK
CANADA Commercial Banks CA0641491075
39 Home Capital Group Inc CANADA Bank Holding & Holding Companies CA4369131079
40 Banco de Credito e Inversiones - 
BCI
CHILE Commercial Banks CLP321331116
41 Banco de Chile CHILE Commercial Banks CLP0939W1081
42 Banco Santander Chile CHILE Commercial Banks CLP1506A1070
43 Shanghai Pudong Development 
Bank
CHINA Commercial Banks CNE0000011B7
44 China Merchants Bank Co Ltd CHINA Commercial Banks CNE1000002M1
45 China Everbright Bank Co Ltd CHINA Commercial Banks CNE100000SL4
46 Ping An Bank Co Ltd CHINA Commercial Banks CNE000000040
47 Hua Xia Bank co., Limited CHINA Commercial Banks CNE000001FW7
48 Bank of China Limited CHINA Commercial Banks CNE1000001Z5
49 China CITIC Bank Corporation 
Limited
CHINA Commercial Banks CNE1000001Q4
50 Agricultural Bank of China Limited CHINA Commercial Banks CNE100000Q43
51 Industrial Bank Co Ltd CHINA Commercial Banks CNE000001QZ7
52 China Minsheng Banking 
Corporation
CHINA Commercial Banks CNE0000015Y0
53 Bank of Beijing Co Ltd CHINA Commercial Banks CNE100000734
54 China Construction Bank 
Corporation
CHINA Commercial Banks CNE1000002H1
55 BBVA Colombia SA COLOMBIA Commercial Banks COB13PA00019
56 Banco de Bogota COLOMBIA Commercial Banks COB01PA00030
57 Grupo Aval Acciones y Valores S.A. COLOMBIA Bank Holding & Holding Companies COT29PA00025
58 Banco Davivienda COLOMBIA Commercial Banks COB51PA00076
59 Bancolombia S.A. COLOMBIA Commercial Banks COB07PA00078
60 Zagrebacka Banka dd CROATIA Commercial Banks HRZABARA0009
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61 Komercni Banka CZECH REPUBLIC Commercial Banks CZ0008019106
62 Danske Bank A/S DENMARK Commercial Banks DK0010274414
63 Deutsche Postbank AG GERMANY Commercial Banks DE0008001009
64 Commerzbank AG GERMANY Commercial Banks DE000CBK1001
65 Deutsche Bank AG GERMANY Commercial Banks DE0005140008
66 Banco de la Produccion SA - 
PRODUBANCO-Grupo Financiero 
Produccion
ECUADOR Commercial Banks ECP7914V1044
67 Banco Pichincha C.A. ECUADOR Commercial Banks ECP1322M1036
68 Commercial International Bank 
(Egypt) S.A.E.
EGYPT Commercial Banks EGS60121C018
69 Pohjola Bank plc-Pohjola Pankki 
Oyj
FINLAND Commercial Banks FI0009003222
70 Société Générale FRANCE Commercial Banks FR0000130809
71 Crédit Industriel et Commercial - 
CIC
FRANCE Commercial Banks FR0005025004
72 BNP Paribas FRANCE Commercial Banks FR0000131104
73 Natixis FRANCE Commercial Banks FR0000120685
74 Liberty Bank GEORGIA Commercial Banks GE1100000300
75 Bank of Georgia GEORGIA Commercial Banks GE1100000276
76 Alpha Bank AE GREECE Commercial Banks GRS015013006
77 National Bank of Greece SA GREECE Commercial Banks GRS003003019
78 Piraeus Bank SA GREECE Commercial Banks GRS014003008
79 Eurobank Ergasias SA GREECE Commercial Banks GRS323003004
80 Chong Hing Bank Limited HONG KONG Commercial Banks HK1111036765
81 Allied Irish Banks plc IRELAND Commercial Banks IE0000197834
82 Bank of Ireland-Governor and 
Company of the Bank of Ireland
IRELAND Commercial Banks IE0030606259
83 Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero) - 
Bank BNI
INDONESIA Commercial Banks ID1000096605
84 Bank Rakyat Indonesia (Persero) 
Tbk
INDONESIA Commercial Banks ID1000118201
85 Bank Pan Indonesia Tbk PT-Panin 
Bank
INDONESIA Commercial Banks ID1000092703
86 PT Bank CIMB Niaga Tbk INDONESIA Commercial Banks ID1000098007
87 Bank Mandiri (Persero) Tbk INDONESIA Commercial Banks ID1000095003
88 Bank Internasional Indonesia Tbk INDONESIA Commercial Banks ID1000099302
89 Bank OCBC NISP Tbk INDONESIA Commercial Banks ID1000094402
90 Bank Danamon Indonesia Tbk INDONESIA Commercial Banks ID1000094204
91 Bank Central Asia INDONESIA Commercial Banks ID1000109507
92 Union Bank of India INDIA Commercial Banks INE692A01016
93 Canara Bank INDIA Commercial Banks INE476A01014
94 Bank of Baroda INDIA Commercial Banks INE028A01013
95 State Bank of India INDIA Commercial Banks INE062A01012
96 Indian Bank INDIA Commercial Banks INE562A01011
97 Punjab National Bank INDIA Commercial Banks INE160A01014
98 AXIS Bank Limited INDIA Commercial Banks INE238A01026
99 ICICI Bank Limited INDIA Commercial Banks INE090A01013
100 Bank Hapoalim BM ISRAEL Commercial Banks IL0006625771
101 Bank Leumi Le Israel BM ISRAEL Commercial Banks IL0006046119
102 Banco di Desio e della Brianza SpA-
Banco Desio
ITALY Commercial Banks IT0001041000
103 Intesa Sanpaolo ITALY Commercial Banks IT0000072618
104 Credito Emiliano SpA-CREDEM ITALY Commercial Banks IT0003121677
105 Credito Bergamasco ITALY Commercial Banks IT0000064359
106 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena 
SpA-Gruppo Monte dei Paschi di 
Siena
ITALY Commercial Banks IT0001334587
107 Banca Carige SpA ITALY Commercial Banks IT0003211601
108 UniCredit SpA ITALY Commercial Banks IT0004781412
109 National Commercial Bank Jamaica 
Limited
JAMAICA Commercial Banks JMP710541039
110 Arab Bank Plc JORDAN Commercial Banks JO1302311013
111 Bank of Jordan Plc JORDAN Commercial Banks JO1102211017
112 Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group, 
Inc
JAPAN Bank Holding & Holding Companies JP3890350006
113 Mizuho Financial Group JAPAN Bank Holding & Holding Companies JP3885780001
114 Suruga Bank, Ltd. (The) JAPAN Commercial Banks JP3411000007
115 Shizuoka Bank JAPAN Commercial Banks JP3351200005
116 Daiwa Securities Group Inc JAPAN Bank Holding & Holding Companies JP3502200003
117 Nomura Holdings Inc JAPAN Bank Holding & Holding Companies JP3762600009
118 BTA Bank JSC KAZAKHSTAN Commercial Banks KZ1C34920013
119 Bank CenterCredit KAZAKHSTAN Commercial Banks KZ1C36280010
120 Kazkommertsbank Joint-Stock 
Company
KAZAKHSTAN Commercial Banks KZ000A0JC858
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121 Ahli United Bank KSC KUWAIT Commercial Banks KW0EQ0100051
122 Gulf Bank KSC (The) KUWAIT Commercial Banks KW0EQ0100028
123 Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait (KSC) KUWAIT Commercial Banks KW0EQ0100044
124 Commercial Bank of Kuwait SAK 
(The)
KUWAIT Commercial Banks KW0EQ0100036
125 National Bank of Kuwait S.A.K. KUWAIT Commercial Banks KW0EQ0100010
126 Bank Audi SAL LEBANON Commercial Banks LB0000010415
127 Byblos Bank S.A.L. LEBANON Commercial Banks LB0000010613
128 Hong Leong Bank Berhad MALAYSIA Commercial Banks MYL5819OO007
129 Malayan Banking Berhad - Maybank MALAYSIA Commercial Banks MYL1155OO000
130 Grupo Financiero BANORTE MEXICO Bank Holding & Holding Companies MXP370711014
131 Banco Nacional de Mexico, SA - 
BANAMEX
MEXICO Commercial Banks MXCFDA020005
132 Attijariwafa Bank MOROCCO Commercial Banks MA0000011926
133 ING Groep NV NETHERLANDS Bank Holding & Holding Companies NL0000303600
134 Bank of Africa - Niger NIGER Commercial Banks NE0000000015
135 Fidelity Bank Plc NIGERIA Commercial Banks NGFIDELITYB5
136 United Bank for Africa Plc NIGERIA Commercial Banks NGUBA0000001
137 Access Bank Plc NIGERIA Commercial Banks NGACCESS0005
138 Union Bank of Nigeria Plc NIGERIA Commercial Banks NGUBN0000004
139 Diamond Bank Plc NIGERIA Commercial Banks NGDIAMONDBK6
140 Zenith Bank Plc NIGERIA Commercial Banks NGZENITHBNK9
141 Guaranty Trust Bank Plc NIGERIA Commercial Banks NGGUARANTY06
142 Bank Sohar SAOG OMAN Commercial Banks OM0000003398
143 Bank Dhofar SAOG OMAN Commercial Banks OM0000002549
144 Bank Muscat SAOG OMAN Commercial Banks OM0000002796
145 National Bank of Oman (SAOG) OMAN Commercial Banks OM0000001483
146 Banco Internacional del Peru - 
Interbank
PERU Commercial Banks PEP148001006
147 Scotiabank Peru SAA PERU Commercial Banks PEP140001004
148 Banco Interamericano de Finanzas 
S.A. - BIF
PERU Commercial Banks PEP121001007
149 Banco de Credito del Peru PERU Commercial Banks PEP120001008
150 BDO Unibank Inc PHILIPPINES Commercial Banks PHY077751022
151 Security Bank Corporation PHILIPPINES Commercial Banks PHY7571C1000
152 Bank of The Philippine Islands PHILIPPINES Commercial Banks PHY0967S1694
153 Union Bank of the Philippines PHILIPPINES Commercial Banks PHY9091H1069
154 Rizal Commercial Banking Corp. PHILIPPINES Commercial Banks PHY7311H1463
155 Metropolitan Bank & Trust 
Company
PHILIPPINES Commercial Banks PHY6028G1361
156 China Banking Corporation - 
Chinabank
PHILIPPINES Commercial Banks PHY138161229
157 mBank SA POLAND Commercial Banks PLBRE0000012
158 Bank Zachodni WBK S.A. POLAND Commercial Banks PLBZ00000044
159 Bank Polska Kasa Opieki SA-Bank 
Pekao SA
POLAND Commercial Banks PLPEKAO00016
160 Bank Ochrony Srodowiska SA - BOS 
SA-Bank Ochrony Srodowiska 
Capital Group
POLAND Commercial Banks PLBOS0000019
161 Bank Millennium POLAND Commercial Banks PLBIG0000016
162 Bank Handlowy w Warszawie S.A. POLAND Commercial Banks PLBH00000012
163 ING Bank Slaski S.A. - Capital 
Group
POLAND Commercial Banks PLBSK0000017
164 BANIF - Banco Internacional do 
Funchal, SA
PORTUGAL Commercial Banks PTBAF0AM0002
165 Banco Comercial Português, SA-
Millennium bcp
PORTUGAL Commercial Banks PTBCP0AM0007
166 Banco BPI SA PORTUGAL Bank Holding & Holding Companies PTBPI0AM0004
167 Al Khalij Commercial Bank QATAR Commercial Banks QA000A0M6MD5
168 Qatar National Bank QATAR Commercial Banks QA0006929895
169 Doha Bank QATAR Commercial Banks QA0006929770
170 Commercial Bank of Qatar (The) 
QSC
QATAR Commercial Banks QA0007227752
171 Ahli Bank QSC QATAR Commercial Banks QA0001200748
172 Transilvania Bank-Banca 
Transilvania SA
ROMANIA Commercial Banks ROTLVAACNOR1
173 BRD-Groupe Societe Generale SA ROMANIA Commercial Banks ROBRDBACNOR2
174 OJSC Promsvyazbank RUSSIAN FEDERATION Commercial Banks RU000A0JNX47
175 Urals Transport Joint-Stock Bank - 
UralTransBank
RUSSIAN FEDERATION Commercial Banks RU000A0JRWL0
176 JSC Rosbank RUSSIAN FEDERATION Commercial Banks RU000A0HHK26
177 SDM Bank JSC RUSSIAN FEDERATION Commercial Banks RU000A0JQ8X5
178 Bank UralSib RUSSIAN FEDERATION Commercial Banks RU0006929536
179 AK Bars Bank RUSSIAN FEDERATION Commercial Banks RU000A0JQMF5
180 Joint-Stock Investment 
Commercial Bank Novaya Moskva-
NOMOS-Bank
RUSSIAN FEDERATION Commercial Banks RU000A0JRAF8
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181 Bank Zenit RUSSIAN FEDERATION Commercial Banks RU000A0JPCR3
182 Probusiness Bank RUSSIAN FEDERATION Commercial Banks RU0006454527
183 Open Joint-Stock Social 
Commercial Bank of Primorye 
'Primsotsbank'
RUSSIAN FEDERATION Commercial Banks RU0009100945
184 Open Joint-Stock Company "MTS 
Bank
RUSSIAN FEDERATION Commercial Banks RU000A0JPBL8
185 Saudi Investment Bank (The) SAUDI ARABIA Commercial Banks SA0007879063
186 Samba Financial Group SAUDI ARABIA Commercial Banks SA0007879097
187 Saudi British Bank (The) SAUDI ARABIA Commercial Banks SA0007879089
188 Banque Saudi Fransi SAUDI ARABIA Commercial Banks SA0007879782
189 Arab National Bank SAUDI ARABIA Commercial Banks SA0007879105
190 Bank Al-Jazira SAUDI ARABIA Commercial Banks SA0007879055
191 Riyad Bank SAUDI ARABIA Commercial Banks SA0007879048
192 Saudi Hollandi Bank SAUDI ARABIA Commercial Banks SA0007879071
193 Investec Limited SOUTH AFRICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies ZAE000081949
194 Nedbank Group Limited SOUTH AFRICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies ZAE000004875
195 Nordea Bank AB (publ) SWEDEN Bank Holding & Holding Companies SE0000427361
196 Svenska Handelsbanken SWEDEN Commercial Banks SE0000193120
197 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB SWEDEN Commercial Banks SE0000148884
198 United Overseas Bank Limited UOB SINGAPORE Commercial Banks SG1M31001969
199 Oversea-Chinese Banking 
Corporation Limited OCBC
SINGAPORE Commercial Banks SG1S04926220
200 Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor d.d. SLOVENIA Commercial Banks SI0021104052
201 Banco Agricola EL SALVADOR Commercial Banks SV0011300317
202 Banco Davivienda Salvadoreno, SA EL SALVADOR Commercial Banks SV0011100311
203 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA SPAIN Commercial Banks ES0113211835
204 Bankia, SA SPAIN Commercial Banks ES0113307021
205 Banco Santander SA SPAIN Commercial Banks ES0113900J37
206 UBS AG SWITZERLAND Commercial Banks CH0024899483
207 EFG International SWITZERLAND Commercial Banks CH0022268228
208 Credit Suisse Group AG SWITZERLAND Bank Holding & Holding Companies CH0012138530
209 Sinopac Financial Holdings TAIWAN Bank Holding & Holding Companies TW0002890001
210 CTBC Financial Holding Co Ltd TAIWAN Bank Holding & Holding Companies TW0002891009
211 Waterland Financial Holdings Co., 
Ltd
TAIWAN Bank Holding & Holding Companies TW0002889003
212 Taichung Commercial Bank TAIWAN Commercial Banks TW0002812005
213 King's Town Bank TAIWAN Commercial Banks TW0002809001
214 Chang Hwa Commercial Bank Ltd. TAIWAN Commercial Banks TW0002801008
215 Far Eastern International Bank TAIWAN Commercial Banks TW0002845005
216 Taishin Financial Holding Co., Ltd TAIWAN Bank Holding & Holding Companies TW0002887007
217 Jih Sun Financial Holding Co., Ltd TAIWAN Bank Holding & Holding Companies TW0005820005
218 Siam Commercial Bank Public 
Company Limited
THAILAND Commercial Banks TH0015010000
219 TMB Bank Public Company Limited THAILAND Commercial Banks TH0068010Z07
220 Krung Thai Bank Public Company 
Limited
THAILAND Commercial Banks TH0150010Z03
221 Bank of Ayudhya Public Company 
Ltd.
THAILAND Commercial Banks TH0023010000
222 SCB (Thai) Public Company Limited THAILAND Commercial Banks TH0067010007
223 CIMB Thai Bank Public Company 
Limited
THAILAND Commercial Banks TH0041010Y05
224 Bangkok Bank Public Company 
Limited
THAILAND Commercial Banks TH0001010006
225 Arab Tunisian Bank TUNISIA Commercial Banks TN0003600350
226 Denizbank A.S. TURKEY Commercial Banks TREDZBK00015
227 Turkiye Vakiflar Bankasi TAO TURKEY Commercial Banks TREVKFB00019
228 Alternatifbank A.S. TURKEY Commercial Banks TRAALNTF91N6
229 Sekerbank T.A.S. TURKEY Commercial Banks TRASKBNK91N8
230 Finansbank A.S. TURKEY Commercial Banks TRAFINBN91N3
231 Akbank T.A.S. TURKEY Commercial Banks TRAAKBNK91N6
232 Tekstilbank-Tekstil Bankasi A.S. TURKEY Commercial Banks TRATEKST91N0
233 Turk Ekonomi Bankasi A.S. TURKEY Commercial Banks TRATEBNK91N9
234 Turkiye Garanti Bankasi A.S. TURKEY Commercial Banks TRAGARAN91N1
235 Yapi Ve Kredi Bankasi A.S. TURKEY Commercial Banks TRAYKBNK91N6
236 Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S. TURKEY Commercial Banks TRETHAL00019
237 Turkiye is Bankasi A.S. - ISBANK TURKEY Commercial Banks TRAISCTR91N2
238 Emirates NBD PJSC UNITED ARAB EMIRATES Commercial Banks AEE000801010
239 Union National Bank UNITED ARAB EMIRATES Commercial Banks AEU000401015
240 National Bank of Ras Al-Khaimah 
(P.S.C.) (The)-RAKBANK
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES Commercial Banks AEN000601015
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241 First Gulf Bank UNITED ARAB EMIRATES Commercial Banks AEF000201010
242 Commercial Bank of Dubai P.S.C. UNITED ARAB EMIRATES Commercial Banks AEC000201017
243 National Bank of Abu Dhabi UNITED ARAB EMIRATES Commercial Banks AEN000101016
244 Mashreqbank PSC UNITED ARAB EMIRATES Commercial Banks AEM000101018
245 Bank of Sharjah UNITED ARAB EMIRATES Commercial Banks AEB000101011
246 Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank UNITED ARAB EMIRATES Commercial Banks AEA000201011
247 Joint-Stock Commercial Bank for 
Social Development - Ukrsotsbank
UKRAINE Commercial Banks UA1002231009
248 Pivdennyi Joint-Stock Bank UKRAINE Commercial Banks UA1500091103
249 Pravex Bank UKRAINE Commercial Banks UA4000068159
250 VTB Bank (Ukraine) JSC UKRAINE Commercial Banks UA4000012702
251 Bank Forum UKRAINE Commercial Banks UA1006051007
252 HSBC Holdings Plc UNITED KINGDOM Bank Holding & Holding Companies GB0005405286
253 Barclays Plc UNITED KINGDOM Bank Holding & Holding Companies GB0031348658
254 Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc 
(The)
UNITED KINGDOM Bank Holding & Holding Companies GB00B7T77214
255 Schroders Plc UNITED KINGDOM Bank Holding & Holding Companies GB0002405495
256 Standard Chartered Plc UNITED KINGDOM Bank Holding & Holding Companies GB0004082847
257 Lloyds Banking Group Plc UNITED KINGDOM Bank Holding & Holding Companies GB0008706128
258 Independent Bank Corp. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US4538361084
259 Metlife, Inc. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US59156R1086
260 Bank of New York Mellon 
Corporation
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US0640581007
261 New York Community Bancorp, Inc UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US6494451031
262 People's United Financial, Inc UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US7127041058
263 East West Bancorp, Inc UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US27579R1041
264 Astoria Financial Corporation UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US0462651045
265 Prudential Financial Inc UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US7443201022
266 Fulton Financial Corporation UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US3602711000
267 First Commonwealth Financial 
Corp.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US3198291078
268 Hancock Holding Company UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US4101201097
269 AmeriServ Financial, Inc UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US03074A1025
270 First Interstate Bancsystem, Inc UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US32055Y2019
271 Community Bank System, Inc. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US2036071064
272 Ocwen Financial Corp UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US6757463095
273 Trustmark Corporation UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US8984021027
274 First National of Nebraska, Inc. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US3357201082
275 Associated Banc-Corp. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US0454871056
276 First Midwest Bancorp, Inc UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US3208671046
277 Ally Financial Inc UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US02005N1000
278 Wells Fargo & Company UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US9497461015
279 SunTrust Banks, Inc. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US8679141031
280 PNC Financial Services Group Inc UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US6934751057
281 Comerica Incorporated UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US2003401070
282 Northern Trust Corporation UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US6658591044
283 KeyCorp UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US4932671088
284 State Street Corporation UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US8574771031
285 Huntington Bancshares Inc UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US4461501045
286 First Horizon National Corporation UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US3205171057
287 UMB Financial Corporation UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US9027881088
288 Regions Financial Corporation UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US7591EP1005
289 Cullen/Frost Bankers, Inc UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US2298991090
290 Zions Bancorporation UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US9897011071
291 Fifth Third Bancorp UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US3167731005
292 City National Corporation UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US1785661059
293 FirstMerit Corporation UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US3379151026
294 Popular, Inc UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies PR7331747001
295 M&T Bank Corporation UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US55261F1049
296 Synovus Financial Corp UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US87161C1053
297 JPMorgan Chase & Co UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US46625H1005
298 Dime Community Bancshares, Inc UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US2539221083
299 First BanCorp UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies PR3186727065
300 American Express Company UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US0258161092
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301 US Bancorp UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US9029733048
302 Capital One Financial Corporation UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US14040H1059
303 KKR Financial Holdings, LLC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US48248A3068
304 First Niagara Financial Group, Inc UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US33582V1089
305 CVB Financial Corp UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US1266001056
306 Webster Financial Corp UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US9478901096
307 Cathay General Bancorp Inc UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US1491501045
308 Citigroup Inc UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US1729674242
309 Doral Financial Corporation UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies PR25811P8521
310 BB&T Corporation UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US0549371070
311 TCF Financial Corporation UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US8722751026
312 Central Pacific Financial Corp. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US1547604090
313 Bank of America Corporation UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US0605051046
314 Morgan Stanley UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US6174464486
315 Goldman Sachs Group, Inc UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US38141G1040
316 BOK Financial Corporation UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US05561Q2012
317 GFI Group Inc UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Bank Holding & Holding Companies US3616522096
318 Open Joint Stock Commercial Bank 
Agrobank
UZBEKISTAN Commercial Banks CZ0000000203.
319 Banco Provincial VENEZUELA Commercial Banks VEV001271007
320 Banco del Caribe CA VENEZUELA Commercial Banks VEV0021410A5
321 Banco Occidental de Descuento, 
Banco Universal CA
VENEZUELA Commercial Banks VEV002241009
322 Banco Exterior, C.A. - Banco 
Universal
VENEZUELA Commercial Banks VEV000771007
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Appendix II
Table A: List of bank Long Term ratings by Fitch for the period 2000 - 2012
S/N Country Bank 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
1 ARGENTINA BANCO MACRO SA B B B B+ B+ B B B B B-
2 AUSTRIA RAIFFEISEN BANK INTERNATIONAL A- A- A A A A- A- A- A- A A
3 ERSTE GROUP BANK A A A A A A- A A A A A- A A
4 AUSTRALIA AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND BANKING GROUP AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA-
5 BANK OF QUEENSLAND BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+
6 COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA-
7 BENDIGO AND ADELAIDE BANK BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ A- A-
8 WESTPAC BANKING CORP AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA AA AA 
9 NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA-
10 MACQUARIE GROUP A A A A A A A A A A-
11 SUNCORP A A A A A A A A+ A+ A+ A+ A A+
12 AZERBAIJAN DEMIRBANK OPEN JOINT STOCK COMPANY CCC+ CCC+ CCC+ B- B- B- B- B- B
13 BAHRAIN AHLI UNITED BANK BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ A- A- A- A- A- BBB+ BBB+
14 BBK B.S.C. BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ A- A- A- BBB+ BBB+
15 ARAB BANKING CORP BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB BBB BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB BBB- BB+
16 NATIONAL BANK OF BAHRAIN BBB A- A- A- A- A- A A A A BBB BBB 
17 BELGIUM KBC GROEP NV A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ AA- AA- A+ A A A A-
18 DEXIA AA+ AA+ AA+ AA+ AA+ AA- A+ A+ A+ A+
19 BENIN BANK OF AFRICA B+ B+ B+ B B B B B
20 BERMUDA BANK OF N.T. BUTTERFIELD A A A A A A A A A- A- A- A-
21 BRAZIL BANCO DO BRASIL S.A. B B+ BB- BB- BB+ BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB BBB
22 BANCO ABC BB- BB BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+
23 BANCO DAYCOVAL BB- BB- BB BB BB BB+
24 BANCO DA AMAZONIA BB- BB BB+ BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB BBB
25 BANCO BTG PACTUAL BB- BB- BB+ BBB- BBB BB+ BBB- BBB- BBB-
26 BANCO PANAMERICANO BB  BB BB BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+
27 BANCO BRADESCO BB- BB- B B+ BB- BB- BB+ BBB- BBB BBB BBB BBB+ BBB+
28 BANCO SAN (BRASIL) S.A. BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BBB- BBB BBB BBB BBB+ BBB
29 BANCO PINE B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ BB- BB- BB
30 BANCO DO ESTADO DO RIO GRANDE DO SUL BB BB BB- BB- BB BB BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+
31 ITAU UNIBANCO HOLDING B BB- BB- BB+ BBB- BBB BBB BBB BBB+ BBB+
32 BULGARIA FIRST INVESTMENT BANK BB- BB- BB- BB- BB- BB- BB- BB-
33 CANADA CANADIAN IMPERIAL BANK OF COMMERCE AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA-
34 BANK OF MONTREAL-BANQUE DE MONTREAL AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA-
35 NATIONAL BANK OF CANADA A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+
36 BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA-
37 ROYAL BANK OF CANADA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA
38 TORONTO DOMINION BANK AA AA AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA-
39 HOME CAPITAL BANK BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB BBB BBB
40 CHILE BANCO SAN CHILE A- A- A- A- A- A A+ A+ A+ A+ AA- A+ A+
APPENDIX B: LIST OF BANK RATINGS 
 407 
 
41 BANCO  DE CREDITO E  INVERSIONES BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ A- A- A-
42 BANCO DE CHILE A- A- A- A A A A A A A A
43 CHINA BANK OF BEIJING BB BB BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+
44 BANK OF CHINA BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ A- A- A A A A A A
45 SHANGHAI PIUDONG DEVELOPMENT BANK BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+
46 CHINA MERCHANT BANK BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB+
47 CHINA EVERBRIGHT BANK CO BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB
48 AGRICULTURAL BANK OF CHINA A A A A A A A A A A
49 INDUSTRIAL AND COMM BANK OF CHINA BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ A- A- A A A A A A
50 HUA XIA BANK CO BB+ BB BB- BB- BB- BB BB BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+
51 PING AN BANK CO BB BB BB BB BB BB BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+
52 CHINA CONSTRUCTION BANK CORP A- A- A A A A A A
53 CHINA MINSHENG BANKING COPR BB- BB- BB- BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+
54 CHINA CITIC BANK BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB BBB+ BBB+ BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB
55 COLOMBIA BBVA BB+ BB+ BB BB BB BB BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BBB BBB
56 BANCO DE BOGOTA BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB
57 BANCOCOLOMBIA BB BB BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BBB- BBB- BBB
58 BANCO DAVIVIENDA BBB- BBB BBB BBB BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB-
59 GRUPO AVAL ACCIONES Y VALORES BBB+ BBB+ BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB-
60 CROATIA ZAGREBACKA BANKA BB+ BB+ BB+ BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+
61 CZECH REPUBLIC KOMERCNI BANKA BBB BBB+ BBB+ A- A+ A+ AA- AA- A+ A A A A
62 DENMARK DANSKE BANK AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- A+ A+ A+ A
63 GERMANY DEUTSCHE POSTBANK A+ A+ A+ A+ A A A A A A+ A+ A+ A+
64 COMMERZBANK AG A+ A+ A- A- A- A- A A A A+ A+ A+ A+
65 DEUTSCHE BANK AA AA AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- A+ A+
66 ECUADOR BANCO DE LA PRODUCCION CCC+ CCC+ CCC+ B- B- B- B- B- B- B- B- B-
67 BANCO PICHINCHA CCC+ CCC+ CCC+ B- B- B- B- B- B- B- B- B-
68 EGYPT COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK BBB- BBB- BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB B+
69 FINLAND POHJOLA BANK PLC A+ A+ AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- A+ A+
70 FRANCE SOCIETE GENERALE AA AA AA AA- AA- AA- AA AA- AA- A+ A+ A+ A+
71 CREDIT INDUSTRIAL ET COMMERCIAL A A A A+ A+ AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- A+ A+
72 BNP PARIBAS AA- AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA- AA- A+
73 NATIXIS AA- AA- AA AA+ AA+ AA AA- A+ A+ A+ A+ A+
74 GEORGIA LIBERTY BANK B- B- B- B B B B B B B B
75 BANK OF GEORGIA B- B+ B B B+ BB- BB-
76 GREECE ALPHA BANK AE A- A- A- A- A- A- A- A- A- BBB+ BBB- B- CCC
77 EUROBANK ERGASIAS A- A- A- A- A- A- A A A BBB+ BBB- C- CCC
78 NATIONAL BANK OF GREECE A- A- A- A- A- A- A- A- A- BBB+ BBB- B- B-
79 PIRAEUS BANK BBB BBB BBB BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ A- BBB+ BBB- B- CCC
80 HONG KONG CHONG HING BANK BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+
 
 
 
 408 
 
 
81 IRELAND BANK OF IRELAND-GOV AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- A- BBB BBB BBB
82 ALLIED IRISH BANK AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- A- BBB BBB BBB
83 INDONESIA BANK DANAMON B B+ B+ BB- BB- BB- BB BB BB+ BB+ BB+
84 BANK CENTRAL ASIA B B+ B+ BB- BB- BB- BB BB BB+ BBB- BBB-
85 BANK RAKYAT B B+ B+ BB- BB- BB- BB BB BB+ BBB- BBB-
86 BANK NEGARA B B+ B+ BB- BB- BB- BB BB BB+ BBB- BBB-
87 BANK MANDIRI B- B B+ B+ BB- BB- BB- BB BB BB+ BB+ BBB-
88 BANK INTERNASIONAL B- B- B- B B+ BB- BB- BB- BB BB BB+ BB+ BBB
89 BANK OCBC B- B B+ B+ BB- BB- BB- BB BB BB+ BB+ BBB
90 BAN PAN INDONESIA BB- BB- BB- BB- BB- BB- BB- BB BB BB BB
91 PT BANK CIMB NIAGA BB- BB- BB- BB- BB- BB- BB BB BB+ BB+ BBB
92 INDIA UNION BANK OF INDIA BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB BBB
93 CANARA BANK BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB-
94 BANK OF BARODA BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB-
95 STATE BANK OF INDIA BB+ BB+ BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB-
96 INDIAN BANK BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB-
97 PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB-
98 AXIS BANK BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB-
99 ICICI BANK BB+ BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB-
100 ISRAEL BANK HAPOALIM A- A- A- BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ A- A- A- A- A-
101 BANK LEUMI LE ISRAEL A- A- A- BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ A- A- A- A- A-
102 ITALY BANCO DI DESIO BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ A- A- A- A- A A A A A- BBB+
103 INTESA SANPAOLO A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- A A-
104 UNICREDIT AA- AA- AA- AA- A+ A+ A+ A+ A A A- A-
105 BANK CARIGE A A AA AA- A A A A A A A BBB BB+
106 CREDITO EMILIANO A A A A A A A A A A A BBB+ BBB+
107 BREDITO BERGAMASCO A A A A A A- A- BBB+ BBB
108 BANCA MONTE DEI PASHI DE SIENA A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A A A- BBB+ BBB
109 JAMAICA NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANK B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B CCC B- B- B-
110 JAPAN SHIZUOKA A- A- A- A A A+ A+ A+ A+ A A
111 SURUGA BANK BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ A- A- A- A- A-
112 MIZUHO FIN GROUP A A A A A A A+ A+ A A A A-
113 SUMITOMO MITSUI FIN GROUP A A A A A+ A+ A A A A-
114 NOMURA HOLDING INC BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB BBB BBB BBB
115 DAIWA GROUP BBB+ BBB+ BBB BBB BBB BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+
116 JORDAN ARAB BANK BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ A- A- A- A- A- A- A-
117 BANK OF JORDAN BB- BB- BB- BB- BB- BB- BB- BB-
118 KAZAKHSTAN KAZKOMMERTSBANK B+ B+ BB- BB BB BB+ BB+ BB+ BB B- B- B- B
119 BANK CENTERCREDIT B B B- B+ B+ BB- BB- BB- BB- B+ B B B
120 BTA BANK B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ BB BB+ BB+ BB+ CCC B- C C 
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121 KUWAIT GULF BANK KSC BBB+ BBB+ A- A- A- A- A A A+ A+ A+ A+ A+
122 NATIONAL BANK OF KUWAIT A- A A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ AA- AA- AA- AA- AA-
123 AHLI UNITED BANK BBB+ BBB+ A- A- A- A- A- A- A-
124 AL AHLI BANK OF KUWAIT BBB+ BBB+ A- A- A- A- A- A- A-
125 COMMERCIAL BANK OF KUWAIT BBB+ BBB+ A- A- A- A- A A A+ A+ A+ A+ A+
126 LEBANON BYBLOS BANK BB- B+ B- B- B- B- B- B- B- B B B
127 BANK AUDI SAL BB- B+ B- B- B- B- B- B- B- B- B B B
128 MALAYSIA HONG LEONG BANK BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+
129 MALAYAN BANKING BERHAN BBB- BBB- BBB+ BBB+ A- A- A- A- A- A- A- A- A-
130 MEXICO GRUPO FINANCIERO BANORTE BBB- BBB- BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB
131 BANNCO NACIONAL DE MEXICO BB+ BB+ BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB+ A- A A A- A- A- A-
132 MOROCCO ATTIJARIWAFA BANK BB BB BB BB BB BB BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+
133 NETHERLANDS ING GROEP NV AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- A A A A
134 NIGER BANK OF AFRICA B- B- B- B- B- B B B B B
135 NIGERIA GUARANTY TRUST BANK B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B+
136 ACCESS BANK B- B- B- B- B- B- B- B B B- B
137 UNITED BANK FOR AFRICA B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B+
138 UNION BANK OF NIGERIA B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B- B- B+
139 DIAMOND BANK B B B B B B B B B B
140 ZENITH BANK BB- BB- BB B+ B+ B+ B+ B B+ B B+
141 FIDELITY BANK B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B B+ B B+
142 OMAN BANK SOHAR BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB- BBB BBB+ BBB+ BBB+
143 BANK MUSCAT SAOG BBB- BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB A- A- A- A- A- A- A
144 BANK DHOFAR BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+
145 NATIONAL BANK OF OMAN BBB- BBB- BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB
146 PERU BANCO INTERNATIONAL DEL PERU BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB BBB-
147 SCOTIABANK B+ BB- BB- BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB+ BBB+
148 BANCO CONTINENTAL BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB BBB BBB BBB+ BBB+
149 BANCO DE CREDITO DEL PERU BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB BBB BBB BBB-
150 PHILIPPINES CHINA BANKING CORP BB BB BB BB BB BB BB BB BB BB BB
151 RIZAL COMM BANK BB- BB- BB- BB- BB- BB- BB- BB- BB- BB-
152 BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLAND BB- BB- BB BB BB BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB BB+ BB+
153  UNION BANK OF PHILIPPINES BB- BB- BB- BB BB BB+ BB+ BB+ BB- BB BB- BB-
154 SECURITY BANK CORP BB BB BB BB BB BB BB BB BB BB
155 BDO UNIBANK BB- BB- BB- BB BB BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB
156 METROPLITAN BANK & TRUST BB BB BB BB- BB- BB BB BB BB BB BB
157 POLAND BANK HANDLOWY BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ A- A- A- A A A A
158 BANK ZACHODNI WBK BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ A A A+ A+ A+ BBB+ BBB+ A+ BBB
159 BANK POLSKA KASA OPIEKI BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ A A A A A A- A- A- A-
160 ING BANK SLASKI BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ A A A+ AA- AA- A A A A
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161 BANK MILLENNIUM A A A A- BBB- BBB-
162 BANK OCHRONY SCRODOWISKA BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB
163 MBANK BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ A- A- A- A A A A
164 PORTUGAL BANCO COMERCIAL AA- AA- A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ BBB+ BB+ BB+
165 BANIF BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB- BB BB
166 BANCO BPI A A A A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A- BB+ BB+
167 QATAR AL KHALIJ COMMERCIAL BANK A A A- A- A- A- A- A- A- A-
168 COMMERCIAL BANK OF QATAR BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ A A A+ A A+ A A
169 AHLI BANK QSC BBB+ A- A A- A- A-
170 QATAR NATIONAL BANK BBB BBB+ A- A- A- A- A A+ AA- A+ A+ A A+
171 DOHA BANK A A A A A A A A A+ A A
172 ROMANIA TRANSILVANIA BANK BB- BB- BB- BB- BB- BB- BB- BB-
173 BRD B- B BB- BB BBB- BBB- A- A- BBB BBB BBB BBB+ BBB+
174 RUSSIA URALS TRANSP. JOINT-STOCK BANK B- B- B- B- B- B- B B- B B-
175 SDM BANK B- B- B- B- B- B- B- B- B B B
176 JSC ROSBANK B- B- B- B B B+ BB- A- BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+
177 BANK URALSIB B B B B B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ BB- BB-
178 JOINT STOCK COMMERCIAL BANK BB+ BBB- BBB- BBB BBB BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB
179 BANK ZENIT B- B- B- B B B B+ B+ B+ B+ B+
180 PROBUSINESS BANK B- B- B- B- B- B- B- B- B- B- B- B- B-
181 JOINT-STOCK INVST COMM BANK CCC+ B- B B B B B+ B+ B+ B+ BB- BB BB
182 OPEN JOINT STOCK COMPANY B- B- B- B B B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B+
183 OJSC PROMSVYAZBANK CCC+ CCC+ B- B- B B B+ B+ B+ B+ BB- BB- BB-
184 AK BARS BANK B- B- B- B+ B+ BB- BB BB BB BB BB-
185 EL SALVADOR BANCO AGRICOLA BB+ BB+ BB+ BB BB BB BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BBB- BBB-
186 BANCO DAVIVIENDA BB+ BB BB BB BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BB+
187 SAUDI ARABIA SAUDI HOLLANDI BANK BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ A- A- A- A- A- A- A-
188 SAUDI INVESTMENT BANK A A A+ A A A- A- A- A- A- A-
189 SAMBA FINANCIAL GROUP BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ A- A- A A A A+ A+ A+ A+ A+
190 BANK AL-JAZIRA BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB+ BBB+ A- A- A- A- A-
191 BANQUE SAUDI FRANSI BBB+ BBB+ A- A- A A A A A A A A
192 RIYAB BANK BBB+ BBB+ A- A- A A A A+ A+ A+ A+ A+
193 ARAB NATIONAL BANK BBB BBB BBB+ BBB+ A- A- A A A A A A
194 SAUDI BRITISH BANK BBB+ BBB+ A- A- A A A A A A A A
195 SPAIN BANKIA BBB- BBB- BBB BBB+ BBB BBB AA- A- A- BBB
196 BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARGENTARIA AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- A+ BBB+
197 BANCO SANTANDER AA- AA- AA- A+ AA- AA- AA AA AA AA AA AA- BBB+
198 SINGAPORE OVERSEA-CHINESE BANKING CORP A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA-
199 UNITED OVERSEAS BANK A+ A+ A+ AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA-
200 SLOVENIA NOVA KREDITNA BANKA BBB BBB+ A- A- A- A- A- A- A- BBB+ BBB
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201 SOUTH AFRICA NEDBANK BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB+
202 INVESTEC BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB+ BBB+ BBB BBB BBB BBB
203 SWEDEN SKANDINAVISKA ENSKILDA BANKEN A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+
204 SVENSKA  HANDELSBANKEN AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA-
205 NORDEA BANK AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA-
206 SWITZERLAND EFG INTERNATIONAL A- A- A- A- A A A A A A
207 UBS AG AA AA AA AA+ AA+ AA+ AA A+ A+ A+ A+ A A
208 CREDIT SUISSE AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- A A
209 TAIWAN KING'S TOWN BANK BB BB BB- BB- BB BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BBB- BBB-
210 FAR EASTERN INTERNATIONAL BANK BBB+ BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB-
211 CHANG HWA COMMERCIAL BANK A+ BBB+ BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+
212 TAICHUNG COMMERCIAL BANK BBB+ BBB+ BBB BBB BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BB+ BB+ BB+
213 SINOPAC FINANCIAL HOLDINGS BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB- BBB- BBB
214 CTBC FINANCIAL BBB+ BBB+ A- A- A- A A A A A A
215 WATERLAND FINANCIAL BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB
216 JIH SUN FINANCIAL BB- BB- BB BB BB+ BB+ BB BB BB BB+ BB+
217 TAISHIN FINANCIAL BBB- BBB BBB BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB BBB BBB
218 THAILAND TMB BANK BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB-
219 BANK OF AYUDHYA B+ B+ B+ BB- BB BB+ BBB- BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB
220 SCB THAI BANK BBB BBB A- A- A- A- BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+
221 KRUNG THAI BANK BB+ BB+ BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB BBB BBB BBB
222 BANGKOK BANK BB+ BB+ BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+
223 SIAM COMMERCIAL BANK BB+ BB+ BBB- BBB- BBB BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+
224 CIMB THAI BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB BBB
225 TUNISIA ARAB TUNISIA BBB- BBB- BBB BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB BBB-
226 TURKEY DENIZBANK B B B+ BB- BB BB BB BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB-
227 TURKIYE VAKIFLAR BANKASI BB- B B- B B+ BB- BB- BB- BB- BB+ BB+ BB+ BBB-
228 TEKSTILBANK TEKSTIL BANKASI B- B B B B B B B+ B+ B+
229 TURK EKONOMI BANKASI BB- B B B B+ BB BB BB BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB
230 FINANSBANK BB- B B- B B+ BB- BB BB BB BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB-
231 ALTERNATIFBANK BB- B B- B- B- B+ B+ BB- BB- BB BB BB BB
232 TURKIYE GARANTI BANKASI BB- B B B B+ BB- BB BB BB BBB- BBB BBB BBB
233 AKBANK BB- BB- B B B+ BB- BB BB BB BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB
234 TURKIYE HALK BANKASI BB- B B B B+ BB- BB- BB- BB- BB+ BB+ BB+ BBB-
235 SEKERBANK B- B- B- B B B B+ BB- BB-
236 TURKIYA IS BANKASI BB- B B B B+ BB- BB BB BB BBB- BBB- BBB
237 YAPI VE KREDI BANKASI BB- B B- B B+ BB- BB BB BB BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB
238 UAE EMIRATE NBD PJSC A- A A A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+
239 UNION NATIONAL BANK A A- A- A- A- A- A A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+
240 MASHREQBANK A- A- A- A- A- A A + A+ A A A A
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241 FIRST GULF BANK BBB+ BBB+ A A+ A+ A+ A+ A+
242 NATIONAL BANK OF ABU DHABI A+ A A A A A A A+ AA- AA- AA- AA- AA-
243 COMMERCIAL BANK OF DUBAI A A- A- A- A- A- A A A A- A- A- A-
244 ABU DHABI COMMERCIAL BANK A- A A A A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+
245 BANK OF SHARJAH BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ A- A- A- BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+
246 NATIONAL BANL OF RAS AL-KHAIMOH BBB+ A- A- A- BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+
247 UKRAINE JOINT-STOCK COMMERCIAL BANK B- B- B B+ B- B B B
248 VTB BANK BB- BB- B+ B- B B B
249 PIVDENNYI JOINT STOCK CCC+ B- B- B- B- B- B- B-
250 PRAVEX BANK B- B+ B- B B B
251 BANK FORUM B- B- B+ B- B B CC 
252 UNITED KINGDOM HSBC HOLDING AA- AA- AA- AA- AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA-
253 ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND AA+ AA+ AA AA AA+ AA+ AA- AA- AA- A A
254 BARCLAYS PLC AA+ AA+ AA+ AA+ AA AA- AA- A A
255 SCROEDERS PLC A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+
256 STANDARD CHARTERED PLC A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ AA- AA- AA-
257 LLOYDS BANK AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA+ AA+ AA- AA- A A
258 UNITED STATES ALLY FINANCIAL INC A A- A- BBB+ BBB BB BB+ BB+ CCC B B BB BB-
259 AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY AA- A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+
260 AMERISERV FIN INC BB+ BB+ BBB B B+ B+ BB- BB BB BB BB BB BB
261 ASSOCIATED BANC-CORP A- A- A- A- A- A- A- A- BBB+ BB+ BBB- BBB- BBB-
262 ASTORIA FIN CORP BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB-
263 BANK OF AMERICA CORP AA- AA- AA- AA AA- AA- AA- AA A+ A+ A+ A A
264 BANK OF NEW YPRK MELLON CORP AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA-
265 BB&T CORP A A+ A+ A+ A+ AA- AA- AA- AA- A+ A+ A+ A+
266 BOK FIN CORP A- A- A- A- A- A- A- A- A- A- A- A- A
267 CAPITAL ONE FIN CORP BBB+ A- A- A- A- A- A-
268 CATHAY GENERAL BANCORP BB+ BBB- BBB- BBB- BB BB BB BB
269 CENTRAL PACIFIC FIN CORP BBB BBB BBB BBB CCC CC B+ BB-
270 CITIGROUP INC AA AA AA+ AA+ AA+ AA+ AA+ AA A+ A+ A+ A A
271 CITY NATIONAL CORP BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ A- A- A- A- A- A- A- A- A-
272 COMERICA INCORP A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A A A A
273 COMMUNITY BANK SYSTEM BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB
274 CULLEN/FROST BANKERS INC BBB+ BBB+ A- A- A- A- A- A- A- A- A A A
275 CVB FIN CORP BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB BBB BBB
276 DIME COMMUNITY BANCSHARES BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB
277 DORAL FIN CORP BBB BBB BBB BBB+ BBB BB- B+ CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC CCC
278 EAST WEST BANCORP BBB+ BBB+ BBB BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB BBB BBB BBB
279 FIFTH THIRD BANCORP AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- A A- A- A A-
280 FIRST BANCORP BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BB BB BB BB B- CC CCC B-
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281 FIRST COMMONWEALTH FIN CORP BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB-
282 FIRST HORIZON NATIONAL CORP A A A A A A A A BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB-
283 FIRST INTERSTATE BANCSYSTEM BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB-
284 FIRST MIDWEST BANCORP BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB BBB- BBB- BBB-
285 FIRST NATIONAL OF NEBRASKA BBB BBB BBB BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+
286 FIRST NIAGARA FIN CORP BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB-
287 FIRSTMERIT CORP A- A- A- A- A- A- A- A- A- A- A- A- BBB+
288 FULTON FIN CORP A- A- A A A A A A- A- A- A- A- A-
289 GFI BBB+ BBB+ BBB BBB BBB- BBB- BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB-
290 GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- A+ A+ A A
291 HANCOCK HOLDING COMPANY BBB BBB+ BBB+ BBB BBB BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+ BBB+
292 HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES A A A A A A A A- A- BBB BBB+ BBB+ BBB+
293 INDEPENDENT BANK CORP BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+ BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB- BBB BBB
294 JPMORGAN CHASE & CO AA- AA- A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- A+
295 KEYCORP A+ A A A A A A A A A- A- A- A-
296 KKR FIN HOLDING BBB+ BBB BBB BBB- BBB- BBB BBB BBB BBB
297 M&T BANK CORP A A A A- A- A- A- A- A- A- A- A- A-
298 METLIFE INC AA- AA A A A A+ A+ A+ A+ A A A
299 MORGAN STANLEY AA AA AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- A A A A A
300 NEW YORK COMMUNITY BANCORP BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB+
301 NORTHERN TRUST CORP AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA-
302 OCWEN FIN CORP B B B B B B B B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B
303 PEOPLE'S UNITED FINANCIAL BBB+ BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB+ A- A- A- A-
304 PNC FIN SERV GROUP A+ A+ A A A A A A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+
305 POPULAR INC A A A A A A A A- A- B B B+ B+
306 PRUDENTIAL FIN INC A A A A A A+ A+ A BBB+ A- A- A-
307 REGIONS FIN CORP A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ BBB+ BBB- BBB- BBB-
308 STATE STREET COPR AA AA AA AA AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- A+ A+ A+ A+
309 SUNTRUST BANK AA- AA- AA- AA- A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A- BBB+ BBB+ BBB+
310 SYNOVUS FIN CORP A A A A A A A A A- BB- BB- BB- BB-
311 TCF FIN CORP A- A- A- A- A- A- A- A- A- A- A- A- BBB
312 TRUSTMARK CORP A- A- A- A- A- A- A- A- A- A- A- A- A-
313 UMB FIN CORP A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+ A+
314 US BANCORP A+ A+ A+ A+ AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA- AA-
315 WEBSTER FIN CORP BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB BBB
316 WELLS FARGO & CO AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA AA- AA- AA- AA-
317 ZION BANCORP A- A- A- A- A- A- A- A- A- BBB BBB- BBB- BBB-
318 UZBEKISTAN OPEN JOINT STOCK COMMERCIAL BANK B B- B- B- B- B B B- B-
319 VENEZUELA BANCO EXTERIOR B+ BB- B B- B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B+
320 BANCO PROVINCIAL BB- B B- B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B+
321 BANCO DEL CARIBE BB- B B- B+ B+ B+ B B B B B B
322 BANCO OCCIDENTAL DEL DESCUENTO B+ B+ B CCC+ B- B- B- B- B- B- B- B- B-
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APPENDIX C: RATING GRADING SCHEDULE 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________
___ 
Fine Grading      Coarse Grading 
__________________________________________________________________________________
______ 
AAA   9    AAA    
AA+       AA+    
AA   8    AA   3 
AA-   7    AA- 
A+   6    A+   
A   5    A   2 
A-   4    A- 
BBB+   3    BBB+    
BBB   2    BBB   1 
BBB-   1    BBB- 
BB+       BB+ 
BB       BB 
BB-       BB- 
B+       B+ 
B       B 
B-       B- 
CCC+   0    CCC+   0 
CCC       CCC 
CCC-       CCC- 
CC       CC 
C       C 
D       D 
__________________________________________________________________________________
______ 
Note: Fine and coarse grading of the numerical ratings. Rating structure is based on the Fitch’s rating 
letters. The BBB- is the investment-grade threshold rating category 
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APPENDIX D: RESULTS OF THE BANK CREDIT RATING DETRMINANTS MODELS EMPLOYING COARSE RATING 
Table D.1. Contemporaneous rating determinants model results (coarse grading) 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel A Parameter estimates 
    Hypothesised   Model X   Model XI   Model XII   
Independent variables         Sign  Coefficient  Z-stat  Coefficient Z-stat  Coefficient Z-stat 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Intercept       -6.6547  -3.69***  1.3145  21.22***             -6.2514  -3.25*** 
TIER1    + (H1)    0.0654  5.24***            -         -   0.1021   5.84***  
LLR/GL    − (H2)   -0.0426  -2.24**            -         -  -0.0724  -3.55*** 
ROA    + (H3)    0.0988   2.98**          -         -   0.0996   2.65** 
LTA    − (H4)   -0.0251  -3.21***            -         -  -0.0102  -4.54*** 
INTER       + (H4)    0.0544   3.10***            -         -   0.0681   3.74*** 
BETA    − (H5)                -0.0252   2.22**            -         -  -0.0106   1.78* 
IDIO    − (H6)   -0.0109  -1.62*            -         -  -0.0116  -1.79* 
In(Z-Score)   + (H7)    0.0621   2.98***            -         -   0.0633   2.44** 
LR    − (H8)   -0.0658  -3.06***           -     -  -0.0269  -3.39*** 
CRK    − (H9)   -0.0194  -7.51***            -  -  -0.0208  -6.31***  
CI    − (H10)   -0.0051  -0.76            -          -  -0.0984   2.35*** 
InTA    + (H11)    0.6847  10.25***       0.7392  11.62*** 
TBTF    + (H12)             -        -   0.0401  3.25***   0.0425   4.69*** 
OWN    + (H13)             -        -   0.0124   1.67*   0.0135   1.79*  
INST    + (H14)             -        -   0.0103   1.39*   0.0124   1.85* 
INDD    + (H15)             -        -   0.0014   0.89   0.0102   0.69 
SOVAA    + (H16)             -        -   0.0215   6.98***   0.0456   7.21*** 
SOVA    + (H16)             -        -   0.0621   5.85***   0.0695   6.66*** 
SOVBBB   + (H16)             -        -   0.0051   2.65***   0.0107   3.58*** 
YEARD    − (H17)             -        -  -0.0125   0.21  -0.0251  -0.68 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________  
Panel B: Selected model statistics 
Log-likelihood       -1,324.214   -1,565.695   -1,258.214   
Restr.log-lik.       -1,954.115   -1,987.254   -1,725.369 
No. of obs.       3,682    3,682    3,682 
χ2 statistic       672.687***   635.1251***   765.584*** 
Pseudo- R2ϛ       38.25%    37.18%    43.09% 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Notes: The dependent variable of all ordered probit models is the categorical variable CR (fine ratings). The independent variables are defined in Appendix A. All significance levels are 
determined using the two-tailed Z-test. ***, **,* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Ϛ This measure of goodness-of-fit is a simple computational statistic [pseudo −
𝑅2 =
χ2
χ2+N
] proposed by Aldrich and Nelson (1984). The upper boundary represents the threshold for each of the rating categories; in this model the categories represent the fine ratings. 
The SOV (dummies) captures any country related variables as this measure the sovereign ratings of the countries. 
 
Table D.2. Marginal effects of Model XII (full specification) 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Rating Category 
   _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variables  Below BB+                  BBB                   A              AA, AAA 
TIER1           -0.04*    -0.13*     0.06*    0.12* 
LLR/GL            0.01**     0.05*                 -0.06*                -0.04* 
ROA           -0.02*    -0.01*        0.05*    0.03* 
LTA            0.03*     0.01                 -0.02*                -0.08** 
INTER           -0.01    -0.02*      0.06*    0.05* 
BETA            0.00     0.03*                  -0.06*                -0.06* 
IDIO            0.00    -0.01*                             0.03*    0.01* 
In(Z-Score)          -0.06**                 -0.03*                           0.08*               0.10**  
LR            0.02*    -0.01*                 -0.03*                -0.02*  
CRK            0.08*    -0.04*                 -0.02*                -0.08* 
CI            0.07*     0.05                 -0.02*                -0.10*  
InTA           -0.12*     0.17*               0.10*    0.21*   
TBTF           -0.06*                  0.05                            0.02**    0.07*  
OWN           -0.02*    0.01*                           0.01*                 0.06* 
INST           -0.04*    -0.01*                0.04    0.06*   
INDD           -0.02     0.00      0.03    0.02  
SOVAA           -0.08*    -0.03      0.12    0.15**  
SOVA           -0.05*    -0.06*                0.11    0.10*  
SOVBBB
 
         -0.02*    -0.01*     0.06*    0.03  
YEARD            0.00    -0.02*     0.00    0.00  
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table D.3. Contemporaneous rating determinants specification (coarse rating): Prediction Evaluation (Model XII) 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Estimated Equation (2000-2008):  
Year: 2009__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel A:  
Dependent Variable Dependent Actual  Predicted Forecast Absolute  Absolute (%)  Squared Error 
____________________________ Value__________Obs.__________Obs.__________Error__________Deviation______of Error_______________________________  
BB+ and below  0   95  89    6    6    6.31    36 
 BBB   1   89  66  23  23  25.84  529 
 A   2              106  81  25  25  23.58 625    
 AA and above  3  32    22  10  10  31.25  196 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________                          
   Total               322               258       
Mean Absolute Percentage Error: 21.75% 
Root-Mean-Squared-Error: 18.61 
Total percentage predicted: 80.12% 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Year: 2010__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel B:  
Dependent Variable Dependent Actual  Predicted Forecast Absolute  Absolute (%)  Squared Error 
____________________________ Value__________Obs.__________Obs.__________Error__________Deviation______of Error_______________________________  
BB+ and below  0  90  88    2    2    2.22         4 
 BBB   1  95  62               33  33  34.73  1,089 
 A   2             103   80  23  23  22.33      529 
 AA and above  3               34    18  16  16  47.06     256 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________                          
   Total              322               248       
Mean Absolute Percentage Error: 26.85% 
Root-Mean-Squared-Error: 21.66 
Total percentage predicted: 77.02% 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Year: 2011________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel C:  
Dependent Variable Dependent Actual  Predicted Forecast Absolute  Absolute (%)  Squared Error 
____________________________ Value__________Obs.__________Obs.__________Error__________Deviation______of Error_______________________________  
BB+ and below  0    92  84    8    8    8.69       64 
 BBB   1               104  66  38  38  36.54  1,444 
 A   2               102  71  31  31  30.39     961 
 AA and above  3    24    16    8    8  33.33       64 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________                          
   Total    322             237       
 
Mean Absolute Percentage Error: 27.24% 
Root-Mean-Squared-Error: 25.16 
Total percentage predicted: 73.60% 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Year: 2012 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel D:  
Dependent Variable Dependent Actual  Predicted Forecast Absolute  Absolute (%)  Squared Error 
____________________________ Value__________Obs.__________Obs.__________Error__________Deviation______of Error_______________________________  
BB+ and below  0    89  77  12  12  13.48     144 
 BBB   1  114  75  39  39  34.21  1,521 
 A   2    98  62  36  36  36.73  1,296 
 AA and above  3    21    11  10  10  47.61     100  
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________                          
   Total    322               225       
Mean Absolute Percentage Error: 33.01% 
Root-Mean-Square-Error: 27.66 
Total percentage predicted: 69.88% 
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___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel E:  
Year  Mean Absolute Percentage Error   Root-Mean-Squared-Error   Total percentage predicted 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 2009   21.75%     18.61     80.12%  
 2010   26.85%     21.66     77.02% 
 2011   27.24%     25.16     73.60% 
 2012   33.01%     27.66     69.88% 
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Table D.4.Predictive rating determinants model results (coarse grading) 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel A Parameter estimates 
    Hypothesised   Model XIII   Model XIV   Model XV   
Independent variables         Sign  Coefficient  Z-stat  Coefficient Z-stat  Coefficient Z-stat 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Intercept      -6.6547  -3.98*** 1.5471  21.22***             -6.3254  -3.65*** 
TIER1    + (H1)    0.0547   6.21***            -         -   0.1257   6.01***  
LLR/GL    − (H2)   -0.0624  -2.87***           -         -  -0.0855  -3.28*** 
ROA    + (H3)    0.0885   3.02**          -         -   0.0752   3.54*** 
LTA    − (H4)   -0.0128  -2.99***           -         -  -0.0166  -3.65*** 
INTER       + (H4)    0.0668   2.21**            -         -   0.0724   2.86*** 
BETA    − (H5)                -0.0325  -2.20**            -         -  -0.0293  -2.77** 
IDIO    − (H6)   -0.0221  -2.78***           -         -  -0.0339  -2.88*** 
In(Z-Score)   + (H7)    0.0557   2.65***            -         -   0.0752   2.99*** 
LR    − (H8)   -0.0854  -3.25***          -     -  -0.0656  -3.21*** 
CRK    − (H9)   -0.0322  -6.33***           -  -  -0.0395  -4.22*** 
CI    − (H10)   -0.0412  -1.78*            -          -  -0.0458  -2.23** 
InTA    + (H11)    0.7845   9.74***        0.8835  10.33*** 
TBTF    + (H12)             -        -   0.0528   3.29***   0.0657   4.12*** 
OWN    − (H13)             -        -  -0.0265  -1.08  -0.0354  -1.66*  
INST    + (H14)             -        -   0.0133   1.48*   0.0265   1.82* 
INDD    + (H15)             -        -   0.0106   1.83*   0.0222   0.89 
SOVAA    + (H16)             -        -   0.0365   6.59***   0.0426   6.65*** 
SOVA    + (H16)             -        -   0.0695   6.01***   0.0894   6.22*** 
SOVBBB   + (H16)             -        -   0.0111   4.21***   0.0131   4.36*** 
YEARD    − (H17)             -        -  -0.0195   0.88  -0.0308  -1.05 
Panel B: Selected model statistics 
Log-likelihood       -1,402.226   -1,651.014   -1,330.517   
Restr.log-lik.       -1,822.165   -1,999.059   -1,524.630 
No. of obs.       3,402    3,402    3,402 
χ2 statistic       695.221***   666.265***   758.667*** 
Pseudo- R
2ϛ       40.55%    42.69%    47.02% 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Notes: The dependent variable of all ordered probit models is the categorical variable CR (coarse ratings). The independent variables are defined in Appendix A. All significance levels are 
determined using the two-tailed Z-test. ***, **,* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. ϚThis measure of goodness-of-fit is a simple computational statistic [pseudo −
𝑅2 =
χ2
χ2+N
] proposed by Aldrich and Nelson (1984). The upper boundary represents the threshold for each of the rating categories; in this model the categories represent the coarse ratings. 
The SOV (dummies) captures any country related variables as this measure the sovereign ratings of the countries.  
 
 
Table D.5. Marginal effects of Model XV (full specification) 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Rating Category 
   _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variables  Below BB+                  BBB                   A              AA, AAA 
TIER1           -0.06*    -0.10*     0.04*    0.18* 
LLR/GL            0.10**     0.13*                 -0.05*                -0.15* 
ROA           -0.03*    -0.04*        0.02*    0.07* 
LTA            0.08*     0.03                 -0.06*                -0.10* 
INTER           -0.03    -0.04*      0.07*    0.09* 
BETA            0.01     0.03*                  -0.02*                -0.05* 
IDIO            0.01     0.02*                            -0.02*                -0.05* 
In(Z-Score)          -0.03**                 -0.04*                           0.01*               0.07*  
LR            0.02*     0.02*                 -0.01*                -0.03* 
CRK           -0.02*    -0.04*     0.03*    0.07* 
CI            0.06*    -0.03*                 -0.03*                -0.10* 
InTA           -0.09*    -0.03*               0.05*    0.07*   
TBTF           -0.07*                 -0.02*                            0.03**    0.09*  
OWN            0.01*     0.01*                          -0.02*                -0.03* 
INST           -0.04*    -0.01*               0.04    0.06*   
INDD           -0.02     0.00     0.03    0.01  
SOVAA           -0.06*    -0.01     0.02    0.05*  
SOVA           -0.04*    -0.03*                0.03    0.06*  
SOVBBB
 
         -0.03*    -0.04*     0.02*    0.05*  
YEARD            0.00     0.00     0.00    0.00  
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________  
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Table D.6. Predictive rating determinants model specification (coarse rating): Prediction Evaluation (Model XV) 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Estimated Equation (2001-2009):  
Year: 2009__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel A:  
Dependent Variable Dependent Actual  Predicted Forecast Absolute  Absolute (%)  Squared Error 
____________________________ Value__________Obs.__________Obs.__________Error__________Deviation______of Error_______________________________  
BB+ and below  0   95  83  12  12  12.63  144 
 BBB   1   89  78  11  11  12.36  121 
 A   2              106  80  26  26  24.53 676    
 AA and above  3  32    25   7    7  21.87    49 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________                          
   Total               322               266       
Mean Absolute Percentage Error: 17.85% 
Root-Mean-Squared-Error: 15.73 
Total percentage predicted: 82.61% 
 
Year: 2010_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel B:  
Dependent Variable Dependent Actual  Predicted Forecast Absolute  Absolute (%)  Squared Error 
____________________________ Value__________Obs.__________Obs.__________Error__________Deviation______of Error_______________________________  
BB+ and below  0  90  82               12  12  13.33   144 
 BBB   1  95  70               25  25  26.31   625    
 A   2             103   85  18  18  17.48    324 
 AA and above  3               34    19  15  15  44.12   225 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________                          
   Total              322               256       
Mean Absolute Percentage Error: 25.31% 
Root-Mean-Squared-Error: 18.15 
Total percentage predicted: 79.50% 
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Year: 2011________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel C:  
Dependent Variable Dependent Actual  Predicted Forecast Absolute  Absolute (%)  Squared Error 
____________________________ Value__________Obs.__________Obs.__________Error__________Deviation______of Error_______________________________  
BB+ and below  0    92  80  12  12  13.04     144 
 BBB   1               104  61  43  43  41.35  1,849 
 A   2               102  70  32  32  31.37  1,024 
 AA and above  3    24    18    6    6  25.00       36 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________                          
   Total    322             229       
Mean Absolute Percentage Error: 27.69% 
Root-Mean-Squared-Error: 27.63 
Total percentage predicted: 71.12% 
 
Year: 2012_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel D:  
Dependent Variable Dependent Actual  Predicted Forecast Absolute  Absolute (%)  Squared Error 
____________________________ Value__________Obs.__________Obs.__________Error__________Deviation______of Error_______________________________  
BB+ and below  0    89  70  19  19  21.35     361 
 BBB   1  114  73  41  41  35.96  1,681 
 A   2    98  60  38  38  38.76  1,444 
 AA and above  3    21    13    8    8  38.09       64  
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________                          
   Total    322               216       
Mean Absolute Percentage Error: 33.54% 
Root-Mean-Square-Error: 29.79 
Total percentage predicted: 67.08% 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel E:  
Year  Mean Absolute Percentage Error   Root-Mean-Squared-Error   Total percentage predicted 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 2009   17.85%     15.73     82.61%  
 2010   25.31%     18.15     79.50% 
 2011   27.69%     27.63     71.12% 
 2012   33.54%     9.79     67.08% 
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Table D.7: Lagged rating determinants model specification results (coarse grading) 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel A Parameter estimates 
    Hypothesised   Model XVI   Model XVII   Model XVIII   
Independent variables         Sign  Coefficient  Z-stat  Coefficient Z-stat  Coefficient Z-stat 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Intercept                 -10.1254  -6.29*** 1.6251    10.51***         -12.5147  -9.54*** 
TIER1    + (H1)    0.0794   6.55***            -            -   0.1547   6.99***  
LLR/GL    − (H2)                -0.0435  -3.11**            -            -  -0.0821  -3.98*** 
ROA    + (H3)    0.1021   2.21**            -            -   0.0992   2.25** 
LTA    − (H4)                -0.0298  -2.32**            -            -  -0.0314               -5.02*** 
INTER    + (H4)    0.0166   2.14**            -            -   0.0782   3.21*** 
BETA    − (H5)                -0.0264  -3.08***           -            -  -0.0287  -4.21** 
IDIO    − (H6)                -0.0214               -1.69*            -            -  -0.0325               -1.54* 
ln(Z-Score)   + (H7)    0.0854   3.85***            -            -   0.0754   4.51*** 
LR    − (H8)                -0.0785  -1.08*            -              -  -0.0984  -1.12* 
CRK    − (H9)               - 0.0325  -7.95***           -            -  -0.0384  -8.24*** 
CI    − (H10)                -0.0109  -1.74*            -             -  -0.0214  -3.54*** 
lnTA    + (H11)    0.7951               11.34***       0.8412               12.14*** 
TBTF    + (H12)             -        -   0.1005   4.35***    0.1251   4.62*** 
OWN    + (H13)             -        -                0.0154   2.22**  -0.0254   2.12**  
INST    + (H14)             -        -   0.0063   1.42*    0.0107    2.22** 
INDD    + (H15)             -        -   0.0061   1.79*    0.0111   2.34** 
SOVAA    + (H16)             -        -   0.0841   7.02***    0.0865   8.45*** 
SOVA    + (H16)             -        -   0.0621   5.69***    0.0745   7.21*** 
SOVBBB   + (H16)             -        -   0.0103   2.99***    0.0225   4.68*** 
YEARD    − (H17)             -        -               -0.0149   1.69   -0.0285               -1.88* 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel B: Selected model statistics 
Log-likelihood       -1,441.215   -1,651.168   -1,524.654   
Restr.log-lik.       -2,514.515   -2641.226   -2,325.159 
No. of obs.       3,682    3,682    3,682 
χ2 statistic       824.547***   785.214**   882.214** 
Pseudo- R
2ϛ       30.84%    31.22%    32.18% 
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______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: The dependent variable of all ordered probit models is the categorical variable CR (fine ratings). All significance levels are determined using the two-tailed Z-test. ***, **,* denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Ϛ This measure of goodness-of-fit is a simple computational statistic [pseudo − 𝑅2 =
χ2
χ2+N
] proposed by Aldrich and Nelson (1984). The 
upper boundary represents the threshold for each of the rating categories; in this model the categories represent the fine ratings. The SOV (dummies) captures any country related variables 
as this measure the sovereign ratings of the countries. 
 
 
Table D.8: Marginal effects of Model XVIII (full specification) 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Rating Category 
   _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variables  Below BB+                  BBB                    A              AA, AAA 
TIER1           -0.02*    -0.10*     0.04*    0.10* 
LLR/GL            0.03**     0.06*                 -0.05*                -0.05* 
ROA           -0.03*    -0.02*     0.03*    0.02* 
LTA            0.02     0.02                 -0.03*    0.01 
INTER           -0.02    -0.01*     0.05*    0.04* 
BETA            0.01     0.02*                  -0.07                -0.08 
IDIO            0.00                 -0.00                              0.00    0.00  
ln(Z-Score)          -0.05**                 -0.01*               0.07*               0.11**  
LR           -0.03*                 -0.03*                    0.02*    0.03*  
CRK           -0.07*    -0.03*      0.01*    0.06* 
CI            0.02*    -0.01*                -0.02*                -0.05*  
InTA           -0.06*    -0.12*                0.11*    0.13*   
TBTF           -0.03*                 -0.02*                0.03**    0.07*  
OWN            0.04*     0.02*              -0.02*                -0.05* 
INST           -0.03*    -0.06*                0.01    0.06*   
INDD           -0.02     0.01      0.02    0.05  
SOVAA           -0.06*    -0.02      0.13    0.13**   
SOVA           -0.06*    -0.05*                  0.10    0.12*  
SOVBBB
 
         -0.01*    -0.07*      0.07*    0.05* 
YEARD            0.01    -0.01      0.01    0.01  
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table D.9: Lagged rating determinants model specification (coarse rating): Prediction Evaluation (Model XVIII) 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
   Estimated Equation (2000-2008): 
Panel A  Year: 2009  
Dependent Variable Dependent Actual  Predicted Forecast Absolute  Absolute (%)  Squared Error 
____________________________ Value__________Obs.__________Obs.__________Error__________Deviation______of Error_______________________________ 
 BB+ and below  0   95  85  10  10  10.53  100 
 BBB   1   89  71  18  18  20.22  324 
 A   2              106  88  18  18  16.98 324    
 AA and above  3  32    29    3    3    9.37      9 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________                          
    Total              322               273       
Mean Absolute Percentage Error: 15.02% Root-Mean-Squared-Error Magnitude: 13.76 Total percentages predicted: 84.78% 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel B  Year: 2010  
Dependent Variable Dependent Actual  Predicted Forecast Absolute  Absolute (%)  Squared Error 
____________________________ Value__________Obs.__________Obs.__________Error__________Deviation______of Error_______________________________ 
 BB+ and below  0  90  79  29  29  32.22     841 
 BBB   1  95  70               25  25  26.31     625 
 A   2             103   75  28  28  27.18      784 
 AA and above  3               34    25    9    9  26.47       81 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________                          
    Total            322               249       
Mean Absolute Percentage Error: 28.04% Root-Mean-Squared-Error Magnitude: 24.14 Total percentage predicted: 77.33% 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel C  Year: 2011 
 Dependent Variable Dependent Actual  Predicted Forecast Absolute  Absolute (%)  Squared Error 
____________________________ Value__________Obs.__________Obs.__________Error__________Deviation______of Error_______________________________  
BB+ and below  0    92  85    7    7    7.61       49 
 BBB   1               104  68  36  36  34.61  1296 
 A   2               102  65  37  37  36.27   1369 
 AA and above  3    24    15    9    9  37.50       81 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________                          
   Total    322             233       
Mean Absolute Percentage Error: 28.99% Root-Mean-Squared-Error Magnitude: 26.41 Total percentages predicted: 72.36% 
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___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel D  Year: 2012  
Dependent Variable Dependent Actual  Predicted Forecast Absolute  Absolute (%)  Squared Error 
____________________________ Value__________Obs.__________Obs.__________Error__________Deviation______of Error_______________________________  
BB+ and below  0    89  69  20  20  22.47     400 
 BBB   1  114  72  42  42  36.84  1,764 
 A   2    98  59  39  39  39.79  1,521 
 AA and above  3    21    14    7    7  33.33       49  
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________                          
   Total    322               214       
Mean Absolute Percentage Error: 33.10% Root-Mean-Square-Error Magnitude: 30.55 Total percentages predicted: 66.46% 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel E:  
Year  Mean Absolute Percentage Error   Root-Mean-Squared-Error   Total percentage predicted 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 2009   15.02%     13.76     84.78% 
 2010   28.04%     24.14     77.33% 
 2011   28.99%     26.41     72.36% 
 2012   33.10%     30.55     66.46% 
 
 
